拜占庭军队的招募与征兵 C. 550-950（10）

作者：John·F· Haldon  约翰·F·哈尔顿
出版商：1979年维也纳奥地利科学院出版

接上

A word is perhaps in order regarding the kodikes or katalogoi in which the soldiers or their holdings were registered. As pointed out already, the military kt&mata began to be registered only in the first part of the tenth century — previously the names only were registered. The lists were kept by the military logothesion in the capital, although there were certainly copies kept in each provincial headquarters, since the strategos and his staff were responsible for raising the troops in wartime and for reviewing them at the yearly adnoumia. Such lists were presumably revised as the military holdings were also incorporated, perhaps involving the addition of an extra column so that the lands could be registered — έν τοϊς στρατιωτικούς καταλόγοις άπογράφονται.（在军事名单被清点。）

          关于士兵或他们的财产登记的 kodikes 或 katalogoi，可能需要一个词。 正如已经指出的那样，军事 kt&mata 仅在 10 世纪上半叶才开始注册 - 以前仅注册名称。 名单由首都的军事标志保存，尽管每个省总部肯定都有副本，因为战略和他的工作人员负责在战时筹集军队并在每年的公告中对其进行审查。 这些名单可能是随着军事财产也被纳入而进行了修订，可能涉及增加一个额外的栏目，以便可以登记土地——έν τοϊς στρατιωτικούς καταλόγοις άπογράφονται。（在军事列表中被清点。）

To summarise the gist of the argument: the situation in the tenth century is one of wide-ranging changes, and of legislation to prevent some of these changes, which were regarded as detrimental to the efficiency of the armies (and hence to the authority of the central government) from going further. Briefly, the ability of individual soldiers to fulfill the hereditary obligations for which they were enrolled, was founded upon their lands (and originally also other forms of income). But these had been neither registered nor protected, although it had become customary that they should not be alienated, since thus the means to support the strateia might be lost. The service owed was personal, but need not be carried out by the official holder of the title — he might be too old or too young, for example. Instead, a member of the same family could (when the provincial government insisted upon the provision of a soldier) be appointed to carry out the necessary duties. This much is clearly confirmed by the story of Leo and George already referred to. In cases where the families became impoverished and unable to fulfill their duties, the reform of Nicephoros I appointed a certain number of contributors, with whose aid the family should continue to carry out its obligations. It was in any case the final responsibility of the general and his staff to select, from all those registered, soldiers for particular campaigns. By the time of the tenth-century legislation, the lands which were the basis of this military service needed protection, and henceforth the hitherto personal obligations of the family which owned the land, while not being lost sight of, became increasingly replaced by an impersonal obligation fixed to the lands themselves. It became possible, and indeed necessary, as a result of the parcellisation of holdings, to appoint a soldier not belonging to the family or families which held the land, to carry out the duties involved; while at the same time it became normal practice for the state to commute the services for cash in order to raise and pay full-time troops. The eventual result, as a number of scholars have shown, was the complete fiscalisation of the strateia and its application as a tax levy on the whole population. The military lands as such disappeared.

          总结一下论点的要点：10 世纪的形势是一个范围广泛的变化，立法阻止了其中的一些变化，这些变化被认为有损于军队的效率（从而有损于军队的权威）。 中央政府）走得更远。 简而言之，士兵个人履行其登记的世袭义务的能力是建立在他们的土地上（最初也是其他形式的收入）。 但是这些既没有登记也没有受到保护，尽管它们不应该被转让已经成为惯例，因为这样可能会失去支持战略的手段。 所欠的服务是个人的，但不需要由正式的头衔持有人执行——例如，他可能太老或太年轻。 相反，可以任命同一个家庭的成员（当省政府坚持提供士兵时）执行必要的职责。 已经提到的利奥和乔治的故事清楚地证实了这一点。 在家庭陷入贫困无法履行职责的情况下，Nicephoros I 的改革任命了一定数量的捐助者，在他们的帮助下，家庭应该继续履行其义务。 无论如何，从所有登记的士兵中挑选出特定战役的士兵是将军及其参谋的最终责任。 到 10 世纪立法时，作为这种兵役基础的土地需要保护，因此，拥有土地的家庭迄今为止的个人义务虽然没有被忽视，但越来越多地被非个人化的义务所取代。 对土地本身的义务。 由于土地分块，有可能而且确实有必要任命一名不属于拥有土地的家庭或家庭的士兵来执行相关职责； 与此同时，国家将服务换成现金以筹集和支付全职部队的费用已成为正常做法。 正如许多学者所表明的那样，最终的结果是战略的完全财政化及其作为对全体人口征税的应用。 军事土地就这样消失了。

The origins of this system will be examined below. What I have tried to show here is that because “military holdings” do not appear in the sources before the 830s, and in official legislation before the 930s, this is absolutely no argument for their non-existence.114 Their appearance in legal and other official literature of the tenth century is solely a response to a threat which forced the state to take action to preserve what was already a weakened institution. I do not believe that the stratiotika ktemata were a marginal or local phenomenon, for in this case the legislation of the tenth century would hardly have been necessary. On the contrary, I think they were the “hidden” basis for the recruitment of a considerable proportion of the Byzantine provincial armies, a basis which was revealed only when it was threatened.

          下面将研究这个系统的起源。 我在这里试图表明的是，因为“军事控股”没有出现在 830 年代之前的来源中，并且在 930 年代之前的官方立法中，这绝对是不存在的理由。  它们在法律和其他方面的出现 10 世纪的官方文献完全是对威胁的回应，这种威胁迫使国家采取行动来保护已经被削弱的机构。 我不相信 Stratiotika ktemata 是一种边缘或局部现象，因为在这种情况下，十世纪的立法几乎没有必要。 相反，我认为他们是招募相当一部分拜占庭省军队的“隐藏”基础，只有在受到威胁时才会显露出来。

C. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE “MILITARY LANDS”

C. “军区制” 的起源和发展

To trace the origins of this form of recruitment is a somewhat more difficult task. There is evidence in plenty for the activities of Byzantine armies throughout the seventh and eighth centuries. But little of it concerns the ways in which these armies were raised and organised. Nevertheless, some general suggestions about the ways in which the system described above grew up may be hazarded.

          追查这种招募形式的起源是一项比较困难的任务。 有大量证据表明拜占庭军队在整个七世纪和八世纪的活动。 但其中很少涉及这些军队的组建和组织方式。 然而，关于上述系统发展方式的一些一般性建议可能会受到威胁。

Professional, full-time forces were always maintained, both in the themes and in the capital. The corps of excubitores up to the middle of the seventh century or a little later, that of the spatharii, and the noum&ra and Walls regiments made up the guards units at Constantinople, supplemented from the middle of the eighth century by the new tagmata established by successive emperors. In the provinces, a corps of full-time, paid regulars was maintained in the largest garrison towns and at the headquarters of the strategos. The proportion of regulars to those released from service for part of the year was probably in favour of the latter. But this can only be answered when we have decided when and how the recruitmentsystem which came ultimately to be based upon “military holdings” developed.

          无论是在主题还是在首都，专业的、专职的力量始终保持着。 直到 7 世纪中叶或更晚的 excubitores 军团，spatharii 军团，以及 noum&ra 和 Walls 团组成了君士坦丁堡的卫兵部队，从 8 世纪中叶开始，由 历任皇帝。 在各省，在最大的驻军城镇和战略总司令部维持着一支全职的、有薪的正规军。 在一年中的一部分时间里，常客与退役的比例可能更倾向于后者。 但这只能在我们决定最终以“军事控股”为基础的招募系统何时以及如何发展时才能得到解答。

The confused years during the second half of the seventh century present themselves as the period most likely to have given rise to a system of recruitment such as that described above. I have shown elsewhere that it was precisely at this time that the Byzantine forces began to be localised and to lose their former character of full-time field forces maintained in regular garrisons.116 It was also at this time that the kaballarika themata appeared, and as I have suggested, this reflects already the division of the military forces into two groups, those based more or less permanently in garrisons or at other strategic points, and those able to participate in mobile and often long-distance actions.

          七世纪下半叶的混乱年代是最有可能产生上述招募制度的时期。 我已经在别处表明，正是在这个时候，拜占庭军队开始局部化，失去了以前在正规驻军中维持的专职野战部队的性质。 116 也正是在这个时候出现了 kaballarika 军区，和 正如我所建议的那样，这已经反映了将军队分成两组，一组或多或少永久驻扎在驻军或其他战略要地，另一组能够参与机动且通常是远距离行动。

It is apparent that the field armies were widely scattered throughout the districts they occupied. So much is demonstrated by (a) the success with which Arab raiders were able to penetrate into Byzantine territory, meeting little or no opposition in the field — the troops were centred in defensible towns, or spread among smaller settlements as a protection for the local population, and (b) the fact that the imperial forces were forced to adopt a policy of avoidance, following a strategy of ambushes and shadow warfare.117 Such a policy was both stimulated by, and in its turn promoted, a localisation of forces.

          很明显，野战军广泛分散在他们占领的地区。  (a) 阿拉伯袭击者成功地渗透到拜占庭领土，在战场上几乎没有遇到任何反对者——军队集中在防御性城镇，或分散在较小的定居点中以保护当地 人口，以及 (b) 帝国军队被迫采取回避政策，遵循伏击和影子战的策略。这种政策既受到军队本土化的刺激，又反过来促进了军队的本土化。

But more concrete evidence exists. The text relating to the soldier Mousoulios shows that by the 780s — and presumably for some considerable time beforehand — the military forces of the empire were scattered throughout their districts, and called together for campaign service or review only occasionally during the year. Mousoulios himself clearly lived at home, since Philaretos encounters him on his way to the adnoumioTi — had he been based in a regular, centralised garrison, such a procedure would not have been necessary. An earlier text, however, comes from the Ecloga, possibly issued by Leo and Constantine not in the year 726, but in 741. The text in question — XVI 2 — has recently been the subject of an article by J. Mossay and P. Yannopoulos, and since its importance is not to be ignored, it will be worth looking at their arguments in some detail.

          但存在更具体的证据。 与士兵 Mousoulios 相关的文本显示，到了 780 年代——并且可能在之前的相当长一段时间里——帝国的军队分散在他们的地区，并且在一年中偶尔会被召集起来进行战役服务或审查。  Mousoulios 本人显然住在家里，因为 Philaretos 在前往 adnoumioTi 的路上遇到了他——如果他驻扎在一个正规的、集中的驻军中，这样的程序就没有必要了。  然而，早期的文本来自 Ecloga， 可能由 Leo 和 Constantine 发布，不是在 726 年，而是在 741. 有问题的文本——XVI 2——最近成为 J. Mossay 和 P. Yannopoulos 一篇文章的主题，因为它的重要性不容忽视， 值得详细研究他们的论点。

未完待续