【自译短篇】米兰·多拉巧解“自我他者化”

原文：In order to be anything, it has to take the risk of becoming other thing itself, of bouncing into its other. So, the self is empty in itself. 

if it doesn't take the risk of adopting the otherness, of bouncing into the otherness. So this is "Sichanderswerden", this goes for any entity we would say. 

Any entity is empty in itself and the origin is empty in itself unless it takes the risk of Sichanderswerden, unless it produces something that called "beyond that origin", something that negates that origin.

In order to be anything at all, it has to adopt the otherness. This is extremely basic Hegel's stance. And one other way to present the idea is the idea of "the fall". Slavoj Zizek has written quite a bit about the question about "the fall".

You can take "the fall" in the biblical sense: There was a paradise and then there is a "fall" from paradise--is the narrative which is usually given. But Hegel's idea of "the fall" is that we start with the fall and paradise, which existed before, when an entity is closed in itself, is a retroactive construction.

So, things have to be "fall" in order to be themselves. I mean they are not themselves in the supposed paradise of their self-identity. It's only after the fall, that we can construct what they were supposed to be in themselves. 'Cause before the fall they were empty.

We only retroactively have the idea of the fullness of origin. Origin for Hegel is always empty. It is an empty thing. It's not full wealth from which things should have evolved. It's an empty thing and the only one before, from this alleged paradise of self-identity let's say. Only then can we retroactively see what supposedly precedes it.

But in our imagination we can't help doing the narrative -- imagining is a narrative-- of some fullness of being which then fell.

译文：为了是任何东西，自我就必须冒险变成其他东西，与自我的他者正面遭遇。所以，自我如果不冒险将他者性容纳在内，从而遇见他者，自我就自身而言就是空的。所以这就是“自我他者化”，我们讲的实体都适用这个道理。

任何实体就自身而言都是空的，且如果不进行自我他者化并创造出超越本原的东西、一种扬弃了本原的东西，本原就自身而言也会是空的。

为了是任何东西，就必须要接纳他者性。这是黑格尔的基本立场。另一种可以用来说明这个观念的是“堕落”这一概念。齐泽克已经写了一些关于“堕落”的东西。

你可以在经典（圣经）意义上把握“堕落”这个概念：曾有天堂，而后有从天堂中“堕落”下来——这是一般的叙事。但是黑格尔意义上的“堕落”则是：堕落是我们的起点，而之前存在的那个天堂，即实体与自我同一的那个时刻，是一种回溯性建构。

所以，物为了是物自身必须要先“堕落”。我的意思是它们在假设中的那个自我同一的天堂中还不是自身。而只有在堕落之后，我们才能够建构起它们自身所应当是的那个样子。因为堕落之前，它们是空的。

我们只有在回溯性的建构中才产生“本原的完满性”这一概念。黑格尔意义上的本原是空的。是空的东西。事物不是从完满的丰富性中演化出来的。本原是空的、唯一的，是来自于假设中自我同一的天堂的先在。然后，我们才能回溯性地看到先于它的那个东西。

但是在想象中我们忍不住去建构这种叙事（想象是一种叙事），这种叙事认为先有存在者的某种完满，然后这种完满的存在堕落了。

（以上为2018年4月12日讲座切片）