【中英对照】等待的现象学分析（Phenomenological Analysis of Waiting）
——IMAD SHOUER
For most existentialists and phenomenologists Heidegger’s attempt to bring philosophical discourse home to Dasein as a being in the world is a breakthrough in the history of philosophy.
对大多数存在主义者和现象学家来说，海德格尔试图将哲学话语带回到作为世界中的存在的 Dasein，是哲学史上的一个突破。
This breakthrough takes place in his approach to metaphysics[1] and more so in his great work Being and Time.[2] In the former he states the problems which traditional metaphysics confronts in the attempt to understand man as a being in the world. In the latter he offers alternatives through which new explications and directions in interpreting man’s relationship to the world is possible.
这种突破发生在他对形而上学的研究方法中 [1]，更发生在他的伟大作品《存在与时间》中[2]。在前者中，他指出了传统形而上学在试图理解人作为世界中的存在时所面临的问题。在后者中，他提供了一些替代方案，通过这些方案，在解释人与世界的关系方面有可能出现新的解释和方向。
The major setback of traditional metaphysics, according to Heidegger, is related to its orientation, and more basically to its fundamental directions through which it lends itself to an understanding of the problem of Being. Consequently, Heidegger concludes that meta¬ physics needs to be redirected, or rather twisted around. Thus instead of looking into general categories and methods which can offer universality and cohesion concerning man’s nature, we should direct our attention to man himself and examine his existentiality, namely the modes of his being as a being in the world.
海德格尔认为，传统形而上学的主要挫折与它的方向有关，更主要的是与它的基本方向有关，通过这些方向它可以理解存在的问题。因此，海德格尔的结论是，元物理学需要被重新定向，或者说被扭曲。因此，我们不应该去研究那些能够提供关于人的本性的普遍性和凝聚力的一般范畴和方法，而应该把我们的注意力引向人本身，研究他的存在性，即他作为世界中的一个存在的模式。
This program needs two fundamental requirements:i) a basic com¬ prehension of language in order to grasp whatever Dasein attempts to communicate about his own existentiality, and 2) an understanding of Dasein’s modes, in which he expresses and relates himself to the world. Thus instead of attempting to know man through the mirror of traditional metaphysics, we reflect upon man himself in order to de¬ scribe his ontological relations with the world. By qualifying man’s relation with the world to be ontological, Heidegger means that man as an entity is capable of questioning himself as an entity among other entities.[3]
这个方案需要两个基本要求： 1）对语言的基本理解，以便掌握 Dasein 试图传达的关于他自己的存在性的任何东西，以及 2）对 Dasein 的模式的理解， 在这些模式中，他表达并将自己与世界联系起来。因此，我们不是试图通过传统形而上学的镜子来认识人，而是对人本身进行反思，以便描述他与世界的本体论关系。海德格尔将人与世界的关系限定为本体论的关系，意味着人作为一个实体，能够将自己作为其他实体中的一个实体进行质疑[3] 。
This very questioning which Dasein brings forth against himself is the evidence of man’s ontological conditions, namely the condition which stretches man's existentiality to the borderline of his own existence, the existence of a being who puts forth his very being in question. The starting point, therefore, ought not to be the study of being qua being, in the Aristotelian sense, but rather the analysis of Dasein’s ontological relation with the world. This analysis should also be con¬ fined to temporality because any transcendental speculation which does not address itself to the existentiality of Dasein in time is "double talk" which not only hinders our understanding of Dasein, but throws him on the level of transcendental speculation, the discourse which Heidegger consistently avoids.
Dasein 对自己提出的这种质疑是人的本体论条件的证据，即把人的存在性延伸到他自己的存在的边界的条件，即一个对自己的存在提出质疑的存在。因此，出发点不应该是研究亚里士多德意义上的存在本身，而是分析 Dasein 与世界的本体论关系。这种分析也应该与时间性相联系，因为任何不涉及 Dasein 在时间中的存在性的超验推测都是 "两面派"，不仅妨碍我们对 Dasein 的理解，而且将他抛到超验推测的层面上，这是海德格尔一贯避免的话语。
In this paper I am following Heidegger’s approach in analyzing Dasein's modes as a being in the world, and the phenomenon which 1 have chosen to pursue in my analysis is waiting.
在本文中，我遵循海德格尔的方法来分析 Dasein 作为世界中的存在的模式，而我在分析中选择的现象是等待。
As we follow man in his everydayness we see him engaged constantly with the other in situations. This engagement makes man open to a multiplicity of conditions; one which is unavoidable is waiting. Man is confronted with the possibility of waiting for a rendezvous with a friend, for a loved one to come from a journey, for the war to end, for graduation, to get married, for history to reach its dialectical end, or even waiting for God.[4] This experience of waiting can be examined phenomenologically.
当我们在日常工作中跟随人类时，我们看到他不断地在各种情况下与他人接触。这种接触使人向多种条件开放；其中不可避免的是等待。人面临着这样的可能性：等待与朋友的约会，等待爱人从旅途中归来，等待战争结束，等待毕业，等待结婚，等待历史达到其辩证的终点，甚至等待上帝。
The phenomenon of waiting is not experienced by consciousness on the individual level only, but also on the collective level. On the individual level waiting is experienced subjectively, whereas on the collective level it is experienced in a projected state, i.e., on the social, political, theological, and historical level. Undoubtedly these projected states are interrelated and it is even difficult to separate them, but this difficulty docs not make the distinction between the levels of consciousness incomprehensible.
等待的现象不仅在个人层面上被意识体验到，而且在集体层面上也是如此。在个人层面上，等待是主观体验的，而在集体层面上，它是在预测状态下体验的，即在社会、政治、神学和历史层面上。毫无疑问，这些投射状态是相互关联的，甚至很难将它们分开，但这种困难并不意味着意识层次之间的区别是不可理解的。
On the collective level, however, individual consciousness becomes objectified and a part of the general collective state; its confrontation with waiting is shared, either reflectively or unreflectively, with the collective group. On the individual level the experience of waiting is subjectively felt and inwardly grasped.
然而，在集体层面上，个人意识成为客观存在，成为一般集体状态的一部分；它与等待的对抗被反思或不反思地与集体群体分享。在个人层面上，等待的经验是主观感受和内在把握的。
In this paper due attention will be given to the collective level of waiting, but more emphasis will be focused on the individual level.
本文将对集体层面的等待给予适当关注，但更多的重点将放在个人层面。
In the midst of waiting man experiences the emptiness of time, or as Professor Ludwig Landgrebe suggests, the elapse of time. Why is this so? Because in the midst of waiting consciousness freezes on the threshold between the past as it was, and the future as expectation, or in the sense of coming to be. The presence does not exist in waiting because consciousness is thrown ahead of its immediate project in the possibilities of coming to be, not in the being of itself.
在等待的过程中，人体验到了时间的空虚，或者像路德维希-兰德格雷布教授所说的那样，是时间的流逝。为什么会这样呢？因为在等待的过程中，意识被冻结在过去的门槛上，而未来则是期待，或者说是即将到来的意义。在等待中，存在并不存在，因为意识被抛到了它眼前的项目之前，即未来的可能性，而不是它本身的存在。
In waiting, consciousness experiences a sense of disengagement from its very presence, because while waiting for someone to come, after he has not come at the specified time, or for some happenings that are only possibilities, the here and now elapses into the projected future and the projected future becomes the annihilating, or the objectifying, factor of consciousness. In this case consciousness becomes an object for waiting and loses not only its schemes of temporality, but also its articulation of its own presence. Thus consciousness becomes absent toward itself in waiting. Of course, one can say that I can avoid being subjected to the intensity of waiting by doing something while waiting. But this doing something is nothing but the acknowledgment of the anxiety which waiting already produced in consciousness. What consciousness is actually doing is escaping from the grip of waiting, but to no avail.
在等待中，意识体验到一种脱离自身存在的感觉，因为在等待某人到来的时候，在他没有在指定的时间到来之后，或者在等待一些只是可能发生的事情的时候，此时此刻就会消失在预测的未来中，而预测的未来就会成为意识的湮灭因素，或者说是对象化因素。在这种情况下，意识成为等待的对象，不仅失去了它的时间性计划，而且也失去了它对自身存在的表述。因此，意识在等待中变得对自己不存在。当然，人们可以说，我可以通过在等待时做一些事情来避免受制于等待的强度。但这一行动不过是承认等待已经在意识中产生的焦虑。意识实际上在做的是逃离等待的控制，但无济于事。
Let us apply this interpretation of waiting to a particular case in which the individual consciousness is experiencing waiting, and then analyze it in a more general case in which waiting is experienced collectively.
让我们把对等待的这种解释应用于个人意识正在经历等待的特殊情况，然后在等待被集体经历的更普遍的情况下进行分析。
Gary is waiting for Pat to call sometime between four and five o’clock. In order to escape the objectification of waiting, Gary convinces himself that he is really not waiting, but reading, and while reading Pat may call. But after we scrutinize Gary’s situation in his attempt to escape self-objectification in waiting we find that he did not succeed doing so for various reasons.
加里正在等待帕特在四点到五点之间的某个时间打电话过来。为了摆脱等待的对象化，加里说服自己，他其实不是在等待，而是在阅读，而在阅读的时候，帕特可能会打电话来。但是，当我们仔细研究加里试图在等待中摆脱自我客体化的情况后，我们发现，由于各种原因，他并没有成功地做到这一点。
i) Was Gary waiting for Pat and while waiting, reading, or 2) was he engaged in mundane affairs as reading or writing and at the same time expecting a call from Pat?
i) 加里是否在等待帕特，并在等待中阅读，或者 2) 他是否在从事阅读或写作等世俗事务，同时期待着帕特的电话？
It is important to note the goal toward which the intentional grasp of consciousness is directed:
重要的是要注意意识的有意把握所指向的目标：
a) Is it directed toward waiting?
a) 它是针对等待的吗？
b) Is it directed toward reading?
b) 它是针对阅读的吗？
c) Is it directed toward waiting while reading or toward reading
c) 它是针对阅读时的等待， 还是针对阅读时的等待？
while waiting?
在等待中？
In the case of a and b there is no difficulty, because there is no duality or overlapping intentions within consciousness. The direction of the intentional act is projected toward waiting or reading. In either case one cannot say that ‘I am not waiting while reading’ or ‘1 am only reading and not actually waiting’.
在 a 和 b 的情况下，没有任何困难，因为在意识中不存在二元性或重叠的意图。意图行为的方向是投射到等待或阅读。在任何一种情况下，都不能说 "我在阅读时没有等待 "或 "我只是在阅读而不是在等待"。
In the case of c, the situation is problematic for the following reason. If we ask Gary whether he is experiencing an emptiness of time, a sense of anxiety, or some form of duality in the directions of the intentionality of his consciousness, Gary is faced with only two possible alternatives, cither affirming his conscious state in waiting, or denying it. If he chooses to affirm it, we will not have any issue. But,if he decides that it is perfectly reasonable to be doing what he is involved in doing without experiencing any sense of duality in the use of his time while waiting for Pat, then Gary's situation can be scrutinized further.
在 c 的情况下，这种情况是有问题的，原因如下。如果我们问加里，他是否正在经历时间的空虚、焦虑感，或者他的意识的意向性方向的某种形式的二元性，加里只面临两种可能的选择，要么肯定他在等待中的意识状态，要么否认它。如果他选择肯定它，我们就不会有任何问题。但是，如果他决定，在等待帕特的过程中，做他所参与的事情是完全合理的，而在使用他的时间时没有体验到任何二元性的感觉，那么，加里的情况就可以被进一步审查了。
Suppose it is a warm afternoon (the sun is glittering over the thick air of Terre Haute) and I burst into Gary’s office asking him if he would like to go for a cold beer. Reflectively or unreflectively, he will probably say "It’s a great idea. 1 wish I could go with you, but you see Pat might call at any minute.” What this implies then is that Gary has already devoted a specific chunk of time for one event which is conditioned by waiting. Which means that any desires or intentions which might arise in that specific chunk of time have to be blocked or imperatively negated.
假设这是一个温暖的下午（太阳在特雷霍特厚重的空气中闪闪发光），我冲进加里的办公室，问他是否愿意去喝杯冰啤酒。他可能会反思或不反思地说： "这是个好主意。我希望能和你一起去，但你看帕特可能随时会打电话来。 "那么，这意味着加里已经为一个事件投入了特定的大块时间，这是以等待为条件的。这意味着任何可能在那块特定时间内产生的欲望或意图都必须被阻止或被强制否定。
What this actually implies is that when one’s presence is conditioned or determined by someone’s absence, the presence is emptied from one’s own decision, for the mere fact that consciousness stands still in exercising its own freedom. Neutralizing one’s time with indecision is equal to turning one’s being into an objectified entity.
这实际上意味着，当一个人的存在被某人的缺席所制约或决定时，这个存在就从一个人自己的决定中被抽空了，因为仅仅是意识在行使自己的自由时静止了。用优柔寡断来中和一个人的时间，等于把一个人的存在变成了一个物化的实体。
In this case, we can conclude from Gary’s situation that while he tries to overcome the psycho-ontological burdens of waiting,he in turn is captured by time and ostensibly becomes objectified by it. He is objectified by time because his decisions are no longer his and whatever he chooses he is not choosing in good faith. In waiting, therefore, we arc trapped with self-objectification, and trying to escape the burdens of waiting while waiting is nothing more than trying to escape bad faith by trying to escape from ourselves.
在这种情况下，我们可以从加里的情况中得出结论，当他试图克服等待的心理本体负担时，他反过来被时间俘虏，表面上成为时间的对象。他被时间物化是因为他的决定不再是他自己的，无论他选择什么，他都不是真诚地选择。因此，在等待中，我们陷入了自我客体化的困境，而在等待中试图摆脱等待的负担，无非是试图通过逃避自己来逃避恶意。
Waiting, then, causes self-alienation, namely alienation from our possibilities in time. This is evident, not only in Gary’s case, but in any case in which we surrender our time to an objectified condition, such as personal, social, political, theological, or even historical. This alienation of the self from its possibilities takes place as a result of neutralizing the concrete presence and suspending possible self-actualization into a specified project which is not articulated in the presence but in the hope of becoming. Thus, the here and now elapses into possible becoming, and consciousness fades away from its presence in order to speculate about that which is becoming; consequently consciousness becomes paralyzed and incapacitated in grasping its awareness of the here and now, because it is concentrating intentionally, so to speak, upon that which is becoming. This is the death of time in conscious¬ ness, namely the emptiness of time from its concrete existentiality.
那么，等待导致了自我异化，即与我们在时间中的可能性的异化。这一点很明显，不仅在加里的案例中，而且在任何我们把时间交给一个客观条件的案例中，如个人、社会、政治、神学、甚至历史。这种自我与其可能性的疏离是由于中和了具体的存在，并将可能的自我实现暂停在一个特定的项目中，这个项目不是在存在中阐述的，而是在希望成为的过程中阐述的。因此，此时此地就变成了可能的成为，意识从它的存在中淡出，以便推测那正在成为的东西；因此，意识在把握它对此时此地的意识方面变得麻痹和无能，因为它有意地集中在那正在成为的东西上，可以这么说。这就是时间在意识中的死亡，即时间从其具体存在性中的空虚。
As the characteristic of waiting turns out to be, in essence, equal to the characteristic of facticity, i.e., a borderline which limits the transcendence of consciousness, or an impasse which stands against possible self-actualization: the inescapable effect of waiting is self-negation.
由于等待的特征在本质上等同于事实性的特征，即限制意识的超越的边界，或者说是反对可能的自我实现的僵局：等待的不可避免的效果是自我否定。
The symptoms of self-negation arise in consciousness as soon as the anxiety of waiting overshadows its intentional horizon. Thus in order to escape its out-of-hand predicament, consciousness leaps out cunningly against itself in order to escape the barrier of the facticity of waiting.
一旦等待的焦虑笼罩了意识的意向性视野，自我否定的症状就会在意识中出现。因此，为了摆脱其失控的困境，意识狡猾地跳出来反对自己，以摆脱等待的事实性的障碍。
This cunning is evident among the mystics of most religious beliefs, especially the Christians, who develop a sense of unhappy conscious¬ ness in order to endure the apocalyptic span of waiting, or simply the waiting of the individual self for God.[5] But to the mystic, self-negation is not an escape from the anxiety of waiting in the negative sense, but a virtue, because it is a fundamental prerequisite in developing a sense of passivity to the worldly,in order to become worthy of the out-worldly. Waiting therefore becomes a challenging exercise for the soul in order to conquer time. By conquering time man as finite transcends temporality, and by transcending temporality, he makes headway for the infinite in him to become worthy of the eternal. Kierkegaard showed no mercy in abolishing this hope, considering it a sickness unto death. This sickness can neither be overcome nor cured.It is engraved in the very nature of man, and its solutions arc beyond man's reach.[6] In his attack upon Christendom he was not only attacking Christianity as an organized church, but also attacking the mystification of Christianity and the monopoly over God by the church. Mysticism is rejected by Kierkegaard on three grounds:1) the impossibility for man as finite to reach or rather to embrace the infinite in time, 2) the tendency of making private and subjective thinking publicly objectified, and 3) for making the ending of the religious struggle too optimistic and mundane.
这种狡猾在大多数宗教信仰的神秘主义者中是显而易见的，尤其是基督徒，他们发展出一种不快乐的意识，以忍受世界末日般的等待，或者干脆说是个人自我对上帝的等待。 5 但对神秘主义者来说，自我否定并不是消极意义上对等待焦虑的逃避，而是一种美德，因为它是发展对世俗的被动感的基本前提，以便成为配享世俗的人。因此，等待成为灵魂的一项挑战，以征服时间。通过征服时间，人作为有限的人超越了时间性，而通过超越时间性，他为他体内的无限性取得了进展，从而成为永恒的价值。克尔凯郭尔在废除这种希望时毫不留情，认为它是一种致死的疾病。这种病既不能克服，也不能治愈。它是刻在人的本性中的，它的解决方法是人无法企及的。 [6] 在他对基督教的攻击中，他不仅是在攻击作为有组织的教会的基督教，也是在攻击基督教的神秘化和教会对上帝的垄断。克尔凯郭尔拒绝神秘主义的理由有三： 1）人作为有限的人不可能在时间上达到或者说拥抱无限， 2）使私人和主观的思维公开化的倾向， 3）使宗教斗争的结局过于乐观和世俗化。
What Kierkegaard suggests is that the mystic does not overcome waiting but simply ignores it, as he ignores time. When he discovers that its temporality alienates the finite from the infinite in man, he abolishes it altogether, pretending that all the elements of separation will vanish if time is abolished and this will inevitably guarantee headway toward total participation with the infinite. Our view is that this is not only illusory, but also that it dehumanizes man from his temporality m time, the only ground for consciousness to project its intentional transcendence.
克尔凯郭尔所建议的是，神秘主义者并没有克服等待，而只是忽视它，就像他忽视时间一样。当他发现时间性使人的有限性与人的无限性疏远时，他就完全废除了时间，假装如果废除了时间，所有分离的因素都会消失，这将不可避免地保证走向与无限性的完全参与。我们的观点是，这不仅是虚幻的，而且还使人脱离了他的时间性--时间，这是意识投射其有意超越的唯一基础。
Kierkegaard was at least passionately and intellectually honest concerning man’s limitation in the way of transcending time. He not only ruled out the possibility of total vertical transcendence but he also considered it a paradox. Man cannot solve the predicament of this paradox, he can only surrender to it. And Christianity is precisely the paradox[7].
克尔凯郭尔对于人在超越时间方面的局限性至少是充满激情和理智的。他不仅排除了完全垂直超越的可能性，而且还认为这是一个悖论。人无法解决这个悖论的困境，他只能向它投降。而基督教恰恰就是这个悖论[7]。
Our interpretation of Kierkegaard in this respect makes sense in regard to the phenomenon of waiting if we consider the mystery of revelation, eternal blessedness, or salvation as possibilities which can be revealed in temporality. If they are possibilities, then the devoted Christian mystics hope to witness their actualization in time. In the face of hoping, waiting for the mystery becomes the ritual of everydayness. Waiting for the mystery and hoping for its revelation intoxicate the mystic’s consciousness and become an obsession. It is here that waiting enters into the horizon of consciousness. The mystics attempt¬ ed to overcome waiting by deceiving themselves in their seduction of time, whereas Kierkegaard faced the dilemma, or rather the paradox, by radicalizing his passion in his involvement. All that man can do is to surrender to the paradox[8]; but by surrendering to the paradox the predicament is not solved. It is only a beginning, because the infinite struggle in the face of anguish and despair never ends. The more consciousness, the more anguish[9] This implies that the more we become conscious of our alienation from ourselves or from God, the more we attempt to overcome this alienation—but to no avail. In spite of this hopelessness, Kierkegaard invokes the totality of his being to face the paradox of his existential situation with conscious involvement and radical commitment, whereas the mystics exercise the rituals of self-negation in order to escape absurdity. A happy ending for the soul overshadows their conception of time. For this reason they view time from the illusory perspective of time—eternal, and not from the actual perspective of time—temporal. Waiting then is a virtue because the soul can demonstrate loving patience in preparing itself for the mystery.
我们对克尔凯郭尔在这方面的解释在等待现象方面是有意义的，如果我们把启示的奥秘、永恒的幸福或救赎视为可以在时间性中揭示的可能性。如果它们是可能性，那么虔诚的基督教神秘主义者就希望见证它们在时间上的实现。在希望面前，等待神秘成为日常的仪式。对神秘的等待和对其启示的希望，使神秘主义者的意识沉醉其中，成为一种痴迷。正是在这里，等待进入了意识的地平线。神秘主义者试图通过在时间的诱惑中欺骗自己来克服等待，而克尔凯郭尔则通过在参与中激化他的激情来面对这一困境，或者说是悖论。人所能做的就是向悖论投降[8]；但通过向悖论投降，困境并没有得到解决。它只是一个开始，因为面对苦恼和绝望的无限挣扎永远不会结束。意识越强，痛苦越多[9] 这意味着我们越是意识到我们与自己或上帝的疏离，我们就越是试图克服这种疏离--但无济于事。尽管有这种无望，克尔凯郭尔还是调用了他的全部生命，以有意识的参与和激进的承诺来面对他的生存状况的悖论，而神秘主义者则行使自我否定的仪式，以逃避荒谬。灵魂的幸福结局笼罩着他们的时间概念。由于这个原因，他们从时间-永恒的虚幻角度看待时间，而不是从时间-时间的实际角度。因此，等待是一种美德，因为灵魂可以表现出爱的耐心， 为神秘的事情做准备。
For Kierkegaard man is in time—temporal, but he has awareness for the eternal in him. This awareness does not solve the problem of man’s limitations in time. Kierkegaard suggests that all man can do is to internalize time in his inwardness and to immerse himself in the presence with that which represents his absolute concern. Overcoming waiting is therefore problematic, in spite of this radicalization.
对克尔凯郭尔来说，人是在时间--时间性的，但他对他身上的永恒有意识。这种意识并不能解决人在时间上的限制问题。克尔凯郭尔认为，人所能做的就是将时间内化于他的内在性，并将自己沉浸在与代表他绝对关注的事物的存在之中。因此，克服等待是有问题的，尽管有这种激进化。
This is the reason behind Kierkegaard's decision to direct his passion to only one concern, to either God or . .,[10] not both. Any compromise m concern is a betrayal of both: any solidification of passion is an act of bad faith. The least we can say about Kierkegaard is that he was not hypocritical.
这就是克尔凯郭尔决定将他的激情只用于一个关注点的背后原因，要么是上帝，要么是......而不是两者。任何妥协的关注都是对两者的背叛：任何激情的固化都是一种不真诚的行为。关于克尔凯郭尔，我们至少可以说，他并不虚伪。
From the Marxist point of view, self-negation is consciously structured in religion in order to dislocate consciousness from its concrete situation. The ruling class will have an open hand in controlling material resources when the masses are oriented toward the eternal and negating the temporal. The feudalism of the Middle Ages and the church are indivisible in power.[11]
从马克思主义的观点来看，自我否定在宗教中是有意识的结构，以使意识与它的具体处境脱节。当群众面向永恒而否定暂时时，统治阶级在控制物质资源方面就会有一个开放的手。中世纪的封建主义和教会的力量是不可分割的。
The masses wait for spiritual sublimity and the class manipulates their energy for more gain. Consequently, when the masses are intoxicated with hope in waiting for salvation, the ruling class is at ease in exploiting them. The function of religion is therefore twofold: 1) to encourage patience in waiting for salvation, and 2) to alienate collective consciousness from becoming consciously aware of social, political, and economic injustice.
群众等待精神上的升华，而阶级则操纵他们的能量以获取更多利益。因此，当群众在等待救赎的过程中沉醉于希望时，统治阶级就可以放心地剥削他们。因此，宗教的功能是双重的：一）鼓励人们耐心等待救赎，二）疏远集体意识，使其无法自觉意识到社会、政治和经济的不公正。
The historical process of dialectical materialism, according to Marx, will eventually synthesize the contradiction, and the working class will overcome alienation when it controls its production. But Marx's rejection of waiting and his dependence on time to digest contradictions made him a concrete existentialist. In the objectification of historical process, decisions and action can speed up, if not twist around, the historical situation. Revolution is necessary in order to get rid of the misery and suffering in waiting. Marx thus radicalized time by getting rid of historical objectivity and making time subjective, namely subject, to the collective act of consciousness in time, in order for people to grasp liberty with their own hands and to protect themselves from being exploited or objectified.
按照马克思的说法，辩证唯物主义的历史进程最终会合成矛盾，工人阶级在控制了自己的生产后就会克服异化。但马克思对等待的拒绝和对消化矛盾的时间的依赖，使他成为一个具体的存在主义者。在历史进程的对象化中，决定和行动可以加速，甚至扭曲历史形势。为了摆脱等待中的悲惨和痛苦，革命是必要的。因此，马克思通过摆脱历史的客观性，使时间成为主观的，即受制于时间的集体意识行为，从而使人们用自己的双手掌握自由，保护自己不被剥削或被物化，从而使时间变得激进。
Nietzsche's approach to the problem of self-negation in waiting takes a different course. Submission and humility are the result of negative morality which is emphasized in the Judeo-Christian tradition.[12]Herd morality for Nietzsche is not too different from the morality of the alienated masses in Marx. The way to overcome self-negation for Nietzsche is through the will to power. The will can break through time in order to replace the submissive and negative will with a positive one. The positive will rejects waiting for orders and initiates its own.It does not hesitate to become involved with life because it is already a positive part of it.It says yes and takes full responsibility for its engagements.It establishes its own morality as it manifests itself in action.It docs not wait for possibilities because it is already an actuality incarnated in the here and now.
尼采对等待中的自我否定问题采取了不同的处理方式。臣服和谦卑是犹太教-基督教传统中强调的消极道德的结果。 [12]尼采的群居道德与马克思的异化大众的道德没有太大区别。对尼采来说，克服自我否定的方法是通过权力意志。意志可以突破时间，以便用积极的意志取代顺从和消极的意志。积极的意志拒绝等待命令，并启动自己的意志。它毫不犹豫地参与到生活中去，因为它已经是生活的一个积极部分。它说是的，并对它的参与承担全部责任。
Nietzsche’s morality, which stands beyond traditional concepts of good and evil, cannot be viewed independently from will and time. It is through time that the will actualizes itself. And the conception of time entertained by the will can either be an arresting factor or a breakthrough. When time i$ viewed with the objective lens of the absolute and becomes absolutized, then the activities of the will, or consciousness in time, becomes meaningless. But when time is viewed from the subjective vision of man then human action can have meaning in time. Asceticism in Western Christianity as well as in Eastern Hinduism viewed time from the former perspective, whereas Nietzsche attempted to replace it with the latter.
尼采的道德超越了传统的善与恶的概念，不能脱离意志和时间来看待。意志正是通过时间来实现自身。而意志所接受的时间概念既可以是一个阻碍因素，也可以是一个突破口。当用绝对的客观镜头来看待时间并使之绝对化时，那么意志的活动，或时间中的意识，就变得毫无意义。但是，当时间从人的主观视野来看时，那么人的行动在时间中就会有意义。西方基督教的禁欲主义以及东方的印度教都是从前者的角度来看待时间，而尼采则试图用后者来取代它。
If we draw a line between objective time and waiting and subjective time and action we can see that the two categories are contraries. Revolutionizing time, therefore, is nothing more than twisting the two conceptions around; Nietzsche does precisely that.
如果我们在客观的时间和等待与主观的时间和行动之间画一条线，我们可以看到这两个类别是对立的。因此，对时间进行革命，无非是把这两个概念扭曲一下；尼采正是这样做的。
We suggest that in waiting the will becomes restless and conscious¬ ness disoriented if not hypnotized by its objectified state. Waiting en¬ forces consciousness to dislocate its intentional activities from its immediate concern and shatters its certainty to replace it with a state of confusion. In short, waiting poisons time with meaninglessness.
我们认为，在等待中，意志会变得不安，意识也会迷失方向，如果不是被它的对象化状态所催眠。等待迫使意识把它的意向性活动与它的直接关切脱节，并粉碎了它的确定性，以一种混乱的状态取代它。简而言之，等待以无意义的方式毒害了时间。
Conclusion: The phenomenon of waiting is an existential reality.It carries within it an element of facticity to the extent that it deteriorates the structure of the presence and throws consciousness into a state of annihilation. Thus in waiting, consciousness experiences a sense of objectification and loses its subjectivity.
结论：等待的现象是一种存在的现实。它带有事实性的因素，以至于它恶化了存在的结构，并将意识抛入一种湮灭的状态。因此，在等待中，意识经历了一种对象化的感觉，并失去了其主观性。
In waiting, time becomes distorted, and with this distortion consciousness negates its concrete relations and orientation to the world. This fact causes anxiety and self-objectification, and as a result consciousness becomes trapped in time as becoming and negates the here and now. Hence, the now becomes emptied from conscious and reflective engagement. For this reason we claim that in waiting, consciousness experiences the death of time in a sense that time elapses indefinitely into possibilities of becoming and evasiveness from the present. Waiting can only be overcome through the radicalization of time by radicalizing one's choice in any given situation of waiting, or by not allowing consciousness to become conscious of itself in time. In the former, time becomes a transcendental field articulated through the intentional project of consciousness; in the latter time becomes a hypnotic factor for consciousness in which it remains in deep slumber, unconscious of time and therefore unaware of waiting.
在等待中，时间变得扭曲，而随着这种扭曲，意识否定了它与世界的具体关系和方向。这一事实导致了焦虑和自我对象化，结果是意识陷入了时间的成为之中，否定了此时此地。因此， "现在 "从意识和反思的参与中被抽空。出于这个原因，我们声称，在等待中，意识经历了时间的死亡，在这个意义上，时间无限期地流逝，变成了成为和逃避现在的可能性。等待只能通过时间的激进化来克服，即在任何特定的等待情境中激进化自己的选择，或者不允许意识在时间中变得有意识。在前者中，时间成为一个通过意识的意向性项目阐明的超验领域；在后者中，时间成为意识的一个催眠因素，在其中，它仍然处于深深的沉睡之中，对时间没有意识，因此对等待没有意识。
1- M. Heidegger. Essays m Metaphysics. Philosophical Library. Inc.. New York. i960 (see also Being and Time. p. 6g).
2- M. Heidegger. Being and Time (Harper and Row: New York), 1962.
3- Ibid., 60. 78, 9; (although this notion of the being of Dasein is theoretic in Begin and Time).
4-Simone Weill. Waiting on God, trans, by Emma Craufurd, Routledge, Lon¬ don. (9；a.
5- Ibid
6- S. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death (Doubleday and Company: Garden City. 1954), PP.147,148-50, 153, 163.
7- Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1963), p. 95.
8- Ibid., p. 95. »
9- Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, p. 153-57. 162.
10- Kierkegaard, Either/Or (Doubleday and Company, Inc: Carden City, •959)-
11- Kail Man. The« Communist Manifesto (Appleton, Century, Crofts: New York, 1055).
12- Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Moral» (Vintage Press: New York, 1966). (See also. Beyond Good and Evil.)
