原封面：

作者：Leon Trotsky

出版社：Marxists Internet Archive

原书语言：English

原书出版声明：These writings were first published in 1923 by the Soviet Government. They were translated by Brian Pearce. Annotation is by Brian Pearce. Footnotes are from the original Russian edition. Transcribed for the Trotsky Internet Archive, now a subarchive of the Marxists’ Internet Archive, by David Walters in 1996 with permission from Index Books/Trade Union Printing Services, 28 Charlotte St, London, W1P 1HJ.这些著作于1923年由苏维埃政府首次出版。它们是由布菜恩﹣皮尔斯翻译的。注释由布莱恩﹣皮尔斯负责。脚注来自俄文原版。1996年，经 Index Books / Trade Union Printing Services ,28 Charlotte St , London ,W1P1HJ许可， David Walters 为托洛茨基在线档案馆（现在是马克思主义者在线档案馆的一个子档案馆）转录。Converted to eBook format by Kollektiv Yakov Perelman, from the on-line version of The Military Writings of Leon Trotsky - Volume 1, 1918 available at Trotsky Internet Archive on 28 January 2013.由 Kolektiv Yakov Perelman 将《托洛茨基军事著作﹣第一卷，1918》的在线版本转换为电子书格式，可于2013年1月28日在托洛茨基网（https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/）查阅。

原书在线版本的声明（Introduction to the on-line version）：This five volume collection of Leon Trotsky’s military writings are a major contribution to Revolutionary Marxism. Trotsky was Commissar of Military and Navel Affairs for the newly formed Soviet Republic. In this capacitiy he lead the organization of the Red Army and Navy. This workers’ and peasants’ army, the first regular army of a workers’ state, was to immediately face its first conflict with Imperialism and it’s Russian representatives in 1918. The five volumes represents the sum total of Trotsky’s articles, essays, lectures and polemics as the leader of the Red Army. Some of the writings here were given at Red Army academies, at Bolshevik Party meetings and at national and local soviets. These writing represent official Soviet policy in general and Bolshevik Party positions specifically. All the writings represent Trotsky’s thoughts in reaction to the events as they were transpiring around him from 1918 through 1922: war, revolution, counter-revolution, all without the calm reflection a historian, for example, would have enjoyed in writing about such events with the advantage of 20/20 hindsight. These are the writings of a revolutionary under the actual gunfire of counter-revolution, often times written on the armored train Trotsky used to command the Red Army during various campaigns of the Civil War.这五卷托洛茨基的军事著作集是对革命马克思主义的重大贡献。托洛茨基是新成立的苏维埃共和国的军事和海军事务委员。在这个职位上，他领导了红军和海军的组织。这支工人和农民的军队是工人国家的第一支正规军，将在1918年立即面临与帝国主义及其俄国代表的第一次冲突。这五卷书是托洛茨基作为红军领导人的文章、散文、演讲和论战的总和。这里的一些文章是在红军学院、布尔什维克党的会议以及国家和地方苏维埃上发表的。这些文字代表了苏联官方的总体政策，特别是布尔什维克党的立场。所有的文章都代表了托洛茨基对1918年至1922年发生在他周围的事件的反应：战争、革命、反革命，所有这些都没有像历史学家那样，在写这些事件时享有完全事后式的冷静思考。这些都是一个革命者在反革命的实际枪声下的写照，很多时候是在托洛茨基在内战的各种战役中用来指挥红军的装甲列车上写的。

This on-line version consists of everything available from the printed Russian and English editions with the exception of the color maps showing the various stages of the Civil War, which were to fine in detail reproduce for the World Wide Web.该在线版本包含俄文和英文印刷版中的所有内容，但显示内战各个阶段的彩色地图除外，这些地图将在万维网（World Wide Web）上进行详细复制。

——David Walters

译序：见国内本专题译作空缺，特精选本书译出，以填补空白。有助于提供更多不同于国内传统方面的对于托本人的研究学习角度。译文不精确之处请指正，特附原文。

托洛茨基论军事

第一卷（1918，革命是如何武装起来的）

作者前言

五年的经历

       专门发表我所撰写的关于红军的论文、演讲、报告、呼吁、命令、说明、信件、电报和其他文件的想法是在纪念红军成立五周年时形成的。V·P·波隆斯基同志提出了出版这些文章的倡议，这些材料的选取、检查、整理和修正是由Ya·G·布鲁姆金同志、F·M·维梅尔同志、A·I·鲁宾同志和A·A·尼基丁同志负责的。S·I·温特索夫同志则承担了年表、注解和索引的收集工作。当我快速浏览这些将要付印的手稿时，我所得到的大概印象是

        这些材料所反映的是不充分的，更重要的是缺乏具体性。所有的这些材料都反映了建设红军的实际工作。

        今天，当我们能够审视五年来革命的全部成就时，这一行动就会很清楚地表明，几乎所有（如果不是全部）关于苏维埃的建设性工作的原则问题和困难首先出现在我们面前，在军事领域中最为重要——而且以极其严格、简洁和紧凑的形式。在这方面，它作为一般规则，不允许我们有任何喘息的机会而我们的一些。幻想和错误带来了几乎是立即的惩罚。而最负责任的决议遭到抨击。对这些决议可能存在的任何反对意见都立即进行了实践，接下来则是在战场上。因此，总的来说，在红军建设的内在逻辑上，没有从一个系统到另一个系统的任何疯狂跳跃。可以说，在某种意义上，正是我们所面临的危险的尖锐性拯救了我们。如果我们有更多的时间进行讨论和辩论，我们可能会犯更多的错误。

        最困难的时期是第一个时期——大约是在 1918 年下半年。部分出于必要，部分出于惯性，革命的力量首先被引导到打破所有旧的联系（或可译为环节）的方向，从所有岗位上撤换旧社会的代表。但与此同时，必须塑造新的联系，首先是最严格、最高压和强制性的联系——即新的，革命的军事团的联系。光是我们党，虽然坚强的干部还远没有很多，但他们却能在弹片织成的冰幕下实现这一转变。这一工作所涉及的困难和危险是巨大的。在无产阶级先锋队已经完成了向“工作、纪律和命令”的过渡（虽然并非没有内部问题）的时候，广大工人群众，甚至是比之规模更大的农民才刚刚开始摇摆，这一现象要被根除，就像必须做的那样！剩下的一切人都是旧秩序的残余附庸，他们还没有以实际的方式思考新的秩序。这是苏维埃力量发展中非常关键的时刻。左翼“社会革命党人”的政党——一个知识分子的组织，它的一个分支延伸到农民，另一个延伸到城市里的小市民——在其命运中最生动地反映了从革命的自发破坏期到建国期的痛苦过渡。咬牙切齿的小资产阶级（der rabiat gewordene Spiessburger，引自恩格斯）不想知道任何限制、任何让步、任何对历史现实的妥协——直到后者用横梁敲打他的头骨。接着他瘫倒在地，无助地向敌人投降。反映了这一切的正是社会革命党！革命昨日的次要的自发性面对布列斯特和约、中央集权或正规军时完全无能为力。左翼社会革命党在这些问题上的反对很快转变为反叛，最终导致该党在政治上的毁灭。幸运的是，布鲁姆金同志虽是一位在 1918 年 7 月将自己的生命押在与我们的斗争上的前左翼社会革命党人，但现在他是我们党的一员，他应该成为我的合作者来编写这本书，而书中的其中一个部分反映了我们与左翼社会革命党的致命冲突。

       总的来说，革命标志着历史的急剧转变。但是，如果我们更仔细地研究它，我们会在其中发现一系列转折，这些转折越激烈、越具有转折性，革命的事件以惊人的速度展开得越彻底。最重要的是，这些局部转变中的每一个都是对党的一次非常大的考验。简而言之，党的任务——或者更准确地说，它的战斗中心的任务——可以分解为以下几个要素：及时认识到新阶段的需要；为这个新阶段做准备；在不使党脱离仍然受前一时期惯性支配的群众的情况下完成转变。同时，有必要记住，革命在给予执政党的基本原材料——时间方面是非常节约的。如果领导中心转得太急，它可能会发现自己与自己的政党对立，或者该党可能会发现自己与革命阶级对立：但是，另一方面，一个随昨日的过时潮流摇摆的政党以及它所领导的阶级，在完成客观事件进程所提出的紧迫任务时可能为时已晚——每一次如上对动态平衡的违反都可能对革命造成致命的威胁。这一规律不仅适用于军队，也适用于经济，它要求的节奏的必要调整。

       当我们已经不得不组建新团时，旧军队仍在回到全国各地，散布着对战争的仇恨。沙皇军官被逐出军队，在某些地方受到了无情的处理。然而，我们不得不邀请前军官来担任新军队的教官。沙皇军队团里的委员会就是革命的化身——至少在它的第一阶段。在新的团中，委员会是无法容忍的，这是它解体的根源。当我们不得不引入一门新学科时，对旧学科的诅咒还没有停止响起。然后是从自愿征兵到强制征兵，从游击队到正规军事组织的过渡。与“游击主义”的斗争日复一日地进行着，这需要最大的坚持、不妥协，有时甚至是苛刻。 “游击主义”是革命中农民背景的军事表现，因为这件事还没有上升到国家意识的层面。反对“游击主义”的斗争同时也是争取无产阶级国家地位，反对正在破坏它的无政府主义的小资产阶级自发性的斗争。然而，游击队的方法和习惯也在党的队伍中得到体现：在党内与它们进行思想斗争是对军队采取的组织、教育和惩罚措施的必要补充。只有通过最大压力，才能将无政府主义的“游击主义”带入集权和纪律的框架内。这种压力既是外部的——德国的进攻，然后是捷克军团的暴动——也是内部的，通过军队内部的共产主义组织。

       正如我所说，这里汇编的文章、演讲和命令仅在非常不充分的程度上反映了已完成的实际建设工作。这项工作的主要部分通常是通过演讲和文章以外的方式进行的。此外，最重要的讲话，即针对现场、前线和部队中的军事工作者的讲话，它们具有深刻的实际、具体的意义，这由当时的要求决定——这些是最重要的。重要的演讲通常不会被任何人以书面形式记录下来。除此之外，还必须进一步补充的是，即使是录制的演讲也大多录制得很糟糕。在革命时期，速记艺术的水平与所有其他艺术一样低。一切都是仓在促和“无论如何”中完成的。在辨认字迹时，速记抄本通常由一组神秘的短语组成，其含义并不总是可以随后重建，当这项任务由演讲者以外的人承担时更是如此。

       尽管如此，这些文章确实反映了过去的伟大岁月。这就是为什么，尽管有上面列出的所有保留意见，我仍同意将它们印出来。时不时回顾我们最近的过去对我们来说并不是什么坏事。此外，这些文章可能被证明对我们那些尽管进展缓慢，但仍正在向夺取政权迈进的海外同志并非没有用处。他们也将在一定的阶段面对我们曾经的基本任务和已经克服的问题。也许这些材料将帮助他们避免至少一些等待他们的错误。如果不犯错误，任何事情都无法完成，尤其是革命：但无论如何，将这些错误减少到最低限度总是好的。

                                                                列·托洛茨基

                                                        1923年2月23日

                                                                     莫斯科

P.S.：本出版物主要包括公开发表或已在报刊上发表的文章、演讲、文件等。只有相对较小的部分由由于某种原因在撰写时未出版的材料组成，第一次在这里印刷。本书不包括尚未出版的大量文件（订单、报告、直通电文等）的出版时间，也不会这么快出版。在对整本书进行评估时，需要牢记这一点。

   列·托

注

为了挑起苏俄和德国之间的战争而杀死德国大使米尔巴赫的布鲁姆金（或布拉金）在德国战败后被赦免。他继续在契卡（后来的格别乌）工作。 1929 年，他拜访了流亡中的托洛茨基，带回了一封给俄国反对派的信。他被背叛（显然是被拉狄克）并被处决。 [抄写员注：布鲁姆金是一名左派社会革命党人，他帮助协调针对布尔什维克的恐怖行动。如前所述，他暗杀米尔巴赫是企图挑起德国攻击苏维埃共和国和工人国家。试图暗杀列宁的同一政治边缘使对米尔巴赫的暗杀得以进行。这不是按照布尔什维克的要求做的，而是针对他们的。 – David Walters 在 Joska Rabb 的帮助下注]

以下为英文版原文，用于对照阅读

AUTHOR’S PREFACE

* * *

Through Five Years

The idea of publishing my articles, speeches, reports, appeals, orders, instructions, letters, telegrams and other documents devoted to the Red Army arose in connection with the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the Red Army. Comrade V.P. Polonsky took the initiative in publishing these papers. Selection, critical checking, arrangement and correction of the material was undertaken by Comrades Ya. G. Blyumkin, F.M. Vermel, A.I. Rubin and A.A. Nikitin. The notes, the chronology and the indexes of names and subjects were compiled by Comrade S.I. Ventsov. When I looked quickly through the manuscripts after they had already been assembled for printing, the general impression I got was – how inadequately and, most important, with how little concreteness, all this material reflects the actual work involved in building the Red Army.

Today, when it has become possible for us to survey the entire achievement of the revolution through five years, it stands out quite clearly that nearly all, if not all, the questions of principle and the difficulties of Soviet constructive work arose before us first and foremost in the sphere of military affairs – and, in extremely hard, concise and compact form. In this sphere, as a general rule, no respite was allowed us. Illusions and errors brought with them almost immediate retribution. The most responsible decisions were taken under fire. Any opposition there might be to these decisions was tested in action there and then, on the spot. Hence, by and large, the inner logically in the building of the Red Army, the absence of any wild leaps from one system to another. It can be said that, in a certain sense, it was precisely the acuteness of the danger to which we were subjected that saved us. If we had had more time for discussion and debate we should probably we would of made a great many more mistakes.

The most difficult period of all was the first – covering approximately the second half of 1918. Partly through necessity, partly through mere inertia, revolutionary effort was directed above all into breaking all the old links, removing from all posts the representatives of the old society. But at the same time it was necessary to forge new links and, in the first place, the strictest, most peremptory and coercive of links – namely, the links of new, revolutionary regiments. Our Party alone, with its still far from numerous, though sturdy cadres was capable of effecting this turn, under a hail of shrapnel. The difficulties and dangers involved were colossal. At the time when the vanguard of the proletariat had already accomplished, though not without internal problems, the transition to ‘work, discipline and order’, the broad masses of the workers, and, even more so, of the peasants were only beginning to shake themselves free, wiping out, as had to be done! Everything that remained of the old order, and they were not as yet thinking in a practical way about the new one. This was a very critical moment in the development of the Soviet power. The party of the Left ‘Socialist-Revolutionaries’ – an organization of intellectuals, one wing of which extended to the peasantry and the other to the mass of the urban philistines – reflected most vividly, in its fate, the painful transition from the spontaneously-destructive period of the revolution to the state-building period. The petty-bourgeois who has taken the bit between his teeth (der rabiat gewordene Spiessburger, to use Engels’s expression) does not want to know about any limitations, any concessions, any compromises with historical reality – until the moment when the latter bangs its beam against his skull. Then he collapses into prostration and helplessly surrenders to the enemy. The Socialist-Revolutionary party, which reflected! The peripheral spontaneity of the revolution’s yesterday was utterly incapable of understanding either the Brest peace, or centralized authority, or the regular army. The opposition of the Left SRs on these questions was quickly transformed into revolt, which ended in the political ruin of that party. It has pleased fate that Comrade  Blyumkin, a former Left SR who in July 1918 staked his life on the fight against us, but who is now a member of our party, should have turned out to be my collaborator in putting together this volume, which in one of its sections reflects our mortal conflict with the Left SR party. The revolution is highly skilled both in separating men from one another and also, if need be, in bringing them together. All the most courageous and consistent elements that existed in the Left SR party are now with us.

Taken as a whole, the revolution signifies a sharp turn in history. But, if we examine it more carefully, we find within it a series of turns which are the more acute and critical, the further the events of the revolution unfold, at a furious pace. Each of these partial turns is, above all, a very great test for the leading party. Schematically, the task of the party – or, to be still more precise, that of its fighting center – breaks down into the following elements: appreciating in good time the need for a new stage; preparing the party for this new stage; carrying through the turn without detaching the party from the masses who are still governed by the inertia of the previous period. At the same time it is necessary to remember that the revolution is very sparing in its allowance to the ruling party of that basic raw material, time. If the leading center makes the turn too sharply, it may find itself in opposition to its own party, or the party may find itself in opposition to the revolutionary class: but, on the other hand, a party that drifts with the current of yesterday, along with the class that it leads, may turn out to be too late in fulfilling urgent tasks posed by the objective course of events – and every such violation of the dynamic equilibrium threatens to prove fatal for the revolution. This applies, with the necessary modification regarding tempos, not only to the army but also to the economy.

The old army was still straggling back across the country, spreading hatred for war, when we were already having to form new regiments. The Tsarist officers had been thrown out of the army, and in some places dealt with in merciless fashion. Yet we had to invite former officers to come and serve as instructors of the new army. The committees in the Tsarist regiments were the very embodiment of the revolution – in its first stage, at least. In the new regiments, committees could not be tolerated, being a source of disintegration. The curses cast upon the old discipline had not yet ceased to resound when we were already obliged to introduce a new discipline. Then followed the transition from voluntary to compulsory recruitment and from guerrilla bands to regular military organisation. The struggle against ‘guerrillaism’ was waged unremittingly, from one day to the next, and it called for the greatest persistence, intransigence and, sometimes, severity. ‘Guerrillaism’ was the military expression of the peasant background of the revolution, in so far as the matter had not yet been raised to the level of state consciousness. The struggle against ‘guerrillaism’ was at the same time a struggle for proletarian statehood against the anarchical petty-bourgeois spontaneity that was undermining it. Guerrilla methods and habits found expression, however, in the Party’s ranks as well: an ideological struggle against them within the Party was a necessary supplement to the organisational, educational and punitive measures that were taken in the army. Only through maximum pressure was anarchical ‘guerrillaism’ brought within the framework of centralisation and discipline. This pressure was both external – the German offensive, and then the Czechoslovak revolt – and internal, by way of Communist organisation within the Army.

The articles, speeches and orders assembled here reflect, as I have said, only to a very inadequate degree the work of actual construction that was done. The principal part of this work was generally performed otherwise than by means of speeches and articles. Besides which, the most important speeches, namely, those which were addressed to military workers on the spot, at the fronts and in the Army units, and which had profoundly practical, concrete significance, determined by the demands of the moment – these most important and significant speeches were, as a rule, not taken down in writing by anyone. To all which it must further be added that even the speeches that were recorded were mostly recorded badly. The art of writing shorthand was in that period of the revolution at just as low a level as all the other arts. Everything was done hastily and ‘anyhow’. When deciphered, a shorthand transcript often consisted of a collection of enigmatic phrases, the meaning of which it was not always possible to reconstruct subsequently, and all the less so when this task was undertaken by someone other than the person who had delivered the speech.

Nevertheless, these pages do reflect the great years that have passed; which is why, with all the reservations set out above, I have agreed that they be printed. It is no bad thing for us, from time to time, to look over our recent past. Furthermore, these pages may prove to be not without use to our comrades abroad who are advancing, even though slowly, towards the conquest of power. The fundamental tasks and problems which we have overcome will in due course confront them too. Perhaps these materials will help them to avoid at least some of the mistakes that lie in wait for them. Nothing is ever accomplished without making mistakes and a revolution least of all: but it is good, at any rate, to reduce these mistakes to the minimum.

L. Trotsky
February 27, 1923
Moscow

P.S. Included in the present publication are, predominantly, articles, speeches, documents and so on which were delivered publicly, or which have already been published in the press. A comparatively small section is made up of materials which, for one reason or another, were not published at the time they were written, and are printed here for the first time. The book does not include numerous documents (orders, reports, correspondence over the direct wire, etc.) the time to publish which has not yet come, and will not come so soon. This circumstance needs to be kept in mind when evaluating the book as a whole.

L.T.

Notes

Blyumkin (or Blurakin), who killed the German ambassador Mirbach in order to provoke war between Soviet Russia and Germany, was pardoned after Germany’s defeat had made it safe to do this. He resumed his work in the Cheka (later the GPU). In 1929 he visited Trotsky in exile, taking back with him a letter to Russian oppositionists. He was betrayed (apparently, by Radek) and executed. [Note by transcriber:Blyumkin was a Left SR who helped coordinate terrorist actions against the Bolsheviks. His assassination of Mirbach was an attempt, as stated, to provoke Germany into attacking the Soviet Republic and workers’ state. The assassination of Mirbach was perpetuated by the same political fringe that attempted the assassination of Lenin. It was not done at the behest of the Bolsheviks, but rather it was directed against them. – David Walters with help from Joska Rabb]

非常感谢各位的支持，请期待接下来的译文