Global technopolitics--The new grand bargain  

Without teaming up, democracies will not be able to establish a robust alternative to China’s autocratic technosphere

Don’t stop me now

Their dominant positions in this world of platforms give companies like Facebook and Google powers approaching or surpassing those of many countries. Yet countries can as their economies become more digitised be increasingly understood as platforms, too: national operating systems of sorts. Natural resources still count, but digital resources are gaining ever more relevance: skilled and well-trained tech workers, access to scads of data, computing power, internet bandwidth, industrial policy and venture capital. And as with technology platforms, a country’s competitiveness will, to a large extent, depend on how it manages and multiplies these resources.

 Scads  n. /skædz/~ (of sth) 大量；许多 • scads of $20 bills 许多20元面值的钞票

America is a platform like Microsoft’s Windows and Android, Google’s mobile operating system. These mix aspects of open and closed systems, allowing others to develop applications for their platform, but also closely control it. America combines monopolies and a strongish state with lots of competition. Mainly thanks to this profitable amalgam, the country has given rise to most of the world’s leading tech firms. China is more like Apple and Oracle, which combine being closed with lots of internal competition. The European Union is best compared to an open-source project such as Linux, which needs complex rules to work. India, Japan, Britain, Taiwan and South Korea all run differently and have technology bases to match.

Monopoly  n. /məˈnɒpəli/  1.~ (in/of/on sth)垄断；专营服务；被垄断的商品（或服务） •In the past central government had a monopoly on television broadcasting. 过去，中央政府对电视节目播放实行垄断。 2.~ in/of/on sth 独占；专利；专利品 •Managers do not have a monopoly on stress. 并不只是经营管理者有压力。3.“大富翁”（棋类游戏，游戏者以玩具钞票买卖房地产）

Strongish  /'strɔŋɪʃ/ adj. 稍强的，有点儿强的

Amalgam  n. /əˈmælɡəm/  1.~ (of sth) 混合物；综合体•The film script is an amalgam of all three books. 这个电影脚本由三本书合成。 2.汞合金，汞齐（尤用于补牙）

The rise of cloud computing and AI--the first a truly global infrastructure, the second its most important application has heightened the tensions between these platforms. More and more value is created by using oodles of computing power to extract AI models from digital information generated by people, machines and sensors. The models can then be turned into all sorts of services. Transport, health care, teaching, campaigning, warfare --these parts of society will not become data-driven as fast as many predict, but in time they will all be transformed. Whoever controls the digital flows involved can divert much of the rent they generate. Knowledge is power in the virtual world even more than in the real one and it generates profit. Ian Hogarth, a British tech thinker, summarised the sudden sense of urgency when he wrote in a paper in 2018 that “AI policy will become the single most important area of government policy”.

Oodles  n. /ˈuːdlz/  ~ (of sth) 大量；很多

divertv.   /daɪˈvɜːt/  

1. 使转向；使绕道；转移•Northbound traffic will have to be diverted onto minor roads. 北行车辆将不得不绕次要道路行驶。

2. 改变（资金、材料等）的用途

3.转移（某人）的注意力；使分心 •The war diverted people's attention away from the economic situation. 战争把民众的注意力从经济状况上移开了。

4. 娱乐；供消遣 •Children are easily diverted. 孩子们很容易被逗乐。

Many rich countries have drawn up ambitious industrial-policy plans for AI. Some have also institutednational data strategies which limit the data that can leave the country. A few have begun attacking other countries’ platforms by hacking their computer systems and spreading misinformation. In short, they are behaving increasingly like the companies producing the technology reshaping their world. “Everybody has become much more techno-nationalist,” says Justin Sherman of the Atlantic Council, a think-tank.

Institute动词：建立，制定（体系、政策等）；开始；实行

That the 21st-century internet would be a splinternet was, perhaps, inevitable. It is not just that nations act in their own interests; they also have different preferences and values, for instance regarding privacy. High digital borders behind which data get stuck, however, are not in the interests of most countries--though they may be in the interest of some governments. Russia wants to create a “sovereign internet” that can be cut from the rest of the online world at the flip of a switch (while retaining the capability to mess around in more open systems). Countries interested in using flows of data to improve their citizens’ lot, though, will see few advantages. In a splinternet world choice will be limited, costs will rise and innovation will slow. And all the while China, with the biggest silo and thus the greatest access to data, loses least.

silo  n. /ˈsaɪləʊ/  1.筒仓；2.（核武器的）发射井；（危险物品的）地下贮藏库；3.青贮窖 

译文

Don’t stop me now

Their dominant positions in this world of platforms give companies like Facebook and Google powers approaching or surpassing those of many countries. Yet countries can as their economies become more digitised be increasingly understood as platforms, too: national operating systems of sorts. Natural resources still count, but digital resources are gaining ever more relevance: skilled and well-trained tech workers, access to scads of data, computing power, internet bandwidth, industrial policy and venture capital. And as with technology platforms, a country’s competitiveness will, to a large extent, depend on how it manages and multiplies these resources.

这些企业在互联网平台上的超然地位使得脸书和谷歌这类公司有接近或者超过国家的实力。当然，随着经济越来越数字化，各国也可以越来越多地被理解为平台:各种各样的国家操作系统。自然资源依然重要，但数字资源变得更加重要：熟练和训练有素的技术工人、获取大量数据的途径、云计算、互联网宽带、产业政策和风险投资。与技术平台一样，一个国家的竞争力在很大程度上取决于它如何管理和扩大这些资源。

America is a platform like Microsoft’s Windows and Android, Google’s mobile operating system. These mix aspects of open and closed systems, allowing others to develop applications for their platform, but also closely control it. America combines monopolies and a strongish state with lots of competition. Mainly thanks to this profitable amalgam, the country has given rise to most of the world’s leading tech firms. China is more like Apple and Oracle, which combine being closed with lots of internal competition. The European Union is best compared to an open-source project such as Linux, which needs complex rules to work. India, Japan, Britain, Taiwan and South Korea all run differently and have technology bases to match.

美国如同平台，比如微软的窗口操作系统和安卓系统，谷歌的移动操作系统一样。这些开源或者封闭的系统各方面组合，使得第三方可以在其平台上开发应用，当然，这些应用也受制于平台。美国是垄断和较强势政府的特征与大量的竞争融合。多亏了这个盈利的混合体，美国本土诞生了世界绝大多数领头科技公司。而中国如同苹果或者甲骨文一样，混合了封闭性与激烈的内部竞争。然欧盟更像开源项目，如Linux，需要复杂的规则运行。印度、日本、英国、中国台湾和韩国运营模式各有不同，都有相应的技术基础。

The rise of cloud computing and AI--the first a truly global infrastructure, the second its most important application has heightened the tensions between these platforms. More and more value is created by using oodles of computing power to extract AI models from digital information generated by people, machines and sensors. The models can then be turned into all sorts of services. Transport, health care, teaching, campaigning, warfare --these parts of society will not become data-driven as fast as many predict, but in time they will all be transformed. Whoever controls the digital flows involved can divert much of the rent they generate. Knowledge is power in the virtual world even more than in the real one and it generates profit. Ian Hogarth, a British tech thinker, summarised the sudden sense of urgency when he wrote in a paper in 2018 that “AI policy will become the single most important area of government policy”.

云计算（真正的全球基础建设）和人工智能（云计算最重要的应用）的兴起，加剧了这些（国家）平台的竞争局势。通过大量计算能力计算由人类、机器和传感器产生的数据精炼AI模型创造了越来越多的价值。这些创建的模型之后会转化为各种各样的服务。交通、医疗保健、教育、社会活动（竞选）及战争--这些生活内容不会如预测一样快速转变成“数据驱动模式”，但终将都进入数据的世界。无论谁控制相关的数字流，都可以转移它们产生的大部分租金。知识就是力量--它在虚拟世界要比在现实社会中更加明显表现，还有知识产生利润。Ian Hogarth，一位英国科技思想家，在他2018年的论文中总结了这突如其来的紧迫感：“人工智能的政策方针将会是政府政策方针中唯一最重要的部分。”

Many rich countries have drawn up ambitious industrial-policy plans for AI. Some have also instituted national data strategies which limit the data that can leave the country.A few have begun attacking other countries’ platforms by hacking their computer systems and spreading misinformation. In short, they are behaving increasingly like the companies producing the technology reshaping their world. “Everybody has become much more techno-nationalist,” says Justin Sherman of the Atlantic Council, a think-tank.

许多富有国家都制定了野心勃勃的人工智能产业政策计划。一些设立了国家数据战略用于限制数据外流他国。少数一些国家通过黑掉他国电脑系统和传播谣言攻击他国网络平台。简而言之，一些国家的行为表现更像开发技术和重塑世界的企业。智囊团大西洋理事会的Justin Sherman说道“每个人都变得越来越科技民族主义。”

That the 21st-century internet would be a splinternet was, perhaps, inevitable. It is not just that nations act in their own interests; they also have different preferences and values, for instance regarding privacy. High digital borders behind which data get stuck, however, are not in the interests of most countries--though they may be in the interest of some governments. Russia wants to create a “sovereign internet” that can be cut from the rest of the online world at the flip of a switch (while retaining the capability to mess around in more open systems). Countries interested in using flows of data to improve their citizens’ lot, though, will see few advantages. In a splinternet world choice will be limited, costs will rise and innovation will slow. And all the while China, with the biggest silo and thus the greatest access to data, loses least.

21世纪的互联网可能会是一个四分五裂，割据状态的互联网，也许不可避免。不仅是国家处于自身利益行动，而且国家也有不同的偏好和价值观，比如关于隐私方面的问题。然而，让数据停滞不前的高度数字边界并不符合大多数国家的利益——尽管它们可能符合某些政府的利益。比如俄罗斯想要创建一个“主权互联网”，只需按一下开关，就能与其他网络世界切断联系(同时保留在更开放的系统中乱搞的能力)。而有意于通过数据流改变居民命运的国家将看不到什么好处。在割据的互联网世界中，选择受限、成本增加、创新变缓。与此同时，中国拥有最大的数据仓库，因此也拥有最大的数据获取渠道，损失最少。