{"ops":[{"insert":"印度陆军元帅(Field Marshal Manekshaw)向印度总理英迪拉·甘地(Prime Minister Indira Gandhi)汇报，1972年2月25日在莫斯科，他接受苏联国防部长格里奇科元帅(the Soviet DM Marshal Grechko)关于苏联海军太平洋舰队核潜艇在印度洋上浮赶走美英特混舰队的事件详细通报过程中，苏联国防部长说了这么一句意味深长的特别重要的话：如果我们两国结盟，苏联可以从核武库中拨出50枚洲际导弹划归印度名下，专门用于满足印度威慑东土神州赤县的国防需求(“If we have an alliance, I shall earmark 50 Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) to your defence against China.”)\n听到这话，英迪拉·甘地一笑置之，印度只想拥有核威慑力。而苏联要的是引诱印度加入苏联阵营，和西方搞对抗。这是印度不能答应的，因为印度实行不结盟政策，在东西方之间印度不想选边站，因为两边都得罪不起，印度只想左右逢源，夹缝求生。所以这个提议政治上不可行。\n但是苏联的建议(the potential silo keepers for the nuclear war-heads programme)深化了英迪拉·甘地对核威慑力的理解，她认识到如果不考虑到建设一个完整的核威慑系统的所有方方面面，仅仅是集中全力搞一次核爆炸，其实没有什么多大意思(without all the other elements that are needed for completing the deterrence system – merely carrying out one nuclear explosion would achieve nothing)。说白了就是必须发展出实战化的核兵力才能唬人。\n经过与苏联方面在核问题上的互动，印度总理英迪拉甘地对于印度发展核威慑力的态度逐渐明确。她最终成为印度核计划的最大推动者。\n1972年11月15日，英迪拉甘地总理在印度国会宣布，印度政府决定开展一次和平的核爆炸(Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE))。同时对潜艇核动力推进的设计方案进行。\n1974年，人民海军首次发表了第一艘核潜艇SSN，印度政府立即在同年5月8日悍然下令实施第一次核试验(Pokhran I PNE)，作为回击。\n而关于潜艇核动力推进论证研究计划，真正开始启动从1976年1月算起。因为这时印度政府内阁政治事务委员会正式决策批准了它。当时的印度海军后勤部长海军中将贪蹲和印度海军总部的海洋工程局坚决维护这个项目。计划安排用至少四年的时间论证研究核动力推进装置和潜艇设计方案。\nThe nuclear propulsion project took off in earnest in January 1976, after the approval of the Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs. Vice Admiral Tandon, the then Chief of Material, who along with the DME(The Director of Marine Engineering (DME) NHQ), was defending the case, had made it abundantly clear that at least a four-year lead time would need to be catered for – between the design/development of a nuclear plant and the s/m design.\n按照印度核潜艇计划，印度的核潜艇研制按照三条平行的战线展开。它们分别是核动力推进，作为武器平台的潜艇艇体，潜射弹道导弹。\nThe programme was, thereafter, initiated on three parallel tracks – the nuclear propulsion, the s/m as a weapons platform and the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM).\n1976年，印度与苏联民用核能合作计划正式启动。\n1976年1月22日，在印度海军后勤部长贪蹲中将(V Admiral Tandon)的促使下，印度联邦政府计划委员会批准向压水反应堆计划(the Pressure Water Reactor (PWR) project)提供财政拨款。\n在核动力推进的研究开发阶段，没有明确核动力装置最终应用的平台是什么。但是在工作层级（At the working level），人们的理解是，它的终极目标为核威慑或者说用于弹道导弹核潜艇nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)。\n根据印度战略规划者的论述，北极熊和眯眯眼水师不约而同地采取了相似的循序渐进的发展路线，即从常规潜艇，到巡航导弹潜艇到核攻击型核潜艇，最后到核动力弹道导弹核潜艇(conventional attack s/m (SS) > Cruise missile armed conventional s/m (SSG) > nuclear s/m with cruise missile (SSGN) > nuclear attack s/m (SSN) and finally to ballistic missile armed nuclear s/m (SSBN).)。所以印度海军也只能走同样的路。尤其是考虑到要突破国际上核技术防扩散体制的难度和搞核试验可能受到经济制裁可能性。\n1978年在印度巴巴原子能研究中心成立了一个核潜艇动力包研究小组。\nNuclear propulsion technology was inescapable if Indiawas not to be left too far behind by the end of the century,when atomic energy would be a major source for bothpropulsion and energy requirements. A small nucleus ofengineers was located in BARC as early as 1978.\n\n\"Seeing the advent of nuclear propulsion in submarinesof other navies, a study was undertaken by BARC tostudy a nuclear propulsion package for naval ships andsubmarines. A stage arose when it became necessary to trainserving personnel in this very important area of propulsiontechnology.\"\n\n印度巴巴原子能研究中心，在1980年就搞出了设计方案但是被海军否决。\n\n\nApril 1980\nThe Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) submits a proposal to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to build a nuclearreactor for a nuclear submarine at a cost of approximately 1.5 billion rupees. The BARC proposal is reviewed by anaval team led by Captain Bharat Bhushan and his deputy Subbarao. The Indian Navy identifies 14 design flaws inthe proposed reactor design, and points to violations of some basic safety requirements observed in nuclear\nsubmarines. The Navy's assessment is reviewed by the prime minister who declines BARC's request. Subsequent tothe rejection, BARC begins working on its fourth reactor design.\n-Raj Chengappa, \"Do You Want Our Skulls Cracked,\" Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be aNuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), pp. 248-249.\n\n印度核潜艇计划是印度总理英迪拉甘地决策，是个自上而下推进的，贪大求洋的项目。对印度海军有些超前太多了，印度海军内部其实并没有意愿和能力搞这个玩意。\n印度海军领导都是英国人训练出来的老人，他们信奉英国人制定的1947印度海军发展计划。英国人没说过印度海军要用核潜艇。想都不要想，就觉得这肯定不对。\n\nThe naval acquisitions from the Soviet Union had started in 1965 when the Navy's\ntraditional supplier, the British Navy, because of its own constraints, was unable to meetthe Navy's requirements for more powerful destroyers and the latest conventionallypropelled submarines.\nThe initial acquisitions of ships and submarines from Russia had been designed for theRussian Navy, which operated in a cold and dry climate and in cold, low salinity seas.They had not been designed to operate in the hot humid climate and the warm, salineand highly corrosive seas typical of the tropics. As the Navy gained experience of\noperating Russian vessels in tropical conditions, it identified the essential alterations andadditions required to 'tropicalise' the Russian designs.\n\n\n苏联潜艇在高温高湿高盐的印度水域使用遇到许多问题，同时潜艇维修也让印度海军焦头烂额。\n\nThe Submarine Arm had started with eight submarines from Russia - four Kalvari class in1968-69 and four Vela class in 1973-74. Due to the increased corrosion experienced inwarm saline tropical waters and the deferment of 6-yearly refits because the repair\nfacilities in Visakhapatnam Dockyard were not ready, the deterioration in the materialstate of the first four submarines was tackled on two fronts:\nSubmarines started being sent back to Russia for 6-yearly repairs. Concurrently,6-yearly repairs were commenced in Visakhapatnam with Russian assistance,using whatever limited facilities were available. It took some years for the\nsituation to stabilise. Between 1975 and 1992, five submarines underwent 6-yearly repairs in Russia and six submarines underwent 6-yearly repairs inVisakhapatnam.\nDiscussions were initiated with the Soviet side for successors to the earlier eightsubmarines. These culminated in the acquisition of the eight 877 EKMsubmarines between 1986 and 1990.\nSubmarine Arm projects were not restricted to Europe and Russia. A landmark deal wasthe VLF transaction, with an American firm. When submerged, submarines can only\nreceive wireless messages on Very Low Frequency (VLF). The discussions that had beenin progress with the Soviet Union and the United States culminated in 1984 with the\nselection of an American company, in collaboration with an Indian company, to design,manufacture, install and commission the VLF transmitting station; it was commissionedin 1990\n\n\n\n\n在七，八十年代，印度海军还是潜艇专业的小学生。学习任务很重，它的精力根本不够用。\n1980年10月，印度海军召开司令员年度大会，会上海军高级军官们对于建造核潜艇计划发生分歧。\n\nLate October 1980\nThe Indian Navy organizes a Commanders Conference at the port of Vishakhapatnam. The conference is attendedby all three chiefs of staff of the armed services, the Vice Chief of Naval Staff Tahliani, and the flag officers\ncommanding India's fleets. During conference proceedings, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Pereira opposes theproposal to build nuclear submarines. However, his deputies demur in favor of exploring the option.\n-Raj Chengappa, \"Do You Want Our Skulls Cracked,\" Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be aNuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000], pp. 249-250.\n\n\n当时的印度海军参谋长Pereira海军上将一个人跳出来表示他反对建造核潜艇。其实这个老领导的意见也对，印度连常规潜艇都没造过就想造核潜艇，真是癞蛤蟆想吃天鹅肉，好高骛远，异想天开。\n\nOctober 1980\nThe Indian Navy remains divided over the question of nuclear submarine acquisitions from the Soviet Union.\nOpponents of the proposal argue that such acquisitions will increase India's dependence on the Soviet Union. Chiefof Naval Staff Admiral Pereira reportedly remarks to his deputy R. Tahliani that it is premature for the IN to go fornuclear submarines when it still hasn't mastered the technology to build conventional submersibles.\n-Raj Chengappa, \"Do You Want Our Skulls Cracked,\" Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be aNuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), p. 249.\n\n\n但是英迪拉甘地决心已定，反对意见听不进。\n\n\nDecember 1981\nChief of Naval Staff Admiral Pereira writes to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi objecting to the nuclear submarinedeal. Pereira argues that the Soviet offer will make India dependent on the Soviet Union and prevent the IndianNavy from consummating the deal to purchase HDW diesel-electric boats from West Germany. However, theprime minister rebuts the naval chief's case arguing that monies for the HDW contract have already beensanctioned and would not be affected by the nuclear submarine deal.\n-Raj Chengappa, \"Do You Want Our Skulls Cracked,\" Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to beNuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), p. 253.\n\n过了不久，印度海军参谋长换人，新参谋长又是个犟种，依然坚决反对印度建造核潜艇。\nsanctioned and would not be affected by the nuclear submarine deal.\n-Raj Chengappa, \"Do You Want Our Skulls Cracked,\" Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to beNuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), p. 253.\n\n过了不久,印度海军参谋长换人,新参谋长又是个翠种,依然反对印度建造核潜艇。\n\nMarch-April 1982\nAdmiral Dawson, who succeeds Pereira as the Naval Chief of Staff, also opposes the nuclear submarine project. Ateam of naval designers led by Captain Subbarao persuades Dawson to reject the Bhabha Atomic Research\nCenter's (BARC) nuclear reactor design in favor of the one designed by naval engineers. In subsequent meetingswith defense minister R. Venkataraman, Dawson opposes suggestions to get Soviet assistance in the design of anuclear reactor and complains that the Navy is not being kept abreast of the Soviet proposal. Dawson is alsosupported by BARC, which views the Soviet offer as a ploy to undermine indigenous efforts. However,\nVenkataraman overrules Dawson and informs him that the government has decided to seek Soviet assistance.-Raj Chengappa, \" Arsenal For The Gods,\" Weapans of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a NuclearPower (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), pp. 287-288.\n\n\n就在印度海军有心无力，眼高手低，难成大事的尴尬时刻。1981年4月苏联老大哥派遣的高级军事代表团访问印度，这次访问意义重大印度核潜艇计划得以涅槃重生。欲知详情且听下回分解。\n"}]}
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