劳动的价值理论（七）
本篇文章由我翻译，全文共63页，本篇为节选的第七部分约10.5页内容，原文为英文并附于末尾，红色标注为原文附带的注释，蓝色标注为我添加的补充和注释。文章中引用部分若已有汉译本，则一概使用汉译本的翻译，并补充标注汉译本的引用文献。
3.综合阶段：从价值到价格
综合阶段涵盖了《资本论》第一卷第一篇的其余部分。马克思在这部分中讨论了抽象劳动对象化的产生方式以及这一方式是如何使抽象劳动的支配地位成为必然的；这同时表明了这种对象化的不稳定性。它与“价值规律”的运转有关，而其从根本上意味着抽象劳动被对象化的过程的“规律”。术语“规律”以及价值规律与“起调节作用的自然规律”（参见Capital, I, p. 168）（《马克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第92页）的清晰对比再次提到了这一过程的自然主义方面，即它发生在商品所有者的“背后”。但需要注意的是，马克思并不是持有一个严格的、“决定性的”“调节规律”范畴。他在关于政治经济学的早期著作中就已经批判了这样一种范畴：
“……穆勒——完全和李嘉图学派一样——犯了这样的错误：在表述抽象规律的时候忽视了这种规律的变化或不断扬弃（中断）……（生产成本和价格）暂时的相适应又开始（因相同的原因而）波动和不相适应。这种现实的运动（这才是现实的运动）——（而）上面说到的规律只是它的抽象的、偶然的和片面的因素（环节）……” ('Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of Political Economy', Early Writings, p. 260.)（《马克思恩格斯全集》中文第一版第42卷第18页）[20](14)
在《资本论》的论述中，马克思小心翼翼地回避了这样的一种“抽象规律”。
“总的说来，在整个资本主义生产中，一般规律作为一种占统治地位的趋势，始终只是以一种极其错综复杂和近似的方式，作为从不断波动中得出的、但永远不能确定的平均数来发生作用。” (Capital, III, p. 161) （《马克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第46卷第181页）
“价值规律”时常被认为是价值和价格之间的关系，但这是由于价格是抽象劳动对象化得以实现的形式。这个结果的确立就是综合阶段的第一步。
问题在于如何解释作为劳动的其中一个方面的抽象劳动“对象化”为商品价值的过程。马克思的观点是，这需要将体现在商品（例如亚麻布）中的抽象劳动“对象化地”表现为“（一种）与麻布本身的物体不同，同时又是麻布与其他商品所共有的（东西或对象性）” (Capital, I, p. 142) （《马克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第65-6页）。只要有一种商品具有作为价值（或价值形式）承担者的职能，并反映出与其交换的商品的价值，马克思的观点就是正确的。《资本论》第一章第三节专门探讨了这种“反思规定”('determination of reflection')的含义（参见Capital, I, p. 149）（《马克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第72页脚注21）。其中最易于理解的含义就是：
“商品B的自然形式成了商品A的价值形式，或者说，商品B的物体成了反映商品A的价值的镜子。” (Capital, I, p. 144) （《马克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第67页）
马克思将作为价值承担者的商品称为等价形式；将价值被反映出来的商品称为相对形式。马克思得出的下一个结论是，为了具有作为价值承担者或价值表现的职能，等价形式必须具有“直接交换（的能力）” (Capital, I, p. 147) （《马克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第70页）。也就是说，它的可交换性（与它交换的可能性）不可能取决于它自己的使用价值，也不可能取决于体现在其中的实际的、个别的劳动的特征。在这个意义上，它必须不同于其他所有商品，正如我们之前所看到的那样，它们的使用价值和它们的所有者的私人特征对它们的可交换性发挥着一定作用。可对于等价形式来说，它的可交换性却必须建立在它作为等价物的社会性地位之上。但这种社会性地位“只是商品世界共同活动的结果” (Capital, I, p. 159) （《马克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第82-3页）。也就是说，没有一个个别的商品所有者能够使自己的商品成为等价形式：这只能是每个商品所有者都试图让渡自己的商品来交换其他人的商品的行动的结果(另见Capital, I, p. 180) （《马克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第105页）。
除非等价形式是一种一般等价物，所有其他商品都将其抽象劳动对象化、将其价值反映出来，否则直接的可交换性就仍然只能处于萌芽状态。这种一般等价物的物体形式“是当作一切人类劳动的可以看得见的化身，一般的社会的蛹化” (Capital, I, p. 159) （《马克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第83页）。直接可交换性的全面确立需要一个更进一步的条件，也就是应当出现一个独特的（唯一的）一般等价物，一种“具有其特有的社会职能并因此具有一种社会垄断地位，即在商品世界起一般等价物的作用” (Capital, I, p. 162) （《马克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第86页）的商品。
就这一观点，我们可以对其进行一系列论证和经验审查。这一观点意味着，在资本主义社会中，应当有一种商品被排挤出其他所有商品的行列，并被赋予了具有与其他所有商品直接交换的能力的社会性垄断地位。我们能够找到这样一种商品吗？如果不能，那么马克思的观点一定有哪里错了。经过审查，我们确实发现了这样一种商品：黄金货币。当然，这不意味着一般等价物一定永远是黄金货币。正如我们已经看到的，马克思继续指出，出于某些目的，黄金作为一般等价物的地位可以被它自己的符号、被纸币所取代。这意味着，作为一般等价物的黄金货币是纸币的必要前驱体(precursor)(15)。这一观点的根源在于马克思拒绝接受一般等价物可以“通过习惯”确立，即可以通过所有商品所有者有意识地同时决策的方式来给予某种物质形式以一般等价物的特征的观点。相反，他认为“货币结晶是交换过程的必然产物”(Capital, I, p. 181.)（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第106页），因此当然不能将其视为是“通过习惯”来确立的。
我们确实发现存在这种社会性垄断了可与其他所有商品直接交换的能力的商品，但这一事实并不能证明马克思观点的正确性，即商品是对象化的抽象劳动的可以看得见的表现。相反，这一事实仅仅只是没有反驳它，但并没有终止论证，而是让它继续下去。经验审查所能够做到的只有这些。我们何时才能充分抓住研究中的现实关系，何时才能够充分了解这些关系并采取实际行动，都永远无法通过经验检验来最终确定。这只能始终是一个判断问题。
马克思对黄金货币作为一般等价物、作为“一切人类劳动的直接化身” （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第112页）的作用的阐述中存在一个问题，他并没有充分和清晰地区分作为交换中介的货币和作为价值的货币形式（作为一般等价物）的货币。货币本身并非资本主义生产方式特有的(见Brenner, 1977)，而且货币行使着交换中介的职能也不意味着它就是价值的表现，是“一切人类劳动的直接化身”。
这一区别在第二章“交换过程”的许多论述中被省略，这就给人造成了一种印象，仿佛只要存在货币，那就存在价值。作为交换中介的货币当然是价值的货币形式的一个必要前驱体，但在第二章中，马克思以牺牲差异性为代价，过分强调了连续性。这一观点可以概括如下：从一个资本主义生产方式占统治地位并存在着资本主义交换关系（即通过买和卖的过程，劳动产品普遍具有可交换性的情形）的经济出发，我们可以通过分析得知价值（即抽象劳动的对象化）存在这一经济中；接下来，我们对抽象劳动对象化的条件进行分析，并得出结论，抽象劳动的对象化表明了反映价值且作为价值表现的一般等价物的存在。资本主义经济中的黄金货币确实具有作为一般等价物所必要的特征。但作为一般等价物，它自身取决于资本主义生产方式的社会关系。
马克思的论证并非形式主义的，而是从资本主义特有的社会关系中的现实的前提出发；而且它的确经受住了经验检验，我们确实可以在现实中发现这样一种与综合阶段论证的前提相对应的社会现象。然而，它却使我们得出了一个不同寻常的结论，马克思在《资本论》第一章的最后一节中明确指出了这一结论的特殊性：
“如果我说，上衣、皮靴等等把麻布当作抽象的人类劳动的一般化身而同它发生关系，这种说法的荒谬是一目了然的。但是当上衣、皮靴等等的生产者使这些商品同作为一般等价物的麻布（或者金银，这丝毫不改变问题的性质）发生关系时，他们的私人劳动同社会总劳动的关系正是通过这种荒谬形式呈现在他们面前。” (Capital, I, p. 169) （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第93页）
这一点在《资本论》第一版的一段文本中得到了更为生动的阐述，但这段文本却在之后的版本中消失了。最近Arthur, 1978重新引起了我们对这段文本的注意。通过其在一般等价物中的化身而发生的抽象劳动的对象化
“就像除了分类组成动物界不同属、种、亚种、科等等的狮子、老虎、兔子和其他等等所有实在的动物以外，还存在着作为整个动物界的单个体现的动物一样。” (转引自Arthur, 1978, P. 98) （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第42卷第47页）
抽象劳动的对象化需要它的某种表现，而这种表现依赖于某种形式规定，即货币商品形式。但具有一个独立表现的对象化的抽象劳动（价值）难道不会彻底摧毁马克思关于价值不能是绝对实体(absolute entity)的观点吗？在这里，请记住马克思提出的另一个鲜为人知的区别，即“内在独立性”与“外在独立性”(参见Capital, I, p. 209) （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第135页）的区别。价值缺乏作为一个实体(entity)所必需的“内在独立性”，因为它始终只是作为一个价值和使用价值统一体即商品的一面。但如果商品与另一种仅用于反映价值的商品发生关系，商品的价值一面可以得到“外部独立性”。这就产生了一种虚幻的表象，货币形式下的价值是一个独立的实体(independent entity)；但它赋予价值的自主性(autonomy)仅仅只是相对的。商品拜物教正是这种对象化形式中的、单方面抽象的、劳动抽象方面的外部独立表现。但不同于“宗教世界的幻境” （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第90页）的拜物教，商品拜物教并非某种意识形态，也不是我们看待事物的方式的产物；而是劳动确定(16)的特定形式、特定生产关系的产物。
在一般等价物形式中，抽象劳动不仅被对象化：其还被确立为劳动的主导方面。而具体方面则仅仅用于表现人类劳动的抽象方面；因为体现在一般等价物中的劳动的有用性在于“造了一种物体，使人们能看出它是价值” (Capital, I, p. 150) （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第73页）。体现在一般等价物中的劳动的私人方面则仅仅用于表现其社会方面：在某种商品被某种“盲目的”社会过程确立为一般等价物之前，个别生产者无法主动生产一般等价物。体现在一般等价物中的劳动的社会方面，它的社会必要性，在于生产一种商品，这种商品仅仅只是抽象劳动的化身。这并不意味着劳动的私人、具体和社会方面正在消失、消亡；而是意味着体现在一般等价物中的劳动仅仅只是抽象劳动。这意味着劳动的其他方面从属于抽象劳动的表现。一般等价物形式仅仅反映了价值。
《资本论》第一卷接下来的论述继续揭示了一般等价物、价值的货币形式对其他商品的统治(17)地位，以及这种统治地位是如何表现为价值的货币形式的自我扩张，即价值的资本形态的。此外，它还表明了价值的资本形态的统治不仅限于“固定”在产品中的劳动，还延伸到直接生产过程本身以及这一过程的再生产上。劳动作为资本形态的实际从属(见《直接生产过程的结果》 p. 1019-1038)（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第38卷第103-23页）是劳动的其他方面作为抽象劳动在一般等价物中、价值的货币形式中的表现的一种发展完成的实际从属形式。
在讨论劳动抽象方面对象化的统治地位时，通过价值的资本形态，马克思将价值称为“过程的主体”，“自行增殖着”(Capital, I, p. 255) （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第180页）。在此处，价值似乎又被当作一个绝对独立的实体。这些文本事实上构成了资本-逻辑方法的出发点。在这里马克思似乎确实将“现实的生产行为”误认为是“范畴的运动”。但我们只需要回想起刚刚提到的外部独立性与内部独立性的区别；以及这些文本出现在对资本流通，即货币增殖的表现形式的讨论中的这一事实。在这个层次上，价值当然是过程的主体，并被赋予了它自己的生命力。但它不仅仅是直接出现在眼前的；马克思用讽刺的话语说：
“它所以获得创造价值的奇能，是因为它是价值。它会产仔，或者说，它至少会生金蛋。” (Capital, I, p. 255) （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第180页）
在商品拜物教一节的开头，我们可以回想起对商品神秘能力的讽刺，它的“形而上学的微妙和神学的怪诞”(Capital, I, p. 162) （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第88页），
“商品形式在人们面前把人们本身劳动的社会性质反映成劳动产品本身的物的性质，反映成这些物的天然的社会属性。” (Capital, I, p. 165.) （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第89页）
马克思对价值和价格（表现为货币形式的交换价值）之间关系的论述基于“反思规定”，即商品中的抽象劳动通过其价值的货币形式表现而被对象化。从本文前面的章节中就可以清楚地看到，《资本论》第一卷第一章前两节中提及的劳动时间对价值量的规定并非一个关于价值和价格关系的论述，而是一个关于价值和其内在尺度的论述。在第一章的第三节和第四节中，我们才能首次发现对价值作为交换比率的自动调节器的描述，其中最值得注意的是：
“显然，不是交换调节商品的价值量，恰好相反，是商品的价值量调节商品的交换比例。” (Capital, I, p. 156.) （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第79页）
以及
“……在私人劳动产品的偶然的不断变动的变换比例中，生产这些产品的社会必要劳动时间作为起调节作用的自然规律。” (Capital, I, p. 165.) （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第92页）
从我先前的论证中可以明显地看出来，不能用因变量与自变量之间的关系来解释“调节”。相反，我们应该以某种形式的内在特征在表象层次上、在它的反映上调节它的表现的方式来理解“调节”一词。因此，化学物质（实体，substance）的分子结构以晶体的形式调节着物质(substance)的表现，而有机生物体的细胞结构调节着有机生物体的躯体。
我们也应当留意到，在上面引用的文本中，马克思只提到了价值“调节”交换比率。他没有具体说明这种调节的形式；特别是，他并不认为作为等价形式表现的交换比率直接地表示了价值量（即价格等于价值）。在关于“一般价值形式”的讨论中，有一段文本比较模糊：
“现在，一切商品，在与麻布等同的形式上，不仅表现为在质上等同，表现为价值一般，而且同时也表现为在量上可以比较的价值量。由于它们都通过同一个材料，通过麻布来反映自己的价值量，这些价值量也就相互反映。例如，10磅茶叶=20码麻布，40磅咖啡=20码麻布。因此，10磅茶叶=40磅咖啡。或者说，1磅咖啡所包含的价值实体即劳动，只等于1磅茶叶所包含的1/4。” (Capital, I, p. 159.) （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第83页）
其中的最后一句话无疑是在暗示价值与价格相等（马克思认为麻布在这里起到了货币的作用）。但我认为我们必须特别留意与“表象”有关的文本。马克思在这一论证阶段正在从对商品之间关系的内在实体(substance)的分析回到它们的表象之上。但问题是，根据迄今为止的研究，商品交换的比率似乎直接反映了它们价值量，而目前还没有否定这种表象的依据。然而，在写作《资本论》第一卷时，马克思就清楚地意识到了，在之后的研究阶段中，基于这一表象所得出的结论一定会受到挑战。他在脚注中指出了李嘉图对价值量分析的不足，而“这一点人们将在本书的第三册和第四册中看到”(Capital, I, p. 173)（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第93页脚注31）。
在1859年——也就是《资本论》第一卷出版的八年前——出版的《政治经济学批判》中似乎还看不出这样的观点，里面也没有对实体(substance)（或内在结构）和表象进行同样细致的区分，例如，马克思并没有对价值和交换价值进行系统性地区分。
在《资本论》第一卷中，马克思并没有采取任何措施来澄清价格直接表示价值量的表象。但这与假设价格与价值近似相等并在随后放松这一假设的方式并不相同。相反，在《资本论》第一卷中，关于这一点的论述从对社会关系的分析中被抽象掉了，这意味着价格不能直接表示价值量。这常常被解释为马克思在《资本论》第一卷中研究“资本一般”，而在对价值量表现形式进行精确分析的《资本论》第三卷中则研究“许多资本”('many capitals')(18)(参见Rosdolsky, 1977, p. 41-50)。这种解释的问题在于，它经常导致对竞争的混淆：例如，认为《资本论》第一卷将竞争抽象掉了。但事实显然并非如此：竞争是资本主义的一个基本特征；资本只能以许多资本的形式存在。马克思在第一卷中抽象掉的不是竞争，而是资本之间的价值分配问题。
马克思本人在《直接生产的结果》的开头作出了更有用的区分，即将商品视为劳动的产物和将商品视为资本（即自行增殖的劳动）的产物之间的区别。马克思指出，商品曾经是他论证的出发点，因为它是资产阶级财富的最直接外观形式。第一卷的研究准确地表明了商品的这种直接外观的肤浅性，并揭示了商品，作为“资本主义生产过程的直接结果” （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第38卷第29页），不仅体现为价值，而且体现为剩余价值；不仅以价格形式表示，而且以利润形式表示。(19)
这就要求对由价格表示的价值量进行重新考虑，而这一点在《资本论》第三卷中进行，在其中生产价格范畴得到了阐述。与马克思所得结论的充分性相关的讨论已经超出了本文的范围。在这里，我们只需要注意到，第三卷中有关价格与价值之间关系的分析并不基于与第一卷中不同的前提，而是对同一分析的更进一步发展，并试图纳入那些在第一卷中被抽象掉的资本主义生产方式的特征。
马克思不仅主张价值调节着——在我们之前解释的意义上——价格。他还指出，这种调节存在着被破坏的可能性。为了使体现在商品中的劳动的抽象方面对象化，商品必须拥有一个价格。但这个价格
“既可以表现商品的价值量，也可以表现比它大或小的量，在一定条件下，商品就是按这种较大或较小的量来让渡的。可见，价格和价值量之间的量的不一致的可能性，或者价格偏离价值量的可能性，已经包含在价格形式本身中。” (Capital, I, p. 196) （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第122-3页）
作为一般等价物的货币是抽象劳动对象化的必要条件，但并不是这一对象化在数量规定上、在社会必要形式上的充分条件。由于商品生产下货币流通的相对自主性，以价格形式实现的价值量是不稳定的。在这两个过程的关系中，
“作为使用价值的商品同作为交换价值的货币对立着。另一方面，对立的双方都是商品，也就是说，都是使用价值和价值的统一。但这种差别的统一按相反的方向表现在两极中的每一极上，并且由此同时表现出它们的相互关系。” (Capital, I, p. 199) （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第125页）
放弃自己所有的商品形式的使用价值与获得其他人的使用价值之间没有必然的联系；因为人们可以选择持有货币，这是一种不同于其他商品的商品，它通常可以在任何时间与任何商品进行交换。但货币的价值量必然是不确定的，因为没有唯一反映它的价值的一般等价物，只有给定数量的货币所能购买到的其他所有商品所组成的一系列反映(见Capital, I, p. 147) （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第70-1页）(20)。因此，不同商品在购买和出售时的时间和顺序都可以对价格产生一个独立的影响，且在任何时候，总销售和总购买都不会必然一致。
但是，如果商品生产下货币流通的相对自主性
“达到一定程度时，统一就要强制地通过危机显示出来。商品内在的使用价值和价值的对立，私人劳动同时必须表现为直接社会劳动的对立，特殊的具体的劳动同时只是当作抽象的一般的劳动的对立，物的人格化和人格的物化的对立，……这种内在的矛盾在商品形态变化的对立中取得发展了的运动形式。因此，这些形式包含着危机的可能性，但仅仅是可能性。这种可能性要发展为现实，必须有一系列的关系，从简单商品流通的观点来看，这些关系还根本不存在。” (Capital, 1, p. 209.) （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第135-6页）
我们对资本主义经济的观察告诉我们，危机的可能性不仅实现了，而且还得到了——暂时性的——解决，在这个意义上来说，资本主义经济的重构正在进行并从危机中复苏。因此，货币流通能够在多大的程度上与商品生产相脱节是存在一个明确的限度的；或者换句话说，价格能够在多大的程度上偏离价值量是存在一个明确的限度的。是什么决定了这些限度的大小只能经过大量的调查研究才能够确定。鉴于目前为止我们已经确立的分析范畴，我们只能说，这些限度必须以某种形式向商品生产者施加压力以让他们用货币形式表示生产中耗费的劳动时间，而且每时每刻都要用货币计算[21]。要确定这种压力是如何产生的，就需要对资本主义生产进行分析。认为这种压力必然来自于资本再生产它自己的“需求”是完全不合理的。在这里，我赞同Cutler et al.反对功能主义和经济主义推理的观点(同上1977, p. 71)。但我也要强调一下，马克思从来没有提出过这样的观点。
的确，《资本论》第一卷的研究在很大程度上是基于均衡的假设——价值量反映为商品的价格（等价物的交换）——而非基于非均衡的假设——这种反映不能够在数量上确定（非等价物的交换）。但这是因为，商品生产中货币流通的相对自主性过程体现在资本之间的利润分配上（见Capital, I, p. 262-6中对此的一个初步说明）（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第186-91页）(21)，这恰恰是马克思在第一卷中提出的问题。第一卷主要关注的是确定劳动是如何成为“创造价值的实体” （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第38卷第98页）的，这又是如何使劳动从属于资本形态的。在研究这一点时，马克思首先对他所考虑的过程的均衡方面进行审查，但他同时也指出，这仅仅只是过程的一个方面，资本主义经济中劳动确定过程的形式意味着不均衡与危机，就如同均衡和规律一样。
注释：
[20]当然，穆勒和李嘉图确实认识到了市场价格的波动非常大。但这一波动被视为表面上的“噪音”，掩盖了而不是暴露了潜在的关系(见Banaji, this volume, p. 14-45中对古典政治经济学中潜在关系与表象之间关系的进一步讨论)。
[21]这并不意味着每一小时的劳动都被对象化为相同数量的价值并被表现为相同数量的货币。不同种类的劳动时间可以被对象化为不同数量的价值并表现为不同数量的货币。马克思用划分熟练劳动与非熟练劳动的方式解决了这一问题。对马克思的解决方法是否足够充分的讨论超出了本文的范围，但我们可能会注意到，大量无论是专门对这一问题进行讨论的文献还是与马克思价值理论相关的一般性著作都对其充满了误解
但这也不意味着价值理论的目的就是建立这样一些定价规则——根据这些规则，劳动时间的货币表现必须由劳动时间决定以保证特定的劳动力耗费模式的再生产。因此，即使在联合生产下生产单个商品所需的社会必要劳动时间无法与该商品的价格联系起来，也不会推翻马克思的价值理论（对这一点的进一步讨论，见Himmelweit and Mohun, 1978, Sections 4 and 5）（伊恩•斯蒂德曼和保罗•斯威齐等，2016，p. 276-89）
相反，马克思的价值理论为我们提供了一个可以用于分析定价规则的建立为什么在资本主义的发展中如此必要，从而产生了诸如会计师、资本预算专家和价格分析师（原文如此）等等现代职业阵容的工具；现代经济学家们对寻找一个“最佳”定价规则的关注的产生也同样如此。它同样为我们提供了一些可以用来研究那些马克思不太关心的现象的工具，或许是因为在他的那个时代中，这些现象没有太大的实际意义，定价规则中固有的矛盾，以及其中计算联合生产中耗费的劳动时间的尝试中的矛盾就是一个很好的例子。
译者注：
(14)英译本与中译本在这里的表述方式有较大差异，因此我进行了一些补充来使句子相对通顺，下同。这段的大意是：穆勒认为现实总是与抽象规律相一致，即使不一致，现实也总是朝着抽象规律所规定的均衡方向发展；但实际上恰恰相反，现实的趋势反而是在不断偏离均衡（由于资本的竞争，尤其是使各资本利润率差别化的部门内竞争以及其采取的竞争形式——技术革新，获得技术优势的资本家不会仅仅满足于自己当下占有的市场，而是会通过诸如扩大产量和降价的方式获取更大的市场，此时供给就会超过需求，市场价格就会偏离价值或生产价格；注意，“竞争不过是资本的内在本性”，技术进步内生于资本积累过程中），而朝向均衡的运动仅仅是一种对偏离趋势作出反应的反趋势（竞争中的失败者要么同样采取技术革新，要么就被迫缩减生产规模、将资本转移到其他生产部门或直接退出生产，这才是使市场趋向均衡的力量，但这股力量是由非均衡趋势所引起的，它不可能抵消非均衡趋势，均衡只不过是偶然），趋势引起了反趋势；穆勒所认为的抽象规律仅仅只是对现实运动中反趋势的片面抽象，而它却被认为是本质、必然，趋势却被认为是非本质、偶然，这是严重的歪曲；而这一歪曲的起源则在于“他们把国民经济学归结为一些严格而准确的公式”，“国民经济学的真正规律是偶然性，我们这些学者可以从这种偶然性的运动任意地把某些因素固定在规律的形式中”。穆勒对本质的选取是武断的，他按照自己的心意任意选取某些偶然性因素作为固定不变的本质（因而运用形式逻辑从这些“本质”推导而来的“抽象规律”也是固定不变的，新古典经济学实际上犯的是同样的错误），而缺乏对资本主义现实世界真实特征的把握。在穆勒眼中，不是现实的运动决定理论，反而是理论决定现实的运动，因此他只能得出由这些任意选取的“本质”推论出的“抽象规律”而不能正确地认识现实世界中的资本主义。
(15)在通常的释义中没能找到合适的词语，但前驱体这一化学术语却出奇的合适，希望没有学习过化学的读者也能够理解这一词语的含义。
(16)这里的“劳动确定”在前文曾经提到过，人类劳动的不固定性。
(17)在本译文中，包括该注释之前的绝大多数“主导”、“支配”和“统治”对应的英文单词均相同’domination’、’dominant’，三者含义也相同。
(18)柳欣采用的是相同的分析方法，更进一步的，他追随Rosdolsky将“资本一般”理解为“总量资本”，因此他认为《资本论》第一卷讨论的就是一种宏观上的“总量理论”，而与商品的相对价格分析无关。价值在他的分析中具有了一种绝对实体，“绝对价值”也就出现在了他的理论中。此外，在他的著作中，“许多资本”被翻译为“多数资本”。
(19)在《剩余价值理论》中同样有一段文本表明了作为劳动产物的商品一般与作为资本产物的资本主义商品之间的区别，这明确地展现了马克思分析的历史和社会背景：“我们现在从作为资本主义生产的基础和前提的商品——产品的这个特殊的社会形式——出发。我们考察个别的产品，分析它们作为商品所包含的，也就是给它们打上商品烙印的形式规定性。在资本主义生产以前——在以前的生产方式下——很大一部分产品不进入流通，不投入市场，不作为商品生产出来，不成为商品。另一方面，在这个时期，加入生产的很大一部分产品不是商品，不作为商品进入过程。产品转化为商品，只发生在个别场合，只涉及产品的剩余部分等等，或只涉及个别生产领域（制造业产品）等等。产品既不是全部作为交易品进入过程，也不是全部作为交易品从过程出来。但是产品发展为商品，一定范围的商品流通，从而一定范围的货币流通，从而达到一定发展程度的贸易，是资本形成和资本主义生产的前提和起点。我们把商品作为这样的前提对待，因为我们就是从作为资本主义生产的最简单的元素的商品出发的。但是，另一方面，资本主义生产的产物，它的结果是商品。表现为资本主义生产元素的东西，后来表现为资本主义生产本身的产物。只有在资本主义生产的基础上，商品才成为产品的普遍形式，而且资本主义生产越发展，产品就越是在商品形式上作为组成部分进入资本主义生产过程。从资本主义生产中出来的商品，与我们据以出发的、作为资本主义生产元素的商品不同。在我们面前的已经不是个别的商品，个别的产品。个别的商品，个别的产品，不仅实在地作为产品，而且作为商品，表现为总产品的一个不仅是实在的、而且是观念的部分、每个个别的商品都表现为一定部分的资本和资本所创造的剩余价值的承担者。” （《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第35卷第119页）
(20)作为一般等价物的货币在交换中（购买其他商品时）只能处在扩大的价值形式的位置上，不存在一般等价物的一般等价物，货币的价值只能表现在商品世界中其他无数的一系列商品上而不存在唯一的价值表现，每一其他种类的商品都是反映货币价值的镜子。
(21)这里说的并不是与价值转化为生产价格有关的利润分配，而是在《资本论》第一卷的背景下指出，非等价交换（低买高卖）并不能为所有商品生产者（在这里就是资本主义社会中的资本家）提供利润，因此普遍存在的利润不可能从商品流通领域中产生。
参考文献
伊恩•斯蒂德曼和保罗•斯威齐等. (2016). 价值问题的论战. 商务印书馆.
Arthur, C J (1978), 'Labour: Marx's Concrete Universal', Inquiry, No. 2.
Banaji, J (1979), 'From the Commodity to Capital: Hegel's Dialectic in Marx's Capital' in Elson, D (ed.), op. cit.
Brenner, R (1977), 'The Origins of Capitalist Development—A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism', New Left Review, No. 104.
Cutler, A, Hindess, B, Hirst, P and Hussain, A (1977), Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today, Vol. I, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Himmelweit, S and Mohun, S (1978), 'The Anomalies of Capital', Capital & Class No. 6.
Rosdolsky, R (1977), The Making of Marx's Capital, Pluto Press, London.
3. The phase of synthesis: from value to price
The phase of synthesis encompasses the whole of the rest of Part One of Capital, I. In it Marx discusses the way that the objectification of abstract labour occurs and how this entails the dominance of abstract labour; and also shows the precarious nature of this objectification. It is about the operation of the 'law of value' which fundamentally means the 'law' of the process by which abstract labour is objectified. The term 'law' and the explicit comparison of the law of value with 'a regulative law of nature' (cf. Capital, I, p. 168) is once more a reference to the naturalistic aspect of this process, the fact that it takes place 'behind the backs' of the commodity owners. But it is important to note that Marx does not have a rigid, 'deterministic' concept of a 'regulative law'. He criticised such a concept in one of his earliest writings on political economy:
.. Mill succumbs to the error, made by the entire Ricardo School, of defining abstract law without mentioning the fluctuations or the continual suspension by which it comes into being... the momentary co-incidence (of cost of production and price) is succeeded by the same fluctuations and the same disparity. This is the real movement, then, and the above-mentioned law is no more than an abstract, contingent and one-sided moment in it.' ('Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of Political Economy', Early Writings, p. 260.)20
And he was careful to avoid such an 'abstract law' in the argument of Capital.
'Under capitalist production, the general law acts as the prevailing tendency only in a very complicated and approximate manner, as a never ascertainable average of ceaseless fluctuations.' (Capital, III, p. 161).
The 'law of value' is often posed as a relation between value and price, but this is because price is the form through which the objectification of abstract labour is achieved. Establishing this result is the first step of the phase of syntheses.
The problem is to explain the process by which abstract labour, an aspect of labour, becomes 'objectified' as the value of a commodity. Marx's argument is that this requires the abstract labour embodied in a commodity (e.g. linen) to be expressed 'objectively', as a 'thing which is materially different from the linen itself and yet common to the linen and all other commodities' (Capital, I, p. 142). This can be done if one commodity functions as the bearer of value (or value-form), and reflects the value of the commodities exchanged with it. Section III of chapter 1, Capital, I, is devoted to exploring the implications of this 'determination of reflection' (cf. Capital, I, p. 149). The simplest implication is that,
' . . . the natural form of commodity B becomes the value form of commodity A, in other words the physical body of commodity B becomes a mirror for the value of commodity A'. (Capital, I, p. 144).
Marx calls the commodity which serves as the bearer of value the equivalent form; and the commodity whose value is being reflected, the relative form. The next implication that Marx draws, is that in order to function as a bearer or representation of value, the equivalent form must be 'directly exchangeable' (Capital, I, p. 147). That is, its exchangeability (the possibility of exchanging it) must not depend upon its own use-value, nor on the character of the actual, individual labour embodied in it. In this it must differ from all other commodities, where, as we have already seen, their use-value and the private characteristics of their owners play a role in their exchangeability. In the case of the equivalent form, its exchangeability must instead depend upon its social position as equivalent. But this social position 'can only arise as the joint contribution of the whole world of commodities' (Capital, I, p. 159). That is, no individual commodity owner can decide to make his commodity an equivalent form: this can only come about as the byproduct of the actions of each commodity owner trying to exchange his own commodity for others he would rather have (see also Capital, I, p. 180).
Direct exchangeability will remain in only an embryonic form unless the equivalent form is a universal equivalent, in which all other commodities have their abstract labour objectified, their value reflected. The physical form of such a universal equivalent 'counts as the visible incarnation, the social chrysalis state, of all human labour' (Capital, I, p. 159). The full establishment of direct exchangeability requires a further condition that there should be a unique universal equivalent, a commodity whose 'specific social function, and consequently its social monopoly (is) to play the part of universal equivalent in the world of commodities' (Capital, I, p. 162).
And at this point we can make an empirical check on the line of argument. The argument has implied that in capitalist societies there should be a tendency for one commodity to be excluded from the ranks of all other commodities, to have conferred upon it the social monopoly of direct exchangeability with all other commodities. Can such a commodity be found? If not, then something must be wrong with Marx's argument. On inspection we do find such a commodity: gold-money. The implication is not, of course that the universal equivalent must always be gold money. As we have already seen, Marx goes on to note that gold, for some purposes, can be replaced as universal equivalent by symbols of itself, by paper money. The implication is rather, that gold-money as the universal equivalent-is a necessary precursor to paper money. At the root of the argument here is Marx's rejection of the view that the universal equivalent can be established 'by a convention', i.e. by a conscious and simultaneous decision of all commodity owners to invest some material form with the properties of universal equivalent. Rather he takes the view that 'Money necessarily crystallises out of the process of exchange' (Capital, I, p. 181), and that it certainly cannot be treated 'as if' established 'by a convention'.
The fact that we do find a commodity with the social monopoly of direct exchangeability with all other commodities does not prove the correctness of Marx's argument that such a commodity is the visible expression of objectified abstract labour. Rather it has the negative effect of not disproving it, of not halting the line of argument, but allowing it to proceed. This is all an empirical check on the argument can ever do. The question of when we have sufficiently grasped the real relations under investigation, when we know enough about them to proceed to practical action, is not one that can ever be finally decided by an empirical test. It must always be a matter of judgement.
There is a problem with Marx's exposition of the role of gold-money as universal equivalent, 'direct incarnation of all human labour', in that he does not distinguish sufficiently clearly between money as a medium of exchange and the money form of value (money as universal equivalent). Money in itself is not specific to the capitalist mode of production (see Brenner, 1977), and the fact that money is functioning as a medium of exchange does not mean that it is functioning as an expression of value, the 'direct incarnation of all human labour'. This distinction is ellided in many of the statements made in Chapter 2, 'The Process of Exchange', creating the impression that where there is money, there is also value. Money as medium of exchange is certainly a necessary precursor to the money form of value, but in Chapter 2 Marx overstresses the continuity at the expense of the difference. To recapitulate the argument: beginning from an economy in which the capitalist mode of production is dominant and in which there are capitalist relations of exchange (i.e. the general exchangeability of products of labour through a process of sale and purchase), we arrived through analysis at the conclusion that this presupposes value (i.e. the objectification of abstract labour); we then considered the conditions for the objectification of abstract labour and concluded that this implies a universal equivalent that reflects and is the expression of value. Gold-money in capitalist economies does have the characteristics necessary for being a universal equivalent. But being a universal equivalent is itself predicated upon the social relations of the capitalist mode of production.
Marx's line of argument is not formalist but begins from real premises in the specific social relations of capitalism; and it does survive empirical checks, in that a social phenomenon can be found corresponding to what is posited by the argument of the phase of synthesis. Nevertheless, it leads us to an extraordinary conclusion, the extraordinariness of which Marx notes quite explicitly in the last section of Chapter 1, Capital, I:
'If I state that work or boots stand in a relation to linen because the latter is the universal incarnation of abstract human labour, the absurdity of the statement is self evident. Nevertheless, when the producers of coats and boots bring these commodities into a relation with linen, or with gold or silver (and this makes no difference here), as the universal equivalent, the relation between their own private labour and the collective labour of society appears to them in exactly this absurd form'. (Capital, I, p. 169).
The point is made even more vividly in a passage included in the First Edition of Capital, but not in subsequent editions, and recently brought to our attention by Arthur, 1978. The objectification of abstract labour through its incarnation in the universal equivalent
' . . . is as if alongside and external to lions, tigers, rabbits and all other actual animals, which form grouped together the various kinds, species, sub-species, families etc. of the animal kingdom, there existed also in addition the animal, the individual incarnation of the entire animal kingdom.' (quoted by Arthur, 1978, P- 98).
The objectification of abstract labour entails its dependent expression in a determinate form, the form of the money commodity. But does not this conclusion, that objectified abstract labour (value) has an independent expression, undermine Marx's claim that value is not conceived as an absolute entity? Here it is helpful to bear in mind another little-noticed distinction drawn by Marx, that between 'internal independence' and 'external independence' (cf. Capital, I, p. 209). Value lacks the 'internal independence' necessary for it to be an entity because it is always one side of a unity of value and use-value, i.e. the commodity. But the value side of the commodity can be given 'external independence' if the commodity is bought into a relation with another commodity which serves only to reflect value. This produces the illusory appearance that value in its money form is an independent entity; but the autonomy it confers on value is only relative. It is this externally independent expression, in objectified form, of a one-sided abstraction, the abstract aspect of labour, which is the fetishism of commodities. Unlike the fetishism of the misty realm of religion' it is not an ideological form, a product of our way of looking at things; but a product of the particular form of the determination of labour, of particular relations of production.
In the form of the universal equivalent, abstract labour is not only objectified: it is established as the dominant aspect of labour. The concrete aspect serves only to express the abstract aspect of human labour; for the usefulness of the labour embodied in the universal equivalent consists in 'making a physical object which we at once recognize as value' (Capital, I, p. 150). The private aspect of the labour embodied in it serves only to express the social aspect: individual producers cannot decide to produce the universal equivalent until it has already been established as universal equivalent by a 'blind' social process. The social aspect of the labour embodied in it, its social necessity, consists in producing a commodity which functions simply as the incarnation of abstract labour. This does not mean that the private, concrete and social aspects of labour are being extinguished, obliterated; that the labour embodied in the universal equivalent is simply abstract labour. What it means is that other aspects of labour are subsumed as expressions of abstract labour. The form of the universal equivalent reflects only abstract labour.
The argument of Capital, I, goes on to show the dominance of the universal equivalent, the money form of value, over other commodities, and how this domination is expressed in the self-expansion of the money form of value i.e. in the capital form of value. Further it shows that the domination of the capital form of value is not confined to labour 'fixed' in products, it extends to the immediate process of production itself, and to the reproduction of that process. The real subsumption of labour as a form of capital (see Results of Immediate Process of Production, p. 1019-1038) is a developed form of the real subsumption of the other aspects of labour as expressions of abstract labour in the universal equivalent, the money form of value.
In discussing the domination of objectified abstract aspect of labour, through the capital form of value, Marx refers to value as 'the subject of a process', valorising itself Independently' (Capital, I, p. 255). Here again it seems as if value is being posed as an absolutely independent entity. It is indeed these references which form the point of departure of the capital-logic approach. It does seem as if here is a case where Marx is mistaking the movement of the categories' for the 'real act of production'. But we need to recall the distinction, made earlier, between external and internal independence; and the fact that these references occur in a discussion of the circulation of capital, i.e. of the form of appearance of valorisation in money terms. At this level it certainly appears that value is the subject of a process, endowed with a life of its own. But there is more to it than immediately meets the eye; which Marx signals in these ironic words:
'By virtue of being value, it has acquired the occult ability to add value to itself. It brings forth living offspring, or at least lays golden eggs.' (Capital, I, p. 255.)
We are reminded of the ironical references to the mysterious abilities of the commodity, its "metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties', at the beginning of the section on the fetishism of commodities (Capital, I, p. 162). In my view, value appearing as 'the subject of a process', valorising itself 'independently' is posed by Marx as one more aspect of the fact that,
'the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men's own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things.' (Capital, I, p. 165.)
The 'determination of reflection' whereby the abstract labour of one commodity is objectified by its expression in the money form of value is what underlies Marx's statements about the relation of value to price (exchange-value expressed in the money form). It should be clear from earlier sections of this paper that the references in the first two sections of Chapter 1, Volume I of Capital (i.e. the phase of analysis) to the determination of the magnitude of value by labour-time do not constitute an argument about the relation of value and price, but about the relation of value and its internal measure. It is in Sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 1 that we find the first references to value as a regulator of exchange ratios, most notably:
'It becomes plain that it is not the exchange of commodities which regulates the magnitude of their value, but rather the reverse, the magnitude of the value of commodities which regulates the proportion in which they exchange.' (Capital, I, p. 156.)
and,
' . . . in the midst of the accidental and ever-fluctuating exchange relations between the products, the labour-time socially necessary to produce them asserts itself as a regulative law of nature'. (Capital, I, p. 156.)
It will be apparent from my earlier argument that it would be a mistake to interpret 'regulate' in terms of a relation between a dependent and an independent variable. Rather we should understand it in terms of the way in which the inner character of some form regulates its representation at the level of appearance, its reflection. Thus the molecular structure of a chemical substance regulates the representation of the substance in the form of a crystal, and the cell-structure of a living organism regulates the form of the organism's body.
We should note that in the passages quoted above, Marx confines himself to saying that values 'regulate'exchange ratios. He says nothing specific about the form of this regulation; in particular, he does not commit himself to the view that the exchange ratios expressed in the equivalent form, directly represent the magnitude of values (i.e. that prices are equal to values). There is a passage in the discussion of the General Form of Value which is rather more ambiguous:
'In this form, when they are all counted as comparable with linen, all commodities appear not only as qualitatively equal, as values in general, but also as values of quantitatively comparable magnitude. Because the magnitudes of their values are expressed in one and the same material, the linen, these magnitudes are now reflected in each other. For instance, 10 lb of tea = 20 yards of linen, and 40 lb of coffee = 20 yards of linen. Therefore, 10 lb of tea = 40 lb of coffee, in other words, 1 lb of coffee contains only a quarter as much of the substance of value, that is, labour, as 1 lb of tea.' (Capital, I, p. 159.)
The last sentence certainly suggests an equality of magnitude of value and price. (Marx argues that here linen is playing the role of money). But I think we have to pay particular attention to the unstressed reference to 'appearance'. Marx in this stage of the argument is returning from consideration of the inner substance of the relations between commodities to their appearance. The point is that on the basis of the investigation so far, it appears that commodities exchange in ratios which reflect directly the magnitude of their values, and there is as yet no basis for challenging that appearance. In writing Capital, I, Marx was however well aware that at a later stage of the investigation conclusions based on this appearance would have to be challenged. He signals this in his footnote reference to the insufficiency of Ricardo's analysis of the magnitude of value' which *will appear from the third and fourth books of this work' (Capital, I, p. 173).
Such an awareness is not to be found in Critique of Political Economy published in 1859, eight years before Capital, I, and which does not contain the same careful distinction between substance (or inner structure) and appearance, failing, for instance, to make a systematic distinction between value and exchange-value.
In Capital, I, Marx takes no steps to dispel the appearance that prices directly represent values as magnitudes. But this is not quite the same as making the assumption that prices are approximately equal to values, and subsequently relaxing it. Rather, in Capital, I, the argument abstracts from consideration of the social relations that imply that prices cannot directly represent the magnitude of values. This is often explained in terms of Capital, I, dealing with 'capital in general' and Capital, III, where the form of representation of the magnitude of value is explicitly considered, dealing with 'many capitals' (cf. Rosdolsky, 1977, p. 41-50). The trouble with this explanation is that it often leads to confusion about competition: to the view, for instance, that Capital, I, abstracts from competition. This is clearly not the case: competition is an essential feature of capitalism; capital can only exist in the form of many capitals. It is not competition that Marx abstracts from in Volume I, but the question of the distribution of value between capitals.
More helpful is the distinction that Marx himself makes at the beginning of Results of the Immediate Process of Production, a distinction between considering the commodity simply as the product of labour, and considering it as the product of capital (i.e. of self-valorising labour). Marx indicates that his procedure in Volume I is to begin from the commodity viewed simply as the product of labour, because this is its immediate form of appearance. The investigations of Volume I show precisely the superficiality of this immediate appearance of the commodity, revealing that the commodity, as the 'immediate result of the capitalist process of production', embodies not only value, but also surplus value; is represented not only in the price but in the profit form.
This forces a reconsideration of the representation of magnitudes of value by prices, which is undertaken in Capital, III, where the concept of price of production is elaborated. A discussion of the adequacy of the conclusions reached is beyond the scope of this paper. Here we need merely note that the analysis of the relation between prices and values presented in Volume III does not rest on different premises from that offered in Volume I, but is a further development of the same analysis, attempting to encompass features of the capitalist mode of production from which Volume I abstracts.
Marx not only claims that values regulate, in the sense explained, prices. He also points to the possibility of breakdown of this regulation. In order for the abstract aspect of the labour embodied in a commodity to be objectified, the commodity must have a price. But this price
'may express both the magnitude of value of the commodity and the greater or lesser quantity of money for which it can be sold under given circumstances. The possibility, therefore, of a quantitative incongruity between price and magnitude of value, i.e. the possibility that the price may diverge from the magnitude of value, is inherent in the price-form itself.' (Capital, I, p. 196).
Money as universal equivalent is a necessary condition for the objectification of abstract labour, but not a sufficient condition for its objectification in a quantitatively determinate, socially necessary form. The realisation of the magnitude of value in the price form is precarious because of the relative autonomy of the circulation of money from the production of commodities. In the relation between the two processes,
'commodities as use-values confront money as exchange values. On the other hand, both sides of this opposition are commodities, hence themselves unities of use-value and value. But this unity of differences is expressed at two opposite poles, and at each pole in an opposite way.' (Capital, I, p. 199).
There is no necessary relation between relinquishing one's own use-value in the commodity form and acquiring someone else's use-value; for one can choose to hold money, a commodity which, unlike any other, is normally exchangeable at any time for any commodity. But the magnitude of value of money is necessarily indeterminate, for there is no universal equivalent uniquely reflecting its value, but a whole series of reflections in the quantities of all other commodities that a given amount of money will purchase (see Capital, I, p. 147). The timing and sequence of purchases and sales of different goods can thus have an independent effect upon prices, and at any moment in time there is no necessary identity of aggregate sales and aggregate purchases.
But if the assertion of the relative autonomy of the circulation of money from the production of commodities
"proceeds to a certain critical point, their unity violently makes itself felt by producing—a crisis. There is an antithesis, immanent in the commodity, between use-value and value, between private labour, which must simultaneously manifest itself as directly social labour, and a particular concrete kind of labour, which simultaneously counts as merely abstract universal labour, between the conversion of things into persons and the conversion of persons into things; the antithetical phases of the metamorphosis of the commodity are the developed forms of motion of this immanent contradiction. These forms therefore imply the possibility of crises, though no more than the possibility. For the development of this possibility into a reality a whole series of conditions is required, which do not yet exist from the standpoint of the simple circulation of commodities.' (Capital, 1, p. 209.)
Our observations of capitalist economies tell us that not only is this possibility of crisis realised, it is also—temporarily—resolved, in the sense that restructuring takes place and there is recovery from the crisis. Thus there are clearly limits to the extent to which the circulation of money departs from the production of commodities; or, in other words, to the extent to which price departs from the magnitude of value. What sets these limits can only be established after a good deal more investigation. Given the categories of analysis established so far, all that we can say is that these limits must take the form of some pressure on commodity producers to represent labour-time expended in production in money terms, to account in money terms for every moment. 21 To establish how such pressure is brought to bear requires an analysis of capitalist production. It is quite illegitimate to argue that the pressure must come from capital's 'need' to reproduce itself. Here I am in agreement with Cutler et al. who reject such reasoning as functionalist and economistic (op. cit. 1977, p. 71). But I would also stress that nowhere does Marx present an argument of this type.
It is true that the investigations of Capital, I, proceed for the most part on the assumption of equilibrium —the reflection of the magnitude of value in the price of commodities (exchange of equivalents) —rather than on the assumption of disequilibrium—the failure of this reflection to be quantitatively determinate (exchange of non-equivalents). But this is because the assertion of the relative autonomy of the circulation of money from the production of commodities shows up in terms of the distribution of profit between capitals (see Capital, I, p. 262-6 for a preliminary indication of this), precisely the question from which Marx abstracts in Volume I. The major concern of Volume I is to establish how it is that labour comes to count 'simply as a valuecreating substance', how this entails the subsumption of labour as a form of capital. In doing this Marx follows the procedure of first examining the equilibrium aspect of the process he is considering, its 'law', but he also indicates that this is merely one side of the process, and that the forms of the process of the determination of labour in capitalist economies imply disequilibrium and crisis, just as much as equilibrium and law'
