Byzantium at War AD 600-1453（战争中的拜占庭：公元600-1453年）（13）

作者：John Haldon约翰·哈尔顿

出版商：Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

自翻：神尾智代

接上（12）

Officers

长官

          There was no 'officer corps' in the Byzantine army, although it is clear that the majority of men who commanded units beyond the level of a squad or troop came from the wealthier elements in society, whether in the provinces or in Constantinople, and that service at court in one of the palace units functioned as a sort of training school. The sources tell us quite a lot about the middle and upper levels of officers, and until the 12th century it is clear that there was always a substantial meritocratic element in advancement. Social background and education played a role, but it was perfectly possible for an able and competent soldier or lower-ranking officer to rise to high position. In all aspects of Byzantine society social connections and kinship always played an important role too, and training and ability were generally mediated through personal ties; for example, an officer might advance his career through service initially in the retinue of an important officer, from where he might receive a junior appointment in a local regiment, rising through the various grades, or being transferred to a senior position elsewhere. Some careers developed within families serving in the same unit — there are several examples of officers' sons entering their father's unit as simple troopers or soldiers before being promoted to junior and then more senior officer grade; in other cases, we hear of privileged young provincial men sent to Constantinople where, with the help of an influential relative or patron, they were appointed to a junior post in the guards before further promotion. In one case, which was probably not untypical, a young man was appointed first to a small corps of elite guards in the palace, before receiving a junior command at the capital, then a middling provincial post, before being promoted to a senior position, all in the course of some 10 years or so.

（拜占庭军队中没有“军官团”，尽管很明显，指挥超出小队或部队级别的部队的大多数人来自社会中较富裕的人，无论是在行省还是在君士坦丁堡，而且 在一个宫殿单位的宫廷服务就像一种培训学校。消息来源告诉我们很多关于中上层军官的信息，直到 12 世纪，很明显，晋升中总是存在大量的精英因素。社会背景和教育发挥了作用，但一个有能力的士兵或下级军官升到高位是完全可能的。 在拜占庭社会的各个方面，社会关系和亲属关系也一直扮演着重要的角色，训练和能力通常通过人际关系来调节；例如，一名军官最初可能会通过在重要军官的随从服务中提升他的职业生涯，在那里他可能会在当地军团获得初级职位，升入各个级别，或者被调到其他地方担任高级职位。一些职业是在同一部队的家庭中发展起来的——有几个例子，军官的儿子进入他们父亲的部队，成为普通的士兵或士兵，然后被提升为初级和高级军官级别；在其他情况下，我们听说有特权的年轻外省人被派往君士坦丁堡，在有影响力的亲戚或赞助人的帮助下，他们在进一步晋升之前被任命为卫队的初级职位。有一个例子，这可能并不罕见，一个年轻人在大约十年的时间里，先被任命到宫中的一小支精锐卫队，然后在京城接受初级指挥，然后是中级的省级职位，然后被提升为高级职位。）

          By the middle of the 11th century the growth of a powerful provincial aristocracy had brought some changes to this structure. The provincial elite itself provided a major source of recruits to the middle and senior officers' posts in the empire, and during the later 9th and 10th centuries came to monopolise most key provincial military commands. The increasing use of mercenaries reduced at the same time the importance and status of the provincial, thematic soldiery, who blended back into the mass of the peasantry from which they were drawn, thereby losing their distinctive social position.

（到 11 世纪中叶，强大的省级贵族的成长使这种结构发生了一些变化。省级精英本身为帝国中高级军官职位提供了主要的新兵来源，并且在 9 世纪后期和 10 世纪期间开始垄断大多数关键的省级军事指挥部。雇佣军的使用越来越多，同时降低了省级、专题士兵的重要性和地位，他们重新融入了他们所来自的农民群众中，从而失去了独特的社会地位。）

Discipline and training

纪律和训练

          The Byzantine army, at least as represented in the narrative histories and in the military treatises, prided itself on its order and discipline. Life in the army involved a very different sort of daily routine from life in civilian contexts or from that in less disciplined and organised neighbouring armies. A 6th-century military handbook makes this abundantly clear: 'Nature produces but few brave men, whereas care and training make efficient soldiers,' notes the author. Levels of discipline varied and were a major cause of concern to commanders and to the authors of all the military treatises. There are plenty of cases of mutiny and unrest among the provincial armies and the examples of troops panicking when the commander was thought to have been killed or injured is evidence of the variable psychological condition of the troops. The extent to which proper discipline was actually enforced is not very clear in the limited sources. Usually it was the most able commanders who were most likely to apply military discipline effectively, partly a reflection of their personal character and ability to inspire confidence among the soldiers - a point also recognised in the military treatises. Financial generosity, either on the part of individual commanders or officers, or the government, was a crucial ingredient in encouraging soldiers to follow orders and accept the discipline necessary for effective fighting.

（拜占庭的军队，至少在叙事历史和军事论文中，以其秩序和纪律而自豪。 军队中的生活与平民生活或缺乏纪律和组织的邻近军队的生活有着截然不同的日常生活。一本 6 世纪的军事手册非常清楚地说明了这一点：“大自然造就的勇士寥寥无几，而关怀和训练则造就了高效的士兵，”作者指出。 纪律水平各不相同，是指挥官和所有军事论文作者关注的一个主要原因。省军发生叛变、动乱的事例屡见不鲜，当指挥官被认为已被打死或受伤时，部队惊慌失措的例子就是部队心理状态多变的证据。在有限的资料来源中，实际执行适当纪律的程度并不十分清楚。通常是最有能力的指挥官最有可能有效地运用军事纪律，部分反映了他们的个人性格和激发士兵信心的能力——这一点在军事论文中也得到了承认。无论是个别指挥官或军官，还是政府，财政慷慨都是鼓励士兵服从命令并接受有效战斗所需纪律的关键因素。）

          Discipline also varied according to the categories of troops. A strict code certainly prevailed in elite units such as the imperial tagmata and in units which had a particular loyalty to their commanding officer. One story recounts the tale of an officer who was upbraided by the emperor himself for his unkempt appearance while at his post in the palace. Discipline was probably least effective in the militia-like thematic forces, but under competent officers it seems to have been effectively maintained. There existed an official code of military discipline which is frequently included in the military handbooks, and effective leaders seem on the whole to have applied it. Nikephoros 11 is reported to have awarded punishment to a soldier for dropping his shield because he was too tired to continue carrying it. When his officer ignored the order, he too was punished severely, on the grounds that the first had endangered his comrades as well as himself, while the latter had compounded the crime and further endangered the well-being of the whole force. Constantine V in the 8th century, Nikephoros II, John I Tzimiskes, Basil II in the late 10th century and Romanos IV in the later 1060s were all regarded with approval as strict disciplinarians, as was Alexios I in the late 11th century. Yet discipline often broke down.

（纪律也根据部队的类别而有所不同。严格的守则肯定在精英部队中盛行，例如帝国塔格玛塔和对指挥官特别忠诚的部队。一个故事讲述了一个官员的故事，因为他在宫中任职期间的蓬头垢面被皇帝亲自斥责。 在类似民兵的主题部队中，纪律可能最不有效，但在有能力的军官之下，纪律似乎得到了有效维持。有一个正式的军事纪律守则，经常被列入军事手册，而有效的领导者总体上似乎已经应用了它。 据报道，尼基弗鲁斯 11 曾因一名士兵因太累而无法继续携带盾牌而丢掉盾牌而受到惩罚。 当他的军官无视命令时，他也受到了严厉的惩罚，理由是前者危及他的战友和他自己，而后者则加重了罪行并进一步危及整个部队的福祉。 8 世纪的君士坦丁五世、尼基弗罗斯二世、约翰一世·齐米斯克斯、10 世纪后期的巴西尔二世和 1060 年代后期的罗曼诺斯四世都被认为是严格的纪律家，就像 11 世纪后期的阿莱克修斯一世一样。然而纪律经常崩溃。）

          There are some hints in the sources about the exercises carried out by the soldiers, descriptions corroborated by accounts of similar exercises in the tactical manuals and handbooks. Nikephoros Phokas put on a series of military games and mock battles in the hippodrome at Constantinople in the 960s - they were so realistic and frightening that a panic occurred which claimed many lives. But whatever the textbooks said about the value of such exercises, sensible commanders appear generally to have been aware of the limitations of the different sorts of troops under their command. The treatises on warfare often include quite simple, easily managed tactical manoeuvres for the great bulk of the thematic infantry, who were on the whole not well equipped and potentially unreliable. In contrast the well-trained and well-equipped heavy cavalry and elite units were expected to implement quite complex manoeuvres, frequently under enemy attack, on the battlefield. Skills and training, discipline and morale went hand in hand.

（资料中有一些关于士兵进行的演习的暗示，战术手册和手册中对类似演习的描述也证实了这一点。960 年代，Nikephoros佛卡斯在君士坦丁堡的竞技场上进行了一系列军事游戏和模拟战斗——它们是如此逼真和可怕，以至于发生了一场夺去许多生命的恐慌。 但无论教科书如何评价此类演习的价值，明智的指挥官似乎普遍意识到他们所指挥的不同类型部队的局限性。关于战争的论文通常包括非常简单、易于管理的战术演习，适用于大部分主题步兵，他们总体上装备不足，可能不可靠。相比之下，训练有素、装备精良的重骑兵和精锐部队被期望在战场上执行相当复杂的机动，经常在敌人的攻击下。 技能和培训、纪律和士气齐头并进。）

          The sort of exercise in particular skills which cavalry troopers had to carry out is illustrated in a late 6th-century manual:

          [The trooper] should shoot rapidly, mounted on his horse and at a canter, to the front, to the rear, to right and to left; he should practise leaping onto his horse. When mounted and at a canter he should shoot one or two arrows rapidly and put the strung bow in its case ... and then take the lance which he carries on his back.

With the strung bow in its case he should hold the lance in his hand, then quickly replace it on his back and take the bow.

（6世纪后期的一本手册说明了骑兵必须执行的特定技能练习：

【骑兵】应速射，骑马慢跑，向前、向后、向右、向左； 他应该练习跳上他的马。在骑马和慢跑时，他应该快速射出一两支箭，然后将已上弦的弓放在弓盒中……然后拿起他背在背上的长矛。将已上弦的弓装在盒中，他应将长矛握在手中，然后迅速将其放回背上并拿起弓。）

          As well as these individual skills with bow, lance or sword, the troops were drilled in formation, so that, in larger or smaller bodies, they could be wheeled, moved from column into line and back again, form a square against heavy cavalry attack, form into a wedge to break through an enemy formation, and so forth. Success on the battlefield often depended on the effectiveness with which such manoeuvres might be carried out, although it was also admitted that things should be kept as simple as possible to avoid confusion or being caught unprepared mid-way through a manoeuvre - there are examples of battles in which one of the reasons for the collapse of the imperial forces appears to be due to such errors.

（除了弓、枪、剑这些个人技能外，部队还被编队训练，这样他们就可以在或大或小的身体上进行轮式，从纵队到队列再回来，形成一个方阵，对抗重骑兵的进攻。形成楔形以突破敌人的阵型，等等。战场上的成功通常取决于执行此类机动的有效性，尽管人们也承认事情应该尽可能简单，以避免在机动中途出现混乱或措手不及——有一些例子 帝国军队崩溃的原因之一似乎是由于这些错误的战斗。）

未完待续