A social turn--Hard work and black swans  

To explain wealth and poverty, the ideas of the earliest economists are being revisited and improved

Other economists look to the distant past to explain contemporary disparities in income and wealth. A paper from last year by Benjamin Enke of Harvard University finds evidence that pre-industrial ethnicities which were exposed to a high local prevalence of pathogens exhibited tighter kinship systems meaning, in effect, that people were strongly loyal to their extended family but suspicious of outsiders. In a place threatened by disease, tight family ties were beneficial because they reduced the need to travel, and therefore the risk of being exposed. Places which had tighter kinship systems hundreds of years ago tend to be poorer today, a relationship which first emerged during the industrial revolution. Other research has looked even further back, suggesting that contemporary cultural traits are the result of genetic variation. But this remains a niche pursuit, and most economists turn queasy when it comes to talking about genetics.

disparity  n. /dɪˈspærəti/  （尤指因不公正对待引起的）不同，不等，差异，悬殊

prevalence /ˈprevələns/ n. 流行；普遍；广泛   Pathogen  n. /ˈpæθədʒən/  ( technical 术语 ) 病原体

kinship  n. /ˈkɪnʃɪp/  

1. 亲属关系 •the ties of kinship 亲属关系；2.（因出身或态度相似而产生的）亲切感

genetic variation：基因异变      niche pursuit：小众爱好/追求

Queasy  adj. /ˈkwiːzi/  1.恶心的；欲吐的2.稍感紧张的；略有不安的；心神不定的

A separate body of research focuses on cases where culture is not a sufficient explanation for economic outcomes. Take the case of Guatemala and Costa Rica. “The two countries had similar histories, similar geographies and cultural inheritance, and were faced with the same economic opportunities in the 19th century,” write Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in “The Narrow Corridor”, a book published last year. But today the average Costa Rican is more than twice as rich as the average Guatemalan. The cause of the divergence initially appeared random, according to Mr Acemoglu and Mr Robinson. Eventually it became clear it was down to coffee. In Costa Rica the development of coffee plantations for the European market led to a more balanced relationship between state and society, possibly because the country had more marginal land and more smallholders. In Guatemala, by contrast, it led to the emergence of a rapacious government.

Guatemala /ˌɡwɑːtəˈmɑːlə; ˌɡwætəˈmɑːlə/ 危地马拉（拉丁美洲）  Costa Rica 哥斯达黎加 中美洲国家

 Corridorn.   /ˈkɒrɪdɔː(r)/  

1. （建筑物内的）走廊，过道，通道•His room is along the corridor. 他的房间就在走廊边。

2.（火车上的）走道，过道，通道

3.走廊（一国领土通过他国境内的狭长地带）；空中走廊（一国领空中允许他国飞机经过的区域）air corridor

4.（沿着重要道路或河道的）狭长地带 •the electronics industry in the M4 corridor 沿 4 号高速公路狭长地带的电子工业

IDIOMS 习语

THE CORRIDORS OF ˈPOWER ( sometimes humorous )权力走廊（高层政治决策机构）

Plantation  n. /plɑːnˈteɪʃn/  

1. 种植园，种植场（尤指热带国家种植咖啡、甘蔗、橡胶等的大庄园 •a banana plantation 香蕉种植园

2.  木材林地；人造林  •conifer/forestry plantations 针叶树林地；种植林

Rapacious  adj. /rəˈpeɪʃəs/  ( formal disapproving )  贪婪的；贪欲的；强取的

In addition to culture, therefore, a growing band of economists is looking at institutions , often taken to mean the legal system and regulations. Some cultural economists argue that the focus on institutions proves their point: what are institutions if not the product of norms, values and preferences? Americans’ and Europeans’ differing beliefs about the causes of inequality, for instance, go a long way towards explaining why European welfare states are more generous than America’s.

 go a long way：走了很长一段路、细水长流、对···大有帮助

But in many cases the emergence of different institutions may have nothing to do with a country’s culture. Sometimes it is just luck. Mr Mokyr shows that Europe, which was fragmented into lots of states, was the perfect setting for innovation: intellectuals who challenged received wisdom and incurred the wrath of the authorities could move elsewhere (Thomas Hobbes wrote “Leviathan” in Paris). By contrast in China, Mr Mokyr argues, free thinkers had few escape routes. Europeans did not plan such a system. It just happened.

intellectual /ˌɪntɪˈlɛktʃʊəl/adj. 智力的；聪明的；理智的 n. 知识分子；凭理智做事者

received wisdom：指被大众、社会接受、承认的知识，就是常规常识

incur  v. /ɪnˈkɜː(r)/  

1.招致；遭受；引起•She had incurred the wrath of her father by marrying without his consent 她未经父亲同意就结婚，使父亲震怒。

2.引致，带来（成本、花费等）•You risk incurring bank charges if you exceed your overdraft limit. 如果超出了透支限额，就有被银行加收费用的风险。

Wrath  n. /rɒθ/  盛怒；震怒；怒火 • the wrath of God 上帝的愤怒

Other work by Mr Acemoglu and Mr Robinson, along with Simon Johnson of MIT, has found a further element of randomness which may explain contemporary patterns of wealth and poverty namely, which countries are more prone to certain diseases. The mortality rate of settlers was low in some colonised countries, such as New Zealand and Australia, in part because the kinds of diseases that were there were less virulent. In others, such as Mali and Nigeria, mortality rates were far higher. Colonisers did not want to settle in countries with a high risk of disease, even as they wanted to take those countries’ raw materials. So in countries such as Mali and Nigeria, rather than permanently settling, they set up systems which enabled the maximum of resource extraction with the fewest boots on the ground. That, say Messrs Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, produced rapacious political systems which have endured to this day.

Virulent  adj. /ˈvɪrələnt/  /‑rjəl‑/  

1.(疾病或毒物) 致命的；恶性的；剧毒的 2.狠毒的；恶毒的；不共戴天的 •virulent criticism 恶意的批评

Are economists any closer to answering the foundational question of their science? Far from the simplistic certainty of Weber, it seems likely that some countries are rich and others poor because of a messy combination of economic incentives, culture, institutions and chance which is most important remains unclear. In 1817 Thomas Malthus, one of the early economists, wrote in a letter to David Ricardo, another, that “the causes of the wealth and poverty of nations [were] the grand object of all enquiries in Political Economy”. The revival of cultural economics two centuries on has helped in that quest, but it is not over yet.

译文

Other economists look to the distant past to explain contemporary disparities in income and wealth. A paper from last year by Benjamin Enke of Harvard University finds evidence that pre-industrial ethnicities which were exposed to a high local prevalence of pathogens exhibited tighter kinship systems meaning, in effect, that people were strongly loyal to their extended family but suspicious of outsiders. In a place threatened by disease, tight family ties were beneficial because they reduced the need to travel, and therefore the risk of being exposed. Places which had tighter kinship systems hundreds of years ago tend to be poorer today, a relationship which first emerged during the industrial revolution. Other research has looked even further back, suggesting that contemporary cultural traits are the result of genetic variation. But this remains a niche pursuit, and most economists turn queasy when it comes to talking about genetics.

其他经济学家通过研究遥远的过去来研究当前收入与财富的差异。去年哈佛大学Benjamin Enke 发表的文章发现前工业时代族群暴露在高病毒患病率地区的会展现出比较紧密的家族体系。这表明，实际中这些人会对大家族高度忠诚而对外界人群保持警惕。在疾病肆虐的地区，紧密的家族纽带是对人有帮助的，它减少外出需求，降低人暴露在病毒中的风险。那些几百年前家族关系紧密的地区在现在相对贫穷，这种关联最早在工业化时代显现。其他学者看向更远的地方，认为当代文化特质来自于基因异变。但这只是一小撮人的爱好，大部分的经济学家一提及遗传学就反感。

A separate body of research focuses on cases where culture is not a sufficient explanation for economic outcomes. Take the case of Guatemala and Costa Rica. “The two countries had similar histories, similar geographies and cultural inheritance, and were faced with the same economic opportunities in the 19th century,” write Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in “The Narrow Corridor”, a book published last year. But today the average Costa Rican is more than twice as rich as the average Guatemalan. The cause of the divergence initially appeared random, according to Mr Acemoglu and Mr Robinson. Eventually it became clear it was down to coffee. In Costa Rica the development of coffee plantations for the European market led to a more balanced relationship between state and society, possibly because the country had more marginal land and more smallholders. In Guatemala, by contrast, it led to the emergence of a rapacious government.

另一个分支学者着重研究那些人文不能充分解释的案例。以危地马拉和哥斯达黎加为例，Daron Acemoglu 与 James Robinson在去年出版的《狭长走廊》中提到两国历史相近、文化相通、地理相似，并同时在19世纪面临一样的经济机遇。但现在哥斯达黎加人均财富是危地马拉的两倍。根据Acemoglu先生与 Robinson先生的说法，造成差异的原因开始是偶然的，最终变得具体--是咖啡。在哥斯达黎加，供应欧洲市场的咖啡庄园发展推动了政府与社会关系的平衡，也许是因为这个国家有更多的边境土地和小农户。而危地马拉则相反，它导致了掠夺性政府的出现。

In addition to culture, therefore, a growing band of economists is looking at institutions , often taken to mean the legal system and regulations. Some cultural economists argue that the focus on institutions proves their point: what are institutions if not the product of norms, values and preferences? Americans’ and Europeans’ differing beliefs about the causes of inequality, for instance, go a long way towards explaining why European welfare states are more generous than America’s.

文化之外，一撮不断壮大的经济学家们研究制度，通常研究法律规章制度。一些人文经济学家辩论到对制度的研究验证了他们的观点：制度难道不是标准、价值观念与偏好的产物吗？例如欧美关于导致不平等因素的不同理解是解释欧洲福利普遍比美国慷慨的关键原因。

But in many cases the emergence of different institutions may have nothing to do with a country’s culture. Sometimes it is just luck. Mr Mokyr shows that Europe, which was fragmented into lots of states, was the perfect setting for innovation: intellectuals who challenged received wisdom and incurred the wrath of the authorities could move elsewhere (Thomas Hobbes wrote “Leviathan” in Paris). By contrast in China, Mr Mokyr argues, free thinkers had few escape routes. Europeans did not plan such a system. It just happened.

但更多案例中不同制度的出现似乎与国家文化有什么管理，有的时候只是好运。Mokyr先生解释多个大小国家分割的欧洲曾是创新的完美温床：知识分子挑战常规常识遭到权威的迫害可以跑到别的国家去。例如Thomas Hobbes 在巴黎著成《利维坦》。但有的国家环境并不一样。欧洲并没有可以安排这样的布局，它只是偶然发生。

Other work by Mr Acemoglu and Mr Robinson, along with Simon Johnson of MIT, has found a further element of randomness which may explain contemporary patterns of wealth and poverty namely, which countries are more prone to certain diseases. The mortality rate of settlers was low in some colonised countries, such as New Zealand and Australia, in part because the kinds of diseases that were there were less virulent. In others, such as Mali and Nigeria, mortality rates were far higher. Colonisers did not want to settle in countries with a high risk of disease, even as they wanted to take those countries’ raw materials. So in countries such as Mali and Nigeria, rather than permanently settling, they set up systems which enabled the maximum of resource extraction with the fewest boots on the ground. That, say Messrs Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, produced rapacious political systems which have endured to this day.

Acemoglu 与 Robinson先生及麻省理工的Simon Johnson的其他著作也发现另一个可能可以解释当代贫富模式的随机因素：哪些国家更容易爆发哪些疾病。在一些殖民国家移民死亡率偏低，比如新西兰和澳大利亚，某种程度上此地病毒致命性不强；而在马里和尼日利亚，死亡率偏高。殖民者不愿意在高死亡率国家定居，即使他们想掠夺其原材料。所以在马里或者尼日利亚，相较于永久定居，殖民者创建了能够保障用最少的人力获取最大的利益的制度。这样，据三位学者解释，产生了掠夺性政治制度并延续至今。

Are economists any closer to answering the foundational question of their science? Far from the simplistic certainty of Weber, it seems likely that some countries are rich and others poor because of a messy combination of economic incentives, culture, institutions and chance which is most important remains unclear. In 1817 Thomas Malthus, one of the early economists, wrote in a letter to David Ricardo, another, that “the causes of the wealth and poverty of nations [were] the grand object of all enquiries in Political Economy”. The revival of cultural economics two centuries on has helped in that quest, but it is not over yet.

有经济学家可以进一步回答经济学的基础问题吗？远不同于韦伯的简单肯定，如今看来国家的贫富差距是由多重因素影响，如经济刺激、人文、制度与偶然因素，谁最重要仍是未解之谜。在1817年托马斯·马尔萨斯，一位早期的经济学家写给另一位经济学家大卫·李嘉图的信中写道：国家贫富差距的原因是政治经济学所有问题中的宏伟课题。文化经济学两世纪后的复兴推动着对这一课题的研究，但并未结束。