Byzantium at War AD 600-1453（战争中的拜占庭：公元600-1453年）（11）
作者：John Haldon约翰·哈尔顿
出版商：Routledge Taylor & Francis Group
自翻：流潋紫琳
Strategy
战略
Strategic dispositions evolved to meet the needs of the moment. In the 6th century and up to the period of the Arab invasions the units established in garrisons along and behind the frontier were called limitanei, frontier soldiers, usually comprised of the older legions and auxiliary regiments, while the field armies were largely formed of more recently established units, and located across the provinces, often well behind the frontier, in strategic bases from which they could meet any incursions into Roman territory. One result of the loss of the eastern and Danubian provinces during the 7th century was the disappearance of the former and the withdrawal into Asia Minor of the latter, where they settled down to form the themes to which we have already referred to in the 'Outbreak' chapter. In the later 10th century new and much smaller territories under doukes, 'dukes' grew up along both the eastern and northern frontiers, serving both as a zone of defence and as a springboard for further advances. At the same time, the old themes became increasingly demilitarised with the growth in the use of mercenaries, as we have also seen. The collapse of the later 11th century brought with it a need to reorganise, and although the changes wrought by the Komnenoi produced a series of new thernata and new frontiers in Asia Minor, the basic principles of 11th-century strategy - an in-depth defence based in fortresses and similar strongpoints supported by a single imperial field force based in and around Constantinople - were maintained. The last two centuries of the empire, from the 1250s until 1453, saw no substantial change, although numbers were very much reduced as the empire's resources shrank.
（战略部署不断发展以满足当下的需要。在 6 世纪和直到阿拉伯入侵时期，在边境沿线和后方的驻军中建立的部队被称为边防军，即边境士兵，通常由较老的军团和辅助团组成，而野战军则主要由较新近的部队组成。 已建立的单位，位于各行省，通常远在边境后方，位于战略基地，可以应对任何入侵罗马领土的行为。7 世纪东部和多瑙河省丧失的结果之一是前者消失，后者撤退到小亚细亚，在那里他们定居下来形成我们在“爆发”中提到的军区 ' 章节。在 10 世纪后期，在杜克之下的新的和小得多的领土上，“公爵”在东部和北部边境长大，既作为防御区又作为进一步前进的跳板。与此同时，正如我们所看到的，随着雇佣军使用的增加，旧的主题变得越来越非军事化。11 世纪后期的崩溃带来了重组的需要，尽管科穆宁带来的变化在小亚细亚产生了一系列新的军区和新的前沿，但 11 世纪战略的基本原则——纵深防御 以堡垒和类似的堡垒为基地，由位于君士坦丁堡及其周边地区的单一帝国野战部队支持。帝国的最后两个世纪，从 1250 年代到 1453 年，没有发生实质性变化，尽管随着帝国资源的萎缩，数量大大减少。）
Logistics
后勤
There can be little doubt that one reason for the empire's survival from the 7th century on was its effective logistical administration. The road system, although both greatly reduced in scope and degraded in quality when compared with that of the Roman period, remained an important asset. In addition, the carefully managed fiscal system was closely tied into the needs of the army, and although the exact administrative and organisational structures evolved over the period in question, the arrangements for supplying the soldiers in either peacetime or war were effective. Resources were collected in either money or in kind, depending upon a number of variables: whether the areas in question supported enough market activity; whether the agricultural or other resources needed by the army were available and could be stored; what the particular needs of the army at that point in fact were; and how many soldiers and animals needed to he fed and housed over what length of time. The effects of an army on the land and its population were well understood, and there are in the written sources of the period both recommendations to commanders not to keep concentrations of troops for too long on Byzantine territory and descriptions of what happened when this advice was not followed.
（毫无疑问，帝国自 7 世纪以来得以幸存的原因之一是其有效的后勤管理。 尽管与罗马时期相比，道路系统的范围和质量都大大减少，但仍然是一项重要的资产。此外，精心管理的财政制度与军队的需要密切相关，虽然确切的行政和组织结构在相关时期发生了变化，但无论是和平时期还是战争时期，供应士兵的安排都是有效的。资源是以金钱或实物形式收集的，这取决于许多变量：相关领域是否支持足够的市场活动； 军队所需的农业或其他资源是否可用并可以储存； 当时军队的特殊需求实际上是什么；以及他需要在多长的时间内喂养和收容多少士兵和动物。军队对土地及其人口的影响是众所周知的，在这一时期的书面资料中有建议指挥官不要在拜占庭领土上驻军太久，也有关于不听从建议会发生什么情况的描述。）
When a campaign was planned, local fiscal officials liaised with the central authorities and the military records department at Constantinople, so that the right amount and type of supplies were provided for the numbers involved. The outlay was often very heavy, and accounts from the 10th century show just how heavy the burden could be, especially when the emperor and his household were on the expedition. Each of the regions through which the army passed had to put aside adequate supplies of grain, meat (usually on the hoof) and oil or wine for the required numbers of troops. Large expeditionary armies — which would generally be divided into several smaller columns, each taking a separate route and heading for a pie-arranged rendezvous on the frontier — numbered as many as 20,000 or more, and very occasionally as many as 30,000; but the average theme force might he no more than 3,000-4,000, often far fewer, confronting armies of the same size, or shadowing larger forces until they could be ambushed or taken on in a full-scale battle. Providing resources for such armies involved a considerable organisational effort. In addition to food, horses and pack-animals had to be provided, weapons and other items of military equipment replaced and, for expeditions intended to take enemy strongholds, wagons or carts carrying siege machinery and artillery. While food and supplies were generally provided by the districts through which the army passed, weapons and other equipment, as well as cavalry mounts and pack-animals, might come from more distant provinces. In a 10th-century account, for example, detailing some of the preparations for an expediton by sea, some provinces were commissioned to produce a certain number of weapons: the region of Thessaloniki was ordered to deliver 200,000 arrows, 3,000 heavy infantry spears and 'as many shields as possible'; the region of Hellas was asked to produce 1,000 heavy infantry spears; while the governor of Eurippos in Greece, and the commanders of the themes of Nikopolis and of the Peloponnese all undertook to provide 200,000 arrows and 3,000 heavy infantry spears. The same document specifies also that other governors or officers were commissioned to levy thousands of nails and similar items from their provinces for ship construction.
（在计划一场战役时，地方财政官员与中央当局和君士坦丁堡的军事档案部门保持联系，以便为所涉及的人数提供适当数量和类型的物资。支出往往非常沉重，10 世纪的记载表明负担可能有多么沉重，尤其是当皇帝和他的家人在远征时。 军队经过的每个地区都必须为所需数量的军队储备足够的粮食、肉类（通常在蹄上）和油或酒。大型远征军——通常会被分成几个较小的纵队，每个纵队走一条不同的路线，前往边境的一个派式集合点——人数多达 20,000 人或更多，偶尔多达 30,000 人；但平均主题部队可能不超过 3,000-4,000 人，通常要少得多，面对同样规模的军队，或在更大的部队受到伏击或在全面战斗中被接手之前，他们会受到影响。为这些军队提供资源涉及相当大的组织工作。除了食物之外，还必须提供马匹和驮畜，更换武器和其他军事装备，对于打算攻占敌人据点的远征，运载攻城机器和大炮的马车或手推车。虽然食物和补给通常由军队经过的地区提供，但武器和其他装备，以及骑兵坐骑和驮畜，可能来自更远的省份。例如，在一个 10 世纪的记载中，详细描述了海上远征的一些准备工作，一些省份被委托生产一定数量的武器：塞萨洛尼基地区奉命交付 200,000 支箭、3,000 支重型步兵矛和“ 尽可能多的盾牌'; 希腊地区被要求生产1000支重型步兵矛；而希腊的欧里波斯总督、尼科波利斯和伯罗奔尼撒主题的指挥官都承诺提供20万支箭和3000支重步兵长矛。 同一份文件还规定，其他州长或官员被委托从他们的省份征收数以千计的钉子和类似物品用于造船。）
Military manuals stressed that excess personal baggage and servants should not be taken by the officers or wealthier men, since it caused problems in respect of food and transport; and while many commanders clearly enforced such regulations, there is evidence that many did not and that discipline in this area was slack - with all the consequences that brought with it. The imperial household, on the other hand, necessitated a vast amount of 'excess baggage', since the luxuries to which the emperors were accustomed were rarely left behind. The imperial baggage train in the later 9th and 10th centuries was supposed to have almost 600 pack-animals of one sort or another, to carry the household tents, carpets and other furniture - including a portable commode with gilded seat for the imperial person(!), folding tables, cushions, tableware, a private portable chapel, a portable 'Turkish' bath, with supplies, high-quality wines, meat and fowl, spices and herbs, as well as medicines and various other items for personal use. Large numbers of gifts in the form of both cash - gold and silver coin - and richly-decorated luxury cloths and items of clothing were also taken, in part intended as rewards to the provincial officers, in part as gifts and bribes for foreign guests of distinction or even deserters from the other side. The attitude of the generals, who were generally members of the social elite and wealthy in their own right, varied. Some led a fairly ascetic life while on campaign, winning the respect of their men and other observers by sharing the soldiers' lifestyle; others insisted on taking as many home comforts along with them as they could, in part in order to stress their own status. Yet in general, the system of campaign organisation and logistics was efficient and effective, and kept Byzantine armies in the field in even the most difficult circumstances. Sometimes, of course, in particular in the context of the guerrilla warfare of the frontier regions, this logistical apparatus was irrelevant: soldiers had to live off the land and move in unpredictable directions in order to keep track of and to harass enemy columns. But even here the provincial fiscal apparatus made it possible to claim back through the following year's tax assessment what could be demonstrated to have been consumed by the army, although this, like all such systems, tended to be cumbersome, inefficient, slow and unfair.
（军事手册强调，军官或富人不应带走多余的个人行李和仆人，因为这会导致食品和运输方面的问题； 尽管许多指挥官明确执行了此类规定，但有证据表明，许多指挥官没有这样做，而且该领域的纪律很松懈 - 并带来了随之而来的所有后果。另一方面，皇室需要大量的“超重行李”，因为皇帝习惯的奢侈品很少被遗弃。9 世纪后期和 10 世纪后期的皇家行李列车应该有近 600 只各种各样的动物，以运送家用帐篷、地毯和其他家具——包括一个带有镀金座椅的便携式马桶，供皇帝使用（！)、折叠桌、靠垫、餐具、一个私人便携式小教堂、一个便携式“土耳其”浴室，提供用品、优质葡萄酒、肉类和家禽、香料和草药，以及药品和其他各种供个人使用的物品。还收缴了大量现金——金银币——以及装饰华丽的豪华服装和服饰，部分是为了奖励省级官员，部分是作为馈赠和贿赂外宾的礼物。另一边的区别甚至逃兵。 将军们的态度各不相同，他们通常是社会精英的一员，本身就很富有。 有些人在竞选期间过着相当苦行的生活，通过分享士兵的生活方式赢得了他们的士兵和其他观察者的尊重；其他人坚持尽可能多地随身携带舒适的家，部分是为了强调自己的地位。 然而，总的来说，战役组织和后勤系统是高效的，即使在最困难的情况下，拜占庭军队也能保持在战场上。 当然，有时，尤其是在边疆游击战的背景下，这种后勤机构是无关紧要的：士兵们不得不在陆地上生活并朝着不可预测的方向移动，以跟踪和骚扰敌军纵队。但即使在这里，省级财政机构也可以通过下一年的税收评估来索回可以证明已被军队消耗的东西，尽管这与所有此类系统一样，往往是繁琐、低效、缓慢和不公平的。）
Where Byzantine armies failed it was generally due to poor leadership, or to a combination of poor morale and lack of discipline, themselves often a direct result of the quality and abilities of the commanding officers. They defended their territory, with varying success, for some 600 years, from the 6th and 7th centuries well into the 12th century, if we include the counter-offensives in Asia Minor under the emperors Alexios I, John II and Manuel I Komnenos in the period from the 1080s to the 1170s. For in spite of some often very heavy defeats, they nevertheless maintained the territorial integrity of the eastern Roman state and were even able, on several occasions, to go over to the offensive. The logistical arrangements maintained by the empire were a major, if not the major, contributory factor to this. Only when the political and economic environment in which the empire had to survive had changed sufficiently for it no longer to be able to maintain this logistical basis did the medieval east Roman state ultimately fail.
（拜占庭军队失败的原因通常是领导不力，或者士气低落和缺乏纪律，这往往是指挥官素质和能力的直接结果。如果我们把 1080 年代到 1170 年代在阿历克西斯一世、约翰二世和曼努埃尔一世科姆尼诺斯皇帝领导下的小亚细亚反攻包括在内，从 6 世纪和 7 世纪一直到 12 世纪，他们在大约 600 年的时间里捍卫了自己的领土，取得了不同程度的成功。因为尽管经常遭受非常严重的失败，他们仍然保持了东罗马国家的领土完整，甚至有几次能够发动进攻。帝国维持的后勤安排是一个主要的，如果不是主要的，促成这种情况的因素。只有当帝国赖以生存的政治和经济环境发生了足够的变化，使其不再能够维持这种后勤基础时，中世纪的东罗马国家才最终失败。）
未完待续
