THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO 3

The Theaetetus and the Sophist 

《泰阿泰德篇》和《智者篇》

The Theaetetus begins in the manner of an early dialogue. The question set is ‘What is knowledge?’, and Socrates offers to act as midwife to enable the bright young mathematician Theaetetus to bring the answer to birth. 

《泰阿泰德篇》以一种早期对话的方式开始。所提出的问题是“什么是知识？”，苏格拉底提出要充当助产士，帮助聪明的年轻数学家泰阿泰德产生答案。

The first suggestion is that knowledge consists of things like geometry and carpentry; but this will not do as a definition, for the word ‘knowledge’ itself would turn up if we tried to give definitions of geometry and carpentry. What Socrates is looking for is what is common to all these different kinds of knowledge. 

第一个建议是，知识由几何学和木工之类的东西组成；但这不能作为一个定义，因为如果我们试图给出几何学和木工的定义，‘知识’这个词本身就会出现。苏格拉底所寻找的是所有这些不同种类的知识所共享的东西。

Theaetetus’ second proposal is that knowledge is perception: to know something is to encounter it with the senses. 

泰阿泰德的第二个提议是，知识就是感知：知道某件事就是用感官与之相遇。

Socrates observes that different people’s senses are differently affected: the same wind may be felt by one person as warm and by another as chilly. 

苏格拉底观察到，不同人的感官受到不同的影响：同一阵风可能被一个人感觉为温暖，而被另一个人感觉为寒冷。

‘It feels cold’ means ‘it seems cold’, so that perceiving is the same thing as seeming.

‘它感觉冷’意味着‘它看起来冷’，所以感知就是看起来的东西。

Only what is true can be known, so if knowledge is perceiving, we will have to accept the doctrine of Protagoras that whatever seems is true, or at least that what seems to a particular person is true for him. 

只有真实的东西才能被知道，所以如果知识是感知，我们就必须接受普罗泰戈拉的断言，即无论看起来什么都是真实的，或者至少对于一个特定的人来说，看起来什么都是对他而言真实的。

Behind Protagoras lies Heraclitus. If it is true that everything in the world is constantly undergoing change, then the colours we see and the qualities we feel cannot be objective, stable realities. 

在普罗泰戈拉背后是赫拉克利特。如果世界上的一切都在不断地变化，那么我们看到的颜色和我们感觉到的品质就不能是客观的、稳定的现实。

Rather, each is the offspring of a momentary meeting between one of our senses and some corresponding transitory item in the universal flux. 

相反，每一个都是我们感官之一和普遍流变中某个相应的瞬间事物之间短暂相遇的产物。

When an eye, for instance, comes into contact with an appropriate visible counterpart, the eye begins to see whiteness and the object begins to look white.

例如，当一只眼睛与一个合适的可见对应物接触时，眼睛开始看到白色，而物体开始显现白色。

The whiteness itself is generated by the intercourse between these two parents, the eye and the object. 

白色本身是由这两个来源，眼睛和物体之间的交互产生的。

The eye and its object, no less than the whiteness they beget, are themselves involved in the universal flux; they are not motionless, but their motion is slow by comparison with the speed with which the sense-impressions come and go. 

眼睛和它的对象本身也参与了普遍的流变，和他们所产生的白色并无两样；它们并不是静止的，但它们的运动与感觉印象来去的速度相比是缓慢的。

The eye’s seeing of the white object, and the whiteness of the object itself, are two twins which are born and die together. 

眼睛对白色物体的看见，以及物体本身的白色，是一对共生共死的双胞胎。

A similar story can be told of the other senses: and thus we can see, at least in the realm of the sensation, why Protagoras should say that whatever seems, is; for the existence of a quality, and its appearance to the appropriate sense, are inseparable from each other. 

其他感官也可以讲一个类似的故事：因此我们可以看到，至少在感觉的领域里，为什么普罗泰戈拉应该说无论看起来什么都是；因为一个品质的存在，和它对适当的感官的显现，是不可分割的。

But life is not all sensation. We have dreams, in which we have wings and fly; madmen suffer delusions in which they feel themselves gods. Surely these are seemings which do not accord with reality? 

但生活并不全是感觉。我们有梦，梦里我们长着翅膀飞翔；疯子们遭受妄想症，觉得自己是神。这些难道不是与现实不符的看起来的东西吗？

Half our life is spent asleep, and perhaps we can never be sure whether we are awake or dreaming; so how can any of us say that whatever seems to him at any given moment is true? 

我们一半的生活是在睡眠中度过的，也许我们永远不能确定我们是清醒还是在做梦；那么我们怎么能说无论在任何给定的时刻看起来什么对他来说都是真的呢？

For answer, Protagoras can again appeal to Heraclitus. Suppose Socrates falls ill and sweet wine begins to taste sour to him. On the account given above, the sourness is the offspring of two parents, the wine and the taster. 

为了回答，普罗泰戈拉可以再次诉诸赫拉克利特。假设苏格拉底生病了，甜酒开始对他尝起来酸。根据上面给出的说法，酸味是两个来源，酒和品尝者的产物。

But Socrates sick is a different taster from Socrates healthy, and with a different parent the offspring is naturally different. 

但是生病的苏格拉底和健康的苏格拉底是不同的品尝者，有了不同的来源，结果自然也不同。

As every perceiver is constantly changing, each perception is a unique, unrepeatable experience. 

由于每一个感知者都在不断地变化，每一个感知都是一个独一无二、不可重复的经验。

It may not be true that the wine is sour, but it is true that it is sour for Socrates. 

酒可能并不是酸的，但对苏格拉底来说它是酸的，这是真的。

No one else is in a position to correct the sick Socrates on this point, and so here too Protagoras is vindicated: whatever seems to me, is true for me. 

没有别人有资格在这一点上纠正生病的苏格拉底，所以在这里普罗泰戈拉也得到了证明：无论看起来什么对我来说都是真的。

Theaetetus can continue to maintain that perception is knowledge. 

泰阿泰德可以继续坚持认为感知就是知识。

But is all knowledge perception? Knowing a language, for instance, is more than just hearing the sounds uttered, which we can do in a language we do not know. 

但所有的知识都是感知吗？比如说，知道一种语言，不仅仅是听到发出的声音，这是我们在一种我们不懂的语言中也可以做到的。

It is true, of course, that I often learn something – say that the Parthenon is on the Acropolis – by seeing it with my own eyes. 

当然，这是真的，我经常通过亲眼看到而学到一些东西——比如说帕特农神庙就在雅典卫城上。

But even after I shut my eyes, or go away, I continue to know that the Parthenon is on the Acropolis. 

但即使我闭上眼睛或离开了，我还是知道帕特农神庙在雅典卫城上。

So memory provides an example of knowledge without perception. 

所以记忆提供了一个没有感知的知识的例子。

But perhaps Theaetetus is not yet beaten: Protagoras might come to his aid by replying that it is possible to know and not know something at the same time, just as, if you clap your hand over one of your eyes, you can both see and not see the same thing at the same time. 

但也许泰阿泰德还没有被打败：普罗泰戈拉可能会来帮助他，回答说有可能同时知道和不知道某件事，就像如果你用手捂住一只眼睛，你可以同时看到和看不到同一件事。

Socrates seems to be reduced to an ad hominem riposte. How can Protagoras claim to be a teacher, and charge fees, if no one is in a better position than anyone else with regard to knowledge, since what appears to each man is true for him? 

苏格拉底似乎被迫降低到了对人不对事的反驳。如果没有人在知识方面比别人更有优势，因为对每个人来说看起来什么都是真的，普罗泰戈拉怎么能声称自己是一位老师，并收取费用呢？

Protagoras would reply that while there is no such thing as teaching someone to give up false thoughts for true thoughts, a teacher can make him give up bad thoughts for good thoughts. 

普罗泰戈拉会回答说，虽然没有教某人放弃错误的思想而接受正确的思想这样的事情，但一个老师可以让他放弃坏的思想而接受好的思想。

For though all seemings are equally true, not all seemings are equally good. 

因为虽然所有的看起来都是同样真实的，但并不是所有的看起来都是同样好的。

A sophist like Protagoras can bring a pupil into a better state, just as a doctor might cure Socrates of the illness that affected his palate, so that the wine would come to taste sweet again. 

像普罗泰戈拉这样的诡辩家可以把一个学生带入一个更好的状态，就像一个医生可能治愈苏格拉底影响他味觉的疾病，使酒再次尝起来甜美。

In response to this, Socrates draws on the argument of Democritus to show that Protagoras’ doctrine is self-refuting. 

为了回应这一点，苏格拉底借用了德谟克利特的论证，以显示普罗泰戈拉的断言是自相矛盾的。

It seems true to all men that some men know better than others about various matters of skill and expertise; if so, that must be true for all men. 

对所有人来说，有些人在各种技能和专业知识方面比其他人更懂，这似乎是真的；如果是这样，那么对所有人来说都必须是真的。

It seems to the majority of people that Protagoras’ thesis is false; if so then his thesis must be more false than true, since the unbelievers outnumber the believers. 

对大多数人来说，普罗泰戈拉的论题是错误的，这似乎也是真的；如果是这样，那么他的论题必须比真实的更加错误，因为不信者比信者多。

Protagoras’ theory may seem on a firm footing as applied to sense-perception, but it is quite implausible if applied to medical diagnosis or political prediction. 

普罗泰戈拉的理论在应用于感知时可能看起来很稳固，但如果应用于医学诊断或政治预测，就相当不合理。

Each man may be the measure of what is, but even in the case of sensations he is not the measure of what will be: a physician knows better than a patient whether he will feel hot, and a vintner will know better than a drinker whether a wine will turn out sweet or dry. 

每个人可能是存在的尺度，但即使在感觉的情况下，他也不是将来会怎样的尺度：一个医生比一个病人更知道他是否会感觉到热，一个酿酒师比一个饮酒者更知道一种酒会变得甜还是干。

But even at its strongest, in the realm of sensation, Protagoras’ claim is vulnerable, Socrates argues, for it depends on the thesis of the universal flux, which is itself incoherent. 

但即使在它最强大的领域——感觉领域，苏格拉底认为普罗泰戈拉的主张也是脆弱的，因为它依赖于普遍流变的论题，而这个论题本身就是不连贯的。

According to the Heracliteans, everything is always changing, in respect both of local motion (movement from place to place) and qualitative alteration (such as the change from white to black). 

根据赫拉克利特派的说法，一切都在不断地变化，无论是在局部运动（从一个地方到另一个地方的运动）还是在质量变化（比如从白色到黑色的变化）方面。

Now if something stayed put, we could describe how it changed in quality, and if we had a patch of constant colour, we could describe how it moved from place to place. 

现在如果有什么东西保持不动，我们就可以描述它在质量上是如何变化的，如果我们有一块恒定的颜色，我们就可以描述它是如何从一个地方移动到另一个地方的。

But if both kinds of change are taking place simultaneously, we are reduced to speechlessness; we cannot say what is moving, or what is altering. 

但如果两种变化同时发生，我们就无话可说了；我们不能说什么在移动，或什么在改变。

Senseperception itself will be in flux: an episode of seeing will turn instantly into an episode of non-seeing; hearing and not hearing will follow each other incessantly. 

感知本身也会处于流变中：看见的一瞬间会立刻变成不看见的一瞬间；听见和不听见会不断地相互交替。

This is so unlike what we take knowledge to be, that if knowledge is identical with perception, knowledge will not be knowledge any more than non-knowledge. 

这与我们认为的知识是什么样的相去甚远，以至于如果知识与感知是相同的，知识就不会比非知识更像知识。

Socrates finally moves in for the kill by turning to examine the bodily organs of the senses: the eyes and ears, the channels through which we see colours and hear sounds. 

苏格拉底最后发起致命一击，转而检查感官的身体器官：眼睛和耳朵，我们通过它们看到颜色和听到声音的渠道。

The objects of one sense cannot be perceived with another: we cannot hear colours or see sounds. 

一个感官的对象不能用另一个感官来感知：我们不能听到颜色或看到声音。

But in that case, the thought that a sound and a colour are not the same as each other, but two different things, cannot be the product of either sight or hearing. 

但在这种情况下，声音和颜色不是彼此相同，而是两种不同的东西，这样的想法不能是视觉或听觉的产物。

Theaetetus has to concede that there are no organs for perceiving sameness and difference or unity and multiplicity; the mind itself contemplates the common terms which apply to everything.

泰阿泰德不得不承认，没有感知相同和差异或统一和多样性的器官；心灵本身思考着适用于一切的共同术语。

But the truth about the most tangible bodily properties can only be reached by the use of these common terms, which belong not to the senses but to the mind. 

但关于最有形的身体属性的真理只能通过使用这些共同术语来达到，这些术语不属于感官，而属于心灵。

Knowledge resides not in the sense-impressions but in the mind’s reflection upon them. 

知识不在于感觉印象，而在于心灵对它们的反思。

At last Theaetetus gives up the thesis that knowledge is perception: he proposes instead that it consists in the judgements of the reflecting mind. 

最后，泰阿泰德放弃了知识是感知的论题：他提出，知识是由心灵反思的判断组成。

Socrates approves of this change of course. When the mind is thinking, he says, it is as if it were talking to itself, asking questions and answering them, saying yes or no. 

苏格拉底赞成这种转变。当心灵在思考时，他说，就好像它在跟自己说话，问问题并回答它们，说是或否。

When it concludes its internal discussion with itself, and comes out silently with its answer, that is a judgement. 

当它结束了与自己的内部讨论，并默默地给出答案时，那就是一个判断。

Knowledge cannot be identified outright with judgement, because there is such a thing as false judgement as well as true judgement. 

知识不能直接地与判断相等同，因为有错误的判断和正确的判断这样的东西。

It is not easy to give an account of false judgement: how can I make the judgement that A = B unless I know what A is and what B is, and if I know that, how can I get the judgement wrong? 

要解释错误的判断并不容易：除非我知道A是什么，B是什么，否则我怎么能做出A = B的判断呢？如果我知道了，我怎么会判断错呢？

The possibility of false judgement seems to threaten us with having to admit that someone can know and not know the same thing at the same time. 

错误判断的可能性似乎迫使我们不得不承认，有人可以同时知道和不知道同一件事。

Let us suppose, Socrates now suggests, that the mind is a wax tablet. When we want to commit something to memory we stamp an impression or an idea on this tablet, and so long as the stamp remains we remember. 

让我们假设，苏格拉底现在建议，心灵是一块蜡板。当我们想要记住某件事时，我们就在这块蜡板上印上一个印象或一个想法，只要印记还在，我们就记得。

False judgement may occur in the following way. Socrates knows Theaetetus and his tutor Theodorus and he has images of each of them stamped on the tablet of his memory; but seeing Theaetetus at a distance, he mistakenly matches him not to his own image, but to the image of Theodorus. 

错误的判断可能以以下方式发生。苏格拉底认识泰阿泰德和他的导师泰奥多罗斯，他在他的记忆蜡板上印有他们每个人的形象；但是从远处看到泰阿泰德时，他错误地把他与自己的形象不匹配，而是与泰奥多罗斯的形象匹配。

The more indistinct the images on the wax become, the more possible it is that such mistakes are made. 

蜡板上的图像越模糊，这样的错误就越有可能发生。

False judgement, then, comes about through a mismatch between perception and thought. 

那么，错误的判断就是通过感知和思想之间的不匹配而产生的。

But are there not cases where we make false judgements when no perception is in question: when we make a mistake in working out a sum in arithmetic, for instance?

但是，当没有感知问题时，我们是否没有做出错误判断的情况：例如，当我们在算术中算错一个和时？

In order to take account of these cases, Socrates says that it is possible to possess knowledge without holding it in your mind on a particular occasion, just as you can possess a coat without wearing it. 

为了考虑这些情况，苏格拉底说，有可能拥有知识而不在特定场合把它放在心里，就像你可以拥有一件外套而不穿它一样。

Think of the mind now not as a waxen tablet, but as an aviary. We are born with a mind which is an empty cage; as we learn new things we capture new birds, and knowing something is having the corresponding bird in our collection. 

现在把心灵想象成不是一块蜡板，而是一个鸟舍。我们生来就有一个空笼子般的心灵；当我们学习新东西时，我们捕捉新鸟，知道某件事就是拥有相应的鸟在我们的收藏中。

But if you want to make use of a piece of knowledge, you have to catch the appropriate bird and hold him in your hand before letting him go again. 

但是如果你想利用一块知识，你必须抓住合适的鸟，把它握在手里，然后再放它走。

Thus we explain mistakes in arithmetic: someone who knows no arithmetic has no number birds in his aviary; a person who judges that 7 + 5 = 11 has all the right birds fluttering around, but catches the eleventh bird instead of the twelfth bird. 

这样我们就解释了算术中的错误：不懂算术的人在他的鸟舍里没有数字鸟；一个判断7 + 5 = 11的人脑海中有所有正确的鸟在飞来飞去，但是他抓住了第十一只鸟，而不是第十二只鸟。

Whether or not these similes are sufficient to make clear the nature of false judgement, there is a difficulty, Socrates points out, with the thesis that knowledge is true judgement. 

无论这些比喻是否足以说明错误判断的本质，苏格拉底指出，知识是正确判断的论题有一个困难。

If a jury is persuaded by a clever attorney to bring in a certain verdict, then even though the verdict accords with the facts, the jurors do not have the knowledge that an eye-witness would have. 

如果陪审团被一个聪明的律师说服做出某个裁决，那么即使裁决符合事实，陪审团也没有目击者所拥有的知识。

Theaetetus then modifies his definition so that knowledge is a judgement or belief which is not only true but articulate. 

于是泰阿泰德修改了他的定义，认为知识是一种不仅真实而且清晰的判断或信念。

Socrates then explores three different ways in which a belief about something might be said to be articulate. 

苏格拉底接着探讨了关于某件事的信念可能被说成是清晰的三种不同的方式。

Most obviously, someone has an articulate belief if he can express it in words; but anyone with a true belief who is not deaf and dumb can do this, so it can hardly make the difference between true belief and knowledge. 

最明显的是，如果一个人能用语言表达他的信念，他就有一个清晰的信念；但任何一个有真实信念的人，只要不是聋哑，都可以做到这一点，所以这几乎不能构成真实信念和知识之间的区别。

The second way is the one which Socrates takes most seriously: to have an articulate belief about an object is to be able to offer an analysis of it. 

第二种方式是苏格拉底最认真对待的一种：对一个对象有一个清晰的信念，就是能够提供对它的分析。

Knowledge of a thing is acquired by reducing it to its elements. 

对一件事物的知识是通过把它分解成它的要素而获得的。

But in that case there can be no knowledge of any of the ultimate, unanalysable elements. 

但在这种情况下，就不能有对任何最终、不可分析的要素的知识。

The elements which make up the substances of the world are like the letters which make up the words in a language, and analysing a substance may be compared with spelling a word. 

构成世界物质的要素就像构成语言中单词的字母，分析一种物质可以比作拼写一个单词。

But while one can spell ‘Socrates’ one cannot spell the letter ‘S’. Just as a letter cannot be spelt, the elements of the world cannot be analysed and therefore cannot be known. 

但是虽然可以拼写‘苏格拉底’，却不能拼写字母‘S’。就像一个字母不能被拼写一样，世界的要素不能被分析，因此不能被知道。

But if the elements cannot be known, how can complexes made out of them be known? 

但是如果要素不能被知道，那么由它们组成的复合物又怎么能被知道呢？

Moreover, while knowledge of elements may be necessary if we are to have knowledge of complexes, it is not sufficient; a child might know all his letters, and yet not be able to spell consistently. 

而且，虽然如果我们要有对复合物的知识，对要素的知识可能是必要的，但它并不充分；一个孩子可能知道所有的字母，但却不能一贯地拼写。

On the third interpretation someone has an articulate belief about an object if he can spell out a description which is uniquely true of it. 

在第三种解释中，如果一个人能够拼出一个对它来说唯一真实的描述，他就对一个对象有一个清晰的信念。

Thus, the sun may be described as the brightest of the heavenly bodies. 

因此，太阳可以被描述为天体中最明亮的。

But on this view, how can one have any idea at all of something without having an articulate belief about it?

但在这种观点下，如果没有对它有一个清晰的信念，一个人怎么能对某件事有任何想法呢？

I cannot really be thinking of Theaetetus himself if the only things I can say in description of him are things he has in common with others, like having a nose and eyes and a mouth. 

如果我能用来描述他的唯一东西是他和别人共有的东西，比如有鼻子、眼睛和嘴巴，那么我就不能真正地想到泰阿泰德本人。

Socrates concludes, a little precipitately, that Theaetetus’ third definition of knowledge is no better than his two previous ones. 

苏格拉底有点仓促地得出结论，说泰阿泰德的第三个知识定义并不比他之前的两个更好。

The dialogue ends in bafflement, like the Socratic dialogues of Plato’s early period. 

对话以困惑结束，就像柏拉图早期时期的苏格拉底式对话一样。

But in fact, it has achieved a great deal. 

但事实上，它已经取得了很大的成就。

The account which it gives of the nature of sense perception, modified by Aristotle, became standard until late in the Middle Ages. 

它给出的关于感知本质的描述，在亚里士多德的修改下，一直是中世纪晚期的标准。

The definition of knowledge as articulate true belief, interpreted as meaning justified true belief, was still accepted by many philosophers in the present century. 

知识被定义为清晰的真实信念，被解释为意味着合理的真实信念，这一定义仍然被当代许多哲学家所接受。

But what Plato probably saw as the dialogue’s greatest achievement was the cure which it provided for the scepticism of Heraclitus, by showing that the doctrine of universal flux was self-refuting. 

但柏拉图可能认为对话最大的成就是它为赫拉克利特的怀疑主义提供了药方，通过显示普遍流变的断言是自相矛盾的。

In the Theaetetus Socrates expresses himself too much in awe to take on in argument the philosopher who stands at the opposite extreme from Heraclitus, the venerable Parmenides. 

在《泰阿泰德》中，苏格拉底过于敬畏地表达了自己，不敢与赫拉克利特的对立极端的哲学家——尊敬的巴门尼德——进行争论。

This task Plato undertakes in the dialogue The Sophist. 

这个任务柏拉图在《智者篇》这部对话中承担了。

In this dialogue, though Theaetetus and Socrates reappear, the chief speaker is not Socrates, but a stranger from Parmenides’ town of Elea. 

在这部对话中，虽然泰阿泰德和苏格拉底重新出现，但主要的说话者不是苏格拉底，而是来自巴门尼德的城镇埃利亚的一个陌生人。

The ostensible purpose of the dialogue is to provide a definition of the sophist. 

对话的表面目的是提供智者的定义。

The definition is pursued by the method popular in our own day in the game of Twenty Questions. 

这个定义是通过我们当今流行的二十个问题游戏中的方法来追求的。

In that game the questioner divides the world into two portions, say animate and inanimate; if the object sought is animate, then the animate world is divided into two further portions, say plants and animals; and thus by further dichotomies the object is uniquely identified. 

在那个游戏中，提问者把世界分成两部分，比如说有生命的和无生命的；如果寻找的对象是有生命的，那么有生命的世界就被分成两个更小的部分，比如说植物和动物；这样通过进一步的二分法，对象就被唯一地确定了。

By similar methods the Eleatic stranger defines first the art of angling, and then, more than once, the art of the sophist. 

用类似的方法，埃利亚人先定义了钓鱼的技巧，然后不止一次地定义了智者的技巧。

The account of sophistry which concludes the dialogue is this: ‘the art of contradiction-making, descended from an insincere kind of conceited mimicry, of the semblance-making breed, derived from image-making, distinguished as a portion, not divine but human, of production, that presents a shadow-play of words’. 

对话结束时对智者的诡辩术的描述是这样的：“制造矛盾的技巧，源自一种不真诚的自负模仿，属于制造外表的种类，来自于造像，作为一部分而区别于神圣而是人类的创造，呈现出一种文字的影子戏。”

This is, of course, a joke. 

这当然是一个笑话。

The serious business of the dialogue is carried out on the way. 

对话的严肃内容是在途中进行的。

One line of thought runs as follows. 

一条思路是这样的。

Sophistry is bound up with falsehood; but how is it possible to talk about falsehood without falling foul of the revered Parmenides? 

诡辩术与虚假密切相关；但是如何在不触犯尊敬的巴门尼德的情况下谈论虚假呢？

To say what is false is to say what is not: does that mean that it is tantamount to uttering Unbeing? 

说出虚假就是说出不存在：这是否意味着它等同于说出非存在？

That would be nonsense, for the reasons Parmenides gave. 

那将是无意义的，因为巴门尼德给出了理由。

Shall we be more careful, then, and maintain that to say what is false is to say that what is, is not, or that what is not, is? 

那么我们是否应该更加小心，并坚持认为说出虚假就是说存在者不存在，或者不存在者存在呢？

Will this avoid Parmenides’ strictures? 

这样能避免巴门尼德的限制吗？

We have to disarm Parmenides by forcing him to agree that what is not, in some respect is, and what is, in a manner is not. 

我们必须解除巴门尼德的武装，迫使他同意，在某些方面，不存在者存在，而存在者在某种方式上不存在。

Motion, for instance, is not rest; but that does not mean that motion is not anything at all. 

例如，运动不是静止；但这并不意味着运动什么也不是。

There are many things which even Being is not: for instance, Being is not motion and Being is not rest. 

甚至存在者也有许多不是的东西：例如，存在者不是运动，也不是静止。

When we speak of what is not, we are not talking of Unbeing, the contrary of Being; we are speaking simply of something which is different from one of the things there are. 

当我们说到不存在者时，我们不是在谈论非存在，即存在的对立面；我们只是在谈论一些与存在的某一种东西不同的东西。

The non-beautiful differs from the beautiful, and the unjust differs from the just; but the non-beautiful and the unjust are no less real than the beautiful and the just. 

非美与美不同，非正义与正义不同；但非美和非正义并不比美和正义更不真实。

If we lump together all the things which are non-something, or unsomething, then we get the category of non-being, and this is just as real as the category of Being. 

如果我们把所有的非某物或无某物的东西都归在一起，那么我们就得到了非存在的范畴，这和存在的范畴一样真实。

So we have blown open the prison into which Parmenides had confined us. 

所以我们已经攻破了巴门尼德把我们关进去的监狱。

We are now in a position to give an account of falsehood in thought and speech. 

我们现在有能力解释思想和言语中的虚假。

The problem was that it was not possible to think or say what was not, because Unbeing was nonsense. 

问题是，不可能思考或说出不存在的东西，因为非存在是无意义的。

But now that we have found that non-being is perfectly real, we can use this to explain false thoughts and false sentences. 

但现在我们已经发现非存在是完全真实的，我们可以用它来解释错误的思想和错误的句子。

A typical sentence consists of a noun and a verb, and it says something about something. 

一个典型的句子由一个名词和一个动词组成，它说的是关于某件事的事情。

‘Theaetetus is sitting’ and ‘Theaetetus is flying’ are both sentences about Theaetetus, but one of them is true and one false. 

‘泰阿泰德在坐着’和‘泰阿泰德在飞’都是关于苔阿泰德的句子，但其中一个是真的，另一个是假的。

They say different things about Theaetetus, and the true one says a thing about him which is among the things that he is, while the false one says a thing about him which is among the things that he is not. 

它们说的关于泰阿泰德的事情是不同的，真实的那个说的是关于他的一件事，它属于他所是的事物之中，而虚假的那个说的是关于他的一件事，它属于他不是的事物之中。

Flying is not Unbeing, it is a thing that is – there is quite a lot of it about – but it is a thing that is different from the things that Theaetetus is, the things that can be truly said of Theaetetus. 

飞行不是非存在，它是一种存在的东西——有很多这样的东西——但它是一种与泰阿泰德所是的东西不同的东西，与可以真实地说出泰阿泰德的东西不同。

This account of the falsehood of a false sentence can be adapted to fit false thought and judgement also; for thinking is the silent inward utterance of the mind, and judgement is the mental equivalent of assertion and denial. 

这种对虚假句子的虚假性的解释也可以适用于错误的思想和判断；因为思考是心灵内部无声的表达，而判断是心理上断言和否定的等价物。

When we speak of ‘seeming’ and ‘appearance’ we are referring to judgement which is caused by the operation of the senses, and the same treatment is appropriate here too. 

当我们说到‘似乎’和‘外表’时，我们指的是由感官运作引起的判断，这里也适用同样的处理方法。

The line of thought we have followed is just one strand in a dense web of argument in which the stranger seeks to trap the monists of his native city Elea. 

我们所遵循的思路只是一个密集的论证网中的一条线索，陌生人试图用它来陷害他故乡埃利亚城市中的一元论者。

The Theaetetus and Sophist, between them, enable Plato to take a middle road between the opposed and stultifying philosophies of Heraclitus and Parmenides. 

《泰阿泰德篇》和《智者篇》两部对话使柏拉图能够在赫拉克利特和巴门尼德相对立而使人愚蠢的哲学之间走一条中间道路。

But what is remarkable about the Sophist is that among the philosophers who are criticized as inadequate are some called ‘the friends of the Forms’. 

但《智者篇》中值得注意的是，在被批评为不足的哲学家中，有些被称为‘理型之友’。

These are described in such a way as to leave no doubt that they are proponents of Plato’s own Theory of Ideas. 

他们被描述成这样一种方式，以至于毫无疑问他们是柏拉图本人理型论的支持者。

The Stranger says that the true philosopher must refuse to accept from the champions either of the one or of the many Forms their doctrine that all reality is changeless, and he must turn a deaf ear to the other party who represent reality as everywhere changing. 

陌生人说，真正的哲学家必须拒绝接受来自一元论者或多元论者的教义，即所有的现实都是不变的，他必须对另一方代表现实处处变化的人充耳不闻。

Like a child who wants to have his cake and eat it he must say that Being, the sum of all, is both at once – all that is unchangeable, and all that is in change. 

就像一个想要拥有蛋糕又想吃掉它的孩子，他必须说存在，即一切的总和，是同时具有两种性质的——所有不变的东西，和所有在变化的东西。

In this passage Heraclitus is the party of change, and Parmenides the champion of the one Form. 

在这段话中，赫拉克利特是变化的一方，巴门尼德是一元形式的捍卫者。

The champion of the many Forms is none other than Plato himself in his younger days.

多元形式的捍卫者不是别人，正是柏拉图自己年轻时的样子。

As we have said, we do not know for certain whether in later life Plato retained or abandoned his belief in the Ideas.

 正如我们所说的，我们不确定柏拉图在晚年是否保留或放弃了他对理型的信仰。

But it is difficult to find any other philosopher in the history of the subject who has presented with similar clarity and eloquence such powerful arguments against his own most darling theories. 

但在这个学科的历史上，很难找到另一个哲学家能够以类似的清晰和雄辩提出如此有力的反对他自己最心爱的理论的论据。