（文章翻译）封建主义再辩论：拜占庭案例（三）
上一部分
John Haldon. The feudalism debate once more: The case of Byzantium[J]. The Journal of Peasant Studies,1989(1). pp.5-40.
第四部分
First, the fate of the urban pattern of late Roman society. The evidence now available, both archaeological and literary, makes it quite clear that the urban centres of the late ancient world were almost entirely eclipsed during the seventh and early eighth centuries. The classical city, the polis or civitas, had come during the Roman period to occupy a central role both in the social and economic structure of Mediterranean society, as well as in the administrative machinery of the empire. The cities were centres of market-exchange, of regional agricultural activity, occasionally of small-scale commodity production or, where ports were concerned, major foci of long-distance maritime commerce. Crucially, they were also self-governing districts with, originally, their own lands, and were made responsible by the Roman state for the return of taxes. Where cities in the Hellenistic or Mediterranean sense did not exist, the Roman state created them, sometimes establishing entirely new foundations, sometimes amalgamating or changing the nature of pre-exisiting settlements and providing them with the corporate identity, institutional structure and legal personality of a civitas. These cities were on the whole, however, dependent on their territorial hinterland for their (usually highly localised) market and industrial functions, as well as for the foodstuffs from which their populations lived. They acted as local centres, but on the whole were parasitic on their territoria. And as the social and economic structure of the empire evolved away from the relationships which gave rise to and maintained these urban structures, so the cities became the first key institution of the classical world to feel the effects of these changes.
首先，罗马社会后期的城市模式的命运。现在可用的证据，包括考古学和文学方面的证据，很清楚地表明，在七世纪和八世纪初，古代世界的城市中心几乎完全消失了。古典城市，即polis或civitas，在罗马时期，在地中海社会的社会和经济结构中，以及在帝国的行政机制中，都占据着核心地位。这些城市是市场交换的中心，是地区农业活动的中心，偶尔也是小规模商品生产的中心，或者在港口方面，是远距离海上贸易的主要中心。最重要的是，它们也是自治地区，最初拥有自己的土地，并由罗马国家负责归还税收。在希腊或地中海意义上的城市不存在的地方，罗马国家创造了它们，有时建立全新的基础，有时合并或改变先前存在的定居点的性质，并为它们提供企业身份、制度结构和公民的法律人格。然而，这些城市总体上依赖于其领土腹地的市场和工业功能（通常是高度本地化的），以及其居民赖以生存的食品。它们作为当地的中心，但总的来说是寄生在其领土上的。随着帝国的社会和经济结构从产生和维持这些城市结构的关系中演变出来，城市成为古典世界中第一个感受到这些变化影响的关键地区。
The forms which these changes took are complex, but mirror the effects of a growing conflict between state, cities and private landowners to extract surpluses from the producers; and the failure of the cities to weather the contradictions between their municipal independence on the one hand, and on the other the demands of the state and the vested interests of the wealthier civic landowners. Although there is evidence right up to the early seventh century in the East that many curiales, or members of the city councils, did honour their obligations with respect to both state and city, it is clear already by the later fourth century that many did, or could, not. The curiales, as landowners and leading citizens, had been responsible both for the upkeep of their cities by voluntary subscription, and for the local assessment, collection and forwarding of the revenues demanded by the state. But as many were able to gain senatorial status (which freed them from curial obligations), so the burden of tax-collection and the covering of deficits fell more and more upon the less privileged or wealthy, who were in consequence less able to extract all the revenues demanded (especially as tax evasion among the wealthy, through bribery as well as physical opposition, was endemic). In fact, the whole thing is more nuanced and complex than I have been able to suggest here, but these were some of its most obvious features. As a result, and over the period from the later fourth to the later fifth century (in the West until the empire disappears as well as in the East), the state had to intervene ever more directly to ensure the extraction of its revenues, both by the appointment of supervisors imposed upon the cities, as well as through the confiscation of city lands (the source of rents for the cities' own income) and, eventually, through the appointment of tax-farmers for each municipal district. The curiales seem still to have done the actual work of collecting, but the burden of fiscal accountability seems to have been removed during the reign of Anastasius (491-518). While this certainly relieved the pressure, and possibly promoted the brief renaissance which seems to have occurred in some eastern cities in the sixth century, it did nothing to re-establish their traditional independence and fiscal responsibilities. The expansion of the state bureaucracy into this level of provincial affairs, a direct result of the state's efforts to secure its control over resources, conflicted clearly with the corporate interests of the cities. As they lost ground to the central administration, so they lost the support of their local landowning aristocracies. The civic pride formerly attached to their administrative functions continued a sort of twilight existence; but by the middle of the sixth century the state was the only institution which could afford to invest in civic building - usually defensive or administrative and directly reflecting the state's own priorities. The Church could also intervene, of course, but did so in the East, at any rate, less often.
这些变化的形式很复杂，但反映了国家、城市和私人土地所有者之间为从生产者那里获取盈余而发生的日益严重的冲突；以及城市未能经受住一方面其市政独立，另一方面国家的要求和较富裕的城市土地所有者的既得利益之间的矛盾。虽然有证据表明，直到七世纪初，东方的许多教区长或市议会成员确实履行了对国家和城市的义务，但很明显，到了四世纪后期，许多人已经做到了，或者无法做到。作为土地所有者和主要公民，教士们一直负责通过自愿捐款维持他们的城市，并负责地方评估、收集和转发国家要求的收入。但是，由于许多人能够获得元老院的地位（这使他们摆脱了教区的义务），因此征税和弥补赤字的负担越来越多地落在了没有特权的人或富人身上，因此他们不太能够提取所有的收入要求（特别是由于富人中通过贿赂和人身反对而逃税的现象十分普遍）。事实上，整个事情的细微差别和复杂性超过了我在这里的建议，但这些是它最明显的一些特征。因此，在四世纪后期到五世纪后期这段时间里（在西方直到帝国消失以及在东方），国家不得不更加直接地进行干预，以确保其收入的提取，既通过任命强加给城市的监督员，也通过没收城市土地（城市自身收入的租金来源），并最终通过任命每个城市地区的税农。教士们似乎仍在进行实际的征收工作，但财政责任的负担似乎在阿纳斯塔修斯统治时期（491-518年）被取消。虽然这无疑缓解了压力，并可能促进了六世纪一些东部城市似乎出现的短暂复兴，但这对重建其传统的独立性和财政责任毫无帮助。国家官僚机构向省级事务的扩展，是国家努力确保其对资源控制的直接结果，与城市的企业利益明显冲突。由于他们在中央行政机构面前失去了地位，所以他们也失去了当地地主贵族的支持。以前依附于其行政职能的公民自豪感继续以一种黄昏的方式存在；但到了六世纪中叶，国家是唯一有能力投资于公民建筑的机构，通常是防御性或行政性的，直接反映了国家自身的优先事项。当然，教会也可以进行干预，但在东方这样做，至少是比较少的。
By the middle of the sixth century, cities had effectively lost their autonomy and were no longer centres of independent, self-administering districts. Apart from the needs of local civil and ecclesiastical administration, they were bypassed by the state, replaced by the salaried bureaucracy of the central government. As they lost their role as centres of local social and economic power, so the local elites turned their attention away from them and to the capital.
到六世纪中叶，城市实际上已经失去了自治权，不再是独立的、自我管理的地区中心。除了地方民事和教会管理的需要外，它们被国家绕过，被中央政府的受薪官僚机构所取代。由于它们失去了作为地方社会和经济权力中心的作用，所以地方精英们把注意力从它们身上转移到了首都。
By the seventh century, cities were becoming merely centres of revenue collection. Their survival during and after the Arab invasions (which, it must be stressed, lasted with varying degrees of intensity in Asia Minor from the 640s until the 750s on a more or less yearly basis) owed much to the fact that they might occupy defensible sites, as well as be centres of military or ecclesiastical administration. But the great majority played no commercial or market-exchange role of significance. Any economic role they may have played was peripheral to, and derived from, the economic and social life of the countryside, and reflected if anything the needs of state and Church. The invasions of the seventh century dealt what was simply the final blow to an already dying institution.
到了七世纪，城市仅仅成为税收的中心。它们在阿拉伯人入侵期间和之后的生存（必须强调的是，从公元7世纪40年代到8世纪50年代，小亚细亚或多或少每年都有不同程度的入侵）在很大程度上归功于这样一个事实，即它们可以占据可防御的地点，并成为军事或教会管理中心。但是，绝大多数的城池并没有发挥任何重要的商业或市场交换的作用。它们可能发挥的任何经济作用都是与农村的经济和社会生活相联系的，并且反映了国家和教会的需要。七世纪的入侵对一个已经奄奄一息的机构来说简直是最后一击。
The second factor of importance which is worth dwelling on is more difficult to elucidate, because of the nature of the little evidence that there is, but can be sketched in with a fair degree of certainty by looking at the ways in which the state apparatus functions in this period up to the mid-seventh century, and after the later eighth century. I refer, of course, to the fate of the late Roman ruling class, and the relationship between the state and the evolving military-bureaucratic elite which begins to appear in the sources from the later seventh century.
值得赘述的第二个重要因素更难阐明，因为所掌握的证据很少，但通过考察这一时期到七世纪中叶以及八世纪后期以后国家机器的运作方式，可以相当肯定地勾勒出这一因素。当然，我指的是罗马后期统治阶级的命运，以及从七世纪后期开始出现在资料中的国家与不断发展的军事-官僚精英之间的关系。
There is little doubt that this new elite owes its origins to the period of turmoil and re-organisation of state structures which occurred in the seventh century. The needs of the state in respect of finding persons competent to deal with both civil and military matters in the provinces in this period of crisis is a central consideration. The advantages an individual had over both local landlords and peasants if he occupied a position of military or political authority in the provinces were considerable - a monopoly of armed force, for example, the power to seize or confiscate food or other products for the soldiery, and so forth. Persons appointed to such positions thus had every opportunity to further their own interests if they desired. But what is particularly important, and emerges from a number of careful prosopographical analyses of state officials at this time, is that the composition of both the senate in Constantinople and of the state's leading officials changes. The old senatorial elite, in the broadest sense, gradually gives way to persons of different origins. Although there had always been space for 'newcomers', under imperial patronage, in the state establishment during the later Roman period, the greater proportion of non-Greek names, for example, of officials known from literary sources or lead seals is very striking from the 660s and after. At the same time, the old system of senatorial dignities and titles (in three groups, the clarissimi, the illustres and the spectabiles - the latter including also the elite grade of gloriosi from the sixth century) seems to drop out of use, only the leading category of gloriosus (Greek endoxos or endoxotatos) retaining any real significance.
毋庸置疑，这支新的精英队伍起源于七世纪发生的国家结构的动荡和重组时期。在这个危机时期，国家需要寻找有能力处理各省民事和军事事务的人，这是一个核心考虑。如果一个人在各省占据了军事或政治权威的位置，他对当地地主和农民的优势是相当大的。例如，对武装力量的垄断，为士兵夺取或没收粮食或其他产品的权力，等等。因此，被任命为这些职位的人如果愿意，完全有机会赚取自己的利益。但特别重要的是，从对这一时期国家官员的一些仔细的前景分析中可以看出，君士坦丁堡的元老院和国家主要官员的组成都发生了变化。在最广泛的意义上，旧的元老院精英逐渐让位给不同出身的人。尽管在罗马后期的国家机构中一直有“新人”的空间，但从660年代及以后，非希腊名字的比例越来越大，例如，从文学资料或铅印中得知的官员。同时，旧的元老级地位和头衔系统（分为三组，即clarissimi、illustres和spectabiles--后者还包括六世纪以来的精英级gloriosi）似乎不再使用，只有主要类别的gloriosus（希腊语endoxos或endoxotatos）保留了真正的意义。
Together, these developments suggest both a considerable change in the cultural and social origins of key personnel in the imperial establishment, at all levels; and the increasing irrelevance of a system of titles which no longer corresponded to either social or political realities. This is made clear in the evident re-jigging of the whole system of titles and precedence during the seventh century, in which the importance of titles and posts dependent directly upon imperial palatine service increases to the disadvantage of older titles associated in one way or another with the senatorial order. Power is concentrated and focused more than ever before on the figure of the emperor and in the imperial palace, while the older, much more pluralistic system of rank, privilege, wealth and power disappears. And all these developments in turn suggest that, while many senatorial landowners probably did hold on to their properties during this period of massive economic disruption and sometimes severe political repression (confiscations of senatorial property and waves of executions are supposed to have occurred in the reigns of Phocas - 602-610 - and Justinian II [2nd rule] - 705-711) the old elite must have suffered very considerably as the economic effects of constant warfare came to be felt
这些发展表明，帝国各级机构中的关键人员的文化和社会渊源发生了巨大变化；同时，与社会或政治现实不再相符的头衔制度也越来越不重要。这一点在七世纪整个头衔和优先权系统的明显重新调整中得到了体现，其中直接依赖于帝国宫廷服务的头衔和职位的重要性增加了，这对以这种或那种方式与元老院秩序相关的旧头衔不利。权力比以往任何时候都更集中，更注重于皇帝的形象和皇宫，而旧的、更多元化的等级、特权、财富和权力体系则消失了。所有这些发展反过来又表明，虽然许多元老院的地主可能在这段大规模的经济混乱和有时严重的政治压制时期（没收元老院的财产和一波又一波的处决应该发生在福卡斯（602--610年）和查士丁尼二世[第二统治] 705--711年），但由于不断的战争带来的经济影响，旧的精英阶层一定受到很大的影响。
The sum of all these changes, however, is not simply that the dominance of the older aristocracy was broken, or that the state administration was increasingly filled by newcomers. It is that the new pseudo-meritocratic service elite depended, at least in this period, entirely upon the state and upon the emperor, and although the sources are few and often difficult to interpret, one feature above all stands out: the seventh century witnessed a massive re-concentration of power and economic control in the hands of the state. The shrinkage of the empire territorially, the centralisation of fiscal administration, the effective disappearance of cities as intermediaries, socially and economically, between the provinces and Constantinople, as well as the features outlined above, were all part of this shift in emphasis. And it gave the imperial system a new lease of life which was to last until the eleventh century. But by then the service meritocracy of the later seventh century had become, by virtue of its close affiliation with the state and with imperial patronage, the provincial aristocracy of the middle and later empire.
然而，所有这些变化的总和并不只是老牌贵族的统治地位被打破，或国家行政部门越来越多地由新人担任。而是新的伪贵族服务精英，至少在这一时期，完全依赖于国家和皇帝，虽然资料很少，而且往往难以解释，但有一个特点最为突出：七世纪见证了权力和经济控制权大规模重新集中在国家手中。帝国领土的缩小，财政管理的集中化，作为各省和君士坦丁堡之间的社会和经济中介的城市的消失，以及上述特点，都是这种重点转移的一部分。它使帝国制度获得了新的生命力，并一直持续到11世纪。但到那时，七世纪后期的功勋阶层由于与国家和帝国的密切联系，已经成为帝国中期和后期的省级贵族阶层。
The inherent contradictions between the interests of an increasingly independent landowning magnate class dominating the state, and the interests of the state itself and of the particular power elite or ruling class faction which directed it at any given moment - fought out over the surpluses which could be wrung out of the agricultural producers in the empire - became clear. Should those surpluses go to the magnates, as rent, or to the state and thence, indirectly, to the power elite as taxes and other impositions? Part of the resolution, from the eleventh century, given the dependence of the state upon this class for all its chief civil and military functionaries (although distinct class fractions existed which used the state against their particular opponents) was for the state to concede revenue extraction to those upon whom it depended. The other part of the resolution was the seizure of the state by the representatives of the ruling class, and the establishment of a more openly dynastic system of administration, dependent upon a precarious network of clan alliances and patronage supported by the leading magnate families. But it is important to note that the state even at this stage, when it had become politically much more obviously closely tied to the interests of the ruling class, never conceded assessment, and what eventually became de facto a hereditary concession was rarely admitted de iure.
主宰国家的日益独立的大地主阶级的利益与国家本身的利益以及在任何特定时刻指挥国家的特定权力精英或统治阶级派别的利益之间的内在矛盾（为从帝国的农业生产者那里榨取的盈余而争斗）变得很明显。这些盈余应该作为地租归大户所有，还是归国家所有，然后作为税收和其他强制措施间接归权力精英所有？从11世纪开始，鉴于国家的所有主要民事和军事职能部门都依赖于这个阶级（尽管存在不同的阶级派别，它们利用国家来对付其特定的对手），决议的一部分是国家让出收入给它所依赖的人。决议的另一部分是由统治阶级的代表夺取国家，并建立一个更公开的王朝管理制度，依赖于一个不稳定的氏族联盟网络和由主要大贵族家族支持的赞助人。但重要的是要注意，即使在这个阶段，当国家在政治上与统治阶级的利益更明显地紧密联系在一起时，它也从未承认过评估，而且最终成为事实上的世袭特许权的东西很少被依法承认。
Here we can pause a moment to look more closely at the key elements which are claimed to be indicative of a developing feudalism in the Byzantine world; and without which, the argument goes, no feudalism in Byzantium can be said to have existed. Two aspects above all have been singled out: first, the granting, from the later eleventh century, of proniai to individuals, that is to say, the concession by the state to individuals of the right to receive the revenues from certain public (that is, fiscal, or taxed) districts; or of certain imperial estates, and their tenants, along with part or all of the rents and taxes raised on them. Such grants were made for a variety of reasons to individuals by the emperors. They were personal grants from the emperor, not from the state in any institutional sense; and while there is a general sense in which the word pronoia is used in the sources, that which concerns us involves pronoia grants in return for military service. The second aspect is concerned with the increasing subordination of the peasantry to both private landlords and holders of pronoiai.
在这里，我们可以稍作停顿，更仔细地看看那些据称表明拜占庭世界正在发展的封建主义的关键因素；而且，据说没有这些因素，就不能说拜占庭的封建主义已经存在了。最重要的是两个方面：第一，从11世纪后期开始，向个人授予土地，也就是说，国家向个人让渡权利，以获得某些公共（即财政或税收）地区的收入；或某些帝国庄园及其租户，以及部分或全部租金和税收的权利。皇帝出于各种原因对个人进行了这种授予。它们是皇帝的个人赠与，而不是任何制度意义上的国家赠与；虽然在资料中使用pronoia一词的意义一般，但与我们有关的是以军事服务为回报的土地赠与。第二个方面是关于农民对私人地主和土地持有者（受赠人）越来越多的从属地位。
The arguments adduced by Ostrogorsky, as well as by a number of Soviet scholars, maintain in effect that these developments constitute the first signs of a process of feudalisation. Up until the appearance of military grants of pronoia, it is argued, (that is, until the later eleventh century), the central state had maintained its forces on the basis of salaries and tax-exemptions for certain categories of peasant, in order to keep up the recruitment of (a) mercenary or 'professional' units and (b) the regular, provincial but quasi-militia forces, or themata (thema being the technical word for an army and the district from which it was recruited). The predominantly free peasantry, paying taxes directly to the state, while they had been increasingly liable to the depredations and encroachments of the big landowners and magnates (especially in the tenth century [Morris, 1967]) as well as those who were also the tenants of large landlords, were all still subject to the fisc, that is, they were taxed directly (although some estate owners, particularly monastic or ecclesiastical, were exempted as a special privilege by certain emperors). With the introduction of the pronoia system, a process of alienation of the state's fiscal and juridical rights sets in, which leads ultimately to the privatisation and parcellisation of surplus appropriation by the ruling class at the state's expense.
奥斯特洛格尔斯基以及一些苏联学者提出的论点实际上认为，这些发展是封建化进程的最初迹象。据认为，直到出现普洛尼亚的军事拨款之前（即直到11世纪后期），中央国家一直在为某些类别的农民提供工资和免税的基础上维持其部队，以便继续招募（a）雇佣兵或“职业”部队和（b）正规的、省级的但准军事部队，即军区部队（军区制是军队和其招募的地区的技术词汇）。主要组成是自由农民，他们直接向国家纳税，虽然他们越来越容易受到大地主和大贵族的掠夺和侵犯（特别是在10世纪[Morris, 1967]），以及那些也是大地主的佃户，但他们都仍然受到财政的约束，也就是说，他们被直接征税（尽管一些庄园主，特别是修士或教会，被某些皇帝作为一种特殊的特权豁免）。随着普洛尼亚制度的引入，国家财政和司法权利的异化过程开始了，这最终导致了统治阶级以国家为代价对剩余拨款的私有化和部分化。
Feudalism is thus, according to these arguments, identified with what are claimed to be specific institutional forms of surplus appropriation, which are similar to those also found in the classical feudal structures of the medieval West, and which mark a major change from the mode of surplus appropriation dominant in the previous period: the pronoia is seen as the (evolving) equivalent of the fief; the increasing subordination of a free or semi-free peasantry to the magnate class and the pronoia-holders is seen as leading to a serf-like rural population.
因此，根据这些论点，封建主义被认定为特定的剩余占有的制度形式，这些形式与中世纪西方古典封建结构中的形式相似，并且标志着与前一时期占主导地位的剩余占有模式的重大变化：普洛尼亚制度被视为相当于封地的（演变中的）形式；自由或半自由农民对大贵族阶级和土地持有者的日益从属地位被视为导致了类似农奴的农村人口。
Now there is no doubt that, at the descriptive level, these institutions are similar to those of the West in many respects. Neither is there any doubt that, while they were always revocable and limited in theory, many such grants were eventually given on a semi-permanent basis (for several generations, for example) and thus tended to become the private property of the grantee, particularly where grants of estates and peasants were concerned; the other type of grant, of fiscal revenues (that is, cash) alone was less likely to follow this path, for obvious reasons. On the other hand, such grants only seem to have become generalised from the middle of the twelfth century as a means of supporting soldiers, and many of them were very small - not major estates designed to support a knight and his retinue, but quite small revenues intended to maintain a soldier for a limited period. And it is worth noting that this generalisation occurs well after the state had been seized by the Comnenus clan, one of the leading magnate families, and its allies, in 1081.
毫无疑问，在描述层面上，这些机构在许多方面与西方国家的机构相似。也没有任何疑问的是，虽然它们在理论上总是可撤销的和有限的，但许多这样的赠与最终是在半永久性的基础上给予的（例如几代人），因此倾向于成为受赠人的私有财产，特别是在涉及到庄园和农民的赠与时；另一种类型的赠与，即财政收入（即现金），由于明显的原因，不太可能遵循这一途径。另一方面，这种赠与似乎只是从12世纪中叶才开始普遍化，作为支持士兵的一种手段，而且许多赠与都非常小——不是旨在支持一个骑士及其随从的大庄园，而是旨在维持一个士兵有限时期的相当小的收入。值得注意的是，这种概括发生在国家于1081年被主要的大贵族家族之一科穆宁家族及其盟友夺取之后。
But the crucial question is this: are these institutional developments the sign of the appearance of feudal relations of production, that is, of relations of production different from those which prevailed before? and do they really represent a different mode of surplus appropriation! I do not think so, and for a number of reasons.
但关键的问题是：这些制度上的发展是否标志着封建生产关系的出现，也就是与以前不同的生产关系的出现？我不这么认为，原因有很多。
In the first place, the basic mode of surplus appropriation remains, in fact, exactly as it had been: the direct producers, in possession of their holdings, continued to hand over surpluses on the basis of non-economic coercion. The only difference is that they now handed over the said surplus - or part of it - to the revenue-collectors of those who had received grants of pronoia. Where only revenues were granted, of course, even this did not change - it was the state tax-collector who handed over the appropriate sum to the pronoia holder. The relationship of the peasantry to the means of production — land — similarly remains unchanged. In economic terms, therefore, there is absolutely no change in either the mode of surplus appropriation, or in the relationship of the primary producers to the means of production and their means of subsistence. And since, as we have seen, these are the two key elements which distinguish one mode of production from another, no change in the mode of production can be shown to have occurred either.
首先，剩余物占有的基本方式实际上与过去完全一样：拥有自己土地的直接生产者继续在非经济胁迫的基础上交出剩余物。唯一的区别是，他们现在把上述盈余（或部分盈余）交给了那些获得了特权的人的收入征收者。当然，在只授予收入的情况下，甚至这一点也没有改变（是国家征税人把适当的款项交给了受赠人。农民与生产资料——“土地”）的关系同样没有改变。因此，从经济角度看，无论是剩余物的占有方式，还是初级生产者与生产资料及其生活资料的关系，都绝对没有变化。而且，正如我们所看到的，这是区分一种生产方式和另一种生产方式的两个关键因素，因此也不能证明生产方式发生了变化。
What did change, of course, were the institutional forms in which surpluses were distributed: no longer via the state to the state apparatus, but directly to elements of that apparatus, in this case, sections of the military. And this is where the confusion has arisen: what historians have wanted to see as a mode of surplus appropriation is, in fact, merely a form of surplus distribution, and this is determined very much at a secondary or superstructural level.
当然，变化的是分配盈余的制度形式：不再是通过国家向国家机器分配，而是直接向国家机器的成员分配，在这种情况下，就是军队的部分。而这正是产生混淆的地方：历史学家们想要看到的剩余占有模式，实际上只是一种剩余分配的形式，而这在很大程度上是在二级或上层结构层面上决定的。
By the same token, what have been seen by other historians as different modes of surplus appropriation at an earlier period (tax, rent: private landlords with tenants existed side by side with independent peasant communities subject only to the fisc, or its equivalent, throughout the Roman and into the medieval - Byzantine - period) are, as I have argued, merely different institutional forms of one mode, namely, that of feudal rent. The earlier period, from the fifth or sixth or seventh century is therefore not a ‘proto-feudal’ period, in which two antagonistic modes of surplus appropriation struggle for dominance. On the contrary, the feudal mode clearly dominates. The struggle is between two institutional forms of one mode of surplus appropriation, forms which represent the vested economic and ideological interests of a class of magnates able to assert their independence of the state which produced them; and the relative autonomy of the bureaucratic and centralised state apparatus, run by a particular fraction or coalition of fractions drawn from that magnate class, its clients, and other social groups. The appearance from the ninth century and after on a larger scale than hitherto of private estates with tenants of varying degrees of subordination, therefore, does not mean that the dominance and centrality of the state in the preceding period (seventh and eighth centuries) represents a non-feudal (ancient or slave) mode of production. What it does mean is that the various strata of the bureaucratic pseudo-meritocracy which ran the state, which owed their position and existence to the state, and which received surplus wealth through the state apparatus, constituted during this period a feudal ruling class in the form of a state elite.
同样，其他历史学家所认为的早期不同的剩余占有模式（税收、地租：在整个罗马时期和中世纪-拜占庭时期，有租户的私人地主与独立的农民社区并存，只受国库或类似物的约束），正如我所论证的，只是一种模式的不同制度形式，即封建地租。因此，从五、六、七世纪开始的较早时期并不是一个“原封建”时期，在这个时期，两种对立的剩余占有模式在争夺统治地位。相反，封建模式显然占主导地位。斗争是在一种剩余占有模式的两种制度形式之间进行的，这种形式代表了一个大地主阶级的既得经济和意识形态利益，能够宣称他们独立于产生他们的国家；以及官僚和中央集权的国家机器的相对自主性，由来自该贵族阶级、其客户和其他社会团体的特定部分或部分联盟管理。因此，从九世纪及以后，比以往更大规模地出现了拥有不同程度从属关系的租户的私人庄园，这并不意味着国家在前一时期（七世纪和八世纪）的主导地位和中心地位代表了一种非封建（古代或奴隶制）的生产方式。它的意思是，管理国家的官僚假贵族的各个阶层，他们的地位和存在归功于国家，并通过国家机器获得剩余财富，在这个时期构成了国家精英形式的封建统治阶级。
This seems to me especially important. The difference between these forms represents one of the key structural contradictions within the late Roman and Byzantine social formations. To misrecognise it as a modal difference is to misunderstand the whole internal dynamic of the Byzantine social and economic formation. What the evidence in fact represents is the development from the late seventh century of two dominant and antagonistic fractions within the ruling class: those who remained embedded in the state apparatuses, and whose ideological interests are perceived to be commensurate with those of the state; and those who, while retaining (necessarily) powerful vested interests in the state structures, nevertheless developed economic bases strong enough for them to obtain a degree of independence of the state which facilitated their challenge to it for resources. This does not mean that the former fraction did not also possess or invest in landed property; nor that the demarcation between the two groups was not always very fluid and subject to a wide range of conjunctural interests and factional alliances.
在我看来，这一点特别重要。这些形式之间的差异代表了罗马后期和拜占庭社会形态中的关键结构性矛盾之一。把它误认为是一种模式上的差异，就是误解了拜占庭社会和经济形态的整个内部动态。这些证据实际上代表了从七世纪末开始，统治阶级内部出现了两个占主导地位的、对立的部分：那些仍然嵌入国家机构的人，他们的意识形态利益被认为是与国家的利益相一致的；以及那些虽然在国家结构中保留了（必然）强大的既得利益，但却发展了强大的经济基础，足以使他们获得一定程度的独立于国家的地位，有利于他们向国家挑战资源。这并不意味着前一部分人不拥有或投资于土地财产；也不意味着这两个群体之间的分界线并不总是非常不稳定，并受制于广泛的联合利益和派系联盟。
It should by now be clear that within Byzantine social relations of production there existed a struggle not over different modes of surplus appropriation, but rather over the mode of distribution of that surplus within and between different elements of the ruling class. It is a particular stage of that struggle which is expressed in the development of the military pronoia. And the latter is itself evidence of a compromise solution to the question of manpower and resources faced by a centralised state which had already begun to lose control over its resource-base to an independent landed elite. Grants of pronoia, once they had become normal (and the evidence for this is only really clear from the thirteenth century) appeared to solve the problem of funding the army and at the same time permitted the continued alienation of the state's revenues. But they brought with them also an increasing alienation of the state's jurisdiction over its subjects, and a slow privatisation of the juridical rights of the peasantry [Khvostova, 1984]. The legal status of the peasantry was affected, as were the rights of non-pronoia landowners, in an evolution which again points up the antagonistic relations of wealth allocation between state and aristocracy.
现在应该很清楚，在拜占庭的社会生产关系中，不是存在着不同的剩余占有模式的斗争，而是存在着统治阶级不同成员内部和之间的剩余分配模式的斗争。这是这场斗争的一个特殊阶段，表现在军事-土地制度的发展上。而后者本身就证明了一个中央集权国家对人力和资源问题的妥协解决方案，这个国家已经开始失去对其资源基础的控制，被一个独立的土地精英所控制。普洛尼亚制度的赠予机制，一旦成为常态（这方面的证据只有在13世纪才真正清楚），似乎就能解决军队的资金问题，同时也允许继续转让国家的收入。但它们也带来了国家对其臣民的管辖权的日益疏远，以及农民的司法权利的缓慢私有化[Khvostova, 1984]。农民的法律地位受到影响，非授予土地所有者的权利也受到影响，这种演变再次指出了国家和贵族之间财富分配的对立关系。
But these are all factors of a secondary level, that is, they are concerned with the legal-formal structures of distribution and re-distribution of surpluses. They are superstructural or conjunctural elements, and reflect in no way any fundamental changes in either the mode of surplus appropriation or the relationship of direct producers to means of production. The legal-juridical changes we have noted represent the particular, historically-specific forms available to this social formation, and through which changing relations of distribution could be expressed. What have changed are not the social relations of production between classes, but the political relations of distribution between fractions within the ruling class.
但这些都是次要的因素，也就是说，它们涉及到分配和再分配剩余的法律形式结构。它们是上层结构或偶发因素，丝毫不反映剩余分配方式或直接生产者与生产资料关系的任何根本变化。我们所注意到的法律-司法制度的变化，代表了这种社会形态可以利用的特殊的、历史上特有的形式，通过这些形式可以表达不断变化的分配关系。改变的不是阶级之间的社会生产关系，而是统治阶级内部各部分之间的政治分配关系。
The strength of the centralised state, the degree of residual autonomy it retained, and its commitment to 'its' resources can be seen in the power it was able to exercise until very late in its history in overriding the legal rights of private persons who were considered to have amassed too much property: by a process knowm as hikanösis ('equalisation') the state could confiscate lands in excess of the taxable value attributed to a specific individual or institutional landlord, and re-attribute them, either to itself or to a new private landlord. At least one example of this is known to have affected supposedly inalienable Church lands in the early ninth century; and the practice is well-attested in technical fiscal treatises of the tenth to the twelfth centuries. By the later eleventh century, the power of the magnate class made such a policy all but impossible to apply to members of that class (except where a ruler could isolate an individual family), but even in the later tenth century the emperor Basil II (976-1025) was able to confiscate magnate lands which posed a threat to imperial power.
中央集权国家的力量、它所保留的剩余自主权的程度以及它对“其”资源的承诺，可以从它在历史上很晚的时候才能够行使的权力中看出，即推翻那些被认为积累了太多财产的私人的合法权利：通过一个被称为hikanösis（“均衡化”）的过程，国家可以没收超过归属于特定个人或机构地主的应税价值的土地，并将其重新归属，或者归属于自己或者新的私人地主。据了解，至少有一个例子是在九世纪初影响了所谓的不可转让的教会土地；这种做法在十到十二世纪的技术性财政论文中得到了充分证明。到了十一世纪后期，大贵族阶级的权力使得这种政策几乎不可能适用于该阶级的成员（除非统治者可以孤立某个家庭），但即使在十世纪后期，皇帝巴西尔二世（976-1025）也能够没收对皇权构成威胁的大贵族土地。
The centralised state continued to exist until 1453, as did a dependent bureaucracy of non-magnates and magnates. Indeed, the enormous strength of the imperial ideological system, which demanded a centralised state, and which was inextricably interwoven with the political theology of the Orthodox Church, made anything else inconceivable. And it should be remembered that, while the consideration of a mode of production remains primarily a theoretical abstraction concerned with economic relationships - forces, means and relations of production (although these all have a social dimension) - a social formation is a specific form or variant of these elements, and ideology plays a crucial role in determining how it functions to reproduce itself, how it perceives itself, and - especially in respect of literary sources and visual representation - how historians can construct their knowledge of it. The state 'meritocracy' of the seventh and eighth centuries, which evolves into the magnate aristocracy of the tenth century and after, was ideologically bound to the notion of a bureaucratic and centralised state headed by a divinely-appointed emperor long after that ideology had ceased fully to represent its objective class interests, and long after the development of fractional interests and groupings within the ruling class. But since that ideology was focused above all on the position of the emperor as God's representative and appointee on earth, rather than on any concept of the state as such, the ideological representation of the world was not perceived as contradictory within the context of the shifting relations of distribution.
中央集权的国家一直存在到1453年，一个由非大人物和大人物组成的附属官僚机构也一直存在。事实上，帝国意识形态体系的巨大力量，要求建立一个中央集权的国家，并且与东正教的政治神学密不可分，使得其他任何事情都是不可想象的。应该记住，虽然对生产方式的考虑主要是一种理论上的抽象，涉及到经济关系——力量、手段和生产关系（尽管这些都有一个社会维度），但社会形态是这些要素的具体形式或变体，而意识形态在决定它如何发挥功能以再现自己、如何看待自己，以及（特别是在文学来源和视觉表现方面）历史学家如何构建他们对它的认识方面起着关键作用。七、八世纪的国家“功勋制”演变为十世纪及以后的大贵族，在意识形态上与由神圣任命的皇帝领导的官僚和中央集权国家的概念联系在一起，而这种意识形态已经不再完全代表其客观的阶级利益，并且在统治阶级内部的分化利益和集团发展之后很久。但是，由于这种意识形态首先关注的是皇帝作为上帝在地球上的代表和任命者的地位，而不是任何国家本身的概念，因此，在不断变化的分配关系中，世界的意识形态代表不被认为是矛盾的。
The transition from ancient to medieval social, economic and cultural forms in the East Mediterranean thus takes on a very different appearance from that which occurred in western Europe. Nor did it occur in this form in the territory of the eastern Roman empire alone — those lands which were lost to the Arabs were incorporated into a new state system, whose basic patterns of urban and agricultural exploitation were rooted in their Hellenistic past. Central government, the growth of localised administrative governmental elites, and the contradictions between landholding and serving the state existed here too, although the political and social modalities through which they were given expression were different.
因此，东地中海地区从古代到中世纪的社会、经济和文化形式的转变，与西欧发生的转变有着非常不同的外观。它也不是仅仅以这种形式发生在东罗马帝国的领土上——那些被阿拉伯人夺走的土地被纳入了一个新的国家体系，其城市和农业开发的基本模式根植于希腊化的过去。中央政府、地方化的行政政府精英的增长，以及土地持有和为国家服务之间的矛盾在这里也存在，尽管表达这些矛盾的政治和社会模式有所不同。
From the Byzantine perspective, however, the late sixth, and especially the seventh and the first half of the eighth centuries represent a re-focusing of power (and authority) and the successful redirection by the state of antagonistic elements within the class structure to serve its own interests. The form this structure took was that of a centralised, autocratic and bureaucratic despotism, a more cohesive and tightly centralised version of the Dominate of the fourth century Roman state. In essence, of course, it is the ultimate descendant of the ancient city-state, its subjects were the 'citizens' whose contributions supported the commonwealth in war and in peace. Its historical evolution had taken it far beyond this, through the evolution of class antagonisms, the acquisition and loss of empire, the development of a complex ideological system which was, in a number of ways, to outlive even the demise of the state itself in the fifteenth century, and the crisis of late antique civilisation in the West. But the later Roman and Byzantine states had their roots firmly in a social formation dominated by feudal relations of production, however heavily that may be disguised in the technical vocabularies of Roman law and medieval Byzantine fiscal treatises. The Byzantine social formation can perhaps best be described as the feudal mode of production in the form of the late ancient state, with all the structural contradictions which this formulation implies.
然而，从拜占庭的角度来看，六世纪末，特别是七世纪和八世纪上半叶，代表了权力（和权威）的重新集中，以及国家成功地重新引导阶级结构中的对立因素，为其自身利益服务。这种结构所采取的形式是中央集权、专制和官僚的专制主义，是第四世纪罗马国家的统治者的一个更有凝聚力和紧密集中的版本。当然，从本质上讲，它是古代城邦的最终后裔，它的臣民是 “公民”，他们的贡献在战争与和平中都支持着这个共同体。它的历史演变远远超出了这一点，经历了阶级对立的演变，帝国的获得和丧失，复杂的意识形态系统的发展，在许多方面甚至超过了国家本身在15世纪的消亡，以及西方晚期的古代文明的危机。但是，后来的罗马和拜占庭国家坚定地扎根于由封建生产关系主导的社会形态，无论这一点在罗马法律和中世纪拜占庭财政论文的技术词汇中如何掩饰。拜占庭的社会形态也许可以被描述为晚期古代国家形式下的封建生产方式，以及这种表述所隐含的所有结构性矛盾。
In spite of some similarities, this view is not the same as the position held by any of the different groups of Soviet scholars, for example, whose views I summarised very briefly at the beginning of this article. For them, Byzantium represents either a declining slave mode of production, or a transitional or proto-feudal mode, until the later seventh or eighth centuries (or the eleventh and twelfth, depending on one's position). In this light, 'real' feudalism (but actually understood as much through its superstructures and the pertaining phenomenal forms they present, as through the totality of its relations of production in a strictly economic sense) did not develop until after whichever of these two key moments of transition one prefers. The basically feudal nature of production relations throughout the Roman period, and indeed throughout much of the ancient world, albeit at times displaced by the dominance of a slave mode of production in certain areas, is generally not taken into account. And once again, it is the structure of the state and its institutions, which mediates the social relations of production and the class antagonisms within these social formations, which deserves attention.
尽管有一些相似之处，但这种观点与任何一个不同的苏联学者团体所持的立场都不一样，例如，我在本文开始时非常简要地总结了他们的观点。对他们来说，拜占庭代表的是一种衰退的奴隶制生产模式，或者是一种过渡性的或原封建的模式，直到第七或第八世纪后期（或第十一和第十二世纪，取决于个人的立场）。从这个角度来看，“真正的”封建主义（但实际上是通过其上层建筑和它们所呈现的相关现象形式来理解的，而不是通过其严格意义上的生产关系的整体）直到这两个关键的过渡时刻中的任何一个之后才发展。整个罗马时期乃至整个古代世界的生产关系的基本封建性质，尽管有时会被某些地区的奴隶生产方式的主导地位所取代，但通常没有被考虑在内。值得关注的是国家及其机构的结构，它调解了社会生产关系和这些社会形态中的阶级对立。
But a detailed analysis of these contradictions as they worked themselves out, and more particularly the analysis of the relationship between the state institutions, the governing or power elite, and the ruling class, is the subject of another study. In the meanwhile, we can conclude that the much-debated question of whether or not Byzantine society was feudal, or rather, whether the Byzantine social formation was dominated by feudal relations of production, can only be resolved if the concept of the feudal mode, and of what constitutes feudalism, are both clearly elaborated and carefully employed. Byzantium was feudal - but not because it appeared so.
但对这些矛盾的详细分析，特别是对国家机构、执政者或权力精英和统治阶级之间关系的分析，则是另一项研究的主题。同时，我们可以得出结论，关于拜占庭社会是否是封建社会，或者说，拜占庭社会形态是否被封建生产关系所支配，这个争论不休的问题，只有在封建模式的概念和构成封建主义的内容都得到明确阐述和谨慎运用的情况下，才能得到解决。拜占庭是封建的，却又不是，因为它看起来确实如此。
完！
