[番外篇]精读节选 5.沃邦学说的影响

研究战壕、营和突击的战术细节的意义远远超出了对早期现代战争性质的更好理解。堡垒战和城市作战的独特性质和频率对早期现代社会产生了广泛的影响[1]。 讨论这一时期的“有限”战争时，必须忽略平民陷入交火的无数次情况。战斗是在平原上进行的（字面意思是“野战”），但为了控制人口稠密的城市地区而发动围攻——围攻将战争带入了居民的炉膛和家园。市民最直接感兴趣的是， 一个城镇被占领的容易程度影响了参与者（战斗员和非战斗员）的战争经历。强大的城墙可能会保护里面的人免受掠夺团伙的随意掠夺，但这也使他们成为军事行动的目标。在防守占主导地位的时代，

被围困的堡垒的力量可能会将双方推向极端。驻军将被鼓励坚持到底，而围攻者则对缓慢的围攻感到沮丧，要么安顿下来封锁以饿死城镇，要么通过放火烧毁城镇来发泄他们的愤怒  。另一方面，防御工事薄弱的城镇可能会鼓励攻击者放弃正式的围攻，转而通突袭占领这个地方。如果他们的进攻成功，驻军和镇民的命运将取决于敌方指挥官能否成功地控制他的部队的嗜血。因此，他们的生死直接陷入了国王的最后争论中。

攻防平衡在很大程度上决定了军事行动的吸引力以及这些行动将花费多少资金。由于整个早期现代国家的财政机构都致力于资助这一时期笨拙的军事统治者，这些军事因素决定了早期现代社会将承担的负担。正如蒙克早先的引述所承认的那样，围攻是一种特别昂贵的发动战争的方式[2]。 过去几十年中，对早期现代军队的后勤和行政研究的爆发突显了其军事工具所消耗的沉重费用以及这些政府筹集、装备和维持这些武器的困难[3]。对于法国人来说，建造现代堡垒和翻新旧堡垒花费路易超过1.05亿里弗尔，占皇家总支出的2.5%[4]。 事实上，法国社会的防御工事成本远高于此，因为这个数字只占他一半期间产生的成本。统治，不包括地方直接支付的许多费用，包括现金和人工。占领和保卫这些防御工事也需要花钱，以生命损失、消耗火药和子弹以及爆裂大炮来衡量。与最长的围攻相比，短暂围攻的成本相形见绌，而且两者都使军队年复一年地陷入困境，从而进一步夸大了战时费用——随着军队在特定城镇周围长时间的固定时间，成本飙升。除了几个被征服的地方之外，一场战役几乎没有什么可展示的，和平谈判很容易破裂（或永远不会开始），明年需要更多的军事行动，这需要在整个冬季和春季重建部队力量，并为另一场战役的费用支付资金。在这种代价高昂的停滞中，人们产生了这样的希望：一场决定性的战斗虽然是血腥的，但从长远来看，可以通过缩短一场无决定性的战争的持续时间来挽救生命和金钱[5]。这个理论对路易十四或他的对手都不起作用，特别是在  1688-1697年和1701-1714年的两次最后的马拉松比赛中。庞大的军队（在路易统治期间规模不断扩大[6]）以及他们执行的艰巨任务迫使战争开支失控，从法国国王统治初期的一半开支到他最后一次战争中王室“预算”的 90%[7]。在一个几乎无休止的武装冲突时代，找到资金来支付如此庞大的战争事业，对每一个早期现代国家都提出了严峻的挑战，无论它拥有多么丰富的自然资源，它可以征召多少农民，它可以雇佣多少雇佣军，或者它可以从自己的税基和金融家那里筹集多少钱。 信贷和现金是早期现代战争的支柱，已被确定为传统军事历史与复合君主制的更广泛历史之间的关键联系，这些君主制试图巩固自己的权威，同时相互斗争以争夺主导地位[8]。在一个几乎持续不断的战争时期，这种贪得无厌的要求实际上可以奴役政治领导人，迫使“财政军事”政权经常无方向地发展[9]。发动战争的巨大财政需求促使君主主义者和共和主义者都想方设法为他们的军队提供资金，这些军队往往参与攻击敌人的据点[10]。对于早期的现代法国来说，学者们已经说明了战争如何成为中央集权君主的敌人。对即时现金的无休止需求使对创造性短期融资的追求高于财政和政治改革，因为财政和政治改革将改善王室的长期稳定。像让·巴蒂斯特·勒·大科尔伯特（Jean-Baptiste le Grand  Colbert）这样具有改革思想的财政部长看到他们的计划随着宣战而崩溃：王室被迫出售更多的贪婪办公室并雇用更多自主的税吏，而不是通过回购这些行政职位来重新获得王室控制权。支持这场战争努力十年或更长时间进一步耗尽了路易的资源十四的状态到了极限[11]。因此，阐述进攻和防御战术之间的平衡对于我们理解战争在早期现代国家发展中所起的作用至关重要。

1. Duffy, Siege Warfare,chapter ten, The Fortress and Humankind. See also the wide-ranging collection of Ivy Corfis and Michael Wolfe (eds.), The Medieval City under Siege, (Woodbridge, 1995).

2. Lynn mentions the matter in passing in Wars of Louis XIV, p. 78 and in more detail in Giant, pp. 573–574. See also John Childs, Warfare in the Seventeenth Century, pp. 105–107.

3. Among others (to limit ourselves to monographs): Parker, The Army of Flanders and The Military Revolution, chapter 2; John Lynn’s relevant chapters (3–6) in Giant; the works in his edited Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, (Boulder, CO, 1993); James Wood, The King’s Army, chapter 11; David Parrott’s Richelieu’s Army, chapter 4; and Guy Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest 1661–1701, (Cambridge, 2002). This is also one of the main themes of the recent volume edited by Philippe Contamine, War and Competition between States, (Oxford, 2000).

4. Jean-Pierre Rorive, La guerre de siège sous Louis XIV en Europe et à Huy, (Brussels,1997), pp. 39–40. Localities bore an even greater share of the burden. For an example from the French Wars of Religion, see Michael Wolfe, “Walled towns during the French wars of religion (1560–1630),” in J. Tracy, et al., City Walls: The Urban Enceinte in Global Perspective, (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 328–337.

5. Russell Weigley presents a caricature of this battle-seeking philosophy in The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Victory from Breitenfeld to Waterloo, (Bloomington,1991).

6. See John Lynn, “Recalculating French Army Growth during the Grand Siècle, 1610–1715,” French Historical Studies 18(4) Autumn 1994, reprinted in Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate, pp. 117–148.

7. Rorive, La guerre de siège sous Louis XIV, pp. 39–40. On early modern military financing generally, see P.G.M. Dickson and John Sperling, “War Finance, 1689–1714,” in J.S. Bromley (ed.), The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. 6: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia, 1688–1715/25 (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 284–315. The most recent surveys of French finances during the period can be found in Richard Bonney, Jean Roland Malet: premier historien des finances de la monarchie française. (Paris, 1993); as well as his “The Eighteenth Century II: The Struggle for Great Power Status and the End of the Old Fiscal Regime,” in R. Bonney (ed.), The rise of the fiscal state in Europe, c. 1200–1815, (Oxford, 1995), pp. 315–392. These figures (e.g. 71% of the royal “budget” being expended on the war department in the early years of the war) are based on the financial histories of two 18th century historians, Jean-Roland Malet, an aide to the French controller-general Nicolas Desmaretz, and Véron de Fourbonnais. For the English, see D.W. Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough, (Oxford, 1988); John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783, (New York, 1989), and most recently James Scott Wheeler, The making of a world power: war and revolution in seventeenth-century England, (Stroud,1999).

8. Both Michael Roberts’ initial Military Revolution and Geoffrey Parker’s more recent permutation stressed the increasing army sizes, which in turn necessitated new methods of generating revenue to support the troops. David Parrott and Guy Rowlands argue, to different degrees, for a French royal army supported predominantly by the service ethos of its noble officer corps. Although historians might disagree over how many men were paid, how they were paid, when the most important military changes occurred, and whether military expenses drove administrative and fiscal innovations or the reverse, they all agree that states (and their sources of revenues) usually teetered on the brink of insolvency as a result.

9. For a recent overview of this literature, see Gwynne Lewis’s “‘Fiscal States’: Taxes, War, Privilege and the Emergence of the European ‘Nation State’, c. 1200–1800,” French Historical Studies, 15(1) 2001, pp. 51–63, especially p. 54.

10. Parrott argues this point in Richelieu’s Army, p. 550.

11. For examples of such French financial gymnastics, see Gary McCollim, The formation of fiscal policy in the reign of Louis XIV: the example of Nicolas Desmaretz, controller general of finances (1708–1715), Ph.D. dissertation (Columbus, OH, 1979); and Rowlands, The Dynastic State.