Global technopolitics--The new grand bargain  

Without teaming up, democracies will not be able to establish a robust alternative to China’s autocratic technosphere

It might not have to give all that much. European views on regulating platforms more strictly because of their tendency to become quasi-natural monopolies are not exactly mainstream in Washington, DC, but nor are they completely alien to the political debate there. A recent congressional report about how to limit big tech’s power included many ideas already touted in Brussels, such as banning tech giants from favouring their own services and refusing to connect to competing ones. Positions on regulating speech online are not that far apart either. As in Europe, there is growing agreement in America that legislation is needed to push social-media firms to do more to rid their services of hate speech and the like.

Quasi /ˈkweɪzaɪ; ˈkweɪsaɪ; ˈkwɑːzi/ adj. 准的；类似的；外表的 adv. 似是；有如

tout /taʊt/

1.~ sb/sth (as sth) 标榜；吹捧；吹嘘 •She's being touted as the next leader of the party. 她被吹捧为该党的下一任领导人。

2.~ (for sth) 兜售；推销 • the problem of unlicensed taxi drivers touting for business at airports 没有执照的出租汽车司机在机场揽生意的问题

3.（尤指在剧院、体育场等外）倒卖高价票，卖黑市票

A deal on taxing tech firms seems within reach, too. The Trump administration resisted efforts to compel them to pay taxes where they do business rather than in tax havens, regarding this as a grab for the profits of American companies. A Biden administration is likely to be more open to the argument that more of the taxes on digital firms should go to places where their customers live. Expect negotiations on the matter at the OECD to be revived --as they must be to keep countries from charging digital taxes unilaterally. Barring a compromise, France, Spain and Britain will start collecting such a levy early next year.

Compel  /kəmˈpel/ vt. 强迫，迫使；强使发生

Unilaterally /ˌjuːnɪˈlætrəli/ adv. 单方面地

Levy /ˈlevi/ n. 征收；征兵，征税；vt. 征收（税等）；征集（兵等）；发动（战争）；vi. 征税；征兵

In parts of the world’s international bureaucracy the grand bargaining has already begun. When Japan presided over the G20, a club of developing and rich countries, last year, it succeeded in getting the group to launch the “Osaka Track”, an attempt to come up with rules to regulate global data flows. This summer also saw the launch of the Global Partnership in AI, which is meant to come up with rules for the responsible use of AI, and of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, which brings together lawmakers from 18 countries. These new groups join a few established ones, such as the OECD and the Internet Governance Forum, which have long pushed for common rules in the digital realm. NATO has started to do the same for AI and data-sharing among its members.

bureaucracy  /bjʊəˈrɒkrəsi/ n. 官僚主义；官僚机构；官僚政治

Preside  v. /prɪˈzaɪd/ ~ (at/over sth) 主持（会议、仪式等）；担任（会议）主席 • the presiding judge 首席法官

NATO：North Atlantic Treaty Organization，北大西洋公约组织

One of the key parameters in the bargaining will be how formal a framework the parties want. In some ways, formal is better: everyone knows where they stand. In others, formal is worse: agreement is harder. Take the example of trade, thoroughly formalised within the WTO. Trade agreements take years to negotiate, often only to be blocked by legislatures at the last minute. This is why a Biden administration will probably aim for a much looser form of co-operation, at least initially. An idea discussed in foreign-policy circles close to Mr Biden is that, instead of agreeing on certain policies that then have to be implemented nationally, governments should opt for a division of labour within certain red lines. If Europe wants to go ahead with rules to regulate big tech which do not amount to expropriation, America would not put up a fight thus allowing the EU regulation to become the global standard of sorts, rather as it has done with the GDPR.

expropriation /ˌeksˌprəʊpriˈeɪʃn/ n. 征收，征用；没收

GDPR：通用数据保护条例(General Data Protection Regulation)

opt for ：选择，抉择

译文

It might not have to give all that much. European views on regulating platforms more strictly because of their tendency to become quasi-natural monopolies are not exactly mainstream in Washington, DC, but nor are they completely alien to the political debate there. A recent congressional report about how to limit big tech’s power included many ideas already touted in Brussels, such as banning tech giants from favouring their own services and refusing to connect to competing ones. Positions on regulating speech online are not that far apart either. As in Europe, there is growing agreement in America that legislation is needed to push social-media firms to do more to rid their services of hate speech and the like.

这有可能不需要美国付出很大的代价。欧盟将管制平台越来越严格视为欧盟走向自然垄断的趋势表现，但并不是美国政界的主流，然而这种看法也非美国政界观点的完全异类。一则最新的国会报告是关于如何限制大型科技公司权利，包括很多已经推销给布鲁塞尔的观点，比如禁止科技巨头只使用自己的服务而拒绝与竞争对手联系。规范互联网言论方面，美国与欧盟观点相差不大。与欧洲一样，美国越来越同意需要立法推动互联网传媒企业提供更多的服务摆脱网络仇恨言乱。

A deal on taxing tech firms seems within reach, too. The Trump administration resisted efforts to compel them to pay taxes where they do business rather than in tax havens, regarding this as a grab for the profits of American companies. A Biden administration is likely to be more open to the argument that more of the taxes on digital firms should go to places where their customers live. Expect negotiations on the matter at the OECD to be revived --as they must be to keep countries from charging digital taxes unilaterally. Barring a compromise, France, Spain and Britain will start collecting such a levy early next year.

关于对科技企业征税也在可商讨范围之内。特朗普政府反对对科技企业在业务所在地强制征税而不是在避税天堂征税，并将之视为抢夺美国企业利益。而拜登政府则对这个议题可能更加开放，信息企业的税收更多应该流向公司的客户所在地。预期OECD会重启这方面的谈判--因为他们必须杜绝各国单方面更改数字税。若不能妥协，法国、西班牙和英国明年将会开始征收各自的数字税。

In parts of the world’s international bureaucracy the grand bargaining has already begun. When Japan presided over the G2o, a club of developing and rich countries, last year, it succeeded in getting the group to launch the “Osaka Track”, an attempt to come up with rules to regulate global data flows. This summer also saw the launch of the Global Partnership in AI, which is meant to come up with rules for the responsible use of AI, and of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, which brings together lawmakers from 18 countries. These new groups join a few established ones, such as the OECD and the Internet Governance Forum, which have long pushed for common rules in the digital realm. NATO has started to do the same for AI and data-sharing among its members.

世界部分的国际官僚机构已经启动规模宏大的交易。在日本主持G20（发展中国家与富有国家俱乐部）的时候，它成功使得G20启动“Osaka Track”，试图为世界数据流动制定规则。这个夏天也见证世界人工智能全球伙伴关系的落地，尝试对人工智能的合理使用制定规则以及在中国建立议会交互联盟，聚集了来自18个国家的法律制定者。这些新的组织加入了少量的已存在组织，比如OECD和互联网管理论坛，互联网管理论坛长期致力于数字领域的公共规则推广。NATO也开始对成员国之间AI 和数据分析开展一样的工作。

One of the key parameters in the bargaining will be how formal a framework the parties want. In some ways, formal is better: everyone knows where they stand. In others, formal is worse: agreement is harder. Take the example of trade, thoroughly formalised within the WTO. Trade agreements take years to negotiate, often only to be blocked by legislatures at the last minute. This is why a Biden administration will probably aim for a much looser form of co-operation, at least initially. An idea discussed in foreign-policy circles close to Mr Biden is that, instead of agreeing on certain policies that then have to be implemented nationally, governments should opt for a division of labour within certain red lines. If Europe wants to go ahead with rules to regulate big tech which do not amount to expropriation, America would not put up a fight thus allowing the EU regulation to become the global standard of sorts, rather as it has done with the GDPR.

这场交易中关键因素之一就是参与方想要什么样正式程度的合作框架。在某些情况下，正式意味着优质：所有人都知道其位置。在另外一些情况下，正式意味着糟糕：达成统一更加困难。以贸易为例，在WTO的框架下完全规范化。贸易协议谈判多年达成，结果最后一秒被立法毙掉。这也是为什么拜登政府至少最初有可能以宽松的合作方式为目标。在外交政策圈讨论的一个想法与拜登想法相近，这个想法认为与其各国制定达成必须落地实施的明确政策，政府更应该在红线内选择劳动分工。如果欧盟想要推进对科技巨头的监管政策，其规则不是没收这些企业的话，美国不应该就此挑起战争，而是允许欧盟的监管政策成为此类企业的国际标准，而不是如同（欧盟）通用数据保护条例一样。

经济学人2020年12月刊