欲望的律法——论拉康的《康德同萨德》第一章——Dany Nobus（机翻改）

A New Ethical System

一个新的道德体系

In 1904, the German pioneering sexologist Iwan Bloch published, under the pseudonym of Dr Eugène Dühren, the first ever edition of Sade’s mammoth Les cent vingt journées de Sodome (The Hundred-and-Twenty Days of Sodom), the manuscript of which had been deemed lost after Sade’s transfer from his cell in the royal jail of the Bastille to the asylum of Charenton on 4 July 1789, shortly after the outbreak of the French Revolution and ten days before the most formidable bastion of royal despotism was seized and plundered (Pauvert & Beuchot, 1999, p. 101). Both in his preface and in his extended ‘scientific annotations’ to the book, Dühren repeatedly emphasized the striking similarity between Sade’s fictional heroes and the clinical cases described by Richard von Krafft-Ebing, the most famous sexologist at the time, in his celebrated (and constantly updated) Psychopathia Sexualis (Sade, 1904, p. 3, p. 534—notes 70/71, p. 535—note 90; Krafft-Ebing, 1901). Twenty-five years later, a Lyonese medical doctor by the name of Salvator Sarfati devoted the first doctoral thesis to Sade, in which he endorsed Dühren’s view by saying that Sade’s writings were ‘illustrated monuments of sexual psychopathology which have contributed to science, before Krafft-Ebing did, the full range of perversions’ (Sarfati, 1930, p. 1). Yet Sarfati also extended their ‘scientific’ value by identifying in them the seeds of a doctrine ‘that would be developed, one-hundredand-twenty-five years later, by the Vienna School’ (Sarfati, 1930, p. 117)—to be read as: ‘by Freud’. This is the point that was picked up by the French medical doctor, journalist and Sade-connoisseur Maurice Heine in a review of Sarfati’s work (Heine, 1950a, pp. 107–108), and it emboldened him to promote the hybrid paradigm of ‘freudo-sadism’, which was received with great enthusiasm by the French surrealists.1 In his influential Anthology of Black Humour, the founder of the surrealist movement André Breton accordingly wrote: ‘[P]sychologically speaking, it [Sade’s writing] can be considered the most authentic precursor of Freud’s work’ (Breton, 2009, p. 46).   1904 年，德国性学家先驱伊万·布洛赫 (Iwan Bloch) 以尤金·杜伦 (Eugène Dühren) 博士的笔名出版了萨德巨著《所多玛的一百二十天》的第一版，其手稿曾在 1789 年 7 月 4 日，法国大革命爆发后不久，距离皇家专制主义最强大的堡垒被夺取和掠夺前十天，萨德从巴士底狱皇家监狱的牢房转移到夏朗顿庇护所，之后被认为丢失了（Pauvert & Beuchot，1999 年，第 101 页）。 在他的序言和对该书的扩展“科学注释”中，杜伦反复强调萨德虚构的英雄与当时最著名的性学家理查德·冯·克拉夫特·埃宾（Richard von Krafft-Ebing）在他著名的著作中描述的临床病例之间惊人的相似性。 并不断更新）Psychopathia Sexualis（Sade，1904，第 3 页，第 534 页—注释 70/71，第 535 页—注释 90；Krafft-Ebing，1901）。 二十五年后，一位名叫萨尔瓦托·萨尔法蒂（Salvator Sarfati）的里昂医生将第一篇博士论文献给了萨德，他在其中赞同杜伦的观点，称萨德的著作是“性精神病理学的例证性纪念碑，在克拉夫特-埃宾之前，它们对科学做出了贡献，对各种变态做出了贡献”（Sarfati，1930，第1页）。（Sarfati，1930，第 1 页）。 然而，萨法蒂还通过在其中识别出“一百二十五年后维也纳学派将发展起来”的学说的种子来扩展它们的“科学”价值（萨法蒂，1930，第117页）—— 读作：“弗洛伊德所著”。法国医生、记者和萨德鉴赏家莫里斯·海涅（Maurice Heine）在评论萨法蒂的著作时指出了这一点（Heine，1950a，第 107-108 页），这使他有勇气推广“萨德”的混合范式。超现实主义运动的创始人安德烈·布勒东在他颇具影响力的《黑色幽默选集》中写道：“[P]从心理学角度来说，[萨德的写作]可以是 被认为是弗洛伊德著作最真实的先驱”（Breton，2009，第 46 页）。   After World War II, the idea that Sade’s libertine novels foreshadowed Freudian psychoanalysis reappeared in Jean Paulhan’s ‘Le Marquis de Sade et sa complice ou les revanches de la pudeur’, which was originally published in 1945 (Paulhan, 1945), and later reprinted in numerous editions under the title ‘La douteuse Justine ou les revanches de la pudeur’, as a preface to Sade’s Les infortunes de la vertu (Paulhan, 1959).2 In the fifth section of this essay, Paulhan opined, not without deliberate hyperbole: ‘Reiterating them through ten volumes and supporting them with a thousand examples, a Krafft-Ebing was to consecrate the categories and distinctions the Divine Marquis traced. Later, a Freud was to adopt Sade’s very method and principle. There has not, I think, been any other example, in our Letters, of a few novels providing the basis, fifty years after their publication, for a whole science of man’ (Paulhan, 1990, p. 18). In his deposition at the court case against Pauvert on 15 December 1956, Paulhan reiterated the intellectual synergies between Sade and Freud on three separate occasions (Garçon, 1963, pp. 48–50), but by that time other key figures within the new wave of French Sade-scholarship had also ascertained Sade’s proto-freudianism. For example, in his seminal 1949 article ‘La raison de Sade’, Blanchot had identified a number of themes in Sade’s work that could be easily interpreted as anticipating Freud (Blanchot, 2004, p. 39), whereas in 1957 even Sade’s biographer Gilbert Lely had rekindled Heine’s ‘insight’, quoting the same passage from Sade’s Justine ou les malheurs de la vertu as Blanchot had used, in support of the thesis that in 1791 the Marquis was already professing some of the ideas that would later become cornerstones of the Freudian edifice (Lely, 1957, p. 333, p. 555, footnote 1). And in ‘Must We Burn Sade?’, de Beauvoir had written that in Philosophy in the Boudoir, Sade had clearly anticipated Freud’s ‘pan-sexuality’ (de Beauvoir, 1990, p. 38).   第二次世界大战后，萨德的放荡小说预示了弗洛伊德精神分析的观点再次出现在让·保兰 (Jean Paulhan) 的《萨德侯爵及其同谋或复仇者》中，该书最初出版于 1945 年 (Paulhan, 1945)，后来重印于 以“La douteuse Justine ou les revanches de la pudeur”为标题的许多版本，作为萨德的《Les infortunes de la vertu》的序言（Paulhan，1959）。2 在本文的第五部分，保兰不无故意夸张地指出：克拉夫特-埃宾通过十卷书重申了它们，并用一千个例子来支持它们，克拉夫特-埃宾将神圣侯爵所追踪的类别和区别神圣化。 后来，弗洛伊德也采用了萨德的方法和原则。 我认为，在我们的书信中，没有任何其他例子表明，几部小说在出版五十年后为整个人类科学提供了基础”（Paulhan，1990，第 18 页）。 在 1956 年 12 月 15 日针对波维尔的法庭案件的证词中，保兰在三个不同的场合重申了萨德和弗洛伊德之间的智力协同作用（Garçon，1963，第 48-50 页），但到那时，法国萨德学术新浪潮中的其他关键人物也确定了萨德的原始弗洛伊德主义。例如，在1949年发表的开创性文章“萨德的存在理由”中，布朗肖指出了萨德作品中的许多主题，这些主题很容易被解释为对弗洛伊德的预见（Blanchot，2004，第 39 页），而在 1957 年，甚至萨德的传记作者吉尔伯特 莱利重新点燃了海涅的“洞察力”，引用了布朗肖所用的萨德的《贾斯汀或有害的健康》中的同一段话，以支持这样的论点：侯爵在 1791 年就已经提出了一些思想，这些思想后来成为了自由主义理论的基石。弗洛伊德大厦（Lely，1957，第333页，第555页，脚注1）。 德·波伏瓦在《要焚毁萨德吗？》中写道，在《闺房里的哲学》中，萨德显然预见到了弗洛伊德的“泛性论”（德·波伏瓦，1990，第38页）。   In the opening paragraph of ‘Kant with Sade’, Lacan designated this recurrent portrayal of Sade as a precursor of Freud as nothing more nothing less than ‘a stupidity’ (une sottise), which is endlessly repeated in certain works of ‘literary criticism’ (les lettres) (p. 645). Although he did not clarify his reasons nor his precise target, one plausible explanation could be that for Lacan the analogies that had been drawn between Sade and Freud (and Krafft-Ebing) should not be taken seriously, since they had primarily served the purpose of rendering Sade more palatable, and the publication of his work more justifiable.3 Instead of seeing Sade as presaging Freud, Lacan aligned the Sadean boudoir with the famous locations (the Platonic Academy, Aristotle’s Lyceum and the covered walkway called Stoa, from which the Stoic tradition derived its name), where the ancient philosophers had debated the meaning of life, and where eager young citizens had received instruction into the ethical principles underpinning the establishment of a sustainable social system (p. 645).4 Rather than calling him a precursor of Freud, Lacan suggested that Sade should thus be recognized as a (moral) philosopher, and that his works should be situated within the history of ethics. If there is a link at all between Sade and Freud, it has nothing to do, then, with the former anticipating the latter, but merely with the latter being able to formulate his fundamental ‘scientific’ concept of the ‘pleasure principle’ and especially its ostensible contradictions—the fact that one can experience pleasure in one’s own and someone else’s pain—because Sade had somehow prepared the ethical ground for it (p. 645). Indeed, Sade’s libertine heroes relentlessly insisted on the ‘natural fact’ that human beings are driven by but one ‘moral’ principle, notably that of the selfish pursuit of pleasure, whereas Freud argued—in a scientific rather than an ethical vein —that unconscious mental processes are governed by the sole aim of obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain (Freud, 1958, p. 219). In addition, for Sade’s libertines, there should be no limit to a human being’s compliance with this natural ‘moral’ principle. Even when someone only derives pleasure from inflicting pain, torturing and killing others, or from his or her own suffering, the acts are legitimate on account of their being authentic and truthful. Towards the latter part of his career, Freud too realized that the pleasure principle by no means excludes the existence of a primary (erotogenic) masochism, which is tantamount to human beings finding ‘pleasure in pain’, and which may be reinforced by outward-facing destructive impulses being redirected towards the ego (Freud，1955c, pp. 54–55; 1961a, pp. 161–170).5 Hence, if Freud came up with his own psychoanalytic ‘pleasure principle’—without therefore running the risk of being misunderstood as defending Rousseau’s belief in the virtuous, uncorrupted state of human nature—it was, according to Lacan, because Sade had somehow cleared the ethical path for it, roughly 100 years before Freud, and because throughout the nineteenth century the theme of ‘delight in evil’ (bonheur dans le mal) had gradually gained momentum (p. 645).6 Lacan was no doubt alluding, here, to how the idea of someone feeling good about committing an evil act had slowly yet steadily entered the literary imagination during the nineteenth century, insofar as it had been celebrated by Romantic decadent writers such as Baudelaire, Huysmans, Mirbeau, d’Annunzio, Swinburne and Lautréamont—those, one could say, who had explored the ‘depths of taste’ (p. 645), often in direct allegiance to Sade’s libertine novels. In addition, he could have been thinking also about how, in the course of the nineteenth century, forensic psychiatrists had insisted on the disjunction between the nature of the criminal act and the nature of the person committing it: an evil act, they argued, is not necessarily committed by an evil person, and can stem from madness rather than badness. The literary work which most closely echoes Lacan’s ‘delight in evil’ (bonheur dans le mal) is Barbey d’Aurevilly’s short story ‘Le bonheur dans le crime’ (Barbey d’Aurevilly, 1985), but the expression bonheur du Mal had also already been used by Blanchot in ‘La raison de Sade’ (Blanchot 1986, p. 28; 2004, p. 18), where it has been translated as ‘the pleasures of Evil’.   在《康德同萨德》的开头一段中，拉康将这种反复出现的萨德是弗洛伊德的先驱的描述，称之为“愚蠢”（une sottise），这在某些“文学批评”作品中不断地重复。（第645页）。 尽管他没有澄清他的理由也没有明确的目标，但一种合理的解释可能是，对于拉康来说，萨德和弗洛伊德（以及克拉夫特-埃宾）之间的类比不应被认真对待，因为它们主要是为了使萨德更容易被接受，他的作品的出版也更合理。3拉康并没有将萨德视为弗洛伊德的预言，而是将萨德的闺房与著名的地点（柏拉图学院、亚里士多德学园和名为斯托亚的有盖走道，斯多葛学派传统由此得名），古代哲学家在这里辩论生命的意义，热切的年轻公民在这里接受指导，了解支撑建立可持续社会体系的道德原则（第645页）。4与其把萨德称作弗洛伊德的先驱，拉康更建议萨德因此应被视为一位（道德）哲学家，并且他的著作应置于伦理学历史之中。如果萨德和弗洛伊德之间有任何联系，那么，这与前者对后者的预期无关，而仅仅与后者能够阐述他的“快乐原则”的基本“科学”概念，尤其是它表面上的矛盾——一个人可以从自己的痛苦和他人的痛苦中体验到快乐——因为萨德以某种方式为此准备了道德基础（第645页）。事实上，萨德笔下的放荡英雄无情地坚持这一“自然事实”，即人类只受一种“道德”原则驱动，特别是自私地追求快乐，而弗洛伊德以科学而非伦理的方式主张，无意识心理过程的唯一目标是获得快乐和避免痛苦（Freud，1958，p.219）。 此外，对于萨德的浪荡子来说，人类对这种自然“道德”原则的遵守应该是没有限制的。即使某人仅从施加痛苦、折磨和杀害他人或从他或她自己的痛苦中获得快乐，这些行为也是合法的，因为它们是真实的和诚实的。在他职业生涯的后半段，弗洛伊德也意识到，快乐原则绝不排除原发性（性欲）受虐狂的存在，这相当于人类在痛苦中寻找快乐，并且可以通过外在的外在强化。 -面对被重定向到自我的破坏性冲动（Freud，1955c，第 54–55 页；1961a，第 161–170 页）。5因此，如果弗洛伊德提出了他自己的精神分析“快乐原则”，那么就不必冒被误解为捍卫卢梭对人性善良、纯洁状态的信仰的风险——根据拉康的说法，这是因为萨德以某种方式为卢梭扫清了道德道路，大约比弗洛伊德早了 100 年，而且因为整个 19 世纪的主题 “恶中之乐”（bonheur dans le mal）逐渐获得了动力（第 645 页）。6 拉康在这里无疑是在暗示，某人对犯下恶行感到高兴的想法是如何缓慢而稳定地进入文学想象的，在 19 世纪受到波德莱尔、于斯曼、米尔博、邓南遮、斯温伯恩和洛特雷阿蒙等浪漫主义颓废作家的推崇——可以说，他们探索了“品味的深度”（第645页），通常直接效忠萨德的放荡小说。此外，他也可能在思考，在十九世纪的过程中，法医精神病学家如何坚持将犯罪行为的性质与实施犯罪者的性质分开：他们认为，这是一种邪恶的行为，并不一定是邪恶之人所为，也可能源于疯狂而不是邪恶。最接近拉康的“恶中之乐”（bonheur dans le mal）的文学作品是巴贝·德奥勒维利的短篇小说《Le bonheur dans lecrime》（犯罪中的幸福）（Barbey d'Aurevilly，1985），但“bonheur du Mal”这个表达被布朗肖已经在《萨德的存在理由》（La raison de Sade）中使用过（Blanchot 1986，第 28 页；2004 年，第 18 页），其中它被翻译为“邪恶的享乐”。   For Lacan, Sade had thus been the first to formulate, through the mouth of his libertines, a new ethical system that does not take its bearings from common principles of moral goodness, and that does not aim to secure a set of socially sanctioned values about mutual support, benevolence, courtesy and respect. Yet for this in itself to have been possible, he asserted, Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason would have been the necessary turning point, if only because Kant had set out to propose a comprehensive theory of morality which does not rely on conventional distinctions between good and bad, which regards emotional factors of sympathy and compassion as ‘pathological’, which deems the anticipated consequences of one’s actions to be irrelevant with regard to human beings proceeding to fulfil their moral duty, and which constructs the moral law as simultaneously subjective and universal. Without seeing Sade as the literary extension of Kant, Lacan posited quite firmly that Sade’s work—here, Philosophy in the Boudoir—in a sense completed Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, and even revealed its truth (p. 646). This is indeed one of the most important theses of ‘Kant with Sade’: in Philosophy in the Boudoir Sade presented the disturbing truth of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, a truth which Kant himself had failed to recognize and disclose, as Horkheimer and Adorno had already suggested when they claimed that Kant was not nearly as rational a philosopher as he had wished to be. How Sade did this, and how this truth should be understood, is what Lacan set out to explain in the rest of his paper, although it is fair to say that he never really clarified the precise status of this truth. Should it be restricted to its literary qualities, or should it also be recognized in its philosophical, moral and political dimensions? Is this truth merely a matter of Sade indulging in an act of limitless creative freedom, or does it have concrete implications for the development of an ethical system? Is it a factual or a mere fictional truth? And what is the function of writing when it comes to giving shape to this truth in its relation to fantasy, desire and the law? These questions remain very much on the horizon of Lacan’s discourse, and do not receive a satisfactory answer within the space of ‘Kant with Sade’. 7   因此，对于拉康来说，萨德是第一个通过他的浪荡子之口制定了一种新的伦理体系的人，该体系并不以道德善良的共同原则为基础，也不旨在确保一套社会认可的价值观 相互支持、仁慈、礼貌和尊重。然而，他断言，要使这一点本身成为可能，康德的《实践理性批判》将成为必要的转折点，仅仅因为康德提出了一种全面的道德理论，该理论不依赖于传统的善恶区分。它将同情和同情的情感因素视为“病态的”，认为一个人的行为的预期后果与人类继续履行其道德义务无关，并将道德法则构建为同时主观和普遍的。拉康没有将萨德视为康德的文学延伸，而是相当坚定地认为萨德的作品——这里是《闺房里的哲学》——在某种意义上完成了康德的《实践理性批判》，甚至揭示了它的真理（第646页）。这确实是《康德同萨德》中最重要的论点之一：萨德在《闺房里的哲学》中提出了康德《实践理性批判》中令人不安的真理，而康德本人未能像霍克海默和阿多诺那样认识和揭示这一真理。当他们声称康德并不像他所希望的那样理性的哲学家时，已经暗示过。 萨德是如何做到这一点的，以及应该如何理解这个真理，是拉康在他的论文的其余部分中着手解释的，尽管可以公平地说，他从未真正澄清过这个真理的确切地位。它应该仅限于其文学品质，还是也应该在其哲学、道德和政治维度上得到承认？这个真理仅仅是萨德沉迷于无限创作自由的行为，还是对道德体系的发展有具体的影响？这是事实还是虚构的事实？当要在幻想、欲望和法律的关系中塑造这一真理时，写作的作用是什么？这些问题很大程度上仍然停留在拉康的话语视野中，并且在《康德同萨德》的空间内没有得到令人满意的答案。7   In order to show, then, how Kant’s work was already highly subversive in and of itself, Lacan summarized two of Kant’s‘postulates (presuppositions) of pure practical reason’ (Kant, 1997b, pp. 102–111). The first postulate is that of the immortality of the soul (Unsterblichkeit der Seele). For Kant, the ultimate object(ive) of the moral law is the realization of the ‘highest good’ (Bewirkung des höchsten Guts), which is the moment when supreme virtuousness and supreme happiness coincide. For this highest good to be achieved, a rational being’s will would need to be in ‘complete conformity’ (völlige Angemessenheit) with the moral law, that is to say, a rational being would need to attain a state of ‘holiness’(Heiligkeit). Since no rational being will ever be capable of holiness during his or her earthly existence, and because the moral law should neither be adjusted nor imposed unrealistically, Kant argued that the immortality of the soul needs to be postulated in order to understand why a rational being would never give up trying to comply with the moral law. Endless progress towards perfect compliance is possible if it is presupposed that the soul is immortal, and that holiness can still be achieved after the rational being’s phenomenological death. In this way, rational beings should also be prepared to relinquish or postpone all the temporary satisfactions that they derive from their virtuous compliance with the law, in order to achieve higher stages of moral perfection.   那么，为了表明康德的著作本身已经具有高度颠覆性，拉康总结了康德的两个“纯粹实践理性的假设（预设）”（Kant，1997b，第102-111页）。 第一个假设是灵魂不朽（Unsterblichkeit der Seele）。对于康德来说，道德法则的最终目标是实现“至善”（Bewirkung des höchsten Guts），即至高无上的美德与至高无上的幸福相一致的时刻。为了实现这一至善，一个理性存在者的意志需要与道德法则“完全一致”（völlige Angemessenheit），也就是说，一个理性存在者需要达到一种“神圣”（Heiligkeit）状态。 由于没有一个理性存在在其尘世存在期间能够成为圣洁，而且道德律既不应该被不切实际地调整或强加，康德认为，灵魂的不朽需要被假设，以便理解为什么一个理性存在永远不会放弃遵守道德法则的努力。 如果假设灵魂是不朽的，并且在理性存在现象性死亡后仍然可以实现圣洁，那么朝着完美顺从的无尽进步是可能的。 这样，理性的人也应该准备好放弃或推迟他们从道德遵守法律中获得的所有暂时的满足，以达到道德完美的更高阶段。   Kant’s second postulate of practical reason is the existence of God, who is designated as a ‘supreme intelligence’ and the ‘supreme cause of nature’, and whose existence needs to be presupposed in order to render the highest good altogether possible (conceivable, thinkable and achievable). In the absence of God, the ultimate object(ive) of the moral law cannot be guaranteed, which will inevitably affect a rational being’s will to promote the realization of the highest good. In other words, the existence of God needs to be postulated, because the object(ive) of the moral law needs to appear as a consistent, intelligible and feasible achievement to the rational being, whose duty it is to comply with the law. In the last paragraph of Section 1 of ‘Kant with Sade’, Lacan did not refer to Kant’s God, but simply highlighted the Critique’s ‘need for a [divine] will to which the object that the law concerns [i.e., the highest good] is intelligible’ (p. 646). Lacan did not say anything, here, about Kant’s third postulate—that of a rational being’s freedom from the sensible world (Kant, 1997b, p. 110)— but he pointed out how in the Critique Kant had gone so far as to completely eradicate the function of ‘usefulness’ or ‘utility’ (das Nützliche) as a possible good in itself (Kant, 1997b, p. 51), a function which he had still included, albeit only as a ‘setting’ (Einfassung) of the will, in his first treatise on moral theory, the 1785 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant, 2012, p. 10).8 Following all of this, Lacan could not resist telling his readers (and apparently he shared his elation with everyone else in his environment) how, in studying Kant’s work, he had experienced ‘incredible exaltation’ (p. 646) (Miller, 2003, p. 27).   康德关于实践理性的第二个假设是上帝的存在，上帝被指定为“最高智慧”和“自然的最高原因”，并且需要预先假定其存在，以便使最高的善完全成为可能（可想象的、可想象的，并可实现）。 如果没有上帝，道德律的最终目标就无法得到保证，这必然会影响理性存在促进至高善实现的意志。换句话说，上帝的存在需要被假设，因为道德法则的目标需要表现为对理性存在来说是一致的、可理解的和可行的成就，而理性存在的责任就是遵守法律。 在《康德同萨德》第一节的最后一段中，拉康没有提到康德的上帝，而只是强调了批判的“需要一种[神圣的]意志，而法律所关注的对象[即最高善]” 是可以理解的”（第 646 页）。 在这里，拉康没有提及康德的第三个假设——理性存在摆脱感性世界的自由（Kant，1997b，第110页）——但他指出康德在批判中是如何走得如此之远，以至于完全根除 “有用”或“效用”（das Nützliche）的功能本身是一种可能的善（康德，1997b，第 51 页），他仍然将这一功能包括在内，尽管只是作为一种“设置”（Einfassung）的意志。 这是在他关于道德理论的第一篇论文《1785 年道德形而上学的基础》中的（康德，2012 年，第 10 页）。8 在这一切发生之后，拉康忍不住告诉了他的读者（显然，他在那个教学环境中与每个人分享了他的喜悦），在研究康德的著作时，他如何经历了“难以置信的兴奋”（第646页）（Miller，2003，第27页）。         8The sentence in which Lacan articulated this point is quite ambiguous. Fink translates ‘perdant même le plat appui de la fonction d’utilité où Kant les confinait’ as ‘losing even the lifeless support of the function of utility to which Kant confined them’, which is generally accurate, but which does not resolve the question as to what the ‘them’ actually refers to. In an endnote attached to this paragraph (p. 831, note 766, 2) Fink interprets the ‘them’ as referring to Kant’s postulates, and he goes on to speculate that they lose their function of utility in Philosophy in the Boudoir. However, one of the things that Lacan will endeavour to show in ‘Kant with Sade’ is precisely that Kant’s postulates do not lose their usefulness in Sade’s work, inasmuch as some of Sade’s libertine heroes, such as the minister Saint-Fond and the Italian Cordelli in Juliette, also continue to presuppose the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. In all likelihood, Lacan’s ‘them’ refers to ‘will’ and ‘object’ (and possibly even to ‘law’) in the previous part of the sentence, so that Lacan can indeed be seen as commenting, here, on a sentence in the first section of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals—published three years before the Critique (hence also Lacan’s use of the past tense in ‘to which Kant confined them’) and drawing on lectures delivered by Kant in 1780 (Kant, 1997a, p. xvii)—whose French translation preceded the Barni-translation of the Critique Lacan was using. In this particular sentence, Kant’s term Einfassung was rendered as ‘encadrement’ by Barni (like the frame of a painting) (Kant, 1848, p. 15), which Lacan seems to have retranslated here (on the basis of the standard German Vorländer-edition of Kant’s works, which he also had in front of him) as ‘plat appui’ (literally ‘flat support’), and which Gregor and Timmermann have rendered in English as ‘setting’ (like a jeweller’s setting, which keeps a precious stone in a ring). Immediately after this part of the sentence, Lacan referred (in French) to the Critique’s ‘diamant de subversion’—a diamond, one could say, which has been released on account of Kant removing the ‘setting’ of utility ... 8 拉康阐明这一点的句子是相当含糊的。 芬克将“perdant même le plat appui de la fonction d'utilité où Kant les confinait”翻译为“甚至失去了康德所限制的效用功能的死气沉沉的支持”，这通常是准确的，但并没有解决问题 至于“他们”实际上指的是什么。 在本段所附的尾注中（第 831 页，注 766, 2），芬克将“它们”解释为指康德的假设，他接着推测它们在《闺房哲学》中失去了效用功能。 然而，拉康在《康德同萨德》中力图展示的一件事恰恰是，康德的假设在萨德的作品中并没有失去其用处，因为萨德的一些放荡英雄，例如部长圣丰和意大利人 科代利在《朱丽叶》中，也继续预设灵魂的不朽和上帝的存在。很可能，拉康的“他们”在句子的前一部分中指的是“意志”和“对象”（甚至可能是“法律”），因此拉康在这里确实可以被视为评论康德《道德形而上学基础》的第一部分——在批判之前三年出版（因此拉康在“康德将他们限制在其中”中使用了过去时态），并借鉴了康德在 1780 年发表的讲座（Kant，1997a， p. xvii）——其法文译本早于拉康批判所使用的巴尼译本。在这个特定的句子中，康德的术语 Einfassung 被巴尼（Barni）翻译为“encadrement”（就像一幅画的框架）（Kant，1848，第 15 页），拉康似乎在这里重新翻译了它（基于标准的德语 Vorländer） - 康德作品的版本，他面前也有）作为“plat appui”（字面意思是“平面支撑”），格雷戈尔和蒂默曼将其翻译成英语“设置”（就像珠宝商的放置一样，它固定了戒指中的宝石）。在这部分句子之后，拉康（用法语）立即提到了批判的“diamant de subversion”——可以说是一颗钻石，由于康德消除了功利的“设置”而被释放......