【经典译读】黑格尔《逻辑学》存有论（1）何为开端，何为纯粹直接性

with what must the beginning of science be made?

科学的开端要以什么开始

It is only in recent times that there has been a new awareness of the difficulty of finding a beginning in philosophy, and the reason for this difficulty, and so also the possibility of resolving it, have been discussed in a variety of ways.只是在最近的时代里面出现了一种新的意识：想要在哲学里寻找一个起点是困难的，为什么会有这种困难，以及解决这个困难的可能性已经被很多方式讨论。 The beginning of philosophy must be either something mediated or something immediate, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other;so either way of beginning runs into contradiction哲学的开端必须被作为要么是直接的要么是间接的，（亚里士多德二期分类法），并且很容易证明它既不是间接的也不是直接的所以每一种开端的方式会产生矛盾（隐喻费希特）. The principle of a philosophy also expresses a beginning, of course, but not so much a subjective as an objective one, the beginning of all things. The principle is a somehow determinate content – “water,” “the one,” “nous,” “idea,” or “substance,” “monad,” etc. – or, if it designates the nature of cognition and is therefore meant simply as a criterion rather than an objective determination, as “thinking,” “intuition,” “sensation,” “I,” even “subjectivity,” then here too the interest still lies in the content determination. 当然，哲学的原理也表现为一种开端，与其说是主观的开端不如说是客观的开端，即一切的开端，哲学原理作为特定的内容比如水，太一，努斯等，但是如果说哲学的开端作为认识的标准而不是客观的规定，只作为思维，直观，感觉，我，主观性。那么这里的意义依然在于内容的规定 The beginning as such, on the other hand, as something subjective in the sense that it is an accidental way of introducing the exposition, is left unconsidered, a matter of indifference, and consequently also the need to ask with what a beginning should be made remains of no importance in face of the need for the principle in which alone the interest of the fact seems to lie, the interest as to what is the truth, the absolute ground of everything. 开端本身作为主观的的东西，开端本身没有被思考只是说方便起见或者为了引发进一步说明的方式把偶然的东西说成是开端，哲学家好像只想要获得原理（解释万物）“但是什么样的开端应当被做出来”要去问这个问题的需要就不被思考了（康德先搞实在论批判来解释万物，但是他没想过在他追求原理的目的，他认为哲学的开端这种问题不值得问）But the modern perplexity about a beginning proceeds from a further need which escapes those who are either busy demonstrating their principle dogmatically or skeptically looking for a subjective criterion against dogmatic philosophizing, 但是现在关于开端的困惑没有进一步的需求从那些人中产生：以独断论的方式忙于证明自己的原理，或者以怀疑论的方式寻找主观的标准来否定独断论的哲学运思，（这两类人都不能问出“哲学的开端是什么”这个问题，问不出这个问题，看不出这个问题的重要性的人都很蠢）and is outright denied by those who begin, like a shot from a pistol, from their inner revelation, from faith, intellectual intuition, etc. and who would be exempt from method and logic. 雅各比（我是先知，我不要做哲人）直觉主义也不行也很蠢（登登 哇！我懂了一切！）If earlier abstract thought is at first interested only in the principle as content, 如果早期的抽象思维仅仅以作为内容的原理感兴趣（想找到一切的始基，认识的最对的原理）but is driven as philosophical culture advances to the other side to pay attention to the conduct of the cognitive process, 但是作为哲学文化驱使“注意”开始转向另一边，开始关注认识的过程是如何发生的then the subjective activity has also been grasped as an essential moment of objective truth, 认识的主观活动同样也被把握成是客观性真理的本质性（认识机制虽然是内在的但也是具有客观的真的）and with this there comes the need to unite the method with the content, the form with the principle. 随着这个哲学文化的发展这种把方法和内容连接在一起的需求出现了(形式和原理联系到一起)Thus the principle ought to be also the beginning, and that which has priority for thinking ought to be also the first in the process of thinking.因此，原理就应当是开端，那个对于思维活动来说具有优先性的东西（思维活动发生的本质环节）也应当是思维过程本身处理的第一个东西（思维要以发生形式本身作为内容，你是如何开始的）{科学家拿显微镜研究东西，先把显微镜研究清楚，或者说用显微镜研究东西这件事本身研究清楚} 

Here we only have to consider how the logical beginning appears.在这里我们仅仅考虑逻辑学的开端是如何显现的 The two sides from which it can be taken have already been named, namely either by way of mediation as result, or immediately as beginning proper. 这个开端的两个侧面在前面已经命名了，要么是显现为中介（逻辑学的开端是一个结果）或者是直接性（纯开端）This is not the place to discuss the question apparently so important to present-day culture, whether the knowledge of truth is an immediate awareness that begins absolutely, a faith, or rather a mediated knowledge.现在不适合在这里讨论这一个问题，对于真理的认识是以绝对的方式开始的（信仰）还是通过被中介的知识（迂回把握） In so far as the issue allows passing treatment, this has already been done elsewhere 这个论题被黑格尔讨论完了，在他这本书里：(in my Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 3rd edn, in the Prefatory Concept, §§21ff.). Here we may quote from it only this,我们直接引用一段 that there is nothing in heaven or nature or spirit or anywhere else that does not contain just as much immediacy as mediation, so that both these determinations prove to be unseparated and inseparable and the opposition between them nothing real. 一切都不仅仅只包含直接性或者中介性，直接性和中介性最终会被证明是不被分离的和不可被分离的，他们并不是现实的对立As for a scientific discussion, a case in point is every logical proposition in which we find the determinations of immediacy and mediacy and where there is also entailed, therefore, a discussion of their opposition and their truth.一个关键的例子，每一个我们可以在其中发现具有直接的规定与间接规定的逻辑命题，要求对他们加以讨论，具有直接规定与间接规定的对立背后的真 This opposition, when connected to thinking, to knowledge, to cognition, assumes the more concrete shape of immediate or mediated knowledge, and it is then up to the science of logic to consider the nature of cognition in general, while the more concrete forms of the same cognition fall within the scope of the science of spirit and the phenomenology of spirit. 这种对立，当他们和思维、认识、知识联系到一起的时候，就会得到更加的具体直接的或间接的的形式，这时候就需要逻辑学去思考一般意义上的认识的本质，而那些更具体的认识的形式在精神科学的事业中But to want to clarify the nature of cognition prior to science is to demand that it should be discussed outside science, and outside science this cannot be done, at least not in the scientific manner which alone is the issue here. 但是你想要澄清先于科学发生的认识的本质就相当于要求外在于科学讨论认识，不可能在科学之外去讨论认识本质（黑格尔科学整个精神运动体系，包括逻辑学，科学的方法就是逻辑学）      

A beginning is logical in that it is to be made in the element of a free, self-contained thought, in pure knowledge; it is thereby mediated, for pure knowledge is the ultimate and absolute truth of consciousness.一个开端是（黑格尔意义上的）逻辑性的，他是自由的以自我包含的思维的要素构成的，他是以纯粹知识构成的，因此这个开端是被中介的，因为纯粹知识就是一个最终极的最绝对的意识的真相（就是符号学格局、辩证法张力）We said in the Introduction that the Phenomenology of Spirit is the science of consciousness, its exposition; that consciousness has the concept of science,that is, pure knowledge, for its result.我们已经在导论里说过精神现象学是研究意识的学科，是意识本身的阐发，意识就具有科学的概念，把科学的概念作为结果To this extent, logic has for its presupposition the science of spirit in its appearance, a science which contains the necessity, and therefore demonstrates the truth, of the stand point which is pure knowledge and of its mediation.在这个意义上，逻辑学已经在他的表象（可能就是黑格尔把他写的那部书：精神现象学当做逻辑学的表象）当中有精神科学的前提，这个科学包含了一种必然性，逻辑学经由纯粹知识中介（逻辑形式就是逻辑内容，逻辑学形式就是本体论架构） In this science of spirit in its appearance the beginning is made from empirical, sensuous consciousness, and it is this consciousness which is immediate knowledge in the strict sense; there, in this science, is where its nature is discussed. 在哲学式的把握的精神科学中它的开端就是感性确定性，这种意识就是的直接知识，在这门科学当中要讨论直接知识，感性确定性Any other consciousness, such as faith in divine truths, inner experience, knowledge through inner revelation, etc., proves upon cursory reflection to be very ill-suited as an instance of immediate knowledge.其他的意识中，比如神圣真理的信仰、内在体验、内在显露的知识等等，只要用粗略反思就可以看出这些不是直接的知识 In the said treatise, immediate consciousness is also that which in the science comes first and immediately and is therefore a presupposition; but in logic the presupposition is what has proved itself to be the result of that preceding consideration, namely the idea as pure knowledge. 在上面的讨论当中，直接意识同样也是在精神现象学中第一个出现的，因此它是一个前提假设，但是在逻辑学当中要证明直接意识是逻辑不断往前进展的一个结果（感性确定性是很靠后的）Logic is the pure science, that is, pure knowledge in the full compass of its development.逻辑学是一个纯粹科学，完整把握了科学的发展的纯粹知识 But in that result the idea has the determination of a certainty that has become truth; it is a certainty which, on the one hand, no longer stands over and against a subject matter confronting it externally but has interiorized it, is knowingly aware that the subject matter is itself; and, on the other hand, has relinquished any knowledge of itself that would oppose it to objectivity and would reduce the latter to a nothing; it has externalized this subjectivity and is at one with its externalization. 但是在逻辑学当中，理念变成了笃定确定性的规定，变成了真相，这个笃定确定性一方面不再是和他材料对立，（本身是确定性，不外在于材料）{一般通常来说什么是笃定的：1+1=2，但是这个笃定确定性和这个材料1+1=2，是对立的，黑格尔是说理念变成真相的时，笃定性和材料不对立，感性认识就是这样的，我听到一个声音这种笃定性，就是因为我真听到一个声音}，但是另一方面他也交出了其他的知识(让渡出了其他知识，这个声音甩出主体性),没有反思的，作为直接知识而言没有材料和笃定性的二分，（客观性是由声音例证的）否则就会说这个声音到底是不是真的，把主体性给外在化（就是感性直接性的这个“知”不包含反思的可能性，就是把怀疑的可能性甩到意识，意识就是由这种怀疑的可能性组成的，感性确定性对象就变成了客观的，客观的没什么可以怀疑啊！）主体性被理念运动甩出来的，这里要克服自恋，反思性来自于理念把反思性的能力甩出来，理念为了获得确定的存在，他要直接和确定性合二为一，他要让他的内容和确定性合二为一的方法就是把反身自指的可能性不由他来运动，把反身自指的能力甩出去。无限怀疑的力量不来自自己，意识位面不是凭空有的。有限的意识维度是派生的，理念有外部性不愿意和客观对立，他是主人，意识是客人、臣体、仆人。

Now starting with this determination of pure knowledge, all that we have to do to ensure that the beginning will remain immanent to the science of this knowledge is to consider, or rather, setting aside every reflection, simply to take up, what is there before us.现在从纯粹知识的规定开始，现在我们要确保这个开端（直接知识：感性确定性）将会是内在于逻辑学的，把所有的反思放在一边，存有论里面没反思的东西   

Pure knowledge, thus withdrawn into this unity, has sublated every reference to an other and to mediation; it is without distinctions and as thus distinctionless it ceases to be knowledge; what we have before us is only simple immediacy.纯粹知识因此撤回到统一体中（外部化，扬弃内在纵深），纯粹知识把中介性扬弃，只是直接性，纯粹知识不是知识了（知识可以自我返回）。（纯粹存在其实是加以中介的，给他一个感性确定性，不给去划分，纯粹的认识激发态，就是对思维的打断）

Simple immediacy is itself an expression of reflection; it refers to the distinction from what is mediated.简单的直接性归根结底也是反思，通过单纯的在克制反思，绝对的克制住自己（纯粹直接性就是和被中介东西的一个区分、差别，直接性是2阶反思），辩证法数不了1。 The true expression of this simple immediacy is therefore pure being.对这个简单直接性真正的表达，就是纯粹存在。“纯粹”这个词里面已经包含否定性的自我指涉运动了，当黑格尔说“纯粹pure”的时候，这个纯粹已经是自我抹除了痕迹的高阶否定运动 Just as pure knowledge should mean nothing but knowledge as such, so also pure being should mean nothing but beingin general; being, and nothing else, without further determination and filling. 纯粹知识就指向知识本身，纯粹存在就是指向一般意义的存在，纯粹存在没有进一步的规定和填充

Being is what makes the beginning here; it is presented indeed as originating through mediation, but a mediation which at the same time sublates itself, and the presupposition is of a pure knowledge which is the result of finite knowledge, of consciousness. 存在就是开端，being本身是个运动啊，通过中介来进行起源，（不需要becoming）但是他是这么一个中介，同时扬弃了他自己，这么一种中介，纯粹的嘛，让你以为他不是个中介他是直接的存在，不要做傻逼重复这句话：存在就是中介抹除其中介性的过程、那个运动，这就是存在。（中介活动可以抹除中介性就是一种存在，但是他作为一个起点，作为起点的这么一个中介，一般意义上的所有中介活动抹除他的中介性的那个，把自己化身为直接性的一般意义上的活动作为发起originating活动就叫做存在）（发生学4步，）{因为一个发生、一个起点、一个创生本身，他一旦创造出那个东西他就要把他这个创生给抹除，回溯性取消，否则他就不叫做一个创生，创生本身不是通过后面一个东西给他创生的，创生本身不能被后面一个东西创生，起点本身不能有后面在创生的起点，所以起点永远是第二个，他一旦被看成是一个起点那个真正的发生的运动就已经抹除了他自己，所以应该是怎么样：发生的运动，抹除的运动，起点，起点后面派生物在回溯性的设定这个起点是个起点，所以发生学是有4个环节，存在，无，定在，变化}，说他是一个纯粹知识的预设，是因为有限知识的结果（是因我们的意识是有限的，所以我们不得不把整个发生的过程、存在的发生学过程看成4个环节，第一个环节就是being这个运动）。But if no presupposition is to be made, if the beginning is itself to be taken immediately, then the only determination of this beginning is that it is to be the beginning of logic, of thought as such.There is only present the resolve, which can also be viewed as arbitrary, of considering thinking as such. The beginning must then be absolute or, what means the same here, must be an abstract beginning; and so there is nothing that it may presuppose, must not be mediated by anything or have a ground, ought to be rather itself the ground of the entire science. 只有一种解决的办法把开端看成自我取消的中介性，如果你不做这个假设：开端有中介过程，你把他看成直接的开端，那他只能是逻辑的开端或者思维的开端，就只能思考什么是思维本身，但是由于这个开端是个绝对的开端，所以他一定是抽离一切的开端，他不会预设任何东西，连思维都不预设，是开端本身，他是beginning......你不能加of something和itself 。（辩证法家在思维的时候可以说自己就是存在，不需要“思维”来限制自己）It must therefore be simply an immediacy, or rather only immediacy itself. 所以存在就是直接性本身（直接性本身就是中介的返回，一切都是存在）Just as it cannot have any determination with respect to an other, so too it cannot have any within; it cannot have any content, for any content would entail distinction and the reference of distinct moments to each other, and hence a mediation. The beginning is therefore pure being. 正如他和其他东西相比，他没有任何规定，同样也没有内在规定，也没有任何内容，因为任何内容都会要求区分（这个区分不是内容之间的区分，而是和内容本身的区分，还没有一个所有者和被拥有物的区分），因为内容就要求有一个区分，以及这些内容和他自己之间不同环节的相互援引。存在作为一种自我缝合他不会让人看到端倪，怎么才能看到它的端倪，取消中介性的方式就是把握直接性，这是一种自我指涉的否定性。起点就是纯粹存在（pure自我取消高阶次，存在是很强的力量，是所有中介活动都有的，但不是都有啊，当我们说拥有的时候，就引入直接性了，直接对时态加以描述，打着灯找光亮，一切中介活动都会去中介化，否则他不能开始，把逻辑学把握成运动，因为他要开始，他要自我取消）{迄今为止抽象哲学巅峰黑格尔}

After this simple exposition of what alone first belongs to this simplest of all simples, the logical beginning, we may add the following further reflections which should not serve, however, as elucidation and confirmation of the exposition – this is complete by itself – but are rather occasioned by notions and reflections which may come our way beforehand and yet, like all other prejudices that antedate the science of logic, must be disposed of within the science itself and are therefore to be patiently deferred until then. 在这么一种简明的阐述：对于一开始只属于那个所有简单东西里最简单的那个东西，现在，逻辑性的开端自己加以讨论（里面没反思，他自己会露出一点光，我们现在做的事情就是看他漏出来的光）他可以自我完备，但是我们之所以可以加以阐明，虽然他被缝合，但是他可以扬弃他自身，但是他作为直接性有又是中介性的惟一的存在方式，中介性自我取消因为他要开启其他东西，这个开端其实就是中介本身的开端，作为后面中介的开端，所以他必然的会被我们的意识把握。但是就如其以前他所有的偏见一样我们也会把这些偏见安排在逻辑学内部，（为什么会出现某些具体偏见以及提前使用逻辑学后面的内容，黑格尔一会儿会告诉你）我预先把他们拿出来用，我们要有耐心。

The insight that absolute truth must be a result, and conversely, that a result presupposes a first truth which, because it is first, objectively considered is not necessary and from the subjective side is not known – this insight has recently given rise to the thought that philosophy can begin only with something which is hypothetically and problematically true, and that at first, therefore, philosophizing can be only a quest.这样一种洞见（蛇皮的）认为一个绝对真理必须是一个结果，一个结果必须预设一个原初真理，有了这个原初真理才能避免无限倒退，【就像你问这一切是从那来的，可能会告诉你宇宙大爆炸，宇宙大爆炸之前呢，在那之前没意义，宇宙大爆炸的那个起点是最原初的】这种洞见导致了：哲学也只是个只能伴随着某个假定的有问题的真的东西作为大前提（为了避免陷入无限倒退，哲学也不得不有个工作假设，哲学就被矮化为一种一般科学）这种洞见是的哲学的思辨只能是个摸索This is a view that Reinhold has repeatedly urged in the later stages of his philosophizing,and which must be given credit for being motivated by a genuine interest in the speculative nature of philosophical beginning.莱茵河儿的 的蛇皮观念，被他反复的提出，他认为他的观点整个哲学界都要承认我，我这个哲学只是一般的工作假设，一般的探索性的学术，要发一个信用证变的可靠，这么一个观点是被一种真正的探索欲兴趣驱动，在哲学的开端的思辨性的本性当中能被看到、能被他冒险性的发现秘密（到底以什么作为开端，冒险但是应该能被真正看到的，有一个工作假设来避免无穷倒退）A critical examination of this view will also be an occasion for introducing a preliminary understanding of what progression in logic generally means, for the view has direct implications for the nature of this advance.对这个观点的批判性检查，会有一个机会：在普遍范围上（黑格尔意义上的）对这个进展（他为什么提出这种思路）加入一个初步的了解，{莱茵河儿的在前面的观点已经暗示出了他对进步性的理解}，那么（在逻辑学的意义上）对于“进展、真正的进步”是什么：就是认知模式的泛式改变（探索真理的过程同样就是探索真理方式的变化过程，真理就是真理显现方式的变化）（所以莱茵河儿的这种自我设限，自我搞个工作假设，取消绝对性，取消无穷后退的根据方式来把握哲学式的开端，这已经隐含了这种运动本身的本性，他有一点点心领神会了，拥抱有限性，不确定性）你在推进知识上、内容上认识的时候实际上就已经是知识形式、真理本身显现模式的变化，他是同一个过程。一个推着另一个不断往前进步，形式在这个侧面抵达的那些内容有限的把自己限缩那它就会有新的形式。新的形式、新的内容、新的形式......（所以莱茵河儿的的观点是个蛇皮观点，这是个知性、外部反思的观点。不需要这样，你不需要宣称你是存在，你就是存在，纯粹知识可以白嫖，不是因为你有那个绝对的否定性，而是因为这个世界本身他就是不停的自我取消中介性的中介过程，因为世界存在THE WORLD IS ，根据本身就是逻辑环节）（海德格尔《存在与时间》就会说存在一定是此在，此在一定是在世存在）Indeed, as portrayed by it, progression in philosophy would be rather a retrogression and a grounding, only by virtue of which it then follows as result that that, with which the beginning was made, was not just an arbitrary assumption but was in fact the truth, and the first truth at that.事实上正如被这个观点所勾勒的，在哲学上的这种进展本身他恰恰是回溯性的，我们反而要弄清楚莱茵河儿这种蛇皮为什么把哲学的开端看成一种冒险性的探索，我们反而要领会这种冒险性的探索这个环节是如何在逻辑学的次第里生成的，我们反而要为他的蛇皮开端做奠基，他的观点不是必然的，我们反而要问什么是假设性，何为问题性，我们反而要装载一个问题性，我们要成为一个问题性，我们要对一个问题性本身加以明悟（不要预设前后关系，你们在把握逻辑学之间不要妄加评述，你们那个顺序不对）通过这个奠基，他才作为结果产生出来，才看到哲学上有这样的进展，伴随这个奠基，这个开端就发生了，他不是一个专断的假设，他就是第一个真相（为什么是第一个，不是他在逻辑次序第一个，是他第一个打破了专断性的）（因为他在我们的哲学范式中回过头去看到所谓的哲学发展的这个开始有起点，也就是说为什么对直接性的哲学思考会是逻辑学的开端，因为哲学他自以为他排除了直接性）【说人必须懂谓词逻辑的人，扼杀了数十亿的人权，你完全没有智性成就】只有靠回归才有开端，没有回溯性就没有开端性，回溯性抹除自己的中介过程就是开端，回溯活动就是开端，这个开端就不是工作假设，事实上是第一个真相，直接性可能是回溯性的抹除中介性，是脏的，之所以为纯粹就是有反思的。(如果说有某种真理的话，真理就是一个这里对于他自己的运动得到了把握的，自己看到自己运动的一个理念、反思)（truth就是 in itself和for itself）

回溯性的设立，把他那个回溯性过程本身取消掉，把他的预设性过程、设定性过程取消掉，开端本身是回溯性给他建造的。【这几段非常重要】

不要预设太多东西，也要预设“预设” 本身也是被预设的，不可避免的预设性本身是预设的、被中介的、绝对的

莱茵河儿的为什么犯错，他把绝对缘由看成是hypothetically和problematically，

（假设的和有问题的）如果“预设性”本身是不可被预设的、绝对的，如果问题性身就是绝对呢，如果绝对本身就是这种失衡状态呢，这种倾倒呢，这种运动呢。

一切都要靠工作假设，这一点 为什么没有假设

我们不能有一个无限倒退的终极原理，那么这种不可倒推性怎么在这里停止倒推了

如果这种矢口否认是中介性的中介就是开端呢，

黑格尔把往回不停的回溯开端这件事本身我们会惶恐的觉得不能这样必须要有开端，又实事求是的讲他不得不这样，这种两难性就是开端

这种自我抹除他自身的难题性，抹除他自身无限回溯性的后撤性的这么一个直接性、偶然性、暂时性、不靠谱的假设的这个力量就是开端

问题不得不被扬弃又不得不呈现他自己这就是开端（纯有就是这种不得不被扬弃又不得不维持自身的问题意识）