参与方式：https://github.com/apachecn/stanford-game-theory-notes-zh/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md

整体进度：https://github.com/apachecn/stanford-game-theory-notes-zh/issues/1

项目仓库：https://github.com/apachecn/stanford-game-theory-notes-zh

贡献指南

请您勇敢地去翻译和改进翻译。虽然我们追求卓越，但我们并不要求您做到十全十美，因此请不要担心因为翻译上犯错——在大部分情况下，我们的服务器已经记录所有的翻译，因此您不必担心会因为您的失误遭到无法挽回的破坏。（改编自维基百科）

课程视频：

• 斯坦福博弈论课程官网（http://www.game-theory-class.org/）

• Cousera 博弈论 1（https://www.coursera.org/learn/game-theory-1）

• Cousera 博弈论 2（https://www.coursera.org/learn/game-theory-2）

负责人：

• viviwong（https://github.com/viviwong）

章节列表

• 博弈论 I

• 1-1 Game Theory Intro - TCP Backoff

• 1-2 Self-Interested Agents and Utility Theory

• 1-3 Defining Games

• 1-4 Examples of Games

• 1-5 Nash Equilibrium Intro

• 1-6 Strategic Reasoning

• 1-7 Best Response and Nash Equilibrium

• 1-8 Nash Equilibrium of Example Games

• 1-9 Dominant Strategies

• 1-10 Pareto Optimality

• 2-1 Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium (I)

• 2-2 Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium (II)

• 2-3 Computing Mixed Nash Equilibrium

• 2-4 Hardness Beyond 2x2 Games - Basic

• 2-4 Hardness Beyond 2x2 Games - Advanced

• 2-5 Example: Mixed Strategy Nash

• 2-6 Data: Professional Sports and Mixed Strategies

• 3-1 Beyond the Nash Equilibrium

• 3-2 Strictly Dominated Strategies & Iterative Removal

• 3-3 Dominated Strategies & Iterative Removal: An Application

• 3-4 Maxmin Strategies

• 3-4 Maxmin Strategies - Advanced

• 3-5 Correlated Equilibrium: Intuition

• 4-1 Perfect Information Extensive Form: Taste

• 4-2 Formalizing Perfect Information Extensive Form Games

• 4-3 Perfect Information Extensive Form: Strategies, BR, NE

• 4-4 Subgame Perfection

• 4-5 Backward Induction

• 4-6 Subgame Perfect Application: Ultimatum Bargaining

• 4-7 Imperfect Information Extensive Form: Poker

• 4-8 Imperfect Information Extensive Form: Definition, Strategies

• 4-9 Mixed and Behavioral Strategies

• 4-10 Incomplete Information in the Extensive Form: Beyond Subgame Perfection

• 博弈论 II

• 1.1 Social Choice: Taste

• 1.2 Social Choice: Voting Scheme

• 1.3 Paradoxical Outcomes

• 1.4 Impossibility of Non-Paradoxical Social Welfare Functions

• 1.5 Arrow’s Theorem

• 1.6 Impossibility of Non-Pardoxical Social Choice Functions

• 1.7 Single-Peaked Preferences

• 2.1 Mechanism Design: Taste

• 2.2 Implementation

• 2.3 Mechanism Design: Examples

• 2.4 Revelation Principle

• 2.5 Revelation Principle: Examples

• 2.6 Impossibility of General Dominant-Strategy Implementation

• 2.7 Transferable Utility

• 2.8 Transferable Utility Example

• 2.9 Mechanism Design as an Optimization Problem

• 3.1 VCG: Taste

• 3.2 VCG: Definitions

• 3.3 VCG: Examples

• 3.4 VCG: Limitations

• 3.5 VCG: Individual Rationality and Budget Balance in VCG

• 3.6 VCG: The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem

• 4.1 Auctions: Taste

• 4.2 Auctions: Taxonomy

• 4.3 Bidding in Second-Price Auctions

• 4.4 Bidding in First-Price Auctions

• 4.5 Revenue Equivalence

• 4.6 Optimal Auctions

• 4.7 More Advanced Auctions

流程

一、认领

首先查看整体进度（https://github.com/apachecn/stanford-game-theory-notes-zh/issues/1），确认没有人认领了你想认领的章节。

然后回复 ISSUE，注明“章节 + QQ 号”。

二、整理笔记

• 翻译 Coursera 课程页面的字幕（可以利用谷歌翻译（https://translate.google.cn），但一定要把它变得可读）

• 排版成段落，并添加视频截图

三、提交

• fork Github 项目

• 将文档（Markdown 格式）放在docs中。

• push

• pull request

请见 Github 入门指南（https://github.com/apachecn/kaggle/blob/master/docs/GitHub）。