逃离黑格尔（一）

        本篇文章由我翻译，全文共26页，本篇为节选的第一部分约7页内容，原文为英文并附于末尾，红色标注为原文附带的注释，蓝色标注为我添加的补充和注释。文章中引用部分若已有汉译本，则一概使用汉译本的翻译，并补充标注汉译本的引用文献。

逃离黑格尔

约翰·罗森塔尔

 

摘要：自罗曼·罗斯多尔斯基(1)的《马克思〈资本论〉的形成》出版以来，对于任何希望证明马克思的政治经济学是建立在黑格尔主义“逻辑”基础上的人来说，《政治经济学批判大纲》都是他们观点的一个根本依据。然而，与罗斯多尔斯基的解读相反，《政治经济学批判大纲》实际上可以被解读为一场马克思逃离他的黑格尔哲学传统(heritage)的戏剧。黑格尔的“辩证法”并非一种逻辑论证的方法，而是一种倒错的神秘化“方法”。马克思他自己在《政治经济学批判大纲》中构建经济范畴的“辩证推导”的尝试使他陷入了理论的死胡同，只有摒弃这些冒进，马克思才能在他的经济学研究中取得真正的突破。尽管如此，在《资本论》中，尤其是在第一章中，某种典型的黑格尔主义公式(formulae)的残余(persistence)——尽管，请注意，这并非典型的黑格尔主义论证结构的残余——依然是马克思最初研究对象的，即货币的，本体论特征的职能，且并没有反映出任何“方法论”选择。马克思在《资本论》中的论证本质上并非“辩证的”，而是“先验的”，从给定的市场现象（价格、利润等等）出发，回到它们的可能性条件上。

 

“有必要对唯心主义的叙述方法作一纠正，这种叙述方法造成一种假象，似乎探讨的只是一些概念规定和这些概念的辩证法。”

        ----马克思，《政治经济学批判大纲》[1]

         

        一、黑格尔马克思主义的复活

        在最近的二十多年里（指二十世纪七十年代到九十年代末），马克思主义的方法论讨论被对其中的黑格尔传统(legacy)的各种攻击所主导，而近些年来更令人感到好奇的理论发展之一是形成了所谓的“新”黑格尔马克思主义。我在这里并不想揣测各式各样的个人动机，但毋庸置疑，至少在英语语境下，马克思主义学者“回归黑格尔”的一个直接原因就是二十世纪八十年代中期出现的对马克思主义理论的“分析性”重构，它声称自己表明了马克思的“意图”，并使用了新古典经济学的方法论工具。的确，在“方法论个人主义”的旗帜下，“分析马克思主义者”(2)将新古典经济学的方法论提升到了所有“现代”社会科学研究中的正典(the canon)(3)地位，而根据这一观点，传统马克思主义者的主张则被当作顽固原始人那难以理解的嚎叫。毋庸置疑，无论是出于何种意图和目的，这种自封的“没有废话的马克思主义”很快就暴露出它自己只不过是一种根本没有马克思的“马克思主义”（见Schweickart, 1988），而更传统的马克思主义学者们的回应显然是更合理的。现如今，“分析马克思主义学者”实际上对黑格尔并没有什么确切的说法。在他们的著作中，人们找不到任何对黑格尔（以及黑格尔马克思主义者）的“辩证法”的基于具体文本的批判，就像是科莱蒂(4)的那种批判，或更宽泛地说，阿尔都塞(5)的那种隐晦的批判。尽管如此，他们也确实习惯于将他们在马克思文本中发现的令人厌恶的和无法理解的内容放到“黑格尔主义”的标题下（这种习惯更可能是从对熊彼特(6)或琼·罗宾逊(7)的理解中获得的，而不是通过与黑格尔哲学的任何实际第一手接触获得的）。尤其是，这种习惯甚至被应用在马克思政治经济学的基础，他的价值理论上，因而使马克思的价值理论可以被总结为一个已经过时的价格决定理论，因为一切表明这一理论并非如此的——或更确切地说，不止如此的——复杂细节都被视为受到了“黑格尔主义”的严重污染，所以不值得认真考虑。

        显然，马克思经济理论中的许多内容，实际上几乎是所有内容都由于这种方法而消亡了，因此“新”黑格尔马克思主义者对“分析马克思主义”发起的挑战的回应实际上就相当于通过证明马克思经济学中所谓的“黑格尔”方面来努力挽救马克思：在假定黑格尔主义论证结构确实在马克思的分析中发挥了系统性作用的情况下，甚至，在其中一种最具野心的分支下，在假定后者完全由前者支配的情况下，努力证明其中的“黑格尔”成分不仅仅是“胡说八道”。（顺带一提，“新”黑格尔马克思主义在阐述特定主题时会强调“辩证”模式做出的所谓贡献的体系性，这使得他们区别于历史主义分支的“旧”黑格尔马克思主义，例如卢卡奇(8)举例说明的那种。[2]）因此，“新”黑格尔马克思主义者倾向于将列宁的格言作为他们的口号，其大意是：“不钻研和不理解黑格尔的全部逻辑学，就不能完全理解马克思的《资本论》，特别是它的第1章。”[3]

        在这里我并不是想暗示猛药比沉疴更糟糕。但我确实想说，这并不是一种完全正确的解药——甚至有可能会产生完全有害的效果，它使人自我感觉更好，但实际上没有纠正任何问题。有的人可能会说，“辩证法”只不过是马克思主义知识分子的鸦片。尽管如此，马克思的价值分析与黑格尔对“范畴”的阐述之间存在着惊人的形式相似性是一个不争的事实，而且“新”黑格尔马克思主义确实至少将这一事实暴露了出来。[4] 但我认为，任何从这种相似性中获取灵感并接着推断出马克思的“方法”必定是黑格尔主义的的观点，不仅是不合理的，而且是一个严重的错误。事实上，这种话语上的相似性与“方法”之间没有任何关系，而仅仅只是马克思所分析的实际对象与黑格尔形而上学中对象性本身的特征之间相似性的反映：一个特别的（尤其是唯心主义的）形而上学体系与某种——恰好——与形而上学“相一致”的特定对象之间相似性的反映。与“价值理论家”的实践使人们认同的观点相反，马克思价值分析的主要对象实际上并非价格或价格体系，而是价格体系得以存在的客观的可能性条件：即价值形式本身，或者用更通俗的语言来说，货币。现在，碰巧，货币就是一种“实在的一般性”("real universal")(9)——根据黑格尔形而上学的独特公式，一切事物（或至少“实际存在的一切事物”）都应当具有这种“实在的一般性”。或者，更准确地说，商品货币就是这种“实在的一般性”，而商品货币就是这种在马克思的理论中被明确视作基础的货币（而究竟是出于历史上的偶然原因还是出于某种本质原因尚无法在这里确定）。

         

        二、货币与其他神秘对象

        如果要说货币商品是一种“实在的一般性”，就是在说它是某种特殊种类的东西，在这里也就是一种代表了——实际上是“作为”("is")——所有特殊种类的共同“本质”的特殊商品，而且不仅这些特殊种类不同于这种特殊商品，同属于相同类(genus)的它们之间也互不相同。也就是说，它是一种在经济实践中代表了所有作为交换价值的商品的共同本质或一般性的特殊的商品或“使用价值”。马克思在《资本论》第一章的1867年最初版本中写道：“就像除了分类组成动物界不同属、种、亚种、科等等的狮子、老虎、兔子和其他等等所有实在的动物以外，还存在着作为整个动物界的单个体现的动物一样。” [5]

        为了搞明白我们从上述观察中得到了些什么东西，就需要强调一般的实在性是如何在逻辑上与黑格尔的特殊(particulars)的虚幻性——或者换句话说，物质世界的虚幻性(10)——相一致的，并因此成为黑格尔唯心主义——实际上黑格尔自己也会说，这是任何哲学中唯心主义——的一部分。[6] 由于担心被指责为唯心主义，黑格尔马克思主义，不论是“旧的”还是“新的”，都有着一套传统的辩护词，声称黑格尔的“辩证方法”可以以某种方式从他的唯心主义形而上学体系中解救出来，并合理地应用在“唯物主义”上，例如科学。相反，我的观点是，马克思恰好在货币的本体论特征中为黑格尔的唯心主义，或者更准确地说，为后者的公式特征找到了合理的科学应用。

        当然，这并不是说这些公式的内容在马克思应用它们的时候没有发生改变。黑格尔对“一般性”(Allgemeinheit)的论述存在系统性的歧义，它可以被理解为相对更具包容性，即类(class)概念的含义，也可以被理解为包罗万象的或“真的无限物”("true infinite")的含义，而后者的实在性——“一般”("the" universal)(11)的实在性——在黑格尔的论述中，通过一系列非常特别的方式，或许可以称之为“转喻”滑变("metonymic" slippages)，在它的所有更具体“规定”的所谓实在性中得到证明。然而，货币商品并不是某种地位像“一般”一样高的东西的现实体现。正如之前已经指出的，它只是所有作为交换价值的商品的一般性所取得的实在形式。在没有国家来发行和保证所谓“法定货币”的情况下，在经济实践中必须存在一种特殊的商品来代表其他所有商品全都具有的一般价值特性，尽管大小不一。这种商品不仅是甚至主要是出于衡量目的的体系化经济的必然产物——尽管众所周知，货币商品自身的单位确实提供了一个可以使所有其他商品的相对价值都得以表达并得以通约的同质单位。然而，货币商品所执行的这一观念的价值尺度的职能，是它作为交换媒介所执行的实在的流通职能的结果。正是在交换实践中，货币商品才“代表了”商品的一般本质——它是实在的，因此是商品内含价值特性存在(existence)的现实可占有形式——因为如果所有商品不普遍具有可转换为货币商品的能力，那它们之间的一般交换就根本不可能实现。因此，这种作为货币的特殊商品就被赋予了“一般商品”的地位。它就是——回想一下黑格尔在讨论经验普遍性时最喜欢举的一个例子——君主，而其他商品则是它的臣民；它就是太阳，而其他商品则是它的卫星；它是基督，而其他商品则是基督徒。

        但事实上，尽管这些类比意味深长，但并不完全准确。对于黑格尔来说，不仅一般的实在性与特殊的非实在性相一致，而且在给定种类的现存特殊的范围中，应当有其中一个恰好代表了其余部分的“个别一般性”，并与其余部分相对。黑格尔在这方面的典型范例之一是福音书中所描绘的作为“神人”("God-man")(12)的基督与被创造出来的个人（个别）之间的关系，太阳和君主则分别代表了自然和“客观精神”领域中的类似案例。[7] 但货币商品不是以某种个别商品的形式，而是以某种特殊种类商品的形式代表所有商品的一般性。换句话说，货币商品与其他商品的关系是一种特殊种类与其他所有种类的关系，而个别商品之所以包含在这种关系之中，只是因为它们是其他这些种类的样本。

        为了继续讨论眼前的问题，这里就不再详细讨论交换体系是如何以及为什么能产生商品交换价值的具体化身了（见Rosenthal, 1998, ch.15）。但鉴于这一问题在所谓的马克思的“价值理论”中的核心地位被完全忽视，因此有必要引用下面这段《政治经济学批判》中有些冗长的文本作为根据。马克思在这本著作中所提到的“分离出来的”商品(die ausschließliche Ware)是那（种）通过其他商品的“行动”——或者更确切地说，它们的所有者的行动，只要在交换中给他们正确的数额，他们就总是愿意接受这种商品——而从后者的行列中“分离出来”(ausgeschlossen)并作为它们的一般可交换性的代表的商品。

        在交换过程中，一切商品都同作为商品一般的那个分离出来的商品发生关系，都同作为一般劳动时间在一种特殊使用价值中存在的那种商品发生关系。因此，它们作为特殊商品同一个作为一般商品的特殊商品对立起来。这样一来，商品所有者相互把他们的劳动作为一般社会劳动来对待的关系，就表现为他们把他们的商品作为交换价值来对待的关系，而商品在交换过程中彼此作为交换价值相互对待的关系，就表现为它们把一种特殊商品作为它们交换价值的最适当的表现的全面关系，这反过来又表现为这种特殊商品同一切其他商品的特定关系，因而表现为一个物品的一定的仿佛是天生的社会性质。这样地代表一切商品的交换价值的最适当存在的特殊商品，或者说，作为一种分离出来的特殊商品的商品交换价值，就是货币。(Marx, 1970, 48/MEW, Vol. 13, 34.)（《马克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第31卷第441-2页）

        

        注释：

        [1] 见Marx, 1973, 151/ Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 42, 85-6.（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第30卷第101页）所有对马克思著作英文版的引用都将附带对标准多卷德文版Marx-Engels Werke的引用（以下简称MEW）。正如它们所表明的那样，对马克思的英文翻译时常被扭曲。如果没有引用英文版的话，那就是我翻译的。

        [2] 关于传统黑格尔马克思主义的历史主义，见Rosenthal, 1998, part 1.

        [3] （《列宁全集》第55卷第151页）近来的英文著作显然包含在这里的描述范围之内，例如，Arthur, 1993; Shamsavari, 1991; 以及Smith, 1990. 在英语圈中，有一些对马克思的黑格尔主义重构的早期尝试，鉴于其出版日期，实际上与“分析”马克思主义之间的斗争无关，而似乎是由于与西德黑格尔—马克思学者汉斯-格奥尔格•巴克豪斯(Hans-Georg Backhaus)(13)解读方法的偶然学术接触而受到了或多或少的启发。例如，见Banaji, 1979; Eldred and Hanlon, 1981. 但除此之外，巴克豪斯理论中的曲折细节并非对英语世界的讨论产生太大影响——鉴于直到最近，他的贡献甚至在很大程度上都难以用德语表达，这一点也就不足为奇了。随着Backhaus, 1997的出版，这一问题现在已经得到了解决。总而言之，我在这里所提到的“新”黑格尔马克思主义，由于它主要是英语学术圈的一种现象，所以是以一种类似的方式独立于近来的德语讨论而发展起来的，尽管总的来说更复杂一些。后者与英语版本的“新”黑格尔马克思主义有着相同的“方法论”主张，因此也有着一些相同的缺陷，对后者成熟作品更丰富的解读细节和见解，参见Brentel, 1989.

        [4] 然而，在这一流派最臭名昭著的例子中可以发现，黑格尔的《逻辑学》和马克思的《资本论》之间存在的大量“对应关系”只不过是基于完全间接的文本证据，而且往往是以对后者的严重歪曲和刻意解释为代价的。因此，它们实际上是为了转移人们对这些类推的注意力，以防人们注意到这些类比是刻意的。

        [5] Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Zweite Abteilung, Band 5, 37. （《马克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第42卷第47页）实际上，马克思在这段话中的表达方式有些模棱两可。对于任何代表动物性的一般“范畴”的动物来说，相对于其他所有动物物种来说，其本身就可能是一个特殊的物种，而不是马克思指的“单个动物”。正如接下来可以直接看到的那样，马克思在这方面的困惑几乎可以肯定是受到了黑格尔的启发。相同的困惑也出现在马克思根据他的类比所得到的试探性的话中：“这样一种个别的东西，本身包含着同一事物的所有实际存在的种类，就是一般的东西，如动物、上帝等等。”（同上）

        [6] 黑格尔在他的《逻辑学》中这样写道：“有限物是观念的这一命题构成唯心主义。哲学的唯心主义无非是不承认有限物是真的有的东西。每一种哲学本质上都是唯心主义，或至少以唯心主义为原则……一种哲学，假如把有限的实有本身也算作真的、最后的、绝对的有，就不配承当哲学这个名字；古代或近代哲学的本原，如水或物质或原子，都是思想、一般性和观念物，而不是直接当前的、感性中的个别事物……” (Hegel, 1969, 154-5)（黑格尔，《逻辑学》上，商务印书馆，第156页，译文有改动）

        [7] 见《逻辑学》，黑格尔在这本著作中写道：“在物质世界中，是类(genus)、但又是单个客体的个别一般性及其机械过程的，正是中心体。”（黑格尔，《逻辑学》下，商务印书馆，第408页，译文有改动）

        

        译者注：

        (1) 罗曼·罗斯多尔斯基(Roman Rosdolsky)是一位乌克兰裔马克思主义政治活动家，他不认为自己是经济学家或哲学家。罗斯多尔斯基青年时期就参加了乌克兰社会主义者组织德拉霍曼诺夫小组，参与创立了国际革命社会民主党(IRSD)。他在第一次世界大战当中加入了具有反战性质的“加利西亚国际社会主义青年”组织，这一组织后来发展成西乌克兰共产党。战后罗斯多尔斯基成为东加利西亚共产党中央委员会成员。在20世纪20-30年代，他的思想逐渐发生转变，显示出脱离斯大林主义的倾向，并且接触到了E.普列奥布拉任斯基、伊萨克·鲁宾等独立经济学家的理论。也是在此期间，他成为托洛茨基的追随者。1925年，罗斯多尔斯基因拒绝谴责托洛茨基及其路线而被开除出党，并开始了他的流亡生涯。1926-1931年他曾担任莫斯科马恩研究院在维也纳的联络员，之后不幸于1942年在克拉科夫被德国纳粹逮捕，先后被移送到奥斯维辛、奥拉宁堡和拉文斯布吕克集中营关押，直至1945年。战后在奥地利短暂任教后，罗斯多尔斯基于1947年移居美国。1948年，他在纽约布廷格档案馆发现了1939年俄国出版的《大纲》，至此开始了他漫长的研究生涯，后形成著作《马克思〈资本论〉的形成》（有中译本）。在这本书中，罗斯多尔斯基将《大纲》与黑格尔的《逻辑学》直接联系在一起，并引用卢卡奇在《历史与阶级意识》中的话，否定了那种无视马克思理论中的黑格尔成分的庸俗主张。

        (2) 分马是当代马克思主义的一个流派，采用了分析哲学而抛弃了辩证法，并致力于维护历史唯物主义。这一流派主要代表人物包括科恩(G. A. Cohen), 约翰·罗默(John E. Roemer), 戴维·施韦卡特(David Schwickart), William Shaw, Jon Elster等人，代表性著作包括《马克思主义经济理论的分析基础》（有中译本）、《在自由中丧失》（有中译本）、《剥削和阶级的一般理论》、《社会主义的未来》（有中译本）、《反对资本主义》（有中译本）、《超越资本主义》（有中译本）等。这一流派的基本特征已由罗森塔尔在文中简要指明，它实际上是部分马克思主义者在遭遇理论和政治挫折之后向新古典主义靠拢的表现。

        (3) 分马认为新古典方法论是唯一正确的方法论，因为相比于缺乏清晰定义的辩证法，它能够清晰区分各种概念并对命题进行严格论证，因而分马认为马克思主义也必须采用它才能证明自己是科学的，并尝试利用分析哲学重新解读马克思文本。分马不仅仅有经济学内容，在哲学、历史、政治方面也同样有许多论述。Canon一词最初来源于古希腊手工业者使用的标准度量，后逐渐延伸为基督教的标准典籍，而其他典籍副本都应以正典为准。音乐卡农也同样与这一含义相关，其中所有声部都模仿着一个声部。

        (4) 科莱蒂(Colletti)是意大利共产党人，与其老师德拉-沃尔佩(Della-Volpe)同为新实证主义马克思主义的主要代表人物。

        德拉-沃尔佩对苏联的辩证唯物主义和教条主义持有强烈的批判态度，尽管在苏共二十大和匈牙利事件后并未像其他知识分子一样退出意共，但作为意共党员的他于1962年与意共领导人之间爆发了严重的理论分歧导致所任职的编辑部被解散。相比于卢卡奇、葛兰西，他强调马克思主义辩证法与黑格尔辩证法之间的连续性，德拉-沃尔佩更强调马克思主义辩证法与黑格尔辩证法的断裂性，认为马克思主义是在对黑格尔辩证法的深入批判中形成的。德拉-沃尔佩将马克思的辩证法科学主义化，提出了马克思主义辩证法是科学辩证法的著名观点，以科学辩证法取代黑格尔主义的唯心辩证法、神秘主义辩证法。在政治方面，德拉-沃尔佩认为卢梭是马克思主义政治理论的前辈。德拉-沃尔佩主要著作包括：《逻辑是一门实证科学》、《卢梭和马克思》（有中译本）、《趣味批判》（有中译本）。

        科莱蒂继承了德拉-沃尔佩的主要观点，也是一位反黑格尔主义马克思主义者。他在意共批判德拉-沃尔佩的会议上与意共领导人发生理论上的直接冲突，最终于1964年退党。科莱蒂同样反对黑格尔主义，推崇康德哲学，认为康德是马克思主义的哲学前辈。在政治方面，科莱蒂也同样认为卢梭是马克思和列宁政治理论的前辈。科莱蒂的主要著作包括：《从卢梭到列宁》、《马克思主义与黑格尔》、《政治哲学札记》、《矛盾与对立：马克思主义和辩证法》等。

        (5) 阿尔都塞(Althusser)也是一位著名的法国反黑格尔主义马克思主义者，其用结构主义观点重新解释马克思主义（这一点可能会存在异议）。在《读〈资本论〉》以及其他著作中，阿尔都塞反复强调马克思与黑格尔之间的断裂性（多元决定论与一元决定论、结构的因果性与表现的因果性），并暗中批判黑格尔主义。阿尔都塞著作颇丰，且很多都得到了翻译和引进，主要著作包括：《保卫马克思》（有中译本）、《论再生产》（有中译本）、《读〈资本论〉》（有中译本）、《政治与历史：从马基雅维利到马克思》（有中译本）、《孟德斯鸠：政治与历史》（有中译本）、《在哲学中成为马克思主义者》（有中译本）、《列宁和哲学》（有台版中译本）等等；此外有陈越翻译的文集《哲学与政治：阿尔都塞读本》。

        (6) 熊彼特(Schumpeter)是一位知名经济学家，他出生于奥匈帝国捷克地区的一个小工厂主家庭中，后随母亲改嫁到维也纳，成为上层阶级的一份子，曾跟随奥地利学派学习过，非常了解新古典经济学。熊彼特的主要贡献包括指出创新对经济增长和商业周期的重要作用，并重新发掘了长波理论。除此之外，熊彼特对经济学说史也有些了解。熊彼特并非一位社会主义者，但他认为社会主义取代资本主义可能是必然的，并因此对人类社会的未来感到悲观。他的主要著作有：《经济发展理论》（有中译本）、《资本主义、社会主义与民主》（有中译本）、《经济分析史》（有中译本）、《十位伟大的经济学家：从马克思到凯恩斯》（有中译本）等等；此外，有个人学术传记《约瑟夫·熊彼特》（有中译本）。

        (7) 琼·罗宾逊(Joan Robinson)是一位英国女性经济学家，后凯恩斯经济学的主要代表人物之一，也是上世纪六七十年代扛起反新古典主义大旗的主将。罗宾逊具有如李嘉图一样敏锐洞察力，能够洞察出表面上和谐的新古典主义理论中潜藏的逻辑矛盾，但也如李嘉图一样，这份洞察力并没能让她的视野穿透经验表象的层面，这使罗宾逊略逊于斯拉法和卡莱斯基。罗宾逊同样著作颇丰，且大多得到了翻译引进，主要著作包括：《现代经济学导论》（有中译本）、《资本积累论》（有中译本）、《论马克思主义经济学》（有中译本）、《经济学的异端》（有中译本）、《经济学的尴尬》（有中译本）、《经济哲学》（有中译本）、《不完全竞争经济学》（有中译本）等等；此外有个人传记《琼·罗宾逊》（有中译本）和《琼·罗宾逊与两个剑桥之争》（有中译本）。

        (8) 卢卡奇(Lukács)是一位著名的匈牙利马克思主义哲学家，在本文作者的分类下，他属于“旧”黑格尔马克思主义者。卢卡奇的理论贡献非常丰富，以至于难以用短短几句话加以总结，其思想在不同阶段里也不断反复。卢卡奇曾在《历史与阶级意识》中对“正统马克思主义”做出过一个“惊世骇俗”的定义，这一定义对于任何试图了解马克思主义而不是把它当作教条的人都具有非凡的价值。他的主要著作包括：《历史与阶级意识》（有中译本）、《存在主义还是马克思主义？》（有中译本）、《理性的毁灭》（有中译本）、《关于社会存在的本体论》（有中译本）等等。

        (9) "Real"以及其他具有相同词根的单词，我将视我的判断，在不同的语境下分别翻译为“实在”和“现实”。"universal"和"universality"以及其他具有相同词根的单词同理，我将在不同的语境下分别翻译为“一般”和“普遍”。我的判断必定不会完全准确，因此请读者阅读时注意这一点。

        (10) “既然事物作为特殊仅存在于经验中，那么它必然‘一般’相背离，因此它们必然失去经验实体，必然消亡，‘因此’它们的消亡证明了它们的所谓独立性只不过是一种虚幻的性质。”见Rosenthal, 1997, p. 157-8，这一部分的译文可见我之前的专栏。

        (11) 按照罗森塔尔在其他著作中的叙述，这里的“一般”与“精神”("Geist")所指代的应当是同一概念。

        (12) 基督教中的耶稣既是完全的神又是完全的人，既具有神性也具有人性，这二者一方面相互统一、不可分割，另一方面也不存在混淆、混合，因此基督耶稣就是“神人合一”("God-man")。

        (13) 汉斯-格奥尔格•巴克豪斯(Hans-Georg Backhaus)是一位德国经济学家、哲学家。他的代表作《论价值形式的辩证法》是整个资本—逻辑学派的里程碑之一（另一个是罗曼·罗斯多尔斯基的《马克思〈资本论〉的形成》）。《论价值形式的辩证法》曾由李乾坤翻译，译文刊登于《社会批判理论纪事》第11辑。对这一传统的分支之一的介绍，请见李乾坤的著作《价值形式、国家衍生与批判理论——德国新马克思阅读运动研究》。

        

        参考文献

         

        Arthur, Christopher J. 1991. Review Article. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britaim 23/24, 79-90.

        --------. 1993. "Hegel’s Logic and Marx’s Capital." In Fred Moseley, ed., Marx’s Method in Capital: A Re-examination. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press.

        Backhaus, Hans-Georg. 1997. Dialektik der Wertform. Freiburg: Ça ira Verlag.

        Banaji, Jairus. 1979. "From the Commodity to Capital: Hegel's Dialectic in Marx's Capital. "In Diane Elson, ed., Value: The Representation of Labour in Capitalism. London: CSE Books.

        Brentel, Helmut. 1989. Soziale Form und Ökonomisches Objekt: Studien zum Gegenstandsund Methodenverständnis der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

        Eldred, M. and M. Hanion. 1981. "Reconstructing Value-Form Analysis." Capital and Class, 13 (Spring), 24-60.

        Hegel, G. W. F. 1969. The Science of Logic. Trans. A. V. Miller. London: Allen & Unwin.

        --------. 1970. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Erster Teil. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

        Marx, Karl. 1970. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. New York: International.

        --------. 1973. Grundrisse. Middlesex: Penguin.

        --------. 1975. Texts on Method, ed. Terrel Carver. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

        --------. 1976. Capital, Vol. I. Middlesex: Penguin.

        Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe. 1972-. Berlin: Die tz Verlag.

        Marx-Engels Werke. 1956-. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

        Petry, Franz. 1916. Der soziale Gehalt derMarxschen Werttheorie. Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer.

        Rosenthal, John. 1991. "Freedom's Devices: The Place of the Individual in Hegel's Philosophy of Right." Radical Philosophy, 59, 27-32.

        --------. 1993. "A Transcendental Deduction of the Categories without the Categories." International Philosophical Quarterly, XXXIII: 4, 449-64.

        --------. 1998. The Myth of Dialectics: Re-interpreting the Marx-Hegel Relation. New York: St. Martins.

        Schweickart, David. 1988. "Reflections on Anti-Marxism: Elster on Marx's Functionalism and Labor Theory of Value." Praxis International, 8:1, 109-22.

        Shamsavari, Ali. 1991 . Dialectics and Sodai Theory: The Logic o/Capital. London: Merlin.

        Smith, Tony. 1990. The Logic of Marx's Capital. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

The Escape from Hege

JOHN ROSENTHAL

ABSTRACT: At least since the publication of Roman Rosdolsky's The Making of Marx's Capital, the Grundrisse has been an essential reference for anyone wishing to demonstrate a significant dependence of Marx's political economy upon Hegelian "logic." Contrary to Rosdolsky's interpretation, however, the Grundrisse can in fact be read as the drama of Marx's escape from his Hegelian philosophical heritage. Hegel's "dialectical method" is not a method of logical argumentation, but a "method" of paralogical mystification. Marx's own attempts to construct "dialectical derivations" of economic categories in the Grundrisse lead him into theoretical culs-de-sac, and he is only able to make real progress in his economic investigations by precisely foregoing such adventures. The persistence, nonetheless, of certain characteristically Hegelian formulae - though, n.b., not characteristically Hegelian argumentational structures - in Capital, and especially in the first chapter, is a function of the ontological peculiarity of Marx's initial object of inquiry, viz., money, and does not reflect any "methodological" choice. Marx's arguments in Capital are not "dialectical" but rather "transcendental" in nature, starting from given market phenomena (prices, profit, etc.) and working back to their conditions of possibility.

It will be necessary later ... to correct the idealist manner of the presentation, which makes it seem as if it were merely a matter of conceptual determinations and of the dialectic of these concepts.

 - Marx, Grundrisse [1]

        A Hegelian Marxist Revival

        FOLLOWING MORE THAN TWO DECADES during which methodological discussions on Marxism were dominated by various waves of assaults on the Hegelian legacy in it, one of the more curious theoretical developments of recent years has been the formation of what might be called a "new" Hegelian Marxism. Without wishing to speculate on the diversity of individual motivations, one proximate cause that no doubt gave massive impulse to this "return to Hegel" among Marxist scholars, at least within the Anglo-American context, was the advent in the mid-1980s of a supposedly "analytical" reformulation of Marxian theory, which claimed to serve the "intentions" of Marx while employing the methodological tools of neoclassical economics. Indeed, under the banner of "methodological individualism," the "analytical Marxists" elevated the latter to the status of the canon for all "modern" social scientific inquiry whatsoever, according to which the pronouncements of classical Marxists were dismissed as unintelligible bleatings of stubborn primitives. Not surprisingly, this self-styled "Marxism without bullshit" quickly revealed itself to be a "Marxism," for all intents and purposes, without Marx (see Schweickart, 1988), and a response from more traditionally minded Marxist scholars was clearly in order. Now, the "analytical Marxists" did not in fact have anything very precise to say about Hegel. One will not find in their writings the detailed textually based critique of Hegelian (and Hegelian Marxist) "dialectics" of, say, a Colletti, nor even the suggestive, if more broadstroke, critical indications of an Althusser. Nonetheless, they did have the habit (a habit which was more likely acquired from readings of Schumpeter or Joan Robinson than through any actual first-hand engagement with Hegelian philosophy) of ranging everything they found most distasteful and incomprehensible in Marx's corpus under the epithet of "Hegelianism." This applied, above all, for the very foundation of Marx's political economy, his theory of value, which could thus be disposed of in summary fashion as an antequated theory of price determination, since all the knotty details which might have suggested that it is something other than that - or rather something more than that - were deemed too tainted with "Hegelianism" to merit serious consideration.

        Correctly appreciating that much, indeed almost everything, of significance in Marx's economic theory is lost through such an approach, the "new" Hegelian Marxist response to the challenge of "analytical Marxism" has amounted, in effect, to an effort to salvage Marx by vindicating the allegedly "Hegelian" aspects of his economics: an effort to prove - on the assumption that Hegelian argumentational structures do indeed play a systematic role in Marx's analyses or even, in the most ambitious variant, that the course of the latter is entirely governed by the former - that these are not just "bullshit" after all. (It is, incidentally, in its emphasis upon the systematicity of the alleged contribution made by "dialectical" patterns in the exposition of a specific subject matter that the "new" Hegelian Marxism distinguishes itself from the "old" Hegelian Marxism of the historicist variety, as exemplified, for instance, by Lukács. [2]) Accordingly, the "new" Hegelian Marxists have tended to adopt as their slogan Lenin's famous aphorism to the effect that: "It is impossible to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having studied the whole of Hegel's Logic" They have thus prescribed strong medicine and in a notably large dosage. [3]

        Now, I do not want to suggest that the prescribed medicine is worse than the disease. But I do want to suggest that it is not quite the right medicine - and even perhaps produces the not entirely wholesome effect of making one feel better without, however, in fact correcting the problem. "Dialectics," one might say, is the opiate of Marxist intellectuals. Nonetheless, the existence of striking formal similarities between Marx's value-analysis and Hegel's exposition of the "concept" is undeniable, and the "new" Hegelian Marxism has at least done a service in bringing them out. [4] But I would submit that any inference from the existence of such similarities to the conclusion that Marx's "method" of analysis must, then, be Hegelian in inspiration is not only unjustified, but constitutes a grave error. In fact such discursive similarities have nothing at all to do with "method," but are simply the reflection of a similitude between the actual object of Marx's analysis and the character which is ascribed to objectivity as such in Hegelian metaphysics: of a similitude, then, between a peculiar (and notably idealist) metaphysical system and some specific sort of object which - quite by chance - that metaphysics happens to "fit." For, contrary to what one would be led to believe by the practice of so many a "value theorist," the primary object of Marx's value-analysis is not in fact price or the system of prices, but rather the objective condition of the possibility that there even be a system of prices: viz. the value-form itself or, in more colloquial language, money. Now, it so happens that money is nothing less than a "real universal" -  which is what, according to the distinctive formulae of Hegel's metaphysics, everything (or at least "everything which is actual") is supposed to be. Or, more precisely, specifically commodity-money is a "real universal," and commodity-money is the sort of money which (whether for historically contingent or essential reasons cannot be decided upon here) is clearly treated as basic in Marx's theory.

        

        Money and Other Mystical Objects

        To say that the money-commodity is a "real universal" is to say that it is some particular sort of thing, in this case a particular sort of commodity, which represents - in effect, "is" - the generic "essence" of all those particular sorts which are specifically different from both it and one another within a common genus. This is to say that it is a particular sort of commodity or "use-value" which represents in economic practice the generic essence or universality of all commodities qua exchange-values. "It is as if," Marx writes in the original 1867 version of the first chapter of Capital, "next to and apart from lions, tigers, hares and all other really existing animals, which together constitute the various genera, species, sub-species, families, etc. of the animal kingdom, there existed also the Animal, the individual incarnation of the animal kingdom in its entirety." [5]

        Just to be clear about what we are getting ourselves into with the foregoing observations, it needs to be stressed that the claim for the reality of universais is logically coordinate in Hegel with the claim for the merely illusory character of particulars - or, in other words, of the material world - and hence is part and parcel of Hegel's, and indeed Hegel himself would say of every, idealism.6 Wary of the charge of idealism, the traditional alibi of Hegelian Marxism, both "old" and "new," has been that Hegel's "dialectical method" could somehow be extricated from the idealist metaphysics of his system and put to a properly "materialist," i.e., scientific, use. What I am proposing, on the contrary, is that it is precisely Hegel's idealism, or rather the formulae characteristic of the latter, for which Marx, by virtue of the ontological peculiarity of money, found a legitimate scientific application.

        This is not, of course, to say that the content of those formulae remains unchanged in the usage which Marx makes of them. Hegel's talk of "universality" (Allgemeinheit) is systematically ambiguous between the sense of the relatively more inclusive, viz. in the manner of a class concept, and that of the all-inclusive or "true infinite," and it is the reality of the latter - of "the" universal - to which, by way of a remarkable series of what might be called "metonymic" slippages, the supposed reality of all its more specific "determinations" is called upon to testify in the Hegelian exposition. The money-commodity is not, however, a real embodiment of anything so elevated as "the" universal. It is rather, as noted, the real form acquired specifically by the universality of all commodities as exchange-values. In the absence of a state capable of issuing and guaranteeing the currency of so-called "fiat money," one particular sort of commodity must take on the function in economic practice of representing the universal value character shared in common, though in differing degrees, by all the rest. This is not only or even primarily a systematic economic necessity for purposes of measurement - though the intrinsic unit of the money-commodity does indeed provide, as is well known, the homogeneous unit in which the relative values of all other commodities are both given expression and made commensurable. That the money-commodity comes to discharge this ideal measurement function is, however, a consequence of the real circulatory function it is called upon to discharge, viz. as the medium of exchange. The money-commodity "represents" the generic essence of commodities in the very practice of exchange - it is the real and hence really appropriable form of existence of their implicit value character - since if all commodities were not in fact universally convertible into it, their generalized exchange would not be possible at all. The one particular sort of commodity serving as money is thus invested with the status of the "general commodity." It is - to recall Hegel's own favored illustrations of empirical universality - the sovereign, other commodities are its subjects; it is the sun, other commodities are its satellites; it is the Christ, other commodities are Christians.

        In fact these analogies, though evocative, are not quite exact. For Hegel, it is not only the case that the reality of universais is coordinate with the irreality of particulars, but it is also the case that amidst any range of existing particulars of some given sort there ought to be one that represents precisely the u individual universality" of the rest and vis-à-vis the rest. The relation of the Christ as "God-man" to created individuals as depicted in the Gospels clearly provides Hegel's paradigm in this regard, and the sun and the sovereign are supposed to represent analogous instances of "individual universality" in the domains of nature and "objective spirit," respectively.7 But the money-commodity represents the universality of all commodities not in the form of some one individual commodity, but rather in the form of some one particular sort of commodity. In other words, the relation of the money-commodity to other commodities is a relation of a particular sort to all other sorts, with individual commodities being implicated in this relation only inasmuch as they are specimens of such sorts.

        In order to get on with the business at hand, just how and why the system of exchange gives rise to a specific incarnation of the exchange- value of commodities cannot be gone into at any greater length here (see Rosenthal, 1998, ch.15) . But as the centrality of this theme to what gets called Marx's "value theory" has been so widely ignored, it is worth at least introducing into evidence the following somewhat lengthy passage from the Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy. Marx's reference in it to the "exclusive" commodity (die ausschließliche Ware) is to that (sort of) commodity which through the "action" of other commodities - or, more precisely, the action of their owners, who are willing always to accept it in exchange, provided it be offered in the correct amount - is "set apart" (ausgeschlossen) from the ranks of these latter to serve as the representative of their exchangeability in general.

        In the exchange process all commodities relate to the exclusive commodity as commodity as such, the commodity, embodiment of universal labour-time in a particular use-value. They are therefore as particular commodities opposed to one particular commodity as the universal commodity. The fact that commodity-owners relate to one another's labour as universal social labour thus gets represented in the form of their relating to their commodities as exchange-values; and the interrelation of commodities as exchange-values in the exchange process gets represented as their universal relation to a particular commodity as the adequate expression of their exchange-value; this, conversely, appears again as the specific relation of this particular commodity to all other commodities and hence as the determinate, as it were naturally-evolved, social character of a thing. The particular commodity which thus represents the adequate form of existence of the exchange-value of all commodities, or the exchange-value of commodities in the form of a particular exclusive commodity, is - money. (Marx, 1970, 48/MEW, Vol. 13, 34.)

        

        1 See Marx, 1973, 151 / Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 42, 85-6. All citations of English-language editions of Marx's work will be accompanied by citations of the standard multi-volume German-language edition, the Marx-EngeL• Werke (hereafter cited as MEW). As they appear here, the English renderings of Marx often have been modified. Where no English edition is cited, the translation is mine.

        2 On the historicism of traditional Hegelian Marxism, see Rosenthal, 1998, part 1.

        3 Recent works in English that clearly fall within the current described are, for instance, Arthur, 1993; Shamsavari, 1991; and Smith, 1990. Somewhat earlier attempts at Hegelian reconstructions of Marx in English, which given their dates of publication cannot in fact share the motivation of doing battle with "analytical" Marxism, seem to have been to a greater or lesser extent inspired by isolated academic encounters with the interpretive approach of the West German Hegel-Marx scholar Hans-Georg Backhaus. See, for instance, Banaji, 1979; Eldred and Hanlon, 1981. Otherwise, however, the tortuous details of Backhaus' theoretical itinerary have not had much impact upon English-language discussions - which is hardly surprising when one considers that until very recently his contributions were for the most part not even easily available in German. This problem has now been addressed with the publication of Backhaus, 1997. In general, what I am calling here the "new" Hegelian Marxism, inasmuch as it is a phenomenon of the Anglophone academy, has developed independently of recent German-language discussions in an analogous, though it must be said on the whole rather more sophisticated, vein. For a mature product of these latter, which shares a common "methodological" orientation with the "new" Hegelian Marxism in its Anglophone version and hence too some of its defects, but is rich in exegetical details and insights, see Brentel, 1989.

        4 The worst examples of the genre, however, find too many "correspondences" between Hegel's Logic and Marx's Capital, on the basis of the most circumstantial of textual evidence and often at the cost of wildly misleading and contrived interpretations of the latter. Hence, they serve in fact to divert attention from such analogies as are more than just incidental.

        5 Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Zweite Abteilung, Band 5, 37. Marx's manner of expression in this passage is in fact somewhat equivocal. For any animal which represented the universal "concept" of animality vis-à-vis all other species of animals would have itself presumably to be a particular species, not, as Marx implies, an "individual." As will be seen directly below, Marx's confusion in this regard was almost certainly of Hegelian inspiration. This same conclusion is suggested by the somewhat groping remark with which Marx follows his analogy: "Such an individual, which in itself comprises all really existent sorts of the same thing, is a Universal: like Animal, God, etc."

        6 Thus Hegel writes in his Science of Logic. "The proposition that the finite is ideal constitutes idealism. The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognizing that the finite has no veritable being. Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle. ... A philosophy which ascribed veritable, ultimate, absolute being to finite existence as such, would not deserve the name of philosophy; the principles of ancient or modern philosophies, water, or matter, or atoms are thoughts, universais, ideal entities, not things as they immediately present themselves to us, that is, in their sensuous individuality . . ." (Hegel, 1969, 154-5).

        7 See the Science of Logic, where Hegel remarks: "In the material world it is the central body that is the genus, but it is the individual universality of the single objects and their mechanical process" (722).