《The Russian Civil War》苏俄内战 #2汉化

《The Russian Civil War》汉化 #2

《苏俄内战》 汉化 #第二部分

By Evan Mawdsley 

译者：KoiSama

Bolsheviks and Soviets

布尔什维克和苏维埃

The Bolshevik victory in the winter of 1917-1918 was neither a con-spiracy nor an accident.The hopes and fears of the mass of the Russian people were involved in it,and these hopes and fears were to some extent measurable through a unique national test of political attitudes, held at the decisive moment:the November 1917 elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

布尔什维克在1917-1918年冬季的胜利既不是阴谋，也不是偶然。俄罗斯广大人民的一切希望和怀疑都牵涉到了那场风暴中，而这些希望和恐惧在某种程度上可以决定一切，最后通过1917年11月进行的全国性质的意识形态测试即——全俄罗斯立宪会议表现出来人民对当前政治的态度。

The overall voting in the Assembly elections showed,above all, peasant opinion;over two-thirds of the electorate were peasants.What was striking about these overall returns was the strength of the socialist vote.Some 40 percent of the total vote went to the main peasant socialist party(the SRs)and 27 percent to Marxists(nearly all Bolsheviks); popular ethnic-minority parties,often with a socialist element,took another 15 percent.In contrast to other countries,there was no strong non-socialist farmers'party.So about four voters out of five chose parties calling for radical land reform;this in turn reflected a basic fact of Russian politics-the peasant desire for land reform a the expense of the landowning nobility.

这场议会选举十分需要俄罗斯农民的态度;因为有三分之二以上的选民是农民。投票结果中最令人惊讶的是选票投给社会主义者的票数。大约有40%的选票投给了主要的农民社会党(SRs)， 27%的选票投给了马克思主义者(几乎都是布尔什维克);和还有一些受欢迎的少数民族政党，通常这些小政党带有一些社会主义元素，他们分走了另外15%的选票。与其他国家相比，俄罗斯没有一个强大的非社会主义性质的农民政党。可以看出，选举中有大约五分之四的选民选择了要求激进土地改革的政党;这反过来反映了俄罗斯政治的一个基本事实——农民普遍希望以牺牲拥有土地的贵族为代价来推行土地改革。

//译者注：从原文“社会主义”这个词你可以看出作者的定义，这也是一般西方意识形态学者和真马克思学者的区别，在作者眼中可能就不论是毕苏斯基又或者彼得留拉好歹过去都是社会民主党成员也有些平易近人的政策那自然就是”温和左翼”支持社会主义，但是在“激进左翼“眼中这不就是一群”Cos左但实质是代表小资产阶级利益的工贼吗？比孟什维克还孟什维克”

Relatively few of the Empire's population lived in towns,perhaps 26 million out of 160 million.The main non-socialist party,the Constitu- tional Democrats(Kadets),polled only 24 percent of the urban vote(in sixty-eight of the largest towns);the socialist vote was 61 percent. Socialism was a deeper red in the towns than in the electorate as a whole.The extreme Left,the Bolsheviks,won 36 percent of the votes,making them the largest party.In Petrograd the Bolsheviks took 45 percent,in Moscow 50 percent.The urban Bolshevik votes accounted for only about 1.4 million of the 40 million civitian votes cast,but because power was based on the towns they represented crucial nuggets of strength.The radical nature of the urban electorate had several causes.The mix in the factories of experienced workers and people fresh from the countryside was an explosive one.Trade unions had had little base in Russia and could not act as a channel for discontent.The war brought special hardships to the towns.The unemployment and food shortages of late 1917 created a mood of desperation and a desire for maximalist solutions."Workers'control" was demanded,and the workers'militia(Red Guard)gave the physical force to back up demands.

前俄罗斯帝国的城镇人口相对较少，1.6亿人口中约有2600万居民居住在城镇。在选举中主要的非社会主义政党——立宪民主党(Kadets)只获得了24%的城市选票(在68个城镇中间)，而其他各种社会主义政党则获得了61%的选票。社会主义的理念在城镇中比在全国范围中更受欢迎。其中极左翼的布尔什维克党赢得了36%的选票，这使其也成为了城市区域的第一大党。特别是在彼得格勒，投给布尔什维克的选票占了近45%，同时在莫斯科更是有近50%，但是布尔什维克全部的城市选票也只占4000万俄罗斯公民选票中的140万，不过国家权力建立在聚集的城镇之上，所以布尔什维克还是拥有至关重要的力量。我想城市选民的激进有以下原因：

第一，在每个工厂里有长期经验的工人和刚从农村来的人的混合带来了爆炸性的冲突。同时在过去俄罗斯几乎没有工会基础，所以每个人都没有发泄不满的渠道，导致了政治压力的激增。

//译者注：这也是“经济派”的悲伤，“开明者”想通过放出小利防止革命的手段被更反动的人物给回绝了，而俄罗斯工人在经济上的述求被转变成政治上的诉求和这有很大关系

第二，战争给城镇带来了特殊的苦难。1917年底的大规模失业和食物短缺造成了一种绝望的情绪，人们渴望用最大限度的变化来解决办法，于是提出了“工人掌握国家”，同时他们有工人武装来提供改变的后盾。

The vast Russian armed forces were the third element of mass up- heaval.The army did not drain away to nothing under the Provisional Government.A census of 25 October 1917 put the current strength of the field army at 6,300,000,with a further 750,000 men in rear military districts(the navy would add another 750,000).1Soldati-NCOs and ordinary soldiers-made up 85 percent,say six million.As a group they were much larger than the middle class and twice the industrial working class.And this mass was a unique social force,thanks to the collapse of officer control and the growth of soldiers'committees.By the autumn of 1917 the soldiers'main wish was to end the war and go home.The Constituent Assembly elections show the soldiers(five million of them voted)to have overwhelmingly supported Russian socialist parties:82 percent voted for the SRs or the Bolsheviks.(The centrist Kadets took two percent,the nationalists one percent.)The SRs, with 41 percent of the total army vote,were the strongest party,but the Bolsheviks also took 41 percent in the army(compared to 24 percent in the population as a whole).And the Bolsheviks did even better among troops near the center of political power.In the Northern and Western Army Groups their vote was over 60 percent(and the SR vote under 30 percent),and they did extremely well in the crucial rear garrisons: 80 percent in Petrograd(12 percent for the SRs)and 80 percent in Moscow(six percent SR).

第三个因素是俄国庞大的武装力量。在临时政府统治下的俄罗斯军队并没有流失殆尽。1917年10月25日的一次人口普查显示，当下还有630万野战军，同时有75万人驻扎在后方军区(算上海军还要另增75万人)。军队中的军士和普通士兵占85%，大约有600万人。要知道这样一个群体的人数远超中产阶级，这还是工业区中工人阶级人数的近两倍。这群人最后变成一种独特的社会力量要归功于军官对士兵控制的瓦解以及军队内部士兵委员会的发展。在1917年的秋天，士兵们的主要愿望是赶紧结束战争回家。立宪会议选举的结果显示，士兵们(有近500万人参加了投票)压倒性地支持了俄罗斯的各大社会主义政党:有82%的人投票支持社会革命党或者布尔什维克。(而中间派的立宪民主党只占2%，其他的民族主义者甚至只占1%)在军队中获得41%选票的社会革命党是票数最多的政党，但布尔什维克党在军队中同样获得了41%的选票(相比之下，总票数中布尔什维克只占有24%的选票)。在更靠近政治权力中心的地带，军队投给布尔什维克的票要多一些，比如北方和西部集团军中，他们的选票超过了60%(社会革命党的选票低于30%)，同时在被布尔什维克影响的关键地区里部队票型非常好:彼得格勒的军队中布尔什维克有近80%的选票(社会革命党只有12%)，同时莫斯科也有80%(社会革命党6%)。

Public opinion,then,was predominantly socialist,but it did not follow that socialism would take Bolshevik form.The Bolshevik Party's success is sometimes explained by its organization and program.The leader of the Bolshevik wing of Russian Marxism was,of course,Vladimir llich Lenin,who had organized the break of the Bolshevik wing from the Russian Marxist party(the RSDRP).

当时的公众舆论基本都是社会主义倾向，但这并不意味着人们心中的社会主义形式都会采取布尔什维克的样本。布尔什维克党的成功可以用它强大有力的组织和纲领来解释。俄国马克思主义的布尔什维克派领袖当然是弗拉基米尔·伊里奇·列宁，他组织了布尔什维克与俄国社会民主工党的决裂。

//译者注：译者认为列宁当时在党内投票其实是占多数的，哪怕这个多数在当时并不是绝大多数而是差点没过半，所以我还是认为俄罗斯社会民主工党的分裂可以说他是推波助澜者，但不能说列宁就脱离了社工党，倒不如说是这是为了反对那些“经济派”。

For a decade and a half in exile he had been,if not the total master of the Bolshevik group,at least the single most important influence on doctrine and organization.Lenin called for the creation of a "vanguard party"in his What Is to Be Done? of 1902:"Give us an organization of revolutionaries and we will turn Russia upside down!The Bolsheviks entered 1917 with a core of dedicated,experienced,and radical activists,hardened by Tsarist repression,committed to a maximalist political and economic program, and completely hostile to any vestige of the old regime.The Bolsheviks were better organized than the other socialists.They had in Lenin a remarkable leader,whose political daring in 1917 exceeded that of his closest lieutenants and matched the radical activists.His insistence on an uprising just before the(October)Second Congress of Soviets allowed him to present the congress with power and to form a "Soviet"cabinet (Sovnarkom,the Council of People's Commissars)made up entirely of Bolsheviks.

列宁流亡在外有将近15年，即使他不是布尔什维克的唯一领导人，至少他也是对党理论和组织产生最重要影响的人。比如说列宁在1902年的《怎么办?》一书中就呼吁建立一个“先锋党”。他说:

给我们一个革命者的组织，我们将把俄国搞得天翻地覆!

进入1917年时，布尔什维克其核心就已经是一群有献身精神的、搞事经验丰富的、思想激进的积极分子，过去他们因沙皇的镇压而变得更加强硬，他们致力于最高纲领的政治和经济计划，他们对旧政权的任何残余都充满了敌意。布尔什维克比其他社会主义者更有组织性：列宁是一位杰出的领导人，他在1917年的政治胆略超过了他身边亲密的副手，与那些最激进的分子站在了一起。他坚持在第二届苏维埃代表大会召开前发动起义，这让他得以向代表大会授予权力，并组建了一个完全由布尔什维克组成的“苏维埃”内阁(即人民委员会)。

//译者注：《怎么办?》一书中虽然列宁提到了先锋队的概念，但是译者没有找到类似的表达，不过我估计列宁应该也是想过这样的事情，毕竟他太能打嘴仗了，如果在以前他真的说出过这样的话——那也很正常。

But Bolshevik strengths can easily be exaggerated.Lenin's party was no monolith;the myth of the tightly organized Bolshevik party has rightly been called a"cruel mockery."Membership did indeed swell to 300,000 in October 1917,but from a tiny base of no more than 24,000 in February 1917;this meant that eleven out of twelve Bolsheviks had only a few months'stazh (experience).Communications between the party center and its new branch membership were poor.The very seizure of power would deal a near mortal blow to the party"machine," as the attention of the most active members was turned to their new state,the soviet network.And party organizations were concentrated in a few radical regions,such as Petrograd,the Central Industrial Region (including Moscow),and the Urals;even here the party's reach did not extend beyond the boundaries of towns and industrial settlements. Bolshevik "voters"in the Assembly elections were 35 times party membership,some 10,661,000,but a total of 44,433,000 people voted. And the eight provinces where the party got more than 50 percent of the votes were restricted to a Red heartland in central and western Russia; here too were the military formations that gave more than half their votes to the party-two of the five army groups,and the Baltic Fleet.

但是他人总是很容易夸大布尔什维克的力量。实际上列宁的政党并不是铁板一块的，布尔什维克政党组织严密的神话其实多少有些 “残酷的嘲弄”：1917年10月布尔什维克的党员人数确实增加到30万人，但在1917年2月这个基数还不到2.4万人，这意味着在当时12个布尔什维克中有11个人其实只有几个月的党员经验。所以党中心和新支部成员之间的联系很弱。党里面的积极分子必须成为新国家——苏维埃通讯网络的一部分，所以当时其党组织通常只集中在少数几个激进地区，如彼得格勒、中央工业区(包括莫斯科)和乌拉尔地区;即使在这些地区，党的势力也没有超出城镇和工业区的边界。在议会选举中，布尔什维克的“选民”是其党员数的35倍，约10661000人，但全国总共有44433000人投票。红党获得50%以上选票的8个省份，全都位于俄罗斯中西部的红色腹地; 而五个陆军集团和波罗的海舰队中只有两个把一半以上的选票投给了布尔什维克，基本上站在了红党一边。

Neither the Bolshevik program in its pure form nor the Bolshevik leaders'assessments of the situation were a guarantee of victory or even of support across a wide social spectrum.The small working class was ready,it is true,to support the Bolsheviks;the vague Bolshevik solutions to the economic crisis-workers'control and the expropri- ation of the capitalists,state control of trade,and the replacement of the market with state-controlled barter-were popular enough in the factories.But the great majority of the Russian people were peasants,and the Bolsheviks were a town-based Marxist party.Until well into 1917 Bolshevik agrarian policy had called for turning the landowners' estates into large socialist farms,not simply,dividing them up among the peasants. In addition,the Leninist view of a peasantry split between rich and poor would prove unworkable in the years to follow.On the question of war,Lenin's goal was not simple pacifism but the trans- formation of World War into international civil war.All the Bolsheviks placed their faith in the myth of a European revolution that would save them in Russia.They believed,too,that if attacked by the"imperial- ists"they could defend themselves by means of "revolutionary war." The Bolsheviks' political tactics were also out of step;at a time when the country's mood still favored socialist cooperation,Lenin's dominant faction among the Bolshevik leaders refused to work with other socialists.And unlike most of the population,the Bolsheviks wrote off the Constituent Assembly as a parliamentary sham much inferior to the soviets. Finally,the Bolsheviks,with their stress on the class struggle, were opposed in principle to the idea of independence for the national minorities,who made up half the population.Many strands of Bolshevik policy,then,did not meet the hopes of war-weary,rural,multinational Russia-and much of the program was simply not viable.

无论是单纯的起义计划，还是布尔什维克领导人对形势的评估，都不是十月革命最终胜利的保证，甚至也不是布尔什维克获得广泛社会支持的基本保证。的确大部分工人阶级已经准备好支持布尔什维克;对付经济危机布尔什维克提出了一个模糊的解决方案——工人控制工厂和没收资本家财产，国家控制贸易，用国家控制的易货系统代替自由市场——这种方案在工厂里很受欢迎。绝大多数俄国人都是农民，同时布尔什维克是一个以城镇为基础的马克思主义政党。直到1917年前布尔什维克的农业政策都是要求把地主的地产变成大型的社会主义集体农场，而不是简单地把土地分给农民。此外，马克思列宁主义中关于农民会继续在贫富之间分裂的观点在随后的几年里被证明是行不通的。

//译者注：不论是古代朝代更换还是现在都证明农民内部的分化一直在进行，怎么就行不通了。除非你把贫农佣户变成城市工人另一个种类不然农民怎么不会分化？

在战争问题上，列宁的目标不是简单的和平主义，而是把世界大战转变为国际上的内战。所有布尔什维克都相信只有欧洲爆发革命才会拯救俄国。他们还相信，如果受到“帝国主义者”的攻击，他们可以通过“革命战争”来进行自卫。布尔什维克的政治策略也不协调;在这个国家的情绪仍然倾向于社会主义各派系相互合作的时候，列宁主导下的布尔什维克拒绝与其他社会主义者合作。与大多数人不同，布尔什维克认为制宪会议是一个比苏维埃议会低劣得多的骗局。最后，强调阶级斗争的布尔什维克原则上反对至少占人口一半的少数民族的独立主张。当时许多布尔什维克的政策并无法满足厌战的、农村化、多民族化的俄罗斯，而且许多计划根本就不可行。

The organization and the ideology of the Bolsheviks are not enough to explain their success.What counted was the concept of "Soviet Power."The common name,the "Bolshevik Revolution,"is in this sense misleading.Power was seized not in the name of the Bolshevik Party but in that of "Soviet Power," of the much broader soviet movement.Workers'and soldiers' councils(sovety)had appeared in most towns at the start of 1917.Their success did not come from some special creativity of the Russian workers and soldiers (not the peasants) who elected them.The power of the soviets came partly from the lack of any alternative broadly based local government;under the Tsar the towns had been run by appointees and a wealthy elite.But the soviets, elected directly by factories and military units,did provide a remark- ably direct(if administratively ineffective) means of giving political institutions to a wider range of people than ever before.

布尔什维克的组织和意识形态不足以解释他们的成功， “苏维埃的权力”是什么？将其等同于 “布尔什维克革命”在某个意义上是有误导性的。因为夺取政权不是以布尔什维克党的名义获得的，而是以更广泛的苏维埃运动即 “苏维埃政权”的名义获得的。1917年初的大多数城镇出现了工人和士兵委员会(sovety)。但苏维埃的成功建立并非来自于选举他们的俄国工人和士兵(没有农民)的一种“自我能动性”。苏维埃的权力抢走了部分缺乏广泛基础的地方政府;因为过去在沙皇统治下，城镇任命给了富有的精英管理。而由工厂和军队中每个人直接选举产生的苏维埃，提供了一种比以往任何时候都更广泛的政治制度上的直接选举手段(尽管其在行政上无效)。

The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets,which met in late October,was not entirely dominated by the Bolsheviks,but it did show dissatisfaction with the slow pace of change under the Provisional Government.More important,the leaders of the October uprising in Petrograd claimed to be acting in defense of the soviet congress in the face of a counterrevol- utionary threat from the Provisional Government.This threat was claimed to be a repetition of the August attempt by General Kornilov, the army Supreme Commander-in-Chief,to overthrow the Petrograd Soviet.At the very top of the Bolshevik Party,where the idea of insurrection was indeed born,the counterrevolutionary bogey was a piece of self-conscious manipulation.But even among middle-ranking party activists the tales of Prime Minister Kerensky's scheming were believed-and it was the "defense"of the congress that got so many supporters of the soviets out into the streets in October.And this action was organized not directly by the Bolsheviks but by the Petrograd Soviet's Military-Revolutionary Committee(MRC).

十月下旬召开的第二次全俄苏维埃代表大会也并不是由布尔什维克完全主导的，但它确实对临时政府领导下缓慢的变革步伐表示了不满。更重要的是，在彼得格勒十月起义后，苏维埃的领导人声称，这一行为是为了应对临时政府的反革命威胁，而他们的行动是为了保护苏维埃议会。他们说这一威胁是八月份最高统帅科尔尼洛夫将军企图推翻彼得格勒苏维埃政权的重演。在布尔什维克党的最高层中间确实诞生了起义的思想——在自觉的操纵下一种反革命的妖物叙事诞生了。但即使是党内中层许多人也相信克伦斯基总理正在运量着阴谋——同时也正是临时政府的这种“软弱”姿态，才让这么多苏维埃的支持者在10月走上街头。当然这次行动不是由布尔什维克直接组织的，而是由彼得格勒士兵革命委员会 (MRC)组织的。

The soviets not only gave an excuse for an uprising but also provided the skeleton of an administration to run the country.Indeed,the soviets had been increasing their power for months and,as has been sug-gested,the October Revolution was here more a "shifting of gears,an acceleration of tempo"than a decisive break.After October the Bolsheviks had control of the Central Executive Committeeand of Sovnarkom.The political cooperation of the Left faction of the agrarian- socialist SR Party gave the Central ExCom and Sovnarkom some claim to speak for the peasant majority.The nationwide network of nine hundred soviets made possible the quick spread of the revolution from town to town,and on to the most distant parts of the Empire.Once "Soviet"power had been proclaimed in the capital,local soviets across Russia formed their own MRCs,ejected representatives of the Pro- visional Government,and took sole power in their own hands-with the support of much of the population.

但苏维埃不仅为起义提供了自己的宣称，他们还提供了管理国家的政府框架。事实上，这几个月以来苏维埃就一直在增强他们的力量，正如所暗示的那样，十月革命在这里更多起到了“齿轮的转换，节奏的加快”的作用，而不是整个社会的割裂，十月革命之后布尔什维克完全控制了全俄中央执行委员会(苏维埃代表大会的常设机构)和国家通讯社。同时他们拥有了农业上的盟友——带社会主义倾向的左翼社会革命党，这也使得中央执行委员会和国家粮食署有了能代表大多数农民的权利。由九百名代表组成的苏维埃选举形成了全国性的大网，这使得革命可以从一个城镇迅速得蔓延到另一个城镇，最后蔓延到帝国最遥远的边区。一旦“苏维埃”政权在首都宣告成立，俄罗斯各地的苏维埃支持者们就组成了自己的士兵革命委员会，驱逐那些旧临时政府的代表，并通过大多数人的支持独揽当地的政权。

What might be called the"Soviet program"-as opposed to the Bolsh-evik program-was also of great importance.A series of sweeping social reforms announced by the new soviet government seemed to justify popular confidence.Of the various planks of the Bolshevik program,it was those related to industry and trade that were put into effect in the most full-blooded form:workers' control of the factories was announced, a Supreme Economic Council(VSNKh) set up to run the economy,the banks were nationalized (there was as yet no official nationalization of industry, although many factories were taken over "from below,"by the workers).

他们所称的“苏维埃计划”，当然与布尔什埃维克的最高纲领也有所不同——起到了非常重要的作用。新的苏维埃政府宣布了一系列彻底的社会改革，这似乎证明了民众们的信心是正确的。在布尔什维克的规划下，与工业和贸易有关的各种措施以最全面的形式得到了实施:宣布工人对工厂的控制，成立了最高经济委员会来管理经济，银行被国有化(尽管许多工厂被工人“自下而上”接管，但当时还没有正式的工业国有化)

In other areas of policy,however,the hard ideological cutting edge of radical Marxism was softened into a program more suited to 1917 Russia.The Decree on Land divided the landowners'big estates among millions of individual peasant families(rather than keeping them as "modelfarms'")；the Bolsheviks had simply adapted a draft SR land program.The Decree on Peace offered negotiations with the fighting powers.Talks with the Central Powers began,and on 2 December an armistice was signed.As the armies were sent home nothing more was heard of a revolutionary war against imperialism. Three issues were of greatest importance to all social groups in the winter of 1917-1918:peace,salvation from economic catastrophe,and social change.The Soviet program promised to deal with these issues,and it won wide support in the first two or three months after October,especially after the failure of the Provisional Government even to make gestures.The program won popular support,too,for the Bolshevik domination of the Soviet regime.

然而在政策的其他领域，激进马克思主义者的强硬意识形态还是被软化为更适合1917年俄罗斯的状态。比如《土地法令》将地主的大地产分给了数百万个体农民家庭(而不是将其改造成“模范的集体农场”)，这件事上布尔什维克只是对左派社会革命党的土地计划草案进行了小部分修改。同时《和平法令》提出与一战中的大国们进行谈判。现在与同盟国的谈判开始了，他们于12月2日签订了停战协定。普通士兵们被遣回家时也没有听到过关于进行反帝国主义战争输出革命的消息。在1917-1918年的冬天，三个问题的解决对所有社会群体来说都是十分重要的:和平、从经济危机中拯救，还有合适的社会变革。苏维埃的计划承诺处理完这些问题，苏维埃的成功让其在10月后的头两三个月赢得了人民广泛的支持，毕竟过去临时政府执政期间甚至没有做出类似姿态。同时人们看的出来是布尔什维克在运作苏维埃，所以该计划也赢得了民众的广泛支持。