（文章翻译）拜占庭兵役、军事土地和士兵的地位：当前的问题和解释（第六部分）

Military Service, Military Lands, and the Status of Soldiers: Current Problems and Interpretations Author(s): John Haldon
敦巴顿橡树园论文，1993 年
翻译：神尾智代

接上

I have spent some time on these points because G6recki's conclusions contrast starkly with those of Gregoriou-Ioannidou, who has tried to show that there was no connection between military service and the land in the tenth century; and that the system of military lands develops more or less directly out of the old limitanei-type of service. This is clearly an attempt to revive the views of Karayannopoulos, and I believe it largely fails.

          我在这些问题上花了一些时间，因为 G6recki 的结论与 Gregoriou-Ioannidou 的结论形成鲜明对比，后者试图表明在 10 世纪服兵役与土地之间没有联系； 并且军事土地系统或多或少直接从旧的限制类型的服务中发展而来。 这显然是为了重振 Karayannopoulos 的观点，我认为它在很大程度上失败了。

In the first place, to claim that there was no connection between land and service in the Macedonian period, a connection which is quite evident in the legal texts of the tenth century and which most scholars now agree existed, seems to me to fly in the face both of the texts themselves and the logic of the situation. Again, G6recki's recent work confirms this and throws more light on how the legal stipulations of the tenth-century texts might be more clearly understood.

          首先，声称在马其顿时期土地和服务之间没有联系，这种联系在 10 世纪的法律文本中非常明显，现在大多数学者都同意存在，在我看来 面对文本本身和情境的逻辑。 再次，G6recki 最近的工作证实了这一点，并进一步阐明了如何更清楚地理解 10 世纪文本的法律规定。

Gregoriou-Ioannidou's main line of argument is, quite simply, that the military lands, like other lands, carried merely a fiscal burden, whereas military service remained attached only to individuals. Military status brought with it certain privileges (as we have seen), so that it was not the land occupied by a soldier which brought with it military obligations, but rather the military status of the soldier which brought the status of military land to his property. This has long been recognized, of course, and as far as it goes, is entirely correct. But it ignores the historical nature of the evolution of the strateia: the whole point of the debate in the last few years has been to stress how the institution was developing and changing over time in response to the demands of the state and the social context in which it existed. Further, in criticizing those who have argued for a connection between lands and military burdens——the strateia——she chooses to define this connection (and to represent others to have so defined it) in an overly narrow way, to mean that military lands bore the obligation of recruitment or military service. It is this, I think, that leads her to argue so strongly for no connection at all between land and service. On the basis of two texts in particular (Constantine VII's novel "On Soldiers" [945-959] and a novel of Nicephorus II Phocas) she rightly points out that persons already enrolled on the military registers who are attributed by the state with parts or the whole of abandoned or otherwise deserted military holdings cannot have been expected to serve twice, once for their own property and once for that which they have newly received. Of course, individuals could not serve as two soldiers at the same time. But on the basis of this point she argues that, in consequence, there was no connection between the land and military service, and thereby completely misses the point. For the land itself never had the obligation of "military service," or even of furnishing a recruit, and I have certainly never argued this. But what had happened by this time was that the connection between military service and the land which sup-ported the family from which a registered soldier was drawn, whether active or not, had become explicit. Hence the obligation to provide the resources with which to equip or pro-vision a soldier was apparent-again, all the texts which refer to soldiers and the basis of their military service take this connection for granted. The strateia was perceived as attached to the land as well as to the person registered on the military rolls who held it, for the simple reason that while the individuals inscribed on the military registers actually served, the resources to support this service were drawn from the income derived from agricultural production.

          Gregoriou-Ioannidou 的主要论点很简单，即军用土地与其他土地一样，仅承担财政负担，而兵役只与个人有关。军事地位带来了某些特权（如我们所见），因此不是士兵占领的土地带来了军事义务，而是士兵的军事地位将军事土地的地位带到了他的财产。当然，这一点早已得到认可，而且就其本身而言，是完全正确的。但它忽略了战略演变的历史本质：过去几年辩论的重点一直是强调该机构如何随着时间的推移而发展和变化以响应国家的需求和社会背景它存在。此外，在批评那些主张土地和军事负担之间存在联系的人时——战略——她选择以一种过于狭隘的方式定义这种联系（并代表其他人如此定义它），意味着军事土地承担招募或服兵役的义务。我认为，正是这一点导致她如此强烈地争论土地和服务之间没有任何联系。特别是根据两篇文本（康斯坦丁七世的小说“论士兵”[945-959] 和 Nicephorus II Phocas 的小说），她正确地指出，已经登记在军事登记册上的人被国家赋予部分或不能指望整个废弃或以其他方式废弃的军事财产有两次服役，一次是为他们自己的财产服务，一次是为他们新获得的财产服务。当然，个人不能同时充当两个士兵。但基于这一点，她认为，因此，陆战和兵役之间没有联系，完全没有抓住重点。因为土地本身从来没有“服兵役”的义务，甚至没有提供新兵的义务，我当然从未争论过这一点。但此时发生的事情是，服兵役与养家糊口的土地之间的联系，无论是否在役，都变得明确了。因此，提供用于装备或提供士兵的资源的义务是显而易见的——再次，所有提及士兵及其兵役基础的文本都认为这种联系是理所当然的。领地被视为附属于土地以及在军事名册上登记的持有土地的人，原因很简单，虽然登记在军事名册上的个人实际服役，但支持这项服务的资源来自于农业生产所得收入。

Part of Gregoriou-Ioannidou's difficulty arises from the fact that she insists that the term baros, burden, applied to the state's rights in respect of land, can mean only tax or fiscal burden in the very narrowest sense, not the obligation to provide support for asoldier.88 But there is in practice little or no difference between the appropriation of resources in the form of cash, labor, or crops, for example, and the appropriation of resources in the form of a particular type of service. That the Roman and Byzantine state (and indeed most medieval states) regarded these different forms as equivalents is clear from any examination of the ways in which the state extracted revenues from its territories and those who carried out the productive labor on them. There seems to meno valid reason for denying the fact that the obligation to support military service was just as much a baros on lands defined as "military," as the public taxes were on all lands within the empire. Individuals carried out the service; land provided the resources, directly or indirectly, to support that service. The strateia was hereditarily attached to the person inscribed on the registers, but they could not fulfill their obligations without an income, and this came from the exploitation of the land. It is surely apparent that in the very act of the state stipulating, in a legislative instrument such as the novels of the emperors Constantine VII and Nicephorus II, the amount of inalienable land necessary to support the strateia, land itself came to be associated with the strateia, and the strateia was conceived as associated as much with land as with individuals. This is particularly clear in the final paragraph of the novel of Nicephorus II dealing with the increase from a value of 4 pounds to 12 pounds of gold of the amount of military land hence-forth to be regarded as inalienable: military holdings (stratiotika ktemata) which had been alienated within a period of fewer than thirty years from the date of the legislation were to be returned "to the responsibility and service of their own strateia." It is equally clear in the case of soldiers found guilty of murder. The lands of such a person, which would normally have been awarded in part or whole as compensation to the victim’s family, are at all costs to be kept intact. If there are no relatives willing to undertake the strateia, then another, unrelated person should take up the properties or holding in question (tous topous) and fulfill the strateia. In other words, the connection between the original holder of the land and his family, responsible for the strateia, is severed, and the land is handed over to someone who can fulfill the relevant obligations. But these obligations can then only be seen as related to the land itself, a point emphasized by Lemerle's commentary. Gregoriou-Ioannidou argues here that this is an exceptional case, thus neatly sidestepping a problematic text. In fact, if the land had no military service attached, there is no reason why it could not have been given in compensation. The point is, once again, that while people provided soldiers, it was land that supported them. And this is made even clearer in a case reported in the Peira of the judge Eustathios, in which a kourator is found guilty, along with an unspecified number of codefendants, of attacking, injuring, and robbing a tax collector. Note that this is not a case of murder. As compensation to the injured party, all his property, except that which is subject to a strateia (and the dowry brought by his wife), was to be confiscated and awarded as compensation to the tax collector. Should the property in question be insufficient to compensate for the loss to both the tax collector and the state (in respect of stolen and unrecovered revenue), then the property of the co-defendants was to be similarly treated. It is assumed that the normal regulations for the transfer of the land or property subject to the strateia would then have been implemented, which meant that, in the case of there being no relatives, it would be placed in the hands of an unrelated party. It seems again fairly clear that while the principle of hereditary obligations attached to a registered household was respected, the obligations-the revenues to support the obligations which came with the strateia-were seen as connected with the land. It was inevitable that the state should, according to the situation and circumstances reflected in different items of imperial legislation, regard military service as connected with both. We should recall here that imperial legislation was functional-different items placed the emphasis differently, on either the soldiers or their land-according to the particular problem under discussion, both within the same document and across different documents，both within the same document and across different documents.

          Gregoriou-Ioannidou 的部分困难源于她坚持认为巴罗斯一词，即负担，适用于国家在土地方面的权利，只能指最狭义的税收或财政负担，而不是提供支持的义务asoldier。但实际上，以现金、劳动力或农作物等形式的资源占用与以特定服务类型形式占用资源之间几乎没有区别。罗马和拜占庭国家（以及大多数中世纪国家）将这些不同的形式视为等价物，这一点从任何对国家从其领土上获取收入的方式以及对其进行生产劳动的人的方式的任何审查中都可以清楚地看出。似乎有充分的理由否认支持兵役的义务在定义为“军事”的土地上就像公共税一样对帝国内的所有土地征税。个人提供服务；土地直接或间接地提供了资源来支持这项服务。地契世袭地依附在登记册上的人身上，但他们没有收入就不能履行义务，这来自对土地的剥削。很明显，在国家的行为中，在诸如君士坦丁七世和尼斯弗鲁斯二世的小说等立法文书中规定了支持该地区所必需的不可剥夺土地的数量，土地本身开始与Stratia，而 Stratia 被认为与土地和个人的联系一样多。这一点在 Nicephorus II 小说的最后一段中尤为明显，该段论述了从此以后被视为不可分割的军用土地数量从 4 磅黄金增加到 12 磅：军事资产（stratiotika ktemata）自立法之日起不到 30 年的时间内被转让的那些人将被归还给“他们自己的战略的责任和服务”。在士兵被判犯有谋杀罪的情况下，这一点同样明显。这种人的土地通常会部分或全部作为对受害者家属的补偿而被授予，但不惜一切代价保持完整。若无亲属愿意承办，则由其他无亲属关系的人承办相关财产或财产（tous tous）并履行承办事项。也就是说，土地的原持有人与其负责地契的家庭之间的联系被切断，土地被移交给能够履行相关义务的人。但这些义务只能被视为与土地本身有关，Lemerle 的评论强调了这一点。 Gregoriou-Ioannidou 在这里辩称，这是一个特例，因此巧妙地回避了有问题的文本。事实上，如果土地没有附加兵役，没有理由不给予补偿。重点是，虽然人们提供了士兵，但支持他们的是土地。在 Eustathios 法官的 Peira 中报告的一个案件中，这一点变得更加清楚，在该案件中，一名 kourator 和数量不详的同案犯一起攻击、伤害和抢劫税吏而被判有罪。请注意，这不是一起谋杀案。作为对受害方的赔偿，他的所有财产，除了受制于财产（以及他妻子带来的嫁妆）外，都将被没收并作为补偿判给税吏。如果所涉财产不足以补偿税收官和国家的损失（就被盗和未追回的收入而言），则共同被告的财产将受到同样的对待。假设当时适用于地契的土地或财产转让的正常规定将得到执行，这意味着在没有亲属的情况下，它将被置于非关联方手中。似乎又相当清楚的是，虽然登记家庭的世袭义务原则得到尊重，但义务——支持与地契相关的义务的收入——被视为与土地有关。国家不可避免地要根据帝国立法不同项目所反映的情况和情况，将兵役视为与两者有关。在这里我们应该记得，帝国立法是功能性的——不同的项目侧重于士兵或他们的土地——根据所讨论的特定问题，在同一文件内和不同文件中。

It was thus perfectly possible for a registered stratiotes-any person registered as the holder of a strateia (whether he served actively or not)-to be in possession of two "military" holdings, since each could provide such resources. There is no need to argue that one person could not serve in a double capacity here. And presumably the state，in allotting such lands to registered persons, was both ensuring that labor was available to maintain them in production, and increasing the possibility for the poorer peasants to improve their own productive capacity, all to the state's advantage-this is the main purpose of much of the legislation. As I have argued, both personal hereditary service attached to individuals, and the association of that service more closely with the properties from which it was supported, are represented in the legislative texts. It is surely obvious that the requirement to serve as a soldier was in effect a type of fiscal obligation: the fact that the families of deceased soldiers were still liable for the expenses of military service, or a proportion thereof, at least from the reign of Irene and, as Oikonomides has plausibly suggested, even earlier, when no individual could be produced to carry out the service in question, suggests as much. That the strateia was so easily transformed into a purely fiscal burden from the later tenth century onward bears this out. Indeed, had the strateia remained only and always a personal burden attached to individuals, as it was originally, it is difficult to see how it could ever have been generalized as a fiscal imposition, as it was in the eleventh century. More telling still is the fact that lands subject to the fiscalized strateia were still exempt from extraordinary state levies, even though they were no longer held by active soldiers or their families, to whom the standard immunities and privileges continued to be attached. In other words, it is the special status of the land which is here significant.

          因此，注册的阶层——任何注册为阶层持有者（无论他是否积极服役）的人——完全有可能拥有两个“军事”财产，因为每个人都可以提供这样的资源。没有必要争论一个人不能在这里以双重身份服务。据推测，国家将这些土地分配给登记人员，既是为了确保有劳动力来维持他们的生产，又是为了增加贫困农民提高自身生产能力的可能性，这对国家来说都是有利的——这就是大部分立法的主要目的。正如我所论证的，与个人相关的个人世袭服务，以及该服务与支持它的财产的更密切的联系，都在立法文本中有所体现。显然，作为士兵的要求实际上是一种财政义务：至少从上任以来，已故士兵的家属仍需承担服兵役的费用或其中的一部分。艾琳，正如奥科诺米德斯（Oikonomides）在更早的时候提出的那样，当时没有人能够提供相关的服务，也提出了同样的建议。从 10 世纪后期开始，战略如此容易地转变为纯粹的财政负担，这证明了这一点。的确，如果该法令只保留且始终是个人的个人负担，就像最初那样，很难看出它如何像 11 世纪那样被概括为一种财政征收。更有说服力的事实是，受财政化战略约束的土地仍然免于特殊的国家征税，即使它们不再由现役士兵或其家人持有，他们继续享有标准豁免权和特权。换句话说，土地的特殊地位在这里很重要。

This brings us to a further argument made against the notion that the state came to view land during the tenth century as connected with military obligations. It has been suggested that all the examples of soldiers or groups of soldiers avoiding military service by making a payment to the state instead represent in effect the same phenomenon, that is to say, that there always existed a "fiscalized" strateia. According to this position, individual obligations to serve in the army could always be met by a payment to the state. The examples of such a practice from the ninth and tenth centuries, in particular the well-known case of the soldiers from the thema of the Peloponnese, are equated with the later full fiscalization of the strateia which can be observed in the eleventh century, and it is alleged that there is no difference between the two practices-merely that, in the eleventh century, because the state preferred cash, for a variety of reasons, it tended toward the greater exploitation of this option.

          这使我们进一步反对国家在 10 世纪开始将土地视为与军事义务有关的观点。有人提出，所有通过向国家付款来逃避兵役的士兵或士兵团体的例子实际上都代表了相同的现象，也就是说，始终存在“财政化”战略。根据这一立场，个人在军队服役的义务总是可以通过向国家支付款项来履行。 9 世纪和 10 世纪这种做法的例子，特别是著名的伯罗奔尼撒半岛的士兵案例，等同于后来在 11 世纪可以观察到的 strateia 的全面财政化，据称，这两种做法没有区别——只是，在 11 世纪，由于国家偏爱现金，出于各种原因，它倾向于更多地利用这种选择。

It seems to me once again that this both oversimplifies the problem and obfuscates the issue. Two developments need to be distinguished. In the first place, that of the strateia and its particular evolution as an institution over the period from the seventh century onward; in the second place, that of the demands of the state for cash or manpower according to constantly changing circumstances. As we have seen, it seems from perhaps as early as the beginning of the eighth or the later seventh century to have been a principle that, where a soldier could not be provided from a registered household at the time of the general muster, that household could be liable to a payment in lieu of military service. In this respect, there is certainly a fiscal aspect to military service which, as we have said already, is in the end no more than one form of the extraction by the state from the producers of surplus wealth. The evidence nevertheless points to the state's preference, at least until the later ninth or early tenth century, for the fulfillment of personal service from those so registered. The examples referred to in the De administrando imperio, however, suggest that the state was by this time prepared to broaden and to generalize this procedure to the army of a whole theme, demanding instead either materials (e.g., horses and their harness) or cash. But in both these examples from very different periods it is not in doubt that those thus treated by the state were also holders of strateiai, whether they were personally exempt by reason of their particular title or office or not. The state is applying a particular solution to a particular problem it may have faced (about which we can only guess) at a particular moment. This is in stark contrast to the generalized imposition on all classes of the population, including the Church and monastic foundations, for particular military undertakings of demands for cash and materials, a potential which the state seems always to have exercised when it needed to do so. Such impositions were not, of course, regular in the sense that yearly taxes were. On the other hand, the frequency of military campaigns must have affected their incidence, hence the complaints of the population under Nicephorus II, if the reports of Leo the Deacon and, later, of Zonaras, for example, can be trusted. In addition, there is an increasing tendency toward the general fiscalization of the strateia, particularly marked from the reign of Nicephorus II. Thus we are confronted with two quite different institutions or administrative practices, practices which, as the state's needs evolved, and as the context within which those practices were carried changed, converged to produce a third and, in its turn, quite different institutional procedure.

          在我看来，这又一次把问题简单化了，又混淆了问题。需要区分两种发展。首先，从七世纪开始，战略及其作为一种制度的特殊演变；其次，国家根据不断变化的情况对现金或人力的需求。正如我们所看到的，似乎从 8 世纪初或 7 世纪后期开始就有一个原则，即在一般集结时无法从登记家庭提供士兵的情况下，该家庭可能有责任支付代替兵役的费用。在这方面，兵役肯定存在财政方面的问题，正如我们已经说过的，这最终不过是国家从剩余财富的生产者那里榨取的一种形式。然而，证据表明，至少在 9 世纪后期或 10 世纪初期，国家倾向于由如此注册的人提供个人服务。然而，在 De administrando imperio 中提到的例子表明，此时国家已准备好扩大这一程序并将其推广到整个主题的军队，而不是要求材料（例如，马及其马具）或现金.但在这两个截然不同时期的例子中，毫无疑问，受到国家如此对待的人也是领地的持有人，无论他们是否因特定的头衔或职位而被豁免。国家正在将特定解决方案应用于它在特定时刻可能面临的特定问题（我们只能猜测）。这与包括教会和修道院基金会在内的所有阶层普遍强加于特定军事事业的现金和材料需求形成鲜明对比，国家似乎总是在需要时行使这种潜力。当然，从年度税收的意义上说，这种征收并不是定期的。另一方面，军事行动的频率必定影响了它们的发生率，因此，如果可以相信例如执事利奥和后来的佐纳拉斯的报告，那么尼塞弗鲁斯二世下的民众的抱怨是可信的。此外，该地区的总体财政化有日益增加的趋势，尤其是在尼斯弗鲁斯二世统治时期。因此，我们面临着两种完全不同的制度或行政实践，随着国家需求的演变，以及随着这些实践发生的环境的变化，这些实践汇聚在一起，产生了第三种，反过来，又是完全不同的制度程序。

The point is that the state was becoming more concerned with the sources from which the revenue and provisions for soldiers were drawn by the middle and later tenth century than with the sources of manpower as such, as I believe the texts discussed by Lemerle, Lilie, G6recki, and myself make abundantly clear. This does not mean that individuals and their families did not continue to bear a military obligation, where they were registered, as well, merely that the state's focus of attention shifted as circum-stances and necessity demanded. No amount of semantic prestidigitation alters this. For it is surely absurd to argue that the extensive legislation of tenth-century emperors on the question of soldiers and their lands was intended to protect the basis of their military service by formalizing a specific type of tenure (as demonstrated once again byG6recki) subject to a whole range of complex provisions designed to protect its integrity, while at the same time suggesting that such prescriptions were of a simple fiscal nature only, and had absolutely no effect on the juridical statute and burdens attached to the tenant of the property and, thereby, to the property itself. Fiscal burdens were clearly associated with the possession of land, as much as, and as well as, with individuals. Fiscal burdens intended to provide or support soldiers or their service were no different. But by formally defining the nature of the rights and duties attached to the strateia, the state also formalized the nature of the fiscal burdens which accompanied the tenure of land which supported this particular type of state service, and thereby made the relationship between land and service more obvious. The fact that nonmilitary persons, not previously registered on the military rolls, received military status when they were attributed by the state with military land makes this clear; just as does the fact that persons previously registered as owing "service" to the dromos were transferred to naval or marine "service" by the changes introduced under Nicephorus II. G6recki's observations on the nature of the adoreia in this respect, and those of Lemerle and myself on the nature of partial strateia, would appear to bear this out. In sum, the argument against a connection between land and military service elaborated by Gregoriou-Ioannidou seems to me to be founded on an artificial distinction between different types of state service and obligation, and a failure to recognize the dynamic nature of the developments of the later ninth and tenth centuries.

          关键是，国家越来越关注 10 世纪中后期士兵的收入和供给的来源，而不是人力资源本身，我相信 Lemerle、Lilie、 G6recki 和我自己说得很清楚。这并不意味着个人及其家庭不再继续承担他们登记的军事义务，只是国家的关注重点随着情况和必要性的需要而转移。再多的语义预感也无法改变这一点。因为认为 10 世纪皇帝关于士兵及其土地问题的广泛立法旨在通过正式确定特定类型的任期（如 G6recki 再次证明）来保护他们的兵役基础，这无疑是荒谬的一系列旨在保护其完整性的复杂规定，同时表明此类规定仅具有简单的财政性质，对法律法规和财产租户的负担绝对没有影响，因此, 到财产本身。财政负担显然与拥有土地有关，也与个人有关。旨在提供或支持士兵或其服务的财政负担也不例外。但是，通过正式定义附属于战略的权利和义务的性质，国家也正式确定了伴随土地保有权的财政负担的性质，支持这种特殊类型的国家服务，从而使土地和服务之间的关系更明显。以前未在军事名册上登记的非军事人员在国家赋予其军事土地时获得军事地位这一事实清楚地表明了这一点；正如根据 Nicephorus II 引入的变化，先前登记为“服务”于 dromos 的人被转移到海军或海上“服务”的事实。 G6recki 在这方面对 adoreia 性质的观察，以及 Lemerle 和我对部分 strateia 性质的观察，似乎证实了这一点。总之，在我看来，Gregoriou-Ioannidou 所阐述的反对将陆上服役与兵役之间联系起来的论点，似乎是建立在不同类型的国家服役和义务之间人为区分的基础上，并且没有认识到九、十世纪后期国家发展的动态性质。

In the second place, it is now increasingly recognized that the limitanei in the East were more or less phased out or withdrawn by the mid-sixth and early seventh century as the East Roman state came to rely more and more on "federate"-style troops, especially in eastern frontier provinces, as the recent work of Glen Bower sock and Benjamin Isaac has demonstrated. More significantly, while there may in view of the limited systemic and logistical possibilities open to late Roman and early Byzantine administrations have evolved some apparent similarities between the older limitanei and the later thematic soldiers and their lands, this is based more on appearance than reality-it is also increasingly clear that the limitanei were by no means soldiers given lands or plots by the state as a deliberate policy, except perhaps under Justinian in Africa; rather, they were soldiers who, having once acquired lands, by whatever means, were able to obtain especial exemptions from the payment of regular state taxes. It is worth stressing this: the later Byzantine "military lands" were freed from some extraordinary state impositions, chiefly because in origin they were lands held or owned by soldiers, who received immunity from certain state demands. But they were not freed from the land and hearth taxes, no more than late Roman soldiers had been freed from regular state taxes. The lands of limitanei, in contrast, were exempt from such regular burdens. The point has been made before by Patlagean. It surely follows that were the stratiotika ktemata derived from the lands of limitanei, this privilege would also have remained attached to them.

          其次，现在人们越来越认识到，随着东罗马国家越来越依赖“联邦”风格，到 6 世纪中叶和 7 世纪初，东方的限制或多或少被淘汰或撤回。部队，尤其是在东部边境省份，正如格伦鲍尔袜子和本杰明艾萨克最近的工作所证明的那样。更重要的是，尽管考虑到对罗马晚期和拜占庭早期政府开放的有限的系统和后勤可能性，旧的限制和后期的主题士兵及其土地之间可能存在一些明显的相似之处，但这更多地基于外观而不是现实-越来越清楚的是，除了在非洲的查士丁尼统治下，限制军绝不是国家有意为士兵提供土地或土地的政策。相反，他们是士兵，一旦以任何方式获得了土地，就能够获得特别豁免，免于缴纳常规的州税。值得强调的是：后来的拜占庭“军事土地”从一些特殊的国家强加中解放出来，主要是因为它们在起源上是由士兵拥有或拥有的土地，他们获得了某些国家要求的豁免权。但是他们并没有免除土地和壁炉税，就像晚期罗马士兵免于常规州税一样。相比之下，limitanei 的土地免除了这种经常性的负担。 Patlagean 之前已经提出了这一点。可以肯定的是，如果 Stratiotika ktemata 源自limitanei 的土地，那么这种特权也将一直附属于他们。

Work on the tenth-century legislation and its importance for an understanding of the military lands, on the one hand, and of the state's fiscal-administrative structures, on the other, is continuing and will no doubt bring new insights in the near future. Inspite of some recent objections, however, I would argue that we have now reached a reasonable degree of agreement on the process by which the military lands came into being over the period from the seventh to the tenth century. More importantly, we can see more clearly the process by which a traditionally informal but significant element in the state's arrangements for the recruitment and the maintenance of soldiers became increasingly a focal point of imperial fiscal-political attention, to be transformed during the tenth century into a carefully regulated and formal "system." In this respect, it would be fair to suggest that what has traditionally been called the "theme system" was, in fact, a product of the tenth rather than the seventh century. For I can still find no evidence for a Heraclian creation of a "thematic system" involving both the granting of land to soldiers and the restructuring of the field forces. On the contrary, all the evidence seems to point to a whole series of developments, some planned by the state, some not, some certainly occurring during Heraclius' reign, while others clearly did not, which combined as they evolved over two centuries to produce what we find reflected in the tenth-century sources.

          关于 10 世纪立法及其一方面对理解军事土地的重要性，以及另一方面对国家财政行政结构的重要性的工作仍在继续，并且无疑将在不久的将来带来新的见解。然而，尽管最近有一些反对意见，我认为我们现在已经就 7 世纪到 10 世纪期间军事土地形成的过程达成了合理程度的一致。更重要的是，我们可以更清楚地看到这个过程，在这个过程中，国家安排士兵招募和维持的传统上非正式但重要的因素越来越成为帝国财政政治关注的焦点，并在 10 世纪转变为一个仔细监管和正式的“系统”。在这方面，可以公平地说，传统上称为“主题系统”的东西实际上是 10 世纪而非 7 世纪的产物。因为我仍然找不到证据表明赫拉克利斯创造了一个“军区系统”，涉及向士兵授予土地和重组野战部队。相反，所有的证据似乎都指向了一系列的发展，有些是国家计划的，有些不是，有些肯定发生在赫拉克利乌斯统治期间，而另一些显然没有，这些发展结合了两个世纪的发展我们的发现反映在十世纪的资料中。

预告：

VII. THE ARMY IN SOCIETY

七、社会中的军队

未完待续