中英双语 | “前沿经济体”国家，哪里是跨国企业的下一个金矿？
前沿经济体并非想象中那么可怕，对于寻找新增长点的企业来说，与风险俱来的是高收益。本文将进入前沿经济体的企业分为4大类：苦力型、集群创造者、经纪人和食利者，并分别给出了它们的战略设计建议。
对于寻求两位数增长的跨国公司，机会越来越少。他们越来越关注低收入、高风险的国家——既是进口新市场，也是出口平台。
Global players in search of double-digit growth are running out of opportunities. They are paying more attention to low-income, high-risk countries both as new markets for selling goods and services and as platforms from which to export them elsewhere.
这些被我们称之为“前沿经济体（frontier economies）”的国家，可能看起来并非前路光明的伊甸园——被政府干预的市场，脆弱的法制体系，人均收入低或GDP增长艰难。但在未来5年里预计增长最快的25个国家中，19个是前沿经济体，其中包括缅甸、莫桑比克、越南和卢旺达。很多前沿经济体都蕴藏着世界上最丰富的未开采矿藏和金属资源；尽管目前商品价格疲软，开发这些资源的全球投资仍将继续拉动收入和增长。这一点的重要性在于，前沿经济体增长很少受全球经济趋势左右，即使有时国家风险因素的指向并不乐观，抢占先机者依旧能收获更多的外商投资回报。
These “frontier economies,” as we call them, may not seem like promising terrain; they are characterized by politically manipulated markets, weak legal systems, and either low per capita income or faltering GDP. Yet of the 25 countries forecast to grow the fastest over the next five years, 19 are frontier economies. Among them are Myanmar, Mozambique, Vietnam, and Rwanda. Many are home to the world’s largest untapped sources of minerals and metals, and despite the current soft commodity prices, global investment in developing these resources will continue to boost income and growth. That’s important because it means that growth in frontier economies depends relatively little on overall global economic trends, and first movers can reap better returns on foreign investments than the sometimes alarming country risk factors might suggest.
另外，聪明的公司发现，其中一些风险被过分夸大了。前沿经济体中受政治左右的市场大多限于有巨额资本投入的领域，比如自然资源开采或基础设施。相比之下，像创造资源附加值一类投入相对较少的领域，不易受政治干扰；而且价值创造和迅速发展未开发领域的空间也比较大。比如蒂芙尼（Tiffany & Company）除了在比利时，也成功在柬埔寨、博茨瓦纳、毛里求斯和越南开展钻石抛光业务。
Some of those risks, moreover, turn out to be overblown, as smart companies are discovering. Politically engineered market distortions in frontier economies are often limited to sectors characterized by very large capital investments, such as natural resource extraction or infrastructure. By contrast, sectors where relatively smaller sums of money are involved (such as value-added work on resources) tend to attract less political interest, and there is scope for competing on value and rapidly growing underdeveloped sectors. For example, Tiffany & Company has successful diamond-polishing operations in Cambodia, Botswana, Mauritius, and Vietnam, along with operations in Belgium.
即使是在竞争严重受到政府制约的行业中，选对了细分领域和战略的外国企业也能成功。实际上，与金砖国家或东南亚小龙相比，前沿经济体中公司面临的竞争要小得多，因此能在更长时间内享受更高的利润空间。
Even in industries where competition is skewed by government manipulation, foreign players that target the right sectors with the right strategies can prosper. In fact, companies operating in frontier economies often encounter significantly less competition than they’d face in a BRIC or tiger economy and are therefore likely to enjoy higher profit margins for longer periods.
我们在下文中提供框架，帮助你分析清楚是否应该选择前沿经济体，选择哪些，以及如何在你所选的市场竞争中胜出。
In the following pages we offer a framework to help you figure out whether and where to play and how to win in the spaces you choose to compete in.
Mapping the Opportunities
谋划机遇
寻找前沿经济体中机遇的第一步，是沿两个维度评估所在行业的竞争环境。（1）盈利能力取决于相互竞争的公司，而非政府政策和行为（2）无论主要聚焦国内销售还是对外出口，任何行业均包含在以下4大门类中。
The first step in identifying opportunities in a frontier economy is to assess the competitive environment of its industries along two dimensions: (1) the degree to which profitability is determined by competition between firms and not by government policies and actions and (2) whether the industry is focused primarily on domestic sales or on exports. Industries will fall into one of four categories.
苦力型
Workhorses
这一领域中，企业相对规模小，面向国内顾客销售产品，企业间采取常规商业战略相互竞争，通过产品差异化、运营效率、营销和人力资源发展获得竞争优势。典型的苦力型公司包括当地制造商（家具厂、瓶装水厂等等），服务供应商（小建筑公司，出租车行），零售商（杂货店、药店），以及面向国内或当地市场的小农场。在多数前沿经济体中，苦力型公司雇用了大多数劳动力。例如，联合利华就在海外进行苦力型业务，向非洲国家当地消费者出售清洁剂。
In this category, relatively small companies sell to domestic customers and compete with one another using normal business strategies, seeking competitive advantage through product differentiation, operational efficiency, marketing, and human resource development. Typical examples of workhorse firms include local manufacturers (furniture makers and water bottlers, for example), service providers (small construction firms, taxi drivers), retailers (grocery stores, pharmacies), and small farms serving the domestic or local market. In most frontier economies, workhorse businesses employ the majority of the labor force. An example of a foreign company operating in this category is Unilever making and selling detergent to local consumers in African countries.
集群创造者
Cluster builders
该领域的公司针对出口互相竞争，它们往往是服务于发达国家大型外企的供应链伙伴。这类企业通常身处产业“集群”，以便利用低廉的制造成本，熟练或廉价的劳动力及其他资源，并从多种经验丰富的供应商，或来自当地市场的需求中获益。因为出口集群企业围绕价格和品质竞争，清晰、鼓励商业的法律法规对它们大有裨益，而且它们需要健全的机制来履行合同。典型的集群创造者包括电子和服装制造商，航运公司或呼叫中心等国际服务供应商。Gap在缅甸的服装制造业务属于此类。
Companies in this category compete with one another in export businesses, often as supply chain partners to large foreign corporations serving developed markets. Such firms typically locate in industry “clusters” to take advantage of low production costs, availability of skilled or cheap labor and other inputs, the presence of multiple and sophisticated suppliers, or demand from the local market. Because export cluster firms compete on price and quality, they benefit from clear and business-friendly laws and regulations, and they require well-developed institutions around contract enforcement. Typical players include electronics and garment manufacturers and international service providers such as shipping lines or call centers. Gap’s clothing manufacturing in Myanmar falls into this category.
经纪人
Powerbrokers
和苦力型一样，此类公司服务国内市场，但它们在深受政治影响的行业开展业务。典型例子包括大型电信公司、公共事业、基础设施供应商、水泥制造商和汽油经销商。总部位于华盛顿特区的Symbion Power就是该领域的外来公司，该能源企业在坦桑尼亚、肯尼亚、马达加斯加等前沿市场开发运营发电站。发达国家中此类业务通常受到法规限制，目的是促进竞争或保护消费者。而在前沿经济体中，法规主要让政府或特权阶层获利。
Companies in this category serve the domestic market, as workhorses do, but they operate in industries where political influence has a big role. Typical players include large telecommunications companies, utilities, infrastructure providers, cement manufacturers, and gasoline distributors. An example of a foreign entrant in this space is Washington, D.C.–based Symbion Power, an energy company that develops and operates power plants in Tanzania, Kenya, Madagascar, and other frontier markets. In developed countries, businesses of this kind are usually regulated to promote competition or protect customers. In frontier economies, however, regulation primarily directs profits to the government or privileged interests.
Rentiers
食利者
此类公司为出口导向型，但包括赋税、权利费用以及其他义务等条款都以政府合同形式规定清楚。食利者往往是大型企业，以特许权形式（即基于政府许可）经营，包括油气、矿产和其他资源开采。该领域的执法和合约往往不强，常引起安全和环境问题。利润由账面盈亏决定——公司能把经营成本降到多低——但收入严重受政府从总收入中抽成的影响。矿业巨头Rio Tinto在蒙古的大型铜矿和金矿业务就属于食利者模式。
Companies in this category are export oriented, but the terms of their operation, including taxes, royalties, and other obligations, are spelled out in contracts with the government. Often large, they operate in the “concession” space—that is, on the basis of government licenses—and include oil, gas, mineral, and other resource extractors. Enforcement of regulations and agreements in this category is typically weak, often resulting in safety and environmental problems. Profits are a function of the bottom line—how cheaply firms can conduct their operations—but revenues are greatly affected by how much the government takes off the top. Mining giant Rio Tinto’s massive copper and gold mine in Mongolia operates in the rentier space.
重要的一点是，在不同国家，行业可能属于不同分类，消费电子就是一例。三星在越南是出口业务，但在哈萨克斯坦大部分产品都在国内销售。另外重要的一点是，不要将行业划分得过于宽泛。例如，很多领域可能有赖于政府政策和行为，但依然包括很多苦力型企业。在石油业，开采公司与政府商讨特许权，并估算征用风险，而石油服务公司通过常规渠道与石油巨头争夺业务。
It’s important to note that industries may fall into different categories in different countries. Take consumer electronics. Samsung is an export business in Vietnam, but in Kazakhstan its sales are largely domestic. It’s also important not to define industries too broadly. Many sectors may hinge on government policies and actions, for example, but contain significant workhorse pockets. In the oil industry, extractors negotiate concession terms with governments and assume expropriation risk, while oil service firms compete for business from the oil majors through the usual channels.
一旦你清楚了行业分类，就可以开始相应地划分前沿经济体的GDP。如此你就能看到国家经济的组成部分，占主导地位的当地利益，让你了解到自己在那里有几成机遇。（图表《布局前沿》显示了两个前沿经济体截然不同的分类组成。）
Once you’ve completed the industry categorization, you can segment the GDP of the frontier economy accordingly. This enables you to see how the country’s economy breaks down, exposing the dominant local interests, and gives you a sense of the scale of your opportunity there. (The exhibit “Mapping Frontiers” shows how two very different frontier economies stack up.)
每个门类都与具体主导战略相关，而且所面临的种种风险也截然不同。因此，按4大类别划分行业的过程不仅能揭示你在哪里有最好的机会，也能帮你发现把握机会的最佳战略。让我们从苦力型行业的战略和风险开始分析。
The exercise of mapping industries to the four categories not only reveals where your best opportunities lie but also helps identify your best strategy for pursuing them. That’s because each category is associated with a particular dominant strategy and is exposed to a distinct menu of risks. Let’s begin by looking at strategies and risks for workhorse industries.
苦力型战略
Strategies for Workhorses
成功的苦力型公司看起来和其他地方的优秀企业没什么两样：它们实施并利用现有能力，调整营销和分销战略以应对当地口味和限制。大型跨国公司可能希望超越本土竞争对手，但现实情况远非如此。本土企业深知当地市场情况，并与成功关键的利益相关方建立了联系。（有关强大本土竞争对手的例子，详见边栏《竞争可能比你想象的激烈》。）
Successful workhorse firms look like successful firms anywhere: They adapt and leverage existing capabilities and adjust their marketing and distribution strategies to reflect local tastes and constraints. Big multinationals might expect to outperform local competitors, but this is far from universally the case. Domestic companies know the market conditions intimately and have developed the relationships with stakeholders necessary to succeed. (For an example of a strong homegrown competitor, see “Competition May Be Tougher Than You Think.”)
对于外来者，与强大的本土企业竞争通常需要一些能挑战目标国现有商业模式的颠覆式创新，也可能需要重新定义进入者的产品或服务。以联合利华为例，其典型供应链当中的关键元素——超市和现代零售店，只占非洲前沿市场的一小部分。非洲的消费者每天收入低于2美元，因此每天只在社区简陋的小店里购买小包装的清洁剂、牙膏或食用油。店主在附近的市镇或分销商那里购买大包装产品，然后自己分装成没有商标的小包装出售，售价折合成每盎司或克重后十分昂贵。
For foreign entrants, competing with strong local businesses often requires some disruptive innovation that challenges the dominant business model in the target country and may well require redefining the entrant’s product or service as well. Take the case of Unilever. Supermarkets and modern retail stores—key players in its typical supply chain—serve only a small fraction of the trade in frontier markets in Africa. Consumers there make less than $2 a day, so they buy small sachets of detergent, toothpaste, or cooking fat on a daily basis in informal shops in their communities. Store owners buy big packs of these products in nearby towns or from distributors and then prepare unbranded packets themselves, which they sell at extremely high prices per ounce or gram.
联合利华吸取了其子公司印度斯坦利华的经验，意识到在非洲的机遇：跳过中间商，直接以更低价生产分销自己的小包装产品。效仿在印度的做法，联合利华搭建了农村地区的销售网络，建立多层级分销系统，聘用地区经销商负责将产品配送到当地分销商手中，由当地分销商向一线销售人员提供培训和产品。尽管由于包装和分销成本降低了单位利润率，但薄利多销。在非洲其他市场，联合利华不仅改变了包装，还改变了产品本身特点：例如开发出了不需要冷藏的人造黄油。
Drawing on the experience of its subsidiary Hindustan Lever, in India, Unilever realized that there was an opportunity in Africa to serve customers by cutting out the middleman and producing and directly distributing its own small-format packages at a lower price. As it had done in India, Unilever developed a network of salespeople in rural areas, employing a multitiered distribution system with regional distributors in charge of taking the product to local distributors, who provided training and supplies to the salespeople on the ground. Although the margins per unit were low because of packaging and distribution costs, there was potential for huge volume. In other African markets, Unilever has changed not just packaging but characteristics of the products themselves; for instance, it has developed margarine that does not require refrigeration.
在食利者或经纪人领域的苦力型企业往往是外来者的理想目标，可以作为未来增长的平台，比如尼日利亚的海卡集团（Sea Trucks Group）。荷兰创业家雅克·鲁曼（Jacques Roomans）在1977年成立了海卡集团，其最初是尼日尔三角洲的油气公司的保险经纪机构。如今该公司供应一系列具有复杂技术含量的产品和服务，包括SURF（水下连紧管、立管和出油管线），水下基础设施，和刚性输油管道铺设。海卡集团在规划、设计、实施以及交付尼日利亚客户的项目过程中，尽最大可能让尼日利亚当地人参与。CEO兼总裁鲁曼（Roomans）和高管团队继续在尼日利亚旧都拉各斯工作，即使该公司已经发展到其他新兴和前沿国家，在马来西亚、安哥拉、加纳、巴西、俄罗斯和墨西哥都赢得了合同。
Workhorse pockets in rentier or powerbroker sectors are often good target markets for foreign entrants and can serve as a platform for future growth. Take the case of Nigeria-based Sea Trucks Group. Founded in 1977 by Dutch entrepreneur Jacques Roomans, Sea Trucks started as an insurance broker to oil and gas companies in the Niger Delta. Today, the company provides a range of technologically sophisticated products and services, including SURF (subsea umbilicals, raisers, and flowlines), subsea infrastructure, and rigid-pipeline laying. Sea Trucks maximizes local Nigerian participation in planning, engineering, implementation, and delivery of projects for Nigeria-based clients. Roomans, the CEO and president of the group, and the senior team have continued to work out of Lagos even as the company has globalized to other emerging and frontier countries, winning contracts in Malaysia, Angola, Ghana, Brazil, Russia, and Mexico.
出口集群战略
Strategies for Export Clusters
很多公司从前沿经济体供应商采购制成品，或在前沿经济体建立自己的制造厂房，主要是因为受到廉价劳动力的吸引。在一些前沿经济体中，虐待现象普遍存在，但当地政府怕失去出口机会，不总是采取措施应对。然而发达国家的消费者越来越关注前沿经济体中的劳工处境、对环境的破坏和来自政府的压迫；他们的行为能大幅改变经济图景。
Many companies source manufactured goods from suppliers in frontier economies or set up their own manufacturing facilities there, the attraction generally being the availability of cheap labor. In some frontier economies, however, abuses are widespread, and local governments don’t always take action to correct them for fear of losing export opportunities. Consumers in the developed world, however, are increasingly sensitive to labor conditions, environmental damage, and government oppression in frontier economies; their behavior can change the economic picture dramatically.
2001年，缅甸价值8.5亿美元的出口服装中，超过一半的目的地是美国。但作为对“草根运动”和缅甸独裁政府的抵制，在2003年美国禁止来自缅甸的商品进口，美国服装公司撤出了缅甸，使缅甸的出口一落千丈。当然局势也可能扭转。随着2010年昂山素季被释放，包括美国服装巨头Gap在内的跨国公司以及发展机构纷纷开始回归缅甸。
In 2001 more than half of Myanmar’s $850 million in garment exports went to the United States. But in response to grassroots activism and boycotts protesting Myanmar’s authoritarian regime, followed by a 2003 U.S. embargo on imports from the country, U.S. clothing companies exited Myanmar, and its exports plunged. The pendulum can swing back, of course—with the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, in 2010, investors, multinationals (including U.S. clothing giant Gap), and development agencies started queuing up again in Myanmar.
如果公司想保持在前沿经济体的制造业地位，仅采取获得廉价劳动力的战略还不够；它们必须作为集群制造者行动。明智的企业越来越意识到，很多来自相同出口行业的公司在前沿经济体聚在一处，能在劳动技能、供应商密度和法规支持上产生长期协同效应。集群还有助于消除它们目标市场（发达国家）的法律限制，并且引来援助和发展投资。
If companies are to maintain an enduring manufacturing presence in frontier economies, their strategies must be about more than just access to cheap labor; they must act as cluster builders. Smart companies increasingly recognize the long-term synergies—in terms of labor skills, density of suppliers, and regulatory support—that can result when many firms of the same export industry colocate in a frontier economy. Clusters also help to unblock legal restrictions in the developed markets they serve and act as a magnet for aid and development investment.
Fruit Company（ITFC）是加纳贫困北部地区一家核心-承包型公司（在核心大面积农田周边建立小农户种植园——译者注），直接向欧洲市场出口有机芒果。ITFC拥有400英亩专业运营的商业农场（核心），同时，该组织也与周边地区1200多家小农场主（承包）合作。作为零利息、实物贷款和广泛培训的交换，小农场主同意拿出一两英亩地专门用有机方式种植芒果，并通过ITFC的营销渠道销售，收入用来偿还贷款。通过培育农场主集群，该公司无须在公社和酋长土地制地区进行冗繁、不稳定的土地集约运作，就能维持较大规模运营。
Consider the Integrated Tamale Fruit Company (ITFC), a nucleus-and-outgrower organization in Ghana’s poor northern region that exports organic mangoes directly to the European market. ITFC has its own 400-acre, professionally run commercial farm, but it also works with more than 1,200 smallholder farmers in the surrounding area (the “outgrowers”). In exchange for an interest-free, in-kind loan and extensive training, the smallholders agree to grow mangoes on an acre or two of their land using organic techniques and to sell them through ITFC’s marketing channels. The proceeds are used to repay the loans. By nurturing this cluster of farmers, the company can operate at greater scale without the tedious and uncertain process of assembling acreage in an area with communal and chieftaincy-organized land use.
ITFC的努力为当地农民的收入带来了翻天覆地增长，并引起了非洲开发银行和美国政府的“千年挑战公司”等发展机构及加纳政府的关注。这些组织和机构均已加入支持和扩展集群的规划中，并斥资改善乡村道路建设。
ITFC’s efforts, which have led to transformational income growth for local farmers, have attracted the attention of development agencies such as the African Development Bank and the U.S. government’s Millennium Challenge Corporation, as well as the Ghanaian government. These organizations have stepped in to bolster and expand the cluster scheme and to finance improvements in rural roads.
前沿经济体中的集群创建也出现在高科技产业中。总部在美国的风投公司Socialatom Ventures投资那些面向全球提供服务，并且聘用拉美人才的初创企业。在哥伦比亚的麦德林，它与负责在该城市推动创新的国企Ruta N合作，开发当地初创企业集群并培养程序员。Socialatom还与当地大学合作，提升它们的工程学课程。通过非营利机构Coderise，该公司还在欠发达地区组织设计思维和编程技术的儿童训练营。
Cluster building in frontier economies is happening in high-tech industries as well. Socialatom Ventures, a U.S.-based venture capital firm, invests in start-ups that sell services globally using Latin American talent. In Medellin, Colombia, it has partnered with Ruta N, a public corporation charged with promoting innovation in the city, to develop a local cluster of start-ups and programmers. Socialatom has also teamed up with local universities to improve their engineering curricula. And through its nonprofit foundation Coderise, it runs boot camps in design thinking and coding skills for children from disadvantaged areas.
经纪人和食利者战略
Strategies for Powerbrokers and Rentiers
在食利者或经纪人领域拥有一席之地并维护利益，往往比苦力型或出口集群型领域要难。很多情况下，食利者或经纪人项目具有政治风险极高的公众身份。
Staking out and protecting interests in rentier or powerbroker sectors is usually harder than operating in a workhorse sector or an export cluster. In many cases, rentier or powerbroker projects take on very public identities that carry significant political risks.
玻利维亚的“水战争”（Water War）就是很好的例子。1999年，玻利维亚政府私有化了位于科恰班巴的国有水务公司SEMAPA。柏科特（Bechtel）、Edison和西班牙能源公司Abengoa创建的合资公司Aguas del Tunari赢得了改造这座中型城市供水的合同。（该城市约40%人口往往没有饮用水。与更富有、用水量多的市民相比，相对贫穷的市民用水量少，因此每立方米的水费更高。最贫穷的市民没有进入供水系统，不得不以天价从水罐车上买水。）Aguas del Tunari迅速让超过30%的缺水人口用上了水。为了资助该公司已取得的进展和未来发展， 2000年1月，政府允许水价提高35%。NGO和当地社会团体立刻谴责这种做法属于漫天要价，几千人走上科恰班巴街头，要求政府终止该特许权。4月，政府向民众让步，恢复原价，并最终废除了合同。
The so-called Water War in Bolivia is a case in point. In 1999, the government of Bolivia privatized SEMAPA, the state-owned water company in Cochabamba. Aguas del Tunari, a joint venture between Bechtel, Edison, and the Spanish energy company Abengoa, was awarded the contract to revamp water provision in the midsize city. (Some 40% of the population often did not have potable water. Low-volume users, who were relatively poor, paid more per cubic meter than wealthier high-volume users. The very poorest, who had no connection to the system at all, had to buy water from tanker trucks at exorbitant prices.) Aguas del Tunari rapidly expanded the supply of water to 30% more of the population. To help the company pay for this and future improvements, the government allowed an increase in water tariffs of 35% in January 2000. NGOs and local social groups immediately condemned the price hike as abusive, and thousands of people took to the streets of Cochabamba to demand that the government terminate the concession. In April the government caved, rolling back the price hikes and eventually revoking the contract.
为了成功，海外企业可以通过增加和多样化利益相关方减小类似风险。做法之一是，通过CSR项目为苦力型企业创造机会。例如矿业巨头必和必拓（BHPB）在莫桑比克就炼铝项目进行了大量投资。2001年，与莫桑比克政府和国际金融公司（IFC）合作，BHPB成立了“赋权与联动中小企业项目”（Small and Medium Enterprise Empowerment and Linkage Program）。该项目向当地承包商提供和BHPB竞争合同以及培训工人的技术。此举激发了当地工程公司的发展，并传播了采购、物料处理以及工程服务方面的最佳实践。BHPB开始与当地企业共享其很大部分价值链，让当地社区获益良多。
Foreign firms can reduce this type of risk by increasing and diversifying stakeholders in their success. One way to do that is to create workhorse pockets through CSR programs. Take the case of mining giant BHP Billiton (BHPB), which made a massive investment in Mozambique with its aluminum smelter project. In 2001, working with the Mozambican government and the International Finance Corporation, BHPB set up the Small and Medium Enterprise Empowerment and Linkages Program. The program gave local contractors the skills necessary to compete for contracts with BHPB and trained their workers. This stimulated the development of local engineering firms and disseminated best practices in procurement, materials handling, and engineering services. BHPB began to offer local businesses large shares in its value chain, bringing many positive benefits to the community.
海外公司意识到让利益相关方参与，非常重要，加拿大资源公司Sherritt就明白这点，其在马达加斯加的Ambatovy项目在施工阶段需要约1.1万名当地工人，这使得Sherritt成了该国最大的雇主。如果政府取消合同，公司的总体劳动力构成的选民实力足以形成声讨。但必然地，随着建设进入尾声，员工们因为即将遭到遣散，也不会满意。为了延续这一为期30年工程带来的福利，Sherritt决定在建筑工期结束后继续资助建筑工人。时任Sherritt CEO的伊安·德兰尼（Ian Delaney）解释说：“我们开发的系统能养活项目雇佣的当地人。哪怕他们不再为我们工作，至少每天公司可以为他们提供一顿饭。我们也避免了让他们和国家的收入出现波动，以后每月支付他们5到15美元。”
It’s important for foreign firms to realize that when they engage stakeholders, the commitment must be long term. The Canadian resource company Sherritt understands this. Its Ambatovy project, in Madagascar, required the labor of approximately 11,000 locals for the construction phase, which made Sherritt the largest employer in the country. The company’s workforce was a powerful constituency that would complain if the government were to cancel Sherritt’s contract. But employees would also be unhappy about the layoffs that were inevitable as construction wound down. In order to sustain goodwill for the 30-year project, therefore, Sherritt decided to continue to support the construction workers after the construction phase. Sherritt’s CEO at the time, Ian Delaney, explained: “We developed a system to feed the locals we had hired for the project [and who were no longer employed with us] at least a meal a day. We also avoided a major income shock to them and their country by paying them $5 to $15 a month going forward.”
除让多个利益相关方参与，即使没有核心业务，公司还有多种方式让自己成为当地不可或缺的合作伙伴。Sherritt在古巴就是如此。该公司在阿尔伯塔的精炼厂需要一种特殊的矿石，因此1994年选择在古巴开矿。为了让Sherritt在当地能有一席之地，Sherritt与古巴政府创建了合资公司，共享古巴矿产和加拿大精炼厂的所有权。此外，Sherritt还承担了工人培训，并帮助古巴政府起草海外投资法规。
As an alternative to engaging with multiple stakeholders, firms can make themselves indispensable to powerful local players in multiple ways, even some that are removed from the core business. Sherritt took this approach in Cuba. The company required a specific kind of ore for its refinery in Alberta, and in 1994 it chose to develop a mine in Cuba. In order to protect its position, Sherritt set up a joint venture with the Cuban government, sharing ownership of both the Cuban mine and the Canadian refinery. In addition, Sherritt undertook to train workers and helped the Cuban government draft a foreign investment law.
在矿产运营了若干年后，古巴政府拥有大量现金，但没有国际市场渠道，于是向Sherritt求助，寻找融资机会开发古巴一些废弃的油田。Sherritt在多伦多发行了债券，与古巴政府一起投资了一家新的合资企业。此后，双方又陆续开办了多家合资公司。这些公司为度假城市Varadero提供能源，还经营酒店、移动电话公司以及大豆加工厂。Sheritt与政府的和谐关系，及其为政府提供急需硬通货的能力，使得其从1994年起，一直是古巴市场上强劲稳定的一员。
A few years after the mine’s operations started, the government, cash-strapped and without access to international markets, asked Sherritt to help it find financing to develop some abandoned oil fields in Cuba. Sherritt issued a bond in Toronto and invested in a new joint venture with the Cuban government. Together they created other joint ventures to produce energy for the resort town of Varadero and to operate a hotel, a mobile phone company, and a soy-processing plant. Sherritt’s good relationship with the government, not to mention its ability to provide the government with much-needed hard currency, has made it a stable and profitable player in Cuba since 1994.
很多分析师认为，鉴于目前利率升高，商品价格偏低的大环境，最好不要选择前沿经济体。如果听从了这样的建议，很多跨国企业都会吃1998年亚洲金融危机之后撤离新兴市场的后悔药——错过了长达15年的丰厚回报。因为股票市场不足以让多数投资者了解前沿经济体。了解它们，往往须进行实地考察和直接投资。对长期增长耐心、审慎的分析，以及选择恰当的战略，能让在如今前沿经济体中立足的企业获得丰厚回报。
Many analysts see the current environment of rising interest rates and lower commodity prices as a reason to stay away from frontier economies. But following that advice might lead to the same regrets felt by the many multinationals that pulled out of emerging markets after the Asian financial crisis of 1998: They missed a decade and a half of bumper returns. Since equity markets are not deep enough for most investors to get exposure to frontier economies, investments in these places will necessarily be direct and boots-on-the-ground, and may require a decade or more to realize the investment thesis. Patience, careful analysis of long-run growth potential, and an appropriate choice of strategy will reward those companies that stake out a position in today’s frontier economies.
阿尔多·穆萨基奥是位于马萨诸塞州沃尔瑟姆布兰迪斯国际商学院的教授；
埃里克·沃克是位于加拿大不列颠哥伦比亚省温哥华西蒙弗雷泽大学比迪商学院的教授。
原文刊登于《哈佛商业评论》中文版2016年12期 。
