本文选自卫报，和学长一起来再看气候问题。

学长建议

1. 在语境中学习表达用法；

2. 着重把握学长标注的内容；

3. 带着问题去阅读文章。

Reading Comprehension

1. According to the article, why do the vast majority of people consider climate change to be a global emergency?

2. How can we end the vicious cycle of climate change?

3. Why are the poorest people not responsible for any of the decisions on emissions?

4. What responsibility should the rich have in terms of emissions?

5. What is the purpose of the example of France in the text?

6. Why does any deviation from an egalitarian strategy justify redistribution?

The richest 10% produce about half of greenhouse gas emissions.

This is not simply a rich versus poor countries divide: there are huge emitters in poor countries, and low emitters in rich countries

这不是简单的富国与穷国之分：穷国有巨大的排放者，而富国有低排放者。

let’s face it: our chances of staying under a 2C increase in global temperature are not looking good. If we continue business as usual, the world is on track to heat up by 3C at least by the end of this century. At current global emissions rates, the carbon budget that we have left if we are to stay under 1.5C will be depleted in six years. The paradox is that, globally, popular support for climate action has never been so strong. According to a recent United Nations poll, the vast majority of people around the world sees climate change as a global emergency. So, what have we got wrong so far?

让我们面对现实吧：我们将全球温度保持在 2°以下的机会并不乐观。如果我们继续照常工作，到本世纪末，世界将至少升温 3°。按照目前的全球排放率，如果我们要保持在 1.5℃以下，我们剩下的碳预算将在六年内耗尽。矛盾的是，在全球范围内，民众对气候行动的支持从未如此强烈。根据联合国最近的一项民意调查，世界上绝大多数人认为气候变化是一个全球性的紧急情况。那么，到目前为止，我们有什么错呢？

There is a fundamental problem in contemporary discussion of climate policy: it rarely acknowledges inequality. Poorer households, which are low CO2 emitters, rightly anticipate that climate policies will limit their purchasing power. In return, policymakers fear a political backlash should they demand faster climate action. The problem with this vicious circle is that it has lost us a lot of time. The good news is that we can end it.

当代关于气候政策的讨论有一个根本问题：它很少承认不平等。贫穷的家庭是低二氧化碳排放者，他们正确地预期气候政策将限制他们的购买力。作为回报，政策制定者担心，如果他们要求加快气候行动，会引起政治反弹。这种恶性循环的问题是，它使我们失去了很多时间。好消息是，我们可以结束它

Let’s first look at the facts: 10% of the world’s population are responsible for about half of all greenhouse gas emissions, while the bottom half of the world contributes just 12% of all emissions. This is not simply a rich versus poor countries divide: there are huge emitters in poor countries, and low emitters in rich countries.

让我们先看一下事实。世界上 10%的人口要对所有温室气体排放的一半负责，而世界上最底层的一半人口只占所有排放的 12%。这不是简单的富国与穷国之分：穷国有巨大的排放者，而富国则有低排放者。

Consider the US, for instance. Every year, the poorest 50% of the US population emit about 10 tonnes of CO2 per person, while the richest 10% emit 75 tonnes per person. That is a gap of more than seven to one. Similarly, in Europe, the poorest half emits about five tonnes per person, while the richest 10% emit about 30 tonnes – a gap of six to one. You can now view this data on the World Inequality Database

例如，考虑到美国。每年，美国最贫穷的 50%的人口每人排放约 10 吨二氧化碳，而最富有的 10%的人口每人排放 75 吨。这是一个超过七比一的差距。同样，在欧洲，最贫穷的一半人口每人排放约 5 吨，而最富裕的 10%人口排放约 30 吨：差距为 6 比 1。你现在可以在世界不平等数据库中查看这些数据。

Where do these large inequalities come from? The rich emit more carbon through the goods and services they buy, as well as from the investments they make. Low-income groups emit carbon when they use their cars or heat their homes, but their indirect emissions – that is, the emissions from the stuff they buy and the investments they make – are significantly lower than those of the rich. The poorest half of the population barely owns any wealth, meaning that it has little or no responsibility for emissions associated with investment decisions.

这些巨大的不平等从何而来？富人通过他们购买的商品和服务，以及他们的投资排放更多的碳。低收入群体在使用汽车或取暖时排放碳，但他们的间接排放——即他们购买的东西和进行的投资的排放——明显低于富人的排放。最贫穷的一半人口几乎不拥有任何财富，这意味着他们对与投资决策相关的排放几乎没有任何责任。

Why do these inequalities matter? After all, shouldn’t we all reduce our emissions? Yes, we should, but obviously some groups will have to make a greater effort than others. Intuitively, we might think here of the big emitters, the rich, right? True, and also poorer people have less capacity to decarbonize their consumption. It follows that the rich should contribute the most to curbing emissions, and the poor be given the capacity to cope with the transition to 1.5C or 2C. Unfortunately, this is not what is happening – if anything, what is happening is closer to the opposite.

为什么这些不平等现象很重要？毕竟，我们不应该都减少我们的排放吗？是的，我们应该，但显然有些群体必须比其他人做出更大的努力。直观地说，我们在这里可能会想到大的排放者，即富人，对吗？没错，而且穷人的消费去碳化的能力也较弱。因此，富人应该为遏制排放做出最大的贡献，而穷人应该有能力应对向 1.5° 或 2° 的过渡。不幸的是，这不是正在发生的事情 ——如果有的话，正在发生的事情更接近于相反。

It was evident in France in 2018, when the government raised carbon taxes in a way that hit rural, low-income households particularly hard, without much affecting the consumption habits and investment portfolios of the well-off. Many families had no way to reduce their energy consumption. They had no option but to drive their cars to go to work and to pay the higher carbon tax. At the same time, the aviation fuel used by the rich to fly from Paris to the French Riviera was exempted from the tax change. Reactions to this unequal treatment eventually led to the reform being abandoned. These politics of climate action, which demand no significant effort from the rich yet hurt the poor, are not specific to any one country. Fears of job losses in certain industries are regularly used by business groups as an argument to slow climate policies.

这在2018年的法国很明显，当时政府提高了碳税，对农村、低收入家庭的打击特别大，而对小康之家的消费习惯和投资组合没有多大影响。许多家庭没有办法减少他们的能源消耗。他们别无选择，只能开着汽车去上班，支付更高的碳税。同时，富人用来从巴黎飞往法国里维埃拉的航空燃料被豁免于税收变化。对这种不平等待遇的反应最终导致改革被放弃。这些气候行动的政治，没有要求富人做出重大努力，却伤害了穷人，并不是任何一个国家所特有的。对某些行业失业的担忧经常被商业团体用来作为减缓气候政策的理由。

Countries have announced plans to cut their emissions significantly by 2030 and most have established plans to reach net-zero somewhere around 2050. Let’s focus on the first milestone, the 2030 emission reduction target: according to my recent study as expressed in per capita terms, the poorest half of the population in the US and most European countries have already reached or almost reached the target. This is not the case at all for the middle classes and the wealthy, who are well above – that is to say, behind – the target.

各国已经宣布了到 2030 年大幅减少排放的计划，大多数国家已经制定了在 2050 年左右达到净零排放的计划。让我们专注于第一个里程碑，2030 年的减排目标：根据我最近的研究，以人均计算，美国和大多数欧洲国家最贫穷的一半人口已经达到或几乎达到目标。而中产阶级和富人的情况则完全不是这样，他们远远高于——也就是说——落后于目标。

One way to reduce carbon inequalities is to establish individual carbon rights, similar to the schemes that some countries use to manage scarce environmental resources such as water. Such an approach would inevitably raise technical and information issues, but it is a strategy that deserves attention. There are many ways to reduce the overall emissions of a country, but the bottom line is that anything but a strictly egalitarian strategy inevitably means demanding greater climate mitigation effort from those who are already at the target level, and less from those who are well above it; this is basic arithmetic.

减少碳不平等的一个方法是建立个人碳权，类似于一些国家用来管理水等稀缺环境资源的计划。这种方法将不可避免地引起技术和信息问题，但这是一个值得关注的战略。有许多方法可以减少一个国家的总体排放量，但底线是，除了严格的平均主义战略之外，任何其他方法都不可避免地意味着要求那些已经达到目标水平的人做出更大的气候减缓努力，而那些远远超过目标水平的人则要减少努力；这是基本的算术。

Arguably, any deviation from an egalitarian strategy would justify serious redistribution from the wealthy to the worse off to compensate the latter. Many countries will continue to impose carbon and energy taxes on consumption in the years to come. In these contexts, it is important that we learn from previous experiences. The French example shows what not to do. In contrast, British Columbia’s implementation of a carbon tax in 2008 was a success – even though the Canadian province relies heavily on oil and gas – because a large share of the resulting tax revenues goes to compensate low- and middle-income consumers via direct cash payments. In Indonesia, the ending of fossil fuel subsidies a few years ago meant extra resources for government but also higher energy prices for low-income families. Initially highly contested, the reform was accepted when the government decided to use the revenue to fund a universal health insurance and support to the poorest.

可以说，任何偏离平均主义战略的行为都将证明从富人到穷人的严重再分配是合理的，以补偿后者。许多国家在未来几年将继续对消费征收碳和能源税。在这些情况下，重要的是我们要从以前的经验中学习。法国的例子说明了什么是不应该做的。相比之下，不列颠哥伦比亚省在 2008 年实施的碳税是成功的——尽管该省严重依赖石油和天然气——因为由此产生的税收收入的很大一部分通过直接现金支付来补偿中低收入的消费者。在印度尼西亚，几年前结束化石燃料补贴意味着政府的额外资源，但也意味着低收入家庭的能源价格上涨。起初，这项改革备受争议，但当政府决定将收入用于资助全民健康保险和支持最贫穷的人时，这项改革被接受了。

To accelerate the energy transition, we must also think outside the box. Consider, for example, a progressive tax on wealth, with a pollution top-up. This would accelerate the shift out of fossil fuels by making access to capital more expensive for the fossil fuel industries. It would also generate potentially large revenues for governments that they could invest in green industries and innovation. Such taxes would be politically easier to pass than a standard carbon tax, since they target a fraction of the population, not the majority. At the world level, a modest wealth tax on multimillionaires with a pollution top-up could generate 1.7% of global income. This could fund the bulk of extra investments required every year to meet climate mitigation efforts.

为了加速能源转型，我们还必须突破局限。例如，考虑对财富征收累进税，并对污染进行加价。这将通过使化石燃料行业获得的资本更加昂贵来加速化石燃料的转变。它还将为政府带来潜在的大量收入，使其可以投资于绿色产业和创新。这种税在政治上比标准的碳税更容易通过，因为它们针对的是人口的一部分，而不是大多数。在世界范围内，对百万富翁征收适度的财富税，再加上污染补贴，可以产生全球收入的 1.7%。这可以资助每年所需的大部分额外投资，以满足气候减缓的努力。

Whatever the path chosen by societies to accelerate the transition – and there are many potential paths – it’s time for us to acknowledge there can be no deep decarbonization without profound redistribution of income and wealth.

无论社会选择什么样的道路来加速转型——有许多潜在的道路——现在是时候让我们承认，没有收入和财富的深刻再分配，就不可能有深入的脱碳过程。