【中英双语】“利益相关者资本主义”行动指南

What Does “Stakeholder Capitalism” Mean to You?

过去几年涌现的大量文章和声明预示着一种新的、更具包容性的资本主义形式的到来，通常被人称为“利益相关者资本主义”（stakeholder capitalism）。它可望对公司给予支持，为客户改善结果，为长期股东带来更好的回报，并最终从整体上加强经济和社会。按照新的意识观念，公司董事会和商界领袖受到敦促，要采取多利益相关者的治理方式，而不是已指导他们工作数十年的以股东为中心的治理方式。

The past few years have seen an outpouring of articles and statements heralding the arrival of a new and more inclusive form of capitalism, often called “stakeholder capitalism.” It promises to bolster companies, improve outcomes for their constituencies, produce better returns for long-term shareholders, and ultimately strengthen the economy and society as a whole. In line with the new ideology, corporate boards and business leaders have been urged to adopt a multistakeholder approach to governance in place of the shareholder-centered one that has guided their work for several decades.

这些年来，我经过与数百名公司董事、高管、投资者、治理专业人士和学者的交谈，发现人们对利益相关者资本主义的理解存在着巨大差异。公司内部和公众辩论中存在许多混乱和分歧，其根源在于未能认识到这些差异。最近关于环境、社会和治理的争议就是一个典型的例子。在本文中，我会描述四种利益相关者资本主义——工具型、经典型、福利型和结构型——它们反映出对利益相关者的利益承诺存在显著差异，这些差异基于截然不同的理论依据。（参见图表“利益相关者资本主义的四大类型”）

In speaking with hundreds of corporate directors, executives, investors, governance professionals, and academics over the years, I’ve found wide differences in how stakeholder capitalism is understood. The failure to recognize those differences has been a source of much confusion and disagreement inside companies and in the public debate. The recent controversy over environmental, social, and governance investing is a case in point. In this article I describe four kinds of stakeholder capitalism—

instrumental, classic, beneficial,

 and 

structural

—which reflect significantly different levels of commitment to the interests of stakeholders and are based on very different rationales.

随着越来越多的企业接受利益相关者资本主义，重要的是，企业领导们对他们确切接受的利益相关者资本主义要有共识。如果不清楚对所有利益相关者的承诺到底是什么，人们就对其予以支持，那么当需要在利益相关者的利益之间做出艰难权衡——这种权衡在所难免——的决策时，这会让董事和高管相互发生冲突。它还会在利益相关者中产生期望，而这些期望如果无法实现，就会助长愤世嫉俗、疏远和不信任的情绪——这与大多数利益相关者资本主义支持者的初衷恰恰相反。与此同时，股东们也不知道这种新的意识形态对他们意味着什么。本文旨在提供指导，帮助企业领导者明确他们所指的利益相关者资本主义是何含义，从而降低出现此类负面后果的风险。

As more companies embrace stakeholder capitalism, it is important that corporate leaders have a shared understanding of what, exactly, they are embracing. Espousing a commitment to all stakeholders without clarity about what that actually entails puts directors and executives on a collision course with one another when decisions requiring difficult trade-offs among stakeholders’ interests arise—as they inevitably do. It also creates expectations among stakeholders that if unfulfilled will fuel cynicism, alienation, and distrust—the opposite of what most proponents of stakeholder capitalism intend. Meanwhile, shareholders are left wondering what this new ideology means for them. This article is intended as a guide to help corporate leaders define what they mean by stakeholder capitalism and thus reduce the risk of such negative consequences.

[ 工具型利益相关者主义 ]

实现股东长期价值的最大化

[ Instrumental Stakeholderism ]

Maximizing Long-Term Shareholder Value

工具型利益相关者资本主义认为，考虑所有利益相关者的利益实际上有助于实现股东回报的最大化，因为一家企业对待非股东利益相关者的方式会影响到股东价值。对其他利益相关者的投资可能会降低今天的股东价值，但在未来会给股东带来回报。相反，亏待其他利益相关者可能会暂时让股东受益，但在更长的时间内却对股东不利。因此，即使那些以股东价值最大化为唯一目标的公司领导者也应考虑其他利益相关者的利益。

This version of stakeholder capitalism holds that considering the interests of all stakeholders can actually help maximize returns to shareholders, because how a company treats its nonshareholder stakeholders can affect shareholder value. Investing in other stakeholders may reduce shareholder value today but pay off for shareholders in the future. Conversely, shortchanging other stakeholders may benefit shareholders for a time but be detrimental to them over a longer period. Thus even corporate leaders whose only objective is maximizing value for shareholders should consider the interests of other stakeholders.

这似乎是当今投资界很大一部分人对利益相关者资本主义的主流理解。当然，美国“三大”资产管理公司——贝莱德（BlackRock）、先锋集团（Vanguard）和道富环球投资管理公司（State Street Global Advisors）——的负责人最近发表的声明似乎也反映了这一观点。贝莱德董事会主席兼首席执行官拉里·芬克（Larry Fink）2021 年在致CEO们的信中表示：“你的公司越能展示其为客户、员工和社区提供价值的宗旨，你就越具备能力去竞争，并为股东带来长期、持久的利润。”

That appears to be the dominant understanding of stakeholder capitalism in much of the investment community today. Certainly recent statements by heads of the “big three” asset managers in the United States—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors—seem to reflect this view. In his 2021 letter to CEOs, BlackRock Chairman and CEO Larry Fink stated: “The more your company can show its purpose in delivering value to its customers, its employees, and its communities, the better able you will be to compete and deliver long-term, durable profits for shareholders.”

这种观点认为，今天采取的行动会对明天产生影响，不同利益相关者的利益通常是相互依存的。让我们看看投资员工发展这一简单的例子。为你的销售人员提供脱产的时间去学习新技能，这可能会减少当季的销售额，令部分股东失望，并有可能殃及股价。可是，这很有可能有助于未来的销售并促进增长，从而增加股东价值。根据同样的逻辑，放弃这种投资可能会提高今天的盈亏底线并让股东受益，但如果你的销售团队技能过时，会导致销售额下降、运营效率低下，最终导致股东价值损失，而这些损失甚至会超过之前的收益。

This view recognizes that actions taken today have consequences for tomorrow and that the interests of different stakeholders are often interdependent. Consider the simple example of investing in employees’ development. Giving your salespeople time away from their jobs to learn new skills may dampen that quarter’s sales, disappointing some shareholders and possibly hurting the stock price. But it will most likely help sales and fuel growth in the future, increasing shareholder value. By the same logic, forgoing such investment may improve the bottom line and benefit shareholders today but lead to declining sales, operational inefficiencies, and ultimately losses in shareholder value that exceed the earlier gains if your sales team’s skills become outdated.

对利益相关者的工具性态度绝不是对股东至上主义的挑战，它完全符合股东至上主义的四条基本原则：将股东价值最大化作为公司目标；优先对股东负责而非对其他利益相关者负责；其他利益相关者的偏好服从于股东的偏好；赋予股东对董事和其他治理事项的专属投票权。这在两个方面有别于传统的股东资本主义：明确考虑其他利益相关者的利益，以及在更长的时间跨度内对股东价值进行评估。

An instrumental approach to stakeholders in no way challenges shareholder primacy and is fully consistent with its four main tenets: treating shareholder-value maximization as the corporate objective; prioritizing accountability to shareholders over accountability to other stakeholders; subordinating the preferences of other stakeholders to those of shareholders; and giving shareholders the exclusive right to vote on directors and other governance matters. It differs from traditional shareholder capitalism in just two main ways: by giving explicit consideration to other stakeholders’ interests, and by assessing shareholder value over a longer period.

一些评论人士表示，这些差异无关紧要。然而，明确关注其他相关者的利益可以揭示决策者在狭隘关注股东价值时通常意识不到的风险。事实上，无视这些利益已致使许多企业的股东价值遭到严重破坏。我仅举两个例子——富国银行的虚假账户事件和大众汽车的“柴油门”事件。假如这些公司的领导者能更多关注非股东的利益，他们可能会采取的是不同的做法或战略，并最终为股东做得更好。

Some commentators say those differences are inconsequential. But paying explicit attention to other stakeholders’ interests can reveal risks that decision-makers often don’t recognize when they’re focused narrowly on shareholder value. Indeed, disregard for those interests has led to substantial destruction of shareholder value at numerous companies. Consider the fake-accounts debacle at Wells Fargo and Dieselgate at Volkswagen—to name just two. Had leaders of those companies paid more attention to the interests of constituents who were not shareholders, they might have pursued different practices or strategies and ultimately done a better job for their shareholders.

关注利益相关者的利益、以更长远的目光看问题，这还可以展现战略机遇。建设新工厂时，狭隘关注近期股东回报的企业领导者不太可能选择陷入困境的本土地区，而会选择成本更低的海外地区。然而，当康明斯2010年决定在印第安纳州的西摩生产新的高速、低排发动机系列时，它就做到了目光长远。其决定意味着该公司必须对这一社区及其学校进行大量投资，但同时也为提高该地区的教育程度和收入水平提供了机会，并创建一个先进制造业的全球中心，最终让公司受益。2015年，康明斯开始在西摩工厂生产新的系列发动机。在一定程度上由于康明斯与其他公司以及该地区市政和教育领导的合作，当地居民的受教育程度、收入和工资标准都得到了提升。

Paying attention to stakeholder interests and taking a longer view can also reveal strategic opportunities. Corporate leaders narrowly focused on near-term shareholder returns would be unlikely to choose to build a new plant in their distressed home region rather than in a lower-cost location overseas. But Cummins did just that in 2010 when it decided to manufacture its new line of high-speed, low-emissions engines in Seymour, Indiana. Its decision meant that the company would have to make significant investments in the community and its schools—but it also presented an opportunity to raise educational attainment and income levels in the region and create a global hub for advanced manufacturing that would ultimately benefit the company. In 2015 Cummins began producing its new line of engines at the Seymour plant. And thanks in part to its collaboration with other companies and the region’s civic and educational leaders, local residents’ educational attainment, incomes, and wage rates improved as well.

工具型利益相关者主义面临的挑战。

Challenges for instrumental stakeholderism. 

这种态度可望为利益相关者和社会带来真正的好处，但这些好处只限于此。尽管它要求企业领导考虑利益相关者的利益，但它并不要求他们尊重这些利益，除非这样做在经济上对股东有利。从这个角度来看，对公司利益相关者进行投资与任何其他投资一样，只有在这种投资会增加净现值的情况下才应该着手进行，并且应该避免对那些降低长期股东价值的利益相关者进行投资。虽然工具型利益相关者主义的支持者通常会关注康明斯这样的双赢案例，但企业领导经常会面临压力和机会，其产生股东价值的方式不会让所有利益相关者受益，甚至可能对部分利益相关者造成伤害。

This approach promises real benefits for stakeholders and society, but those benefits go only so far. Although it requires corporate leaders to take stakeholders’ interests into account, it does not require them to 

respect

 those interests unless doing so would be financially beneficial for shareholders. From this perspective, an investment in the company’s stakeholders, like any other investment, should be pursued only if it increases net present value, and investments in stakeholders that reduce long-term shareholder value should be avoided. While proponents of instrumental stakeholderism tend to focus on win-win examples like the Cummins case, corporate leaders frequently face pressure and opportunities to generate shareholder value in ways that do not benefit all stakeholders and may even do harm to some of them. 比如，经济学家罗伊·沙皮拉（Roy Shapira）和路易吉·津加莱斯（Luigi Zingales）已经证明，污染环境，即使是在违反法律和有害公众健康的情况下，有时可以最大化股东的长期价值。他们利用在众多诉讼中披露的信息，对杜邦公司高管1984年在全氟辛酸（PFOA）问题上做出的决定进行了调查。全氟辛酸是一种用于制造特氟龙的有毒化学物质，当时正渗入生产所在社区的饮用水中。文件显示，高管们知道全氟辛酸对人类的毒性和在环境中的持久性。正如几位作者在其论文“污染是否会实现价值最大化？”中所报告的那样，得到考虑的有三种选择：终止全氟辛酸的生产，继续生产并采取措施减少有害排放，以及在不采取减排措施的情况下继续生产。沙皮拉和津加莱斯从股东价值最大化领导者的角度出发，利用与每种选择相关的公司长期成本与收益的现值，对决策进行了建模。他们的分析发现，即使在考虑到法律责任、监管制裁、声誉影响以及公司在后续30年中的其他成本之后，高管们的决定——继续生产全氟辛酸而不减排——也实现了股东价值的最大化。换言之，从工具型利益相关者主义的角度来看，这一决定完全正确，因为尊重其他利益相关者利益的选择不会实现长期股东价值的最大化。

The economists Roy Shapira and Luigi Zingales have shown, for example, that polluting the environment, even when it is against the law and harmful to public health, can sometimes maximize long-term value for shareholders. Using information disclosed in numerous lawsuits, they examined the decision DuPont executives made in 1984 regarding perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), a toxic chemical used in making Teflon that was seeping into the drinking water of the community where it was manufactured. Documents showed that executives knew about PFOA’s toxicity to humans and persistence in the environment. As the authors reported in their paper “Is Pollution Value-Maximizing?,” three options were considered: ending production of PFOA, continuing production with measures to abate the harmful emissions, and continuing production without abatement measures. Shapira and Zingales modeled the decision from the perspective of a shareholder-value-maximizing manager using the present value of the long-term costs and benefits to the company associated with each option. Their analysis found that the executives’ decision—to continue producing PFOA without abatement—maximized shareholder value, even after taking into account legal liabilities, regulatory sanctions, reputational effects, and other costs to the company over the ensuing 30 years. In other words, the decision was perfectly correct from the perspective of instrumental stakeholderism, because an option that respected other stakeholders’ interests would not have maximized long-term shareholder value.

工具型利益相关者主义的支持者有时会将决策规则的清晰性作为其主要优点之一。可是，预测哪种行动方案最有可能实现长期股东价值的最大化充满了困难，尤其是当它需要对健康、清洁空气和司法等没有市场价格的结果赋予货币价值，或预测法律、政策或公众情绪会如何长期演变时。时间范围越长，行动的投机性就越强。实现长期股东价值最大化的规则表面上可能清晰明了，但它消除不了困难的权衡，有时还会对其他利益相关者和整个社会造成严重伤害。

Proponents of instrumental stakeholderism sometimes cite the clarity of its decision rule as one of its principal virtues. But predicting which course of action will most likely maximize long-term shareholder value is fraught with difficulty, especially when it requires putting a monetary value on outcomes such as health, clean air, and justice, which have no market price, or predicting how laws, policies, or public sentiment will evolve over the long term. The longer the time frame, the more speculative the exercise. The rule to maximize long-term shareholder value may be clear on its face, but it does not eliminate difficult trade-offs, and it can sometimes result in serious harm to other stakeholders and society at large.

[ 经典型利益相关者主义 ]

尊重利益相关者的合法诉求

[ Classic Stakeholderism ]

Respecting Stakeholders’ Legitimate Claims

经典型利益相关者资本主义认为，至少部分利益相关者的利益必须得到尊重和考虑。它会区分利益，优先考虑那些受道德或法律规范保护的利益，而不是基于愿望或欲望的利益。其核心思想是，前者更基本的利益会产生诉求，而诉求有效性不取决于对股东价值的贡献，并构成对利益相关者义务的基础，而这些义务与财务和战略需求同等重要。这种利益相关者主义认识到，为利益相关者利益服务通常有助于股东价值，但即使它不会促成股东价值的时候，部分利益相关者的利益也应该得到解决。（我之所以称其为“经典”，是因为它与利益相关者理论的早期表达相似。）

This version of stakeholder capitalism holds that at least some stakeholders’ interests must be respected as well as considered. It differentiates among interests, prioritizing those protected by ethical or legal norms over those based on wishes or desires. The core idea is that the former, more fundamental, interests give rise to claims whose validity is not contingent on their contribution to shareholder value and underpin obligations to stakeholders that sit alongside financial and strategic imperatives. This type of stakeholderism recognizes that serving stakeholder interests often contributes to shareholder value, but that some stakeholder interests should be addressed even when it doesn’t. (I call it “classic” because of its similarity to early expressions of stakeholder theory.)

企业领导被允许（更不用说被要求）以不一定实现股东价值最大化的方式行事，这种想法听起来可能像异端。但事实远非如此。即使是股东至上主义最著名的支持者米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）也承认，追求股东价值应该在法律和“道德习俗”所体现的社会规则范围内进行。他在1970年《纽约时报》的一篇著名文章中对道德习俗进行了相当狭隘的定义，只要求企业竞争的时候“不欺骗或欺诈”，不过，他原本可能会谴责欺骗任何利益相关者——客户、员工、供应商、股东或社区——即使这可以证明为股东创造了长期价值。

The idea that corporate leaders are permitted, let alone required, to act in ways that don’t necessarily maximize shareholder value may sound like heresy. But that is far from the case. Even the best-known proponent of shareholder primacy, Milton Friedman, acknowledged that shareholder value should be pursued within the rules of society as embodied in law and “ethical custom.” In his well-known New York Times article of 1970 he defined ethical custom quite narrowly, as requiring only that companies compete “without deception or fraud,” but presumably he would have condemned deceiving 

any

 stakeholders—customers, employees, suppliers, shareholders, or communities—even if it could be shown to create long-term value for shareholders.

这种观点的一个更强有力形式可以在1981年商业圆桌会议（Business Roundtable）的企业责任声明中找到。该声明宣称：“股东必须获得良好的回报，但其他涉众的合法担忧也必须得到适当的关注。”美国法律学会1992年的《公司治理原则：分析与建议》（Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations）明确承认，公司决策者在与利益相关者打交道时可能会关注道德考虑，“即使公司利润和股东收益没有因此而提高”。

A more robust form of this view is found in the Business Roundtable’s 1981 statement on corporate responsibility, which declared that “the shareholder must receive a good return but the legitimate concerns of other constituencies also must have the appropriate attention.” And the American Law Institute’s 1992 Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations explicitly acknowledges that corporate decision-makers may pay heed to ethical considerations in their dealings with the company’s stakeholders “even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced.”

特拉华州最近的法庭案例更进一步，表明在特定情况下，尊重部分利益相关者的利益甚至可能是一个诚信义务问题。2021年起诉波音公司董事会的案件说明了这一点。在737 MAX窄体客机发生两起致命坠机事故后，股东代表该公司提起诉讼，指控董事会忽视了职责，未能监督和监控飞机安全。在允许案件在辩护阶段之后继续审理时，法院指出，尽管某些董事会和领导层的沟通“名义上”提到了安全，但它们并非“以安全为中心”。也就是说，它们关注的是安全对财务、运营、公共关系或法律的影响，而不是安全本身。

Recent court cases in Delaware go further, suggesting that in certain situations respect for some stakeholder interests may even be a matter of fiduciary duty. The 2021 case against Boeing’s board of directors speaks to this point. After two fatal crashes of the 737 MAX narrow-body airliner, shareholders filed suit on behalf of the company, alleging that the board had neglected its duty by failing to oversee and monitor airplane safety. In allowing the case to proceed beyond the pleading phase, the court noted that although certain board and management communications mentioned safety “in name,” they were not “safety-centric.” That is, they focused on the financial, operational, public relations, or legal implications of safety rather than on safety itself.

可以肯定的是，确定董事会对监督不力的责任极其困难，这个案子最终结案了。然而，对于董事和官员来说，这一案例表明，适当重视利益相关者的根本利益——而不仅仅是他们对股东价值的影响——正日益被视为他们角色不可或缺的一部分。

To be sure, establishing a board’s liability for a failure of oversight is extremely difficult, and the case was ultimately settled. For directors and officers, however, the case suggests that due regard for stakeholders’ fundamental interests—not just their impact on shareholder value—is increasingly seen as integral to their roles.

经典型利益相关者主义面临的挑战。

Challenges for classic stakeholderism. 

与工具型利益相关者主义相比，经典型利益相关者主义为利益相关者和社会利益提供了更强的保护。然而，正如利益相关者主义的批评人士所指出的，确定哪些利益必须得到尊重并不总是那么容易。

Compared with instrumental stakeholderism, classic stakeholderism provides much stronger protection for stakeholder and societal interests. As critics of stakeholderism have noted, however, determining which interests must be respected is not always easy. 一个有用的出发点是全世界广泛接受的公司行为准则。这些准则包括遵守法律、尊重人权、真相和诚实、信守承诺、保护健康和安全等。然而，企业领导在哪些利益必须得到保护的问题上可能会面临艰难的判断。让我们看看一家涉及大规模裁员的企业的重组。通过取消向离职员工提供提前通知和遣散费的惯例（但在法律上是可选的），该公司可以节省数百万美元的资金。让我们再进一步假设取消这些措施将有助于领导层达到之前向股东宣布的指导利润率。一些领导人员会认为这种方法完全有效，认为在这种情况下，员工没有权利提出合法诉求，要求提前通知或遣散费，而另一些领导人员则会认为这对员工极不公平，因此不符合经典型利益相关者主义的要求。

A useful starting point is the norms of corporate conduct that are widely accepted around the world. They include obeying the law, respecting human rights, truth and honesty, honoring promises, protecting health and safety, and so on. Nevertheless, corporate leaders may face difficult judgments about which interests must be protected. Consider a corporate restructuring that involves mass layoffs. The company could save millions of dollars by eliminating its customary (but legally optional) practice of giving advance notice and severance packages to departing employees. Assume further that eliminating those measures would help management meet the guidance on margins previously announced to shareholders. Some managers would see the approach as perfectly valid, arguing that employees have no legitimate claim to advance notice or severance payments in this situation, while others would find it profoundly unfair to employees and thus inconsistent with the requirements of classic stakeholderism.

经典型利益相关者主义面临的一个同样令人烦恼（如果说不更加令人烦恼的话）的挑战是解决利益相关者相互矛盾的诉求之间的冲突。即使诉求范围仅限于基于法律和道德原则的那些要求，企业领导还是可能面临艰难的权衡。比如，在疫情初期，食品行业的一些公司就面临左右为难的局面，一方面要确保在暴发了新冠疫情的工厂里工作的员工安然无恙，另一方面要履行向经销商和消费者提供食品的责任。工具型利益相关者主义将“股东价值最大化”作为解决此类困境的通用决策规则，而与此不同的是，经典型利益相关者主义认为，只有通过一个深思熟虑的过程，将相互矛盾的利益进行权衡和比较，并寻求伤害最小化和人类福祉最大化，这些困境才能够得到解决。

An equally if not more vexing challenge for classic stakeholderism is resolving conflicts among competing stakeholder claims. Even if the universe of claims is limited to those based on legal and ethical principles, corporate leaders can face difficult trade-offs. During the early days of the pandemic, for instance, some companies in the food sector were torn between ensuring the safety of employees working in plants plagued by Covid outbreaks and meeting their responsibilities to get food to distributors and consumers. Unlike instrumental stakeholderism, which offers “maximize shareholder value” as an all-purpose decision rule for resolving such dilemmas, classic stakeholderism holds that they can be resolved only through a process of deliberation that weighs and compares competing interests and seeks to minimize harm and maximize human well-being.

利益相关者理论的批评人士通常指出，缺乏一个解决权衡问题的决策规则是一大缺点。然而，支持者认为，对这一规则的要求是基于过于狭隘的理性观，脱离了企业领导层的混乱现实。他们言之有理。从本质上讲，企业领导的工作需要承担多重义务。他们不可能事先说出应该如何解决冲突，或者应该优先考虑谁的利益。两者都取决于局面的事实和情境以及所涉特定利益的性质。

Critics of stakeholder theory often point to the lack of a single decision rule for resolving trade-offs as a major shortcoming. Proponents, however, see the demand for such a rule as based on an overly narrow conception of rationality, divorced from the messy realities of corporate leadership. They have a point. By its very nature, the job of corporate leaders entails multiple obligations. It is not possible to say in advance how conflicts should be resolved or whose interests should take priority. Both depend on the facts and circumstances of the situation and the nature of the particular interests at stake.

[ 福利型利益相关者主义 ]

为利益相关者改善结果

[ Beneficial Stakeholderism ]

Improving Outcomes for Stakeholders

福利型的利益相关者资本主义不仅寻求满足利益相关者的基本诉求，而且还寻求显著改善他们的福祉。这在一定程度上源于一种信念，认为在过去四十年中，优化股东回报导致许多企业在其他领域投资不足，并导致不成比例的收益分配给了资本所有者。它还受到一种想法的推动，即为改善所有利益相关者的生活而经营企业有助于解决当今社会面临的一些大规模问题和不平等现象，从而有助于保护经济的长期健康，平抑对资本主义日益增长的不满。

This version of stakeholder capitalism seeks not just to meet stakeholders’ basic claims but also to measurably improve their well-being. It comes in part from a belief that optimizing returns for shareholders over the past four decades has led many companies to underinvest in their other constituencies and has caused a disproportionate share of gains to go to the owners of capital. It is also driven by the idea that running companies to improve the lives of all stakeholders will help address some of the large-scale problems and inequities facing society today, thereby helping to protect the long-term health of the economy and quell growing discontent with capitalism.

我称这一类型为“福利型利益相关者主义”，因为它与福利企业运动相似，该运动包括努力将传统公司认证为所谓的B型企业，以及在美国许多州和其他国家通过立法，允许企业将自己变身为“福利公司”或“公益公司”。虽然认证标准和规章各不相同，但它们都有一个共同的要求，即公司董事在制定政策和决策时要“平衡”或“考虑”不同利益相关者的利益，而且公司要定期报告其在促进利益相关者福祉方面取得的进展。

I call this version “beneficial stakeholderism” because of its similarity to the benefit corporation movement, which includes efforts to certify traditional corporations as so-called B Corps and the adoption of legislation in numerous states and countries permitting businesses to organize themselves as “benefit corporations” or “public benefit corporations.” Although the certification standards and statutes vary, they have in common a requirement that the company’s directors “balance” or “consider” the interests of its various stakeholders when setting policies and making decisions, and that the company periodically report on its progress in advancing stakeholders’ well-being.

福利型利益相关者主义与福利企业对待利益相关者的态度有一定相似性，但一家企业不需要成为福利公司或得到认证的B型企业就可以采用其基本原则。保罗·波尔曼（Paul Polman）领导下的联合利华行动就是一个例子。在波尔曼2009年至2019年的任期内，该公司推行的议程是为许多利益相关者带来收益。正如联合利华对其可持续生活计划发表的10年进展报告中所详述的那样，该公司提高了员工的健康和幸福感，使其薪酬体系更加公平，向所有员工支付了生活工资，并改善了80多万小农户的生计。它促进了供应链中的人权，提高了产品的营养价值，改善了10多亿人的健康和卫生，并朝着到2030年将环境影响减半的目标取得了进展。大约在同一时期，联合利华还实现了290%的股东总回报率——远高于同行业18家消费品企业165%的中位数。

Beneficial stakeholderism has certain affinities with the benefit corporation approach to stakeholders, but an organization need not be a benefit corporation or a certified B Corp to adopt its basic tenets. Unilever’s actions under the leadership of Paul Polman are an example. During Polman’s tenure, from 2009 to 2019, the company pursued an agenda that delivered gains for many of its stakeholders. As detailed in Unilever’s 10-year progress report on its Sustainable Living Plan, the company enhanced employees’ health and well-being, made its pay system more equitable, paid all employees a living wage, and augmented the livelihoods of more than 800,000 smallholder farmers. It advanced human rights in its supply chain, raised the nutritional value of its products, improved the health and hygiene of more than a billion people, and made progress toward cutting its environmental impact in half by 2030. During roughly the same period, Unilever also delivered a total shareholder return of 290%—well above the median of 165% for 18 consumer goods companies in its peer group.

在将内在（而不仅仅是工具性）价值归因于非股东利益相关者的某些利益方面，福利型利益相关者主义与经典型利益相关者主义类似。然而，福利型利益相关者主义要求更广泛地致力于利益相关者的福祉。比如，经典型利益相关者主义关注的是员工安全、机会均等、同工同酬以及受基本法律和道德规范保护的其他利益。福利型利益相关者主义会在此基础上增加尊严、包容性、有意义的工作和广义的经济公平——员工是否能获得体面的生计，是否公平地分享到了他们帮助创造的价值，以及是否有足够的晋升机会。

Beneficial stakeholderism is similar to classic stakeholderism in attributing intrinsic (not just instrumental) value to certain interests of nonshareholder stakeholders. However, it calls for a more expansive commitment to the well-being of stakeholders. For example, classic stakeholderism is concerned with employee safety, equal opportunity, equal pay for equal work, and other interests that are protected by basic legal and ethical norms. Beneficial stakeholderism would add to that list dignity, inclusion, meaningful work, and economic equity in the broad sense—whether employees earn a decent livelihood, receive a fair share of the value they are helping create, and have sufficient opportunities for advancement.

福利型利益相关者主义在其他方面的要求也比经典型利益相关者主义高。它设想的是不断改进向利益相关者提供的成果，因而意味着对每个利益相关者群体都制定有明确的目标，以及跟踪、衡量和报告这些成果的方法，同时还有适当的薪酬和激励制度。它需要一种富有想象力的战略方法，而利益相关者的利益是这一战略中不可或缺的组成部分，而非次要的制约因素。它还需要一个全面的决策和资源分配手段。企业领导切勿孤立地看待每一个决定，而是将其视为选择组合的一部分，而这些选择旨在为所有利益相关者实现理想的结果。

Beneficial stakeholderism is more demanding than classic stakeholderism in other ways as well. It envisions ongoing improvement in the outcomes delivered to stakeholders, thus implying defined goals for each stakeholder group and methods for tracking, measuring, and reporting on those outcomes, along with appropriate compensation and incentive systems. It requires an imaginative approach to strategy in which stakeholder interests are essential building blocks rather than side constraints. And it requires a holistic approach to decision-making and resource allocation. Corporate leaders must view each decision not in isolation but as part of a portfolio of choices aimed at achieving the desired outcomes for all stakeholders.

与工具型利益相关者主义一样，福利型利益相关者主义反对传统的股东价值最大化这一短期思维。然而，这两个类型在投资决策方法上相异。福利型利益相关者主义不是仅仅根据可能的股东回报来分配资源，而是优先考虑有可能改善诸多利益相关者结果的项目。据我所知，尽管支持者还没有明确说明应该如何做出这些决定，但这个过程想必会包括分析对每个受影响的利益相关者群体造成的预期影响，并选择总体效益最大的项目，或者通过某种方法可以优化各群体结果的项目。

Like instrumental stakeholderism, beneficial stakeholderism rejects the short-termism of traditional shareholder-value maximization. The two versions diverge, however, in their approach to investment decisions. Instead of allocating resources solely on the basis of likely returns to shareholders, beneficial stakeholderism prioritizes projects with the potential to improve outcomes for multiple stakeholders. Although proponents have not, to my knowledge, spelled out precisely how such decisions should be made, the process presumably involves analyzing the expected impact on each affected stakeholder group and choosing either the project with the greatest benefit in aggregate or the one that by some methodology optimizes results across the groups.

福利型利益相关者主义面临的挑战。

Challenges for beneficial stakeholderism. 

尽管这个类型的利益相关者资本主义为所有利益相关者提供了不断改善结果的前景，但其批评人士发出的不要期望过高的警告是正确的。与经典型利益相关者主义一样，福利型利益相关者主义有时需要在不同的利益之间进行权衡。不过，它对更广泛利益的担忧可能会令这些权衡变得更具挑战性。

Although this version of stakeholder capitalism holds out the prospect of ever-improving outcomes for all stakeholders, its critics are right to caution against expecting too much. Like classic stakeholderism, beneficial stakeholderism sometimes entails trade-offs among differing interests. But its concern for a broader set of interests can make those trade-offs even more challenging. 此外，还存在一个真正的问题，即，在不失去股东支持或违背其信托义务的情况下，企业领导者可以向非股东利益相关者进行多少投资。比如，如果特拉华州一家传统公司的董事决定出售该公司，他们在法律上有义务优先考虑股东的短期财务利益。可是，即使公司不会出售，法律、经济、竞争和资本市场因素通常也会限制领导者考虑其他相关者利益的能力。

Moreover, there is a real question about how much corporate leaders can invest in their nonshareholder stakeholders without losing shareholder support or running afoul of their fiduciary duties. If, for example, the directors of a traditional Delaware corporation decide to sell the company, they are legally obliged to prioritize shareholders’ short-term financial interests. But even when the company is not for sale, legal, economic, competitive, and capital-markets factors often constrain leaders’ ability to promote the interests of other stakeholders.

特拉华州法律被视为美国公司法的黄金标准。根据该州法律，对其他利益相关者的投资必须与促进公司利益保持合理关系。评论人士通常对这一限制不以为然，指出法院不愿意对董事会的商业决定进行事后品评。然而，对于有良知的企业领导者而言，与企业利益的合理关系是一个重要的基准。拟议中对非股东的投资如果不能促进公司利益，那就必须在其他基础上证明其合理性。如前所指出的，出于法律或道德原因，它可能是被要求或得到允许的，也可能作为慈善捐款而得到允许。如果不能以这些方式之一来证明其正当性，那么（从法律上讲）这是对公司资产的浪费，也是对公司董事采取法律行动的理由。

Under Delaware law, considered the gold standard for corporate law in the United States, investments in other stakeholders must have a rational relationship to advancing the interests of the corporation. Commentators often brush off this limitation, noting that courts are reluctant to second-guess a board’s business decisions. For conscientious corporate leaders, however, a rational relationship to the corporation’s interests is an important benchmark. A proposed investment in nonshareholders that does not advance the interests of the corporation must be justified on some other basis. As noted, it might be required or allowed for legal or ethical reasons, or it could be permitted as a charitable contribution. If it cannot be justified in one of those ways, it is (legally speaking) a waste of corporate assets and grounds for legal action against the company’s directors.

对大多数企业领导来说，一个更紧迫的问题不是法律允许什么，而是考虑到公司的经济和竞争形势，什么是现实的。即使是与业务直接相关的利益相关者的利益也只能在某种程度上得到解决。比如，客户几乎总是想要更好的质量、更佳的服务和更低的价格，但一家公司满足这些愿望的能力并非是无限的。加大对客户的投资通常意味着减少对其他方面的投资。无论是传统公司还是福利公司，如果它对客户（或任何其他利益相关者）的慷慨导致太多亏损交易，该公司都可能破坏其自身的生存能力。许多因素——公司的战略、其他利益相关者的预期、可用的资源、竞争对手在做的事情、行业发生变化的方式——都会影响企业领导对任何一个利益相关者群体的投资程度。即使对于景气行业中的快速增长企业来说，实施多方利益相关者战略可能也很困难。对于陷入困境的公司和那些处于低增长或衰退行业的企业而言，情况更是如此。

A more pressing issue for most corporate leaders is not what the law allows but what is realistic given the company’s economic and competitive situation. Even stakeholder interests that are directly related to the business can be addressed only up to a point. Customers, for instance, almost always want better quality, better service, and lower prices, but a company’s ability to satisfy those desires is not infinite. Investing more in customers typically means investing less in something else. And whether it is a traditional corporation or a benefit corporation, a company can undermine its own viability if its generosity to customers (or any other stakeholders) results in too many loss-making transactions. Many factors—the company’s strategy, the expectations of other stakeholders, what resources are available, what competitors are doing, how the industry is changing—affect how much corporate leaders can invest in any one stakeholder group. Even for fast-growing companies in thriving industries, delivering on a multistakeholder strategy can be difficult. For distressed companies and those in low-growth or declining industries, it is even more so.

企业领导对其他利益相关者投资的能力最终取决于股东支持这些投资的意愿。不同意资源分配方式的股东可能会出售其股份。如果有足够多的股东这样做，公司的股价就会下跌。如果下跌严重或旷日持久，该公司可能会成为代理人争斗或收购要约的目标。无论法律制度赋予了企业领导何种决策自由裁量权，他们的实际选择都受到股东偏好的约束，而正如前所指出的，股东通过买卖股票、选举董事、在重大交易上进行投票以及在法庭上挑战董事的权力，对公司的方向拥有最终权力。

Corporate leaders’ ability to invest in other stakeholders ultimately depends on shareholders’ willingness to support those investments. Shareholders who disagree with how resources are being allocated may sell their shares. If enough of them do so, the company’s stock price will fall. If the drop is severe or prolonged, the company may become the target of a proxy fight or a takeover bid. Whatever decision-making discretion the legal system gives corporate leaders, their actual choices are constrained by the preferences of shareholders who, as noted, have ultimate power over the company’s direction through their rights to buy and sell shares, elect directors, vote on major transactions, and challenge directors in court.

总之，福利型利益相关者主义充满希望，但接受它的企业领导面临着一条充满挑战的道路。与工具型和经典型利益相关者主义相比，福利型利益相关者主义设想的是在企业如何部署资源和分配其创造的价值方面，大大改变传统的股东价值最大化的观念，让非股东利益相关者在这两方面都获得更大的份额。可是，如前所讨论的那样，他们促进其他利益相关者利益的能力确实受到了限制。在对普华永道最近一项调查的回应中，仅有13%的董事强烈同意，即使气候目标会影响短期财务业绩，它们也应该成为优先事项。也许这是因为上市公司的投资者似乎很少愿意为了一个更绿色的地球或一个更公平的社会而放弃有意义的回报。

In summary, beneficial stakeholderism holds promise, but corporate leaders who embrace it face a challenging path. In comparison with instrumental and classic stakeholderism, beneficial stakeholderism envisions a more significant shift away from traditional shareholder-value maximization in how companies deploy resources and distribute the value they create, with a greater share of both going to nonshareholder stakeholders. But, as discussed, limits on their ability to advance other stakeholders’ interests are real. Only 13% of directors responding to a recent survey by PwC agreed strongly that climate goals should be a priority even if they affect short-term financial performance. Perhaps that’s because few investors in public companies appear willing to forgo meaningful returns for a greener planet or a more equitable society.

[ 结构型利益相关者主义 ]

增加利益相关者的权力

[ Structural Stakeholderism ]

Increasing Stakeholder Power

截至目前，所讨论的三个利益相关者主义类型全都关注的是股东至上主义的第一个核心支柱：股东价值最大化是（或者说应该是）一家企业的主要目标。它们都要求对这一目标或其实施方式进行完善或改变。它们的相似之处在于，在很大程度上保留了传统的治理结构和流程，而这些决定了股东和其他利益相关者之间的权力平衡。也就是说，它们都接受股东至上主义的另一个支柱：股东是（或者说应该是）在企业治理中唯一有正式发言权的涉众群体。第四个类型——我称之为“结构型利益相关者主义”——呼吁在治理过程中赋予非股东利益相关者投票权或其他权力。这个类型的支持者试图将其他相关者的利益硬连接到这个过程中，而不是依靠公司董事和企业领导来考虑他们，通常是在选择董事或董事会的正式代表时赋予这些利益相关者明确的角色。

The three versions of stakeholderism discussed so far all focus on the first pillar of shareholder primacy: Maximizing value for shareholders is (or should be) a corporation’s principal objective. They all call for refinements or changes to that objective or how it is implemented, and they are similar in leaving the traditional governance structures and processes that define the balance of power between shareholders and other stakeholders largely intact. That is to say, they all accept another pillar of shareholder primacy: Shareholders are (or should be) the only constituency with a formal voice in corporate governance. A fourth version—which I term “structural stakeholderism”—calls for giving nonshareholder stakeholders voting or other powers in the governance process. Advocates of this version seek to hard wire the interests of other stakeholders into the process, rather than relying on corporate directors and business leaders to take them into account, typically by giving those stakeholders a defined role in selecting directors or formal representation on corporate boards.

在这一理念得到广泛实施的地方，尤其是在欧洲，员工是最常被赋予董事会代表权的利益相关者群体（股东除外）。德国的双层董事会制度就是一个例子。按照法律和传统，德国企业的监事会中三分之一至二分之一的董事由员工选举，其余的由股东选举。其他欧洲国家采取了其他的员工参与方式。尽管董事会中的员工代表在美国十分罕见，但也并非闻所未闻。1919年马萨诸塞州的一项法律（仍然有效）允许制造业公司采用的规章授权员工选举一名或多名董事，而一些工会已经在董事会中获得了一个席位。比如，达美航空公司董事会包括一名由其飞行员协会管理机构提名的飞行员。在过去几年里，十多项关于在董事会中增加非领导层员工的股东提案已经在美国的大型企业中进行了投票表决（得到的支持不足），而美国参议院的几项法案也会赋予大型企业的员工选举一定比例的董事会成员的权利。

Where this idea has been widely implemented, notably in Europe, employees are the stakeholder group (other than shareholders) that is most often given board representation. Germany’s two-tiered board system is an example. By law and tradition one-third to one-half of the directors on the supervisory boards of German companies are elected by employees and the rest by shareholders. Other European countries take other approaches to employee participation. Although rare in the United States, employee representation on boards is not unheard of. A 1919 Massachusetts law (still in effect) permitted manufacturing companies to adopt bylaws empowering employees to elect one or more directors, and some unions have secured a seat on company boards. The board of Delta Air Lines, for example, includes a pilot nominated by the governing body of its pilot association. In the past few years more than a dozen shareholder proposals about adding nonmanagement employees to boards have been voted on (and gotten scant support) at large U.S. companies, and several bills in the U.S. Senate would give employees of large companies the right to elect a certain percentage of the board.

有人还不时建议任命可以代表公众利益的董事。20世纪70年代，在一系列企业倒闭和丑闻之后，这种想法在美国法律和商业学术界人士中获得认可。事实上，在2008年全球金融风暴期间接受政府救助的爱尔兰各银行的董事会曾尝试过这种做法。其他评论人士提出，客户、社区、纳税人或其他利益相关者应在董事会中具有代表性。对一些人来说，“利益相关者资本主义”一词本身就意味着公司董事会应该由各种利益相关者群体的代表构成。

The appointment of directors who represent the public interest has also been proposed from time to time. The idea gained currency among law and business academics in the United States in the 1970s, following a spate of corporate failures and scandals. It was actually tried on the boards of Irish banks that received government bailouts during the global financial crisis of 2008. Other commentators have proposed that customers, communities, and taxpayers or other stakeholders have board representation. For some, the term “stakeholder capitalism” itself implies that corporate boards should comprise representatives of various stakeholder groups.

大多数主张在董事会中增加利益相关者代表或将投票权扩大到股东以外的人声称，其他涉众的更有力参与会因提高生产力、提高员工敬业度或激发创新而加强企业创造长期价值的能力。但对大多数人来说，这些都是次要后果。主要目标是保护非股东利益相关者的利益，并在公司决策中增加赋予他们的权重。

Most advocates for adding stakeholder representatives to boards or extending voting rights beyond shareholders claim that more-robust involvement of other constituencies would strengthen companies’ ability to create long-term value by boosting productivity, enhancing employee engagement, or sparking innovation. But for most, those are secondary consequences. The principal goal is to protect the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders and increase the weight given to them in corporate decision-making.

结构型利益相关者主义面临的挑战。

Challenges for structural stakeholderism.

在董事会中增加员工或其他利益相关者代表的呼声提出了对董事会性质和董事职责——以及对董事治理权力基础——的根本性质疑。尽管董事有时被称为股东的“代表”——而且如前所指出的，董事是由股东选举产生的——但在法律上，他们更像是机构的受托人，而不是代表特定涉众群体的代表。这就是为何当一家维权对冲基金在为自己的提名人争取董事会席位，或者因实现其目标而向该董事提供额外薪酬时，其他股东可能会抗议的原因。作为受托人，董事对整个公司负有关爱和忠诚的义务，有义务代表公司进行独立判断——而不是听命于一小部分股东。

The call to add representatives of employees or other stakeholders to corporate boards raises fundamental questions about the nature of boards and the duties of directors—and about the basis of directors’ authority to govern. Although directors are sometimes referred to as shareholders’ “representatives”—and, as noted, are elected by shareholders—they are legally more akin to trustees for the institution than to delegates representing a particular constituency. That is why other shareholders may protest when an activist hedge fund negotiates a seat on the board for its own nominee or offers additional compensation to that director for achieving its goals. As fiduciaries, directors owe care and loyalty to the corporation as a whole and are obliged to exercise independent judgment on its behalf—not to do the bidding of a subset of shareholders.

因此，在传统的法律模式下，公司董事会更接近信托董事会，而不是涉众董事会。这两种取向导致了截然不同的心态和对董事效能截然不同的要求。该机构的受托人必须了解多个涉众群体的利益，以及它们与整个企业的关系。为了保持客观性，他们需要与寻求施加影响的利益相关方保持一定距离。相比之下，某一涉众群体的代表应该与其成员密切接触，实现他们的愿望，维护他们的利益。因此，受托董事和涉众群体董事会对摆在董事会面前的问题保持截然不同的立场。

Under the traditional legal model, a corporate board is thus closer to a fiduciary board than to a constituency board. Those two orientations lead to very different mindsets and very different requirements for director effectiveness. Fiduciaries for the institution must understand the interests of multiple constituencies and how they relate to the business as a whole. To maintain their objectivity, they need to keep some distance from interested parties seeking to exert influence. By comparison, representatives of a constituency are expected to engage closely with its members, carry out their wishes, and advocate for their interests. Fiduciary directors and constituency directors can thus take very different stances on issues that come before the board.

在公司董事会中增加员工或其他利益相关者的提议很少明确提出这一问题，但其中许多人似乎将这些董事会设想为由各种利益相关者群体代表组成的涉众群体董事会。尽管涉众群体董事会适合一些组织，但这种模式对商业企业会产生令人不安的影响。也许最令人担忧的是对决策速度和连贯性的潜在影响。如果董事的主要职责是为他们所代表群体的利益服务，而不是为公司的利益服务的话，那么很快就会出现漫无止境的谈判和争论不休的僵局。涉及战略、投资、领导力、收购、撤资、重组等方面的决策通常必须迅速做出。在快速变化的商业环境中，花时间征求各利益相关者群体的意见并商讨解决他们之间分歧的方案可能行不通。此外，如果没有对公司的共同责任来支持和聚焦谈判，那么极有可能会出现欠佳的结果。

Few if any proposals to add employees or other stakeholders to corporate boards raise this issue explicitly, but many of them seem to envision those boards as constituency boards comprising representatives of various stakeholder groups. Although constituency boards are appropriate for some organizations, the model has troubling implications for business corporations. Perhaps the most worrisome is the potential effect on the speed and coherence of decision-making. If the principal duty of directors is to serve the interests of the groups they represent rather than the interests of the company, the prospect of lengthy negotiations and contentious standoffs quickly arises. Decisions about strategy, investments, leadership, acquisitions, divestments, restructuring, and the like must often be made quickly. In a rapidly changing business environment, taking time to solicit the views of various stakeholder groups and to negotiate a resolution of the differences among them may not be feasible. Moreover, without a shared duty to the company to anchor and focus the negotiations, the odds of a suboptimal result are high.

利益相关者董事会的概念与董事独立性的理想背道而驰，而董事独立性是当今良好治理的核心。对于利益相关者董事会的倡导者而言，作为员工、客户、供应商或其他涉众在企业中拥有利益是一种服务资格。可是，它可能损害董事的判断力，削弱董事会做出整体价值创造决策的能力。利益相关者董事会的支持者将其视为朝着单一目标努力的合作团体，而怀疑人士则将它们视为相互矛盾的复杂主张，会滋生不信任，并损害决策。在接受利益相关者董事会之前，明智的做法是明确其成员的职责，并考虑他们在实践中如何行使职责。

The concept of stakeholder boards runs counter to the ideals of director independence that are at the core of good governance today. For advocates of stakeholder boards, having an interest in the business as an employee, a customer, a supplier, or another constituent is a qualification for service. But it can also compromise a director’s judgment and undermine boards’ ability to make overall value-creating decisions. Proponents of stakeholder boards envision them as collaborative bodies working toward a single purpose, whereas skeptics envision them as thickets of competing claims that breed distrust and impair decision-making. Before embracing stakeholder boards, it would be wise to clarify the duties of their members and consider how they are likely to function in practice.

股东资本主义可能或多或少会超出人们的想象，也或多或少会对股东至上主义构成挑战，这取决于正在考虑的是哪一个类型。每一个类型都涉及一系列独特的承诺和挑战，而且每一个类型对公司及其董事会的运作都有非常不同的实际意义。企业领导需要清楚地了解这些意义是什么。他们还需要诚实坦言，他们的类型实际上可以为利益相关者带来什么，可以为社会带来什么，以及对股东意味着什么。我们已经过了这样一个时间点：对冲突的担忧可以通过简单呼吁股东、利益相关者和社会之间共享长期利益来消除。现在是澄清我们所谓的“利益相关者资本主义”是何意义的时候了。

Stakeholder capitalism can be more or less than meets the eye—and more or less of a challenge to shareholder primacy—depending on which version is being considered. Each one involves a distinctive set of commitments and challenges, and each has very different practical implications for how companies and their boards function. Corporate leaders need a clear understanding of what those implications are. They also need to be honest about what their version can actually deliver for stakeholders, what it can deliver for society, and what it means for shareholders. We have passed the point at which concern about conflicts can be brushed off with easy appeals to a presumed long-term harmony of interests among shareholders, stakeholders, and society. The time has come to clarify what we mean by “stakeholder capitalism.”

林恩·佩因是哈佛商学院贝克基金会教授及约翰·麦克莱恩工商管理教席教授。

林恩·佩因（Lynn S. Paine）| 文

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