Byzantium at War AD 600-1453（战争中的拜占庭：公元600-1453年）（19）
作者：John Haldon约翰·哈尔顿
出版商：Routledge Taylor & Francis Group
自翻：神尾智代
Conclusion and consequences：War, peace, and survival
结论与影响：战争、和平与生存
The Byzantine state survived as an important force in the Balkan and east Mediterranean region until the later 12th century because it maintained an effective fiscal apparatus that could support an efficient and well-organised army. It was as much the changes and shifts in the international situation as it was the internal evolution of Byzantine social and economic relations that led to its decline in the 13th century and its collapse and disappearance in the 14th and 15th centuries. One of the most important reasons for its longevity and its success in defending a territory surrounded on all sides by hostile forces was the system of logistical support that it maintained almost to the end. It was this system which permitted the state to allocate resources from the land to its armies as they needed them, to plan in advance the requirements for offensive operations, to hinder hostile appropriation of the same resources, and thus to make the conditions for enemy forces on Byzantine soil as difficult as possible. The taxation system ensured the raising of supplies in kind at the right time and in the right place, as well as of cash in order to purchase other requirements as well as mercenary soldiers, livestock, and so forth. Naturally, in reality this system was by no means as effective at all times as a simple description might suggest, and it often worked less to the advantage of the army than to that of the social elite, who could exploit it for their own ends. The whole apparatus worked often to the disadvantage of the producing population, who could be very oppressed by the incessant demands of this bureaucratic state.
（直到 12 世纪后期，拜占庭国家作为巴尔干和东地中海地区的一支重要力量幸存下来，因为它维持着一个有效的财政机构，可以支持一支高效且组织严密的军队。 13世纪拜占庭社会经济关系的内在演变和14、15世纪的瓦解和消失，既是国际形势的变化和变迁，也是拜占庭社会经济关系的内部演变。 其长寿并成功保卫四面八方被敌对势力包围的领土的最重要原因之一是它几乎保持到最后的后勤保障系统。 正是这种制度允许国家根据需要从土地上分配资源给军队，提前计划进攻行动的需要，阻止敌对相同资源的侵占，从而为敌军创造条件。 在拜占庭的土地上尽可能困难。 税收制度确保在适当的时间和地点筹集实物供应以及现金以购买其他需要以及雇佣兵、牲畜等。 自然，在现实中，这个系统绝不像简单描述所暗示的那样在任何时候都有效，而且它对军队的好处往往不如对社会精英的好处，后者可以为自己的目的利用它。 整个机构的运作往往对生产人口不利，他们可能会被这个官僚国家的不断要求所压迫。）
Other factors also played a role. Tactical order and discipline were regarded by the Byzantines themselves as key elements in their success over the long term, and they were only too aware of what could happen when these were not respected or maintained. It is also the case that the Byzantine military were by no means unique in this respect. The Islamic armies were also well organised and operated under a strict discipline, while the crusaders in the late 11th century soon learned the value of particular formations and tight tactical discipline in dealing with the fast-moving and hard-hitting Seljuk horse archers. Yet it is clear that Byzantium had an edge over most of its enemies in this respect until the 11th century, even if tactical discipline did not always deliver the results expected because individual officers or commanders lacked the leadership and authority to impose and maintain it. On the other hand, Byzantium was not Rome, and it is important to bear this in mind — the medieval east Roman empire was indeed a medieval empire, and it exhibited similar developmental traits in terms of social organisation, political structures and economic evolution as many of its neighbours.
（其他因素也发挥了作用。 拜占庭人自己认为战术秩序和纪律是他们长期成功的关键因素，他们非常清楚如果不尊重或维护这些会发生什么。 拜占庭军队在这方面也绝不是独一无二的。 伊斯兰军队也组织严密，作战纪律严明，而 11 世纪后期的十字军很快就了解了特定阵型和严密战术纪律在应对快速移动和攻击力强的塞尔柱骑射手时的价值。 然而，很明显，直到 11 世纪，拜占庭在这方面比大多数敌人更具优势，即使战术纪律并不总是能带来预期的结果，因为个别军官或指挥官缺乏强加和维持它的领导力和权威。 另一方面，拜占庭不是罗马，记住这一点很重要——中世纪的东罗马帝国确实是一个中世纪的帝国，它在社会组织、政治结构和经济演变方面表现出类似的发展特征。它的邻居。）
Another important aspect was leadership, the other side of the disciplinary coin, as it were. When Byzantine armies were well led, it usually meant that they were well-disciplined, fought in coherent units and obeyed the basic tactical rules of engagement appropriate to their equipment and weaponry. It also meant that they were, more often than not, victorious, because Byzantine leaders were supposed to observe the fundamental principle of east Roman warfare, namely that of ensuring that they fought only when they were fairly sure they could win, and at the same time that of minimising the loss of life on their side. This was not mere philanthropy, although that was certainly an important ideological element. It was common sense in such a beleaguered state, in which manpower was at a premium and demographic change could lead to serious problems for the armies. But there were plenty of foolish commanders, men whose vanity, arrogance or ignorance led them to throw the lives of their soldiers away in futile attacks or ill-considered actions. And it seems often to have been the case that these were the leaders who paid least attention to the fundamental principles of managing soldiers, discipline, tactical cohesion and esprit de corps. For with good leadership usually came good morale and self-confidence — crucial ingredients for successful fighting, especially in offensive warfare.
（另一个重要方面是领导力，这是纪律硬币的另一面。 当拜占庭军队得到良好领导时，这通常意味着他们纪律严明，以连贯的单位作战，并遵守适合其装备和武器的基本交战战术规则。 这也意味着他们往往是胜利的，因为拜占庭领导人应该遵守东罗马战争的基本原则，即确保他们只有在相当确定自己能获胜时才进行战斗，同时 时间，以尽量减少他们身边的生命损失。 这不仅仅是慈善事业，尽管这当然是一个重要的意识形态因素。 在这样一个四面楚歌的国家，人力非常宝贵，人口结构的变化可能会给军队带来严重的问题，这是常识。 但是有很多愚蠢的指挥官，他们的虚荣、傲慢或无知导致他们在徒劳的攻击或考虑不周的行动中舍弃士兵的生命。 而且似乎经常出现这样的情况，这些领导人最不关注管理士兵、纪律、战术凝聚力和团队精神的基本原则。 因为良好的领导通常会带来良好的士气和自信——成功战斗的关键因素，尤其是在进攻战中。）
Even with well-equipped, disciplined and well-trained troops, the result of a battle in the medieval period, as well as at other times, was, in the end, unpredictable. The ultimate arbiter was a combination of the soldiers' morale and fighting skills, the quality of the leadership, and good luck. But as the emperor Leo VI points out in his military handbook, or tactica, in the early 10th century, the difference between the good general and the bad general was that the good general understood this, acted in a manner appropriate to the circumstances, and made sure that his dispositions could cope with sudden surprises or changes in the conditions of battle. Another writer, this time the son of a famous Byzantine general, noted at the end of the 11th century that he had never known a diligent and alert man who had not been able to make his own good fortune on the battlefield. And while it would be incorrect to suggest that Byzantine defeats were due only to the incompetence or arrogance of commanding officers, this did nevertheless play an important role.
（即使拥有装备精良、训练有素、训练有素的军队，中世纪和其他时期的一场战斗的结果最终也是不可预测的。 最终的仲裁者是士兵的士气和战斗技巧、领导素质和运气的结合。 但是，正如利奥六世皇帝在 10 世纪早期的军事手册或战术中指出的那样，好将军和坏将军之间的区别在于，好将军明白这一点，以适合当时情况的方式行事，并且 确保他的性格能够应对突然的意外或战斗条件的变化。 另一位作家，这次是一位著名的拜占庭将军的儿子，在 11 世纪末指出，他从来没有见过一个勤奋而机警的人，他不能在战场上赚到自己的好运。 虽然认为拜占庭的失败仅仅是由于指挥官的无能或傲慢是不正确的，但这确实发挥了重要作用。）
The Byzantine world has attracted western popular and scholarly attention, not only because it stood at the crossroads of east and west, bridging very diverse cultures, but because it evoked a romantic lost medieval Christian world which was both eastern in its forms yet western in its cultural significance. For some, it had been a bastion of Christianity against Islam; for others, especially in the 16th and 17th centuries, it was a source of politically relevant information about the Ottomans who threatened Europe at that time. And it was to Byzantine authors and texts that later generations directed their attention in the context of increasing national self-awareness as interest grew in the pre-Renaissance and early medieval antecedents of the formerly Byzantine lands. And while both medieval Islam and the Byzantine world served to transmit the heritage of classical and Roman civilisation to the Renaissance and beyond, it was in particular through collections of Byzantine manuscripts and books that many texts were preserved, influencing in this way the evolution and content of modern classical scholarship.
（拜占庭世界吸引了西方大众和学术界的关注，不仅因为它站在东西方的十字路口，连接了非常多样化的文化，还因为它唤起了一个浪漫的失落的中世纪基督教世界，它的形式既是东方的，又是西方的。 文化意义。 对一些人来说，它曾是基督教对抗伊斯兰教的堡垒； 对于其他人来说，尤其是在 16 和 17 世纪，它是有关当时威胁欧洲的奥斯曼帝国的政治相关信息的来源。 随着人们对前拜占庭土地的文艺复兴前和中世纪早期前身的兴趣日益浓厚，后来的几代人将注意力转向了拜占庭作家和文本，以提高民族自我意识。 虽然中世纪的伊斯兰教和拜占庭世界都有助于将古典和罗马文明的遗产传递到文艺复兴时期及以后，但特别是通过拜占庭手稿和书籍的收藏，许多文本得以保存下来，以这种方式影响了演变和内容 现代古典学术研究。）
Byzantium was, in a sense, always at war, for as we have seen, it always had an enemy or a potential enemy on one front or another. This situation necessarily inflected the whole history of the empire and determined in part at least its social structure and the way in which the state as well as the political system could evolve. Byzantium made war against its enemies over a period of some 700 years, from the 7th to the 14th and 15th centuries. In this sense, we might also assert that war made Byzantium what it was.
（从某种意义上说，拜占庭总是处于战争状态，因为正如我们所见，它总是在一条或另一条战线上有一个敌人或潜在的敌人。 这种情况必然影响整个帝国的历史，并至少部分地决定了它的社会结构以及国家和政治制度的演变方式。 从 7 世纪到 14 世纪和 15 世纪，拜占庭在大约 700 年的时间里与敌人作战。 从这个意义上说，我们也可以断言，战争造就了拜占庭。）
Further reading
进一步阅读
Angold, M., The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204.
A Political History, London, Longman, 19114.
Bartusis, M.C., The Late Byzantine Army. Arms and Society, 1204-1453, Philadelphia, U.
Penn. Press, 1992.
Dixon, Karen R. and Southern, Pat , The Late Roman Army, London, Routledge, 1996.
Elton, 11., Warfare in Roman Europe, A.D.
350-425, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996, Haldon, J. F., State, Army and Society in Byzantium. approaches to Military, Social and Administrative History, Aldershot: Variorum, 1995.
Haldon, J. F., Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565-1204, London, Routledge, 1999.
Haldon, J. F., Byzantium. A History, Stroud, Tempus, 2000.
Haldon, J. F., The Byzantine Wars, Stroud.
Tempt's, 2001.
Kaegi, W. E., Jr., Byzantine Military Unrest 471-843. An Interpretation, Amsterdam, Hakkert, 1981.
McGeer, Eric, Sowing the Dragon's Teeth.
Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Cenhity, Dumbarton Oaks Studies XXXII!, Washington DC, Dumbarton Oaks, 1995.
Miller, T. S. and Nesbitt, J. S. (eds)., Peace and War hi Byzantium, Washington DC, CUA, 1995.
Nicol.le, D., Medieval Warfare Source Book, 2.
Christian Europe and its Neighbours, London, Arms Sr Armour Press, 1996.
Oikonomides, N. (ed.)., Byzantium at War, Athens, National Research Foundation, 1997.
Whittow, M., The Making of Orthodox Byzantium, 600-1025, London, MacMillan, 1996.
Angold, M.，拜占庭帝国 1025-1204。
政治史，伦敦，朗文，19114。
Bartusis, M.C.，晚期拜占庭军队。 武器与社会，1204-1453，美国费城 佩恩。 出版社，1992 年。
Dixon, Karen R. 和 Southern, Pat，The Late Roman Army，伦敦，劳特利奇，1996 年。
埃尔顿，11 世，罗马欧洲战争，公元 350-425, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996, Haldon, J. F., State, Army and Society in Byzantium。 军事、社会和行政历史的方法，奥尔德肖特：Variorum，1995 年。
Haldon, J. F.，拜占庭世界的战争、国家和社会，565-1204，伦敦，劳特利奇，1999 年。
Haldon, J. F., 拜占庭。 历史，斯特劳德，坦帕斯，2000 年。
Haldon, J. F.，拜占庭战争，斯特劳德。
诱惑，2001。
Kaegi, W. E., Jr.，拜占庭军事动乱 471-843。 解释，阿姆斯特丹，哈克特，1981 年。
麦吉尔，埃里克，播种龙牙。
第十世纪的拜占庭战争，敦巴顿橡树园研究 XXXII！，华盛顿特区，敦巴顿橡树园，1995 年。
Miller, T. S. 和 Nesbitt, J. S. (eds)., Peace and War hi Byzantium, Washington DC, CUA, 1995.
Nicol.le, D.，中世纪战争资料书，2。
基督教欧洲及其邻居，伦敦，Arms Sr Armor Press，1996 年。
Oikonomides, N. (ed.)，《战争中的拜占庭》，雅典，国家研究基金会，1997 年。
Whittow, M.，东正教拜占庭的形成，600-1025，伦敦，麦克米兰，1996 年。
Byzantium survived for 800 years, yet its dominions and power fluctuated dramatically during that time. John Haldon tells the story from the days when the empire was barely clinging on to survival, to the age when its fabulous wealth attracted Viking mercenaries and Asian nomad warriors to its armies, their very appearance on the field being enough to bring enemies to terms. In 1453 the last emperor of Byzantium, Constantine XII, died fighting on the ramparts, bringing to a romantic end the glorious history of this legendary empire.
拜占庭存在800年，但在那段时间里，它的领土和权力发生了剧烈的波动。约翰哈尔顿讲述了从帝国勉强生存的时代，到其惊人的财富吸引维京雇佣兵和亚洲游牧战士加入其军队的时代，他们在战场上的出现足以让敌人屈服。 1453年，拜占庭最后一位皇帝君士坦丁十二世战死在城墙上，为这个传奇帝国的辉煌历史画上了一个浪漫的句号。
完结
