Journal of Political Economy 2023年第3期

Journal of Political Economy 2023年第3期

Volume 131, Issue 3

——更多动态，请持续关注gzh：理想主义的百年孤独

 Risk-Sharing Externalities

风险共担的外部性
by Luigi Bocola & Guido Lorenzoni

Financial crises typically occur because firms and financial institutions are highly exposed to aggregate shocks. We propose a theory to explain these exposures. We study a model where entrepreneurs can issue state-contingent claims to consumers. Even though entrepreneurs can use these instruments to hedge negative shocks, they do not necessarily do so because insuring against these shocks is expensive, as consumers are also harmed by them. This effect is self-reinforcing because riskier balance sheets for entrepreneurs imply higher income volatility for the consumers, making insurance more costly in equilibrium. We show that this feedback is quantitatively important and leads to inefficiently high risk exposure for entrepreneurs.

金融危机的发生通常是因为企业和金融机构高度暴露于总体冲击之下。我们提出了一个理论来解释这些暴露。我们研究了一个模型，在这个模型中，企业家可以向消费者提出国家条件下的索赔。尽管企业家可以使用这些工具来对冲负面冲击，但他们并不一定这样做，因为防范这些冲击的保险成本很高，因为消费者也会因此受到伤害。这种效应是自我强化的，因为企业家的资产负债表风险越大，意味着消费者的收入波动性越大，从而使保险在均衡状态下成本更高。我们表明，这种反馈在数量上是重要的，并导致企业家的低效率高风险暴露。

 What Do Employee Referral Programs Do? Measuring the Direct and Overall Effects of a Management Practice

员工推荐计划做什么?衡量管理实践的直接和整体效果
by Guido Friebel & Matthias Heinz & Mitchell Hoffman & Nick Zubanov

Employee referral programs (ERPs) are randomly introduced in a grocery chain. On direct effects, larger referral bonuses increase referral quantity but decrease quality, though the increase in referrals from ERPs is modest. However, the overall effect of having an ERP is substantial, reducing attrition by 15% and significantly decreasing labor costs. This occurs, partly, because referrals stay longer than nonreferrals, but, mainly, from indirect effects: nonreferrals stay longer in treated than in control stores. The most supported mechanism for these indirect effects is workers value being involved in hiring. Attrition impacts are larger in higher performing stores and better local labor markets.

员工推荐计划(ERPs)是在连锁杂货店随机引入的。在直接影响上，较大的推荐奖金增加了推荐数量，但降低了质量，尽管erp对推荐的增加是适度的。然而，拥有ERP的总体效果是可观的，减少了15%的人员流失率，并显著降低了劳动力成本。出现这种情况的部分原因是，推荐人比非推荐人停留的时间更长，但主要是间接影响:非推荐人在治疗店停留的时间比在对照店停留的时间更长。这些间接影响最受支持的机制是工人重视参与招聘。在业绩更好的商店和更好的当地劳动力市场，人员流失的影响更大。

 Mixture Choice Data: Revealing Preferences and Cognition

混合选择数据:揭示偏好和认知
by Valentino Dardanoni & Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti & Henrik Petri & Christopher J. Tyson

Mixture choice data consist of the joint distribution of choices of a group of agents from a collection of menus, comprising the implied stochastic choice function plus any cross-menu correlations. When agents are heterogeneous with respect to both preferences and other aspects of cognition, we show that these two determinants of behavior are identified simultaneously by suitable mixture choice data. We also demonstrate how this finding can be extended to allow for specialized assumptions about cognition, focusing on models of random satisficing thresholds and “quantal Fechnerian” choice.

混合选择数据由菜单集合中一组代理的选择的联合分布组成，包括隐含的随机选择函数和任何跨菜单相关性。当代理人在偏好和认知的其他方面都是异质的，我们表明，这两个决定行为的因素是通过适当的混合选择数据同时确定的。我们还演示了如何将这一发现扩展到允许关于认知的专门假设，重点关注随机满足阈值和“量子技术”选择的模型。

 Progressive Random Choice

渐进随机选择
by Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Yusufcan Masatlioglu

We introduce a flexible framework to study probabilistic choice that accommodates heterogeneous types and bounded rationality. We provide a novel progressive structure for the heterogeneous types to capture heterogeneity due to varying levels of a behavioral trait. Given an order of alternatives, our progressive structure sorts the types by the extent to which they align with this order. Unlike the random-utility model, our model uniquely identifies the heterogeneity, allowing policy makers to perform an improved welfare analysis. As a showcase, we provide characterization of a well-studied type of bounded rationality: “less-is-more.” In addition, we provide conditions for unique identification of the underlying order for the less-is-more structure.

我们引入了一个灵活的框架来研究适应异构类型和有限理性的概率选择。我们为异质性类型提供了一种新的递进结构，以捕获由于行为特征的不同水平而引起的异质性。给定可选选项的顺序，我们的递进结构根据它们与该顺序对齐的程度对类型进行排序。与随机效用模型不同，我们的模型独特地识别了异质性，使政策制定者能够进行改进的福利分析。作为展示，我们提供了一种被充分研究的有限理性类型的特征:“少即是多”。此外，我们还为“少即是多”结构的底层顺序的唯一标识提供了条件。

When Parents Decide: Gender Differences in Competitiveness

当父母决定:竞争力的性别差异
by Jonas Tungodden & Alexander Willén

Parents make important choices for their children in many areas of life, yet the empirical literature on this topic is scarce. We study parents’ competitiveness choices for their children by combining two large-scale artifactual field experiments with high-quality longitudinal administrative data. We document three main sets of findings. First, parents choose more competition for their sons than daughters. Second, this gender difference can largely be explained by parents’ beliefs about their children’s competitiveness preferences. Third, parents’ choices predict children’s later-in-life educational outcomes. Taken together, these findings provide novel evidence on the role of parents in shaping children’s long-term outcomes.

父母在生活的许多方面为孩子做出重要的选择，然而关于这一主题的实证文献却很少。本研究通过结合两次大规模人工实地实验和高质量的纵向行政数据，研究了父母对子女竞争力的选择。我们记录了三组主要的发现。首先，父母为儿子选择了比女儿更多的竞争。其次，这种性别差异在很大程度上可以用父母对孩子竞争偏好的看法来解释。第三，父母的选择可以预测孩子日后的教育结果。综上所述，这些发现为父母在塑造孩子的长期结果中所扮演的角色提供了新的证据。

Informationally Simple Incentives

信息简单激励
by Simon Gleyze & Agathe Pernoud

We consider a mechanism design setting in which agents can acquire costly information on their preferences as well as others’. A mechanism is informationally simple if agents have no incentive to learn about others’ preferences. This property is of interest for two reasons. First, it is a necessary condition for the existence of dominant-strategy equilibria in the extended game. Second, this endogenizes an “independent-private-value” property of the interim information structure. We show that, generically, a mechanism is informationally simple if and only if it satisfies a separability condition that rules out most economically meaningful mechanisms.

我们考虑了一种机制设计设置，在这种设置中，代理可以获得关于自己和他人偏好的昂贵信息。如果代理人没有动机去了解他人的偏好，那么机制在信息上是简单的。有两个原因引起人们对这个属性的兴趣。首先，它是扩展对策中存在优势策略均衡的必要条件。其次，这内化了中间信息结构的“独立私有价值”属性。我们表明，一般来说，一个机制是信息简单的，当且仅当它满足可分离性条件，排除大多数经济上有意义的机制。