劳动的价值理论（一）
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劳动的价值理论(1)
Diane Elson
一、马克思的价值理论是关于什么的理论？
1.价值理论：剥削存在的证据？（剥削论解读传统）
让我们首先考虑一下在左派中，特别是在左派社会活动家中广泛存在的一种解读，即马克思(Marx)的价值理论提供了剥削存在的证据。Armstrong、Glyn和Harrison在社会主义经济学家联合会(The Conference of Socialist Economists, CSE. https://www.cseweb.org.uk/)的辩论中的主张就是一个很好的例子。他们对价值范畴坚持不懈的辩护依赖于这样一个信念，即只有运用价值范畴才能证明资本主义剥削的存在，而证明这一点正是马克思价值理论的重点：
“任何有关于剩余劳动的范畴，如果不是从劳动是一切价值的源泉这一主张推导出来的话，都将是无足轻重的。”(Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison, 1978, p. 21.)
然而，马克思似乎并不认同这一观点：
“既然商品的交换价值实际上不过是个人劳动作为相同的一般劳动而相互发生的关系，不过是劳动的一种特定社会形式的对象化表现，那么，说劳动是交换价值的、因而也是由交换价值构成的那种财富的唯一源泉，就是同义反复。……如果认为，劳动就它创造使用价值来说，是它所创造的东西即物质财富的唯一源泉，那就错了。”(A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy[1], p. 35-36.)（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第31卷第427-429页）
“资本并没有发明剩余劳动。凡是社会上一部分人享有生产资料垄断权的地方，劳动者，无论是自由的或不自由的，都必须在维持自身生活所必需的劳动时间以外，追加超额的劳动时间来为生产资料的所有者生产生活资料。”(Capital, I, p. 344.)（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第272页）
此外，将马克思的价值理论视为剥削存在的证据，将会使价值范畴去历史化，使价值成为劳动时间的同义词，使马克思对剩余劳动和剩余价值的区分变得画蛇添足。为了了解剥削是否存在，我们必须重新审视生产资料的所有权和控制权，必须重新审视决定固定工作日长度的流程(参见Rowthorn, 1974.)。马克思关注的是资本主义社会中剥削所采取的具体方式(参见Capital, I, p. 325)（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第265页），因为在资本主义中，剩余劳动不能简单地以直接劳动产品的形式被占有。将劳动产品出售并转换为货币是必需的。正如多布(Dobb)所言：
“对于马克思来说，问题不在于通过价值理论证明剩余价值和剥削的存在；实际上，问题在于如何使剩余价值的存在与市场竞争和等价交换的支配相协调。”(Dobb, 1971. p. 12.)
这种认为马克思的价值理论旨在为剥削存在提供证据的观点虽然确实具有将该理论作为政策干预依据的优点，但问题在于，它展现出的是一种更接近于“李嘉图社会主义”(“Ricardian socialism”)或《德国社会的民主》（罗素的著作）的“天赋人权”(“natural right”)式政治主张，而非马克思的政治主张。（例如，见马克思的《哥达纲领批判》，Marx-Engels, Selected Works, Vol.3; 也见Dobb, 1973, p. 137-141.）正因如此，它没有对以下问题给出一个令人满意的回答：资本主义中的剥削完全可以用剩余产品的分配来理解，而根本不需要引入价值。（例如，见Hodgson, 1976; Steedman, 1977.）但在否定这种对马克思价值理论的解读时，我们必须留意，不能将其去政治化。这一理论的政治性我们将在本文的最后回过头来讨论。
2.价值理论：对价格的解释？（相对价格论解读传统）
这种观点可能单独出现，也可能和我们刚刚讨论的观点结合起来。盎格鲁—萨克逊世界的大部分马克思主义经济学家给出的解释是，马克思的价值理论是对资本主义经济中均衡价格或“自然”价格(2)的解释。它是众多均衡价格理论中的一种，例如在多布的《价值与分配理论》(Theories of Value and Distribution)一书中，马克思的价值理论与斯密(Smith)、李嘉图(Ricardo)、穆勒(Mill)、杰文斯(Jevons)、瓦尔拉斯(Walras)和马歇尔(Marshall)的价值理论一同审查，仿佛它们的研究对象完全相同一样。多布指出，这些理论的主要区别在于：
“主要通过生产条件（成本、投入系数等）来决定价格或交换关系和主要从需求侧来决定价格或交换关系。”(Dobb, 1973, p. 31.)
对于多布来说，最大的分歧在于斯密、李嘉图和马克思属于第一类，而其他人属于第二类。米克(Meek)提出了类似的解读：
“毫无疑问，他（马克思）希望他的价值理论……具有一个更常见的功能，也就是价值理论在经济学中一直被用来做的事，即确定价格。”(Meek, 1977, p. 124.)
当然，人们也意识到，在这种解释下，马克思与其他经济学家之间，甚至是马克思与李嘉图之间都存在着差别。
“马克思的价值理论不仅仅是一般意义上的价值理论：它不仅具有数量意义上解释交换价值或价格的功能，而且还具有在劳动力本身成为商品的交换——或商品——的社会的劳动过程中显现出历史社会基础的功能。”(Dobb, 1971, p. 11.)
斯威齐(Sweezy)提出的价值量问题和价值质问题之间的区别已经成为了切入马克思与其他经济学家差别的最流行的方法。前者是解释商品之间交换比例的问题；后者是解释商品形式背后的社会关系的问题。对于斯威齐来说，
“马克思的价值理论的伟大创见，在于它认识到本问题的这两个方面，并试图在一个单独的概念体系中同时加以探讨。”(Sweezy, 1962, p. 25.)（保罗·斯威齐，2016，p. 46.）
或如米克所说，
“答案的性质方面针对的是这样一个问题：为什么商品具有价格？数量方面的问题则是：为什么商品具有它们应当具有的特定价格？”(Meek, 1967, p. 10.)
很明显，在这一传统中，马克思价值理论的对象是交换或流通的过程。
“……所以，研究商品，就是研究交换的经济关系。”(Sweezy, 1962, p. 23.)（保罗·斯威齐，2016，p. 44.）
马克思被解读为用一个独立的、更基本的过程，即生产过程来解释这一流通过程。例如，在多布写的《马克思〈政治经济学批判〉导论》(Introduction to Marx's A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy)中，暗示了马克思的兴趣所在，
“（马克思的兴趣）现在集中在从生产的角度解释交换……交换关系或市场‘表象’只能被理解为……在社会基础层面上的一些更基本的关系的表现。”(Dobb, 1971, p. 9-10.)
按斯威齐所说，
“商品在市场上按一定的比例相互交换；它们又从社会上可资利用的总劳动力吸收了某个定量（以时间单位衡量）。这两个事实之间有什么关系呢？作为初次近似，马克思假定，在交换比率和劳动时间比率之间有一种精确的对应关系，或者说，凡是需要以等量时间来生产的商品，它们必须在一对一的基础上进行交换。这是一个最简单的公式，因而也是一个好的起点。实践中发生的背离，可以在随后向现实接近的过程中加以处理。”(Sweezy, 1962, p. 42.) （保罗·斯威齐，2016，p. 67.）
通常认为，初次近似在前两卷《资本论》中成立，在第三卷中则被放弃，同时引入生产价格范畴，并将价值转形(transform)为价格。“直到最近，马克思对‘转形问题’的‘解答’的充分性，以及各种替代性解决方案的优点一直都是这一解读传统的主要争议点。”（此处不会试图回顾冗长的文献。参考文献请参见Fine and Harris, 1976.）
在何种意义上，人们认为生产商品所需的劳动时间“解释”或“决定”了商品的价格（作为“初次近似”或通过转形）？我认为这一传统的著作中有两个相互联系的论点。价格与生产所需劳动时间的“初次近似”得到了亚当·斯密关于“鹿和河狸”经济中收益均衡的例子的支持。（参见，例如，Sweezy, 1962, p. 45-46.）（保罗·斯威齐，2016，p. 72-73.）。假设我们考虑两种商品（“鹿”和“河狸”），其中一种（“鹿”）需要一个小时才能生产一个，另一种（“河狸”）需要两个小时；假定市场上一只鹿换一只河狸。每个生产者都会将其生产商品所需的时间（在本例中是通过狩猎）与其用其他商品表示的市场价格进行比较。很明显，与直接生产河狸相比，生产鹿并交换河狸可以获得更多的河狸。因此，生产者倾向于将他们的时间分配给生产鹿，而不是河狸。在其他条件相同的情况下，这将降低鹿的市场价格，提高河狸的市场价格。劳动时间将持续从河狸流向鹿的生产，直到鹿的市场价格与生产这两种商品所需的相对劳动量相等，即直到两只鹿交换一只河狸为止。在这一点时，劳动时间的转移将停止，体系将处于均衡状态，价格等于劳动时间比率。
接下来可以使用一个更复杂的方法来说明劳动时间是如何通过“转形”决定生产价格的。在这里，劳动时间和生产价格通过内生变量和外生变量的均衡“模型”相联系。正如米克所说：
“在他们的基本模型中，这三位经济学家（即李嘉图、马克思和斯拉法(Sraffa)）实际上都设想了一套技术和社会条件，在这些条件下，净产品或剩余将被生产出来（这些净产品超出了工人的生存水平，这一水平通常被认为是由生理和社会条件决定的）。假设该净产品或剩余的水平被给定且与价格无关，这将约束和决定支付出去的利润（和其他非工资收入）的总水平。这个模型的主要目的是表明，在假定的生产条件下，剩余的分配过程将使所有商品的价格和平均利润率同时决定。”(Meek, 1977, p. 160.)
净产品的量由其生产所需的社会劳动时间来衡量。
值得注意的是，这两个观点的特点是，它们将凝结在商品中的社会必要劳动时间视为一种完全不同于、且与价格概念相断裂并完全独立于价格的某种东西。它仅仅在生产过程中被给出，而价格仅仅在流通过程中被给出。这两个过程之间本身是断裂开的，尽管它们事实上是联系在一起的。 “关键因素”，即相对独立的“决定常数”在生产中被发现。(参见Meek, 1967, p. 95; Meek, 1977, p. 151.)因此，原则上，我们可以计算出完全独立于价格的价值（即凝结在商品中的社会必要劳动时间），并从这些价值中推导出均衡价格。后者这种推导的可行性通常被认为是马克思价值理论科学地位的不可或缺的保证，是确使马克思的价值理论不同于形而上学杂耍概念的保证。（尽管，正如这一传统的学者们通常所承认的那样，在实践中这样的转形通常是不可能的。）(3)
在一些专业的经济学家最近的研究中，将马克思视为一名经济模型构建者的解读方式已经达到了逻辑的顶点，其中最出名的或许是森岛通夫(Morishima)的研究，其中，
“我们采用一个人们熟知的、与列昂节夫(Leontief)部门间价格—成本方程相似的形式，将古典劳动价值论(the classical labour theory of value)进行了严密的数学化。通过运用投入—产出数学分析，揭示出古典劳动价值论的全部隐含假定，证明了与商品（用任意选择的一种标准商品）相对价值作用相联系的比较静态规律。物质产品与商品价值之间的双重性，同物质产品与竞争性价格之间的双重性是相似的。这样看来，劳动价值论(the labour theory of value)与消费者需求的效用理论或者它的任何改进的变体可能是一致的。”(Morishima, 1973, p. 5.)（森岛通夫，2017，p. 5.）
为了使马克思成为一个受人尊敬的早期数理经济学家，理论中的所有政治性都被无情抹除。[2]
“（价值）的决定仅取决于技术系数……它们不依赖于诸如市场、社会阶级结构、税收等的情况。” (Morishima, 1973, p. 15.)（森岛通夫，2017，p. 15.）
在社会主义经济学家联合会的辩论中，这种解读传统更重要的一点是发展出了一种不涉及政治性，只与价值有关的方法。
从与斯威齐—米克—多布传统相同的假定出发，将导向这样的结论，
“如果说对资本主义社会进行唯物主义的分析还依存于马克思的价值理论的话，那只能是从否定的意义上来理解的，即继续依附于后者只是前者发展的一个主要桎梏。” (Steedman, 1977, p. 207;另见Hodgson and Steedman, 1975; Hodgson, 1976; Steedman, 1975a, 1975b.)（扬·斯蒂德曼，1991，p. 181.）
凝结在商品中的社会必要劳动时间的数量被发现即使在最好的情况下也不过是冗余的，即使在最好的情况下，社会必要劳动时间也无法决定商品的均衡价格。相反，所谓的“新李嘉图主义者”(“Neo-Ricardians”)则将社会必要生产条件和支付给工人的以特定商品的实物数量表示的实际工资作为自变量(4)。与森岛通夫不同的是，斯蒂德曼(Steedman)并没有将这些数量视为纯粹的技术数量：它们由社会和历史决定，反映了工作场所中工人和资本家之间的“力量平衡”。
毫无疑问，在相对价格理论的范围内，这种对价值理论作为一种对均衡价格和劳动量之间关系的解释的批判是完全正确的。对保留传统盎格鲁—萨克逊版本的价值理论的尝试倾向于融入比“新李嘉图主义”更“李嘉图主义”的立场上(这种观点的提出可参见Himmelweit and Mohun, 1978)（伊恩·斯蒂德曼和保罗·斯威齐等，2016，p. 264.）。本文并不试图挽救这种传统的“劳动价值理论”(“labour theory of value”)。相反，本文主张对马克思的价值理论进行一种完全不同的解读，与之相关的是基于斯拉法的批判——即马克思的价值理论是冗余的——而非经济学中的相对价格概念。
在某些方面，Cutler、Hindess、Hirst以及Hussain的研究甚至比新李嘉图主义者们更具破坏性。他们以一种耶稣清洗异教徒圣殿污秽的姿态开始，声称：
“有人可能会说，价格和交换价值没有一般的功能或一般的决定因素……这种问题针对性的变化不仅将使我们置身于马克思主义价值理论之外，而且还将使我们置身于传统经济理论之外。”(Cutler et al., 1977, p. 14.)
并宣布：
“在本书中，我们将挑战这样一种观点，即‘价值’是一个决定价格的因素。”（同上，p. 19.）
我也将挑战价值是一个决定价格的因素这样一种观点，从这个意义上来讲，Cutler理解的是这样一种观点，即价值是价格和利润的唯一“源泉”或“原因”。但我将挑战这样一种观点，即马克思的价值理论将价值视为一切范畴的起源或原因。此外，我还将设法论证，马克思决定因素范畴完全不同于本章涉及到的那些学者们。
注释：
[1]以下简称《政治经济学批判》(Critique of Political Economy)。
[2]正如斯蒂德曼在1976年指出的那样，森岛的“广义马克思基本定理”实际上包含了一个与马克思截然不同的价值概念。
译者注：
(1)马克思的“劳动价值论”在英文中通常有以下几种写法：“a/the labour theory of value”（最常见的写法，例如米克的《劳动价值学说的研究》Studies in the Labour Theory of Value）、“theory of labour value”（Saad-Filho认为这种写法优于前者）和“value theory of labour”（本文作者强烈建议使用这种写法），通常而言，在中文中它们都被翻译为劳动价值论，但作者Diane Elson选取The Value Theory of Labour作为标题是特意为之，并声称这一写法的意义与其他写法完全不同。为强调这一点，翻译标题时我选择了“劳动的价值理论”以示区别，而前两者分别暂译为“劳动价值理论”、“劳动价值的理论”。
(2)“自然价格”是古典学者常用的一个术语，它指的是市场价格的“引力中心”（斯密借用自牛顿万有引力定律的比喻，参见亚当·斯密，1972，p. 52），同时与市场价格这一概念严格区分（参见亚当•斯密，1972，p. 49、彼罗·斯拉法，1997，p. 73和斯拉法，2012，p. 10）。这一概念还有几个不同的名字，“那些古典用语，例如‘必要价格’，‘自然价格’，或‘生产价格’”（斯拉法，2012，p. 10）所指的都是同一概念。古典学者从来没有试图去解释我们日常经验中的市场价格，更不用说认为某种数学定律或结构（比如供给函数和需求函数）可以用来决定/描述市场价格。古典学者从来没有将市场价格视为一种理论变量，这种方法对于他们来说是极为陌生的，市场价格从来都只是一个经验变量，因而古典学者也不会去解释在某一特定时刻市场价格具体由什么决定。自然价格与均衡价格也具有本质上的不同，后者强调供需均衡这一要求，而前者不以供需均衡为前提，其决定在逻辑上也是先于流通过程的，因此本篇文章对其的解读实际上是错误的，应当留意。对于亚当·斯密来说，自然价格甚至不是“正常”、“平均”或“长期”价格，它指的是一种真正的“自然关系”（见斯拉法的分析，被加雷格纳尼所引用，参见Garegnani, 2004, p. 182）。同时，自然价格的引入要求规律性和复杂的商品交换以及资本的竞争已然形成，也即发达的资本主义商品经济已经存在。通过提出自然价格的概念，古典学者将市场供需等非规律性因素排除出自己的理论体系中，而专门研究一个基于劳动分工体系的资本主义社会在长期再生产中所具有的那些特征。与新古典主义和奥地利学派的方法论相比，古典学者们所采用的方法论更正确。
(3)传统马克思主义认为，我们只有通过价值和剩余价值这一前置范畴才能转形得到生产价格和利润这一后置范畴，但斯拉法的理论表明，我们完全不需要价值和剩余价值这一范畴即可直接得到生产价格和利润这一范畴，两者的推导实际上也是并行的，没有先后顺序，由此引发了许多争议。对此问题的一个直观图表可参见M. C. 霍华德和J. E. 金，2020，p. 266.与伊恩·斯蒂德曼和保罗·斯威齐等，2016，p. 38-40.。对此问题以及相关的持续至今的争论的进行详尽讨论需要极大的篇幅和极多的参考文献，在此不再深入讨论。
(4)这种方法经常被使用，然而我认为这种解读方向存在问题。关键的不是工人得到了多少实物工资，而是相对于计价物，工人得到了多少货币工资，或者说，工人得到了多少交换价值的工资。给定一个工资品束并无意义，反而束缚了我们的手脚。
参考文献：
亚当·斯密. (1972). 国民财富的性质和原因的研究. 商务印书馆.
彼罗·斯拉法. (1997). 李嘉图著作和通信集：第一卷. 商务印书馆.
保罗·斯威齐. (2016). 资本主义发展论. 商务印书馆.
M. C. 霍华德和J. E. 金. (2020). 马克思主义经济学史(1929-1990). 中央编译出版社.
森岛通夫. (2017). 马克思经济学. 中国社会科学出版社.
斯拉法. (2012). 用商品生产商品. 商务印书馆.
扬·斯蒂德曼. (1991). 按照斯拉法思想研究马克思. 商务印书馆.
伊恩•斯蒂德曼和保罗•斯威齐等. (2016). 价值问题的论战. 商务印书馆.
Armstrong, P, Glyn, A and Harrison, J (1978), 'In Defence of Value', Capital and Class, No. 5.
Cutler, A, Hindess, B, Hirst, P and Hussain, A (1977), Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today, Vol. I, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Dobb, M (1971), Introduction to Marx's A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Lawrence and Wishart, London.
Dobb, M (1973), Theories of Value and Distribution since Adam Smith, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Fine, B and Harris, L(1976), 'Controversial Issues in Marxist Economic Theory' in Miliband, R and Saville, J (eds.), Socialist Register, Merlin Press, London.
Garegnani P (2004), ‘Di una svolta nella posizione teorica e nella interpretazione dei calssici in Sraffa nei tardi anni 20’, in Piero Sraffa, Atti dei Convegni Lincei n. 200, Roma: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 157-94.
Himmelweit, S and Mohun, S (1978), 'The Anomalies of Capital', Capital & Class No. 6.
Hodgson, G (1976), 'Exploitation and Embodied Labour Time', CSE Bulletin,No. 13.
Marx, K (1971), A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Lawrence and Wishart, London.
Marx, K (1976), Capital, Vol. I, translated by Ben Fowkes, Penguin Books, London.
Meek, R L (1967), Economics and Ideology and other Essays, Chapman and Hall, London.
Meek, R L (1977), Smith, Marx and After, Chapman and Hall, London.
Morishima, M (1973), Marx's Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Rowthorn, R (1974), 'Neo-Classicism, Neo-Ricardianism and Marxism', New Left Review, No. 86.
Steedman, I (1975a), 'Value, Price and Profit', New Left Review, No. 90.
Steedman, I (1975b), 'Positive Profits with Negative Surplus Value', Economic Journal, March.
Steedman, I (1977), Marx after Sraffa, New Left Books, London.
Sweezy, P (1962), The Theory of Capitalist Development, Dennis Dobson Ltd, London.
THE VALUE THEORY OF LABOUR
Diane Elson
WHAT IS MARX'S THEORY OF VALUE A THEORY OF?
1. The theory of value: a proof of exploitation?
Let us first consider the interpretation which is very widespread on the left, particularly among activists, that Marx's theory of value constitutes a proof of exploitation. A good example of this position in CSE debates is that put forward by Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison. Their dogged defence of value rests on the belief that only by employing the category of value can the existence of capitalist exploitation be demonstrated and that to demonstrate this is the point of Marx's value theory:
Any concept of surplus labour which is not derived from the position that labour is the source of all value is utterly trivial. (Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison, 1978, p. 21.)
Marx does not, however, seem to have shared this view:
Since the exchange-value of commodities is indeed nothing but a mutual relation between various kinds of labour of individuals regarded as equal and universal labour, i.e. nothing but a material expression of a specific social form of labour, it is a tautology to say that labour is the only source of exchange-value, and accordingly of wealth in so far as this consists of exchange-value .. .It would be wrong to say that labour which produces use-values is the only source of the wealth produced by it, that is of material wealth. (A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy!, p. 35-36.)
Capital did not invent surplus labour. Wherever a part of society possess the monopoly of the means of production, the worker, free or unfree, must add to the labour-time necessary for his own maintenance an extra quantity of labour-time in order to produce the means of subsistence for the owner of the means of production. (Capital, I, p. 344.)
Moreover to regard Marx's theory of value as a proof of exploitation tends to dehistoricise value, to make value synonymous with labour-time, and to make redundant Marx's distinction between surplus labour and surplus value. To know whether or not there is exploitation, we must examine the ownership and control of the means of production, and the process whereby the length of the working day is fixed. (See Rowthorn, 1974.) Marx's concern was with the particular form that exploitation took in capitalism (see Capital, I, p. 325), for in capitalism surplus labour could not be appropriated simply in the form of the immediate product of labour. It was necessary for that product to be sold and translated into money. As Dobb comments:
The problem for Marx was not to prove the existence of surplus value and exploitation by means of a theory of value; it was, indeed to reconcile the existence of surplus value with the reign of market competition and of exchange of value equivalents. (Dobb, 1971. p. 12.)
The view that Marx's theory of value is intended as a proof of exploitation does, however, have the merit of seeing that theory as a political intervention, the problem is that it poses that politics in a way that is closer to the "natural right' politics of 'Ricardian socialism' or German Social Democracy, than to the politics of Marx. (See for instance Marx's 'Critique of the Gotha programme', Marx-Engels, Selected Works, Vol.3; also, Dobb, 1973, p. 137-141.) Because of this it has no satisfactory answer to the claim that exploitation in capitalism can perfectly well be understood in terms of the appropriation of surplus product, with no need to bring in value at all. (See for instance Hodgson, 1976; Steedman, 1977.) But in rejecting this interpretation of Marx's value theory we must be careful not to de-politicise that theory. The politics of the theory is a question we shall return to at the end of this paper.
2. The theory of value: an explanation of prices?
This approach may be found separately or combined with the one we have just considered. It is the interpretation offered by most Marxist economists in the Anglo-Saxon world, that Marx's theory of value is an explanation of equilibrium or 'natural' prices in a capitalist economy.. As such it is one of a number of theories of equilibrium price, so that, for instance, in Dobb's Theories of Value and Distribution, Marx's theory of value can be examined alongside the theories of Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Jevons, Walras and Marshall, as if it were a theory with the same kind of object. Indeed the main distinction made by Dobb is
'between theories that approach the determination of prices, or the relations of exchange, through and by means of conditions of production (costs, input-coefficients and the like) and those that approach it primarily from the side of demand.' (Dobb, 1973, p. 31.)
For Dobb the great divide is between Smith, Ricardo and Marx who are in the first category, and the others, who are in the second. A similar interpretation is offered by Meek:
'there is surely little doubt that he (Marx) wanted his theory of value . . . to do another and more familiar job as well—the same job which theories of value had always been employed to do in economics, that is, to determine prices.' (Meek, 1977, p. 124.)
Of course, it is recognised, within this interpretation, that there are differences between Marx and other economists, even between Marx and Ricardo.
'Marx's theory of value was something more than a theory of value as generally conceived: it had the function not only of explaining exchange-value or prices in a quantitative sense, but of exhibiting the historico-social basis in the labour process of an exchange—or commodity—society with labour power itself become a commodity.' (Dobb, 1971, p. 11.)
The way of noting these differences that has become most popular is the distinction between the quantitative-value problem and the qualitativevalue problem, introduced by Sweezy. The former is the problem of explaining the quantitative exchange-relation between commodities; the latter is the problem of explaining the social relations which underlie the commodity form. For Sweezy,
The great originality of Marx's value theory lies in its recognition of these two elements of the problem and in its attempt to deal with them simultaneously within a single conceptual framework.' (Sweezy, 1962, p. 25.)
Or as Meek put it,
'The qualitative aspect of the solution was directed to the question: why do commodities possess price at all? The quantitative aspect was directed to the question: why do commodities possess the particular prices which they do?' (Meek, 1967, p. 10.)
It is clear that the object of Marx's theory of value is taken, in this tradition, to be the process of exchange or circulation.
' . . . the study of commodities is therefore the study of the economic relations of exchange.' (Sweezy, 1962, p. 23.)
Marx is interpreted as explaining this process in terms of a separate, more fundamental process, production. Dobb, for instance, writing an Introduction to Marx's A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, suggests that Marx's interest,
'is now centred on explaining exchange in terms of production ... Exchange relations or market 'appearances' could only be understood . . . if they were seen as the expression of these more fundamental relations at the basis of society.' (Dobb, 1971, p. 9-10.)
According to Sweezy,
'Commodities exchange against each other on the market in certain definite proportions; they also absorb a certain definite quantity (measured in time units) of society's total available labour force. What is the relation between these two facts? As a first approximation Marx assumes that there is an exact correspondence between exchange ratios and labour-time ratios, or, in other words, that commodities which require an equal time to produce will exchange on a one-to-one basis. This is the simplest formula and hence a good starting point. Deviations which occur in practice can be dealt with in subsequent approximations to reality.' (Sweezy, 1962, p. 42.)
It has generally been suggested that this first approximation' is maintained throughout the first two volumes of Capital, and relinquished in Volume III, where the category of prices of production is introduced and Values are transformed into prices.' The adequacy of Marx's 'solution' to the 'transformation problem', and the merits of various alternative solutions have until recently been the chief point of debate in this tradition of interpretation. (No attempt will be made here to review the lengthy literature. For references, see Fine and Harris, 1976.)
In what sense is it held that the labour-time required to produce commodities 'explains' or 'determines' their prices (either as a 'first approximation' or through some transformation')? I think two related arguments are deployed in the writings in this tradition. The 'first approximation' of prices to the labour-time required for production is supported by an argument that derives from Adam Smith's example of the principle of equalisation of advantage in a 'deer and beaver' economy. (See, for instance, Sweezy, 1962, p. 45-46.) Suppose we consider two commondities ('deer' and 'beaver'), one of which ('deer') takes one hour to produce, the other of which ('beaver') takes two hours; and suppose that on the market one deer exchanges for one beaver. The argument is that each producer will compare the time it takes him to produce the commodity (in this case by hunting) with its market price, expressed in terms of the other commodity. It is clear that you can get more beavers by producing deer and exchanging than for beaver, than by directly producing beaver. Therefore producers will tend to allocate their time to producing deer rather than beaver. This will increase the supply of deer, reduce the supply of beaver. Other things being equal, this will reduce the market price of deer and increase the market price of beaver. The movement of labour-time from beaver to deer will continue until the market price of deer in terms of beaver is equal to the relative amounts of labour required to produce the two commodities, i.e. until two deer exchange for one beaver. At this point the transfer of labour-time will stop, and the system will be in equilibrium, with prices equal to labour-time ratios.
A more complex argument is deployed to indicate how labour-time determines prices through a 'transformation.' Here labour-time and price of production are related through an equilibrium 'model' of dependent and independent variables. As Meek put it:
'In their basic models, all three economists (i.e. Ricardo, Marx and Sraffa) in effect envisage a set of technological and sociological conditions in which a net product or surplus is produced (over and above the subsistence of the worker, which is usually conceived to be determined by physiological and social conditions.) The magnitude of this net product or surplus is assumed to be given independently of prices, and to limit and determine the aggregate level of the profits (and other non-wage incomes) which are paid out of it. The main thing which the models are designed to show is that under the postulated conditions of production the process of distribution of the surplus will result in the simultaneous formation of a determinate average rate of profit and a determinate set of prices for all commodities.' (Meek, 1977, p. 160.)
The magnitude of the net product is measured in terms of the labour time socially required for its production.
The feature of both arguments which it is important to note is that they pose the socially-necessary labour-time embodied in commodities as something quite separate, discretely distinct from, and independent of, price. It is given solely in the process of production, whereas price is given solely in the process of circulation. The two processes are themselves discretely distinct, although they are of course linked. And it is in production that 'the key causal factor', the relatively independent 'determining constant" is to be found. (See Meek, 1967, p. 95; Meek, 1977, p. 151.) It follows that we can, in principle, calculate values (i.e. socially-necessary labour-time embodied in commodities) quite independently of prices, and deduce equilibrium prices from those values. The last possibility is often regarded as the indispensable guarantee of the scientific status of Marx's value theory, of its distance from a metaphysical juggling of concepts. (Although, as writers in this tradition generally admit, in practice such a calculation would be impossible to make.)
The reading of Marx as a builder of economic models has been carried to its logical extreme in the recent work of some professional economists, perhaps most notably in the work of Morishima, in which,
'the classical labour theory of value is rigorously mathematised in a familiar form parallel to Leontief's inter-sectoral price-cost equations. The hidden assumptions are all revealed and, by the use of the mathematics of the input-output analysis, the comparative statical laws concerning the behaviour of the relative values of commodities (in terms of a standard commodity arbitrarily chosen) are proved. There is a duality between physical outputs and values of commodities, which is similar to the duality between physical outputs and competitive prices. It is seen that the labour theory of value may be compatible with the utility theory of consumers demand or any of its improved variations.' (Morishima, 1973, p. 5.)
All politics is ruthlessly excised in the interests of making Marx a respectable proto-mathematical economist.2
'(values) are determined only by technological coefficients . . . they are independent of the market, the class-structure of society, taxes and so on.'(Morishima, 1973, p. 15.)
More important in CSE debates has been the development within this general line of interpretation of an approach which excises not politics as such, but value. Arguing from the same premises as the Sweezy-Meek-Dobb tradition, it has come to the conclusion that,
'the project of providing a materialist account of capitalist societies is dependent on Marx's value magnitude analysis only in the negative sense that continued adherence to the latter is a major fetter on the development of the former.' (Steedman, 1977, p. 207; See also Hodgson and Steedman, 1975; Hodgson, 1976; Steedman, 1975a, 1975b.)
The quantity of socially-necessary labour-time embodied in a commodity has been found to be at best redundant to, at most incapable of, the determination of its equilibrium price. The so-called 'Neo-Ricardians' pose instead, as independent variables, the socially-necessary conditions of production and the real wage paid to workers, specified in terms of physical quantities of particular commodities. Unlike Morishima, Steedman does not take such quantities as purely technological: they are assumed to be determined socially and historically and reflect the 'balance of forces' between workers and capitalists in the work place.
There is no doubt that within its own terms this critique of the theory of value, as an explanation of equilibrium prices in terms of labour quantities, is quite correct. Attempts to preserve the traditional Anglo-Saxon version of the theory of value tend to dissolve into positions even more 'Ricardian' than that of the 'Neo-Ricardians' (a point made by Himmelweit and Mohun, 1978). This paper makes no attempt to rescue this traditional 'labour theory of value'. Instead it argues for a quite different reading of Marx's theory of value, in relation to which it is the Sraffa-based critique which is redundant, rather than value.
In some respects even more iconoclastic than the Neo-Ricardians is the work of Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussain. Prefaced by a picture of Christ cleansing the temple, they claim:
'It is possible to argue that prices and exchange-values have no general functions or general determinants... Such a change of pertinence of problems would put us not only outside of the Marxist theory of value but also conventional economic theory.' (Cutler et al., 1977, p. 14.)
and declare:
'In this book we will challenge the notion that Value' is such a general determinant' (op. cit., p. 19.)
I too will challenge the notion that value is such a general determinant, in the sense that Cutler et al. understand this, i.e. as a single 'origin' or 'cause' of prices and profits. But my challenge will be directed to the very notion that Marx's theory of value poses value as the origin or cause of anything. Among other things, I shall argue that Marx's concept of a determinant is quite different from those of authors considered in this section.
