《自由的深渊》第一章（2）

And the symbolic order, the universe of the Word, logos, can only emerge from the experience of this abyss. As Hegel puts it, this inwardness of the pure self must enter also into existence, become an object, oppose itself to this innerness to be external; return to being. This is language as name-giving power.... Through the name, the object as individual entity is born out of the I. What we must be careful not to miss here is how Hegels break with the Enlightenment tradition can be discerned in the reversal of the very metaphor for the subject: the subject is no longer the Light of Reason opposed to the nontransparent, impenetrable Stuff (of Nature, Tradition . . . ); his very kernel, the gesture that opens up the space for the Light of Logos, is absolute negativity qua night of the world," the point of utter madness in which fantasmatic apparitions of partial objects wander around. Consequently, there is no subjectivity without this gesture of withdrawal, which is why Hegel is fully justified in inverting the standard question of how the fall-regression into madness is possible: the true question is rather how the subject is able to climb out of madness and to reach normalcy." That is to say; the withdrawal into self, the cutting off of the links to the Umwelt, is followed by the construction of a symbolic universe that the subject projects onto reality as a kind of substitute-formation destined to recompense us for the loss of the immediate, presymbolic real. However, as Freud himself asserted apropos of Schreber, is not the manufacturing of a substitute-formation that recompenses the subject for the loss of reality the most succinct definition of paranoiac construction as an attempt to cure the subject of the disintegration of his universe? In short, the ontological necessity of madness" resides in the fact that it is not possible to pass directly from the purely animal soul immersed in its natural life-world to normal subjectivity dwelling in its symbolic universe - the vanishing mediator between the two is the mad" gesture of radical withdrawal from reality that opens up the space for its symbolic (re)constitution. It was already Hegel who emphasized the radical ambiguity of the statement What I think, the product of my thought, is objectively true." This statement is a speculative proposition that renders simultaneously the lowest truth," the erratic attitude of the madman caught in his self-enclosed universe, unable to relate to reality, and the "highest truth", the truth of speculative idealism, the identity of thought and being. If, therefore, in this precise sense, as Lacan put it, normalcy itself is a mode, a subspecies of psychosis, that is, if the difference between "normalcy" and madness is inherent to madness in what does then this difference between the "mad"(paranoiac) construction and the "normal"(social construction of) reality consist? Is "normalcy" ultimately not merely a more "mediated" form of madness? Or, as Schelling put it, is normal Reason not merely "regulated madness"? 

符号秩序或者说道与逻各斯的世界，只能从这深渊般的体验中生成出来。正如黑格尔所说，这个纯粹自我的内在性“也必须进入实存的范畴，变成一个客体，成为与它自己的内在性相对立的外在，或者说也必须重归于现实。这就是语言——一种命名的力量……通过名称，客体作为独立的实体从自我中诞生出来”。在此，我们千万要注意，不要忽略这一点：黑格尔是如何通过颠倒对主体的譬喻而与启蒙的传统相决裂的：主体不再是与不透明的、不可透视的东西（比如自然或习俗）相对立的理性之光，它最内在的内核、它开辟出为逻各斯之光所澄明的场域的姿态，恰恰是作为“世界之夜”的绝对的否定性，恰恰是这样一个完全疯狂的时点，在其中，“破碎的客体”如诡谲的幽灵一般四处游荡。所以，没有这样一种回撤的姿态，就没有主体性，正因此，黑格尔完全有理由翻转这个寻常的问题：彻底堕入疯狂是如何可能的？而真正的问题是：主体如何能爬出疯狂的深渊并抵达“正常状态”？这也就是说，撤回到自我或者说与母体联系的断开是首先发生的，接着才是符号世界的建构，主体把这个符号世界投射到现实当中，这样的“现实”注定只是一个替代品，以弥补我们缺失了的直接性与前符号的实在。然而，正如弗洛伊德对施列伯所下的诊断：主体为了弥补其现实的缺失而制造替代品，这不正是对妄想症——主体为治愈其世界的裂解而付出的努力——的最简明的定义吗？简言之，“疯狂”在本体论上的必然性基于这一事实，即一边是全然沉浸在自然的生活世界中的“动物灵魂”，一边是栖居于符号世界中的“正常的”主体，前者不可能直接地变成后者，那种从现实中激进地回撤从而开辟出符号学结构（或重构）之场域的“疯狂”姿态，正是二者之间消逝着的中介。黑格尔早已强调过以下表述的极端两岐性：“我所思维的、我思维的产物，对客体而言是真理。”该表述是一个思辨命题（译者注：在黑格尔那里，“思辨”是矛盾的对立同一），它同时呈现为“最低真理”——陷入到他的自我封闭的世界之中，无法与现实建立联系的疯子的不安定姿态与“最高真理”，也就是思辨唯心论的真理——思维与存在的同一性。因此，正如拉康指出的，从此种意义上说，如果“正常”自身是精神病的一个亚种，或者说，如果“正常”与疯狂之间的区别内在于疯狂，那么“疯狂”（妄想症）构造出的现实与“正常”（社会）构造出的现实之间的差别又何在呢？难道说，“常态”终归不过是疯狂的一种较为“中间的”形态吗？或者，难道正如谢林所指出的那样，正常的理性不过是“被规范了的疯狂”吗？

Hegel's notion of the "night of the world" as the feminine kernel of subjectivity is thus profoundly "Schellingian" in that it subverts the simple opposition between the Light of Reason and the impenetrable darkness of matter. Its ultimate consequence is that the emergence of reality, of the universe as such, is grounded in a fundamental and irreducible inversion/perversion of the "proper" relationship between ontological forces- if their relationship were to be "set straight", reality as such would disintegrate. Schelling sticks to this fundamental insight of Weltalter up to his late philosophy of mythology and revelation: the universe as such (the actual world) is the result of an original inversion perversion of divine" potencies": "reality" emerges when the harmonious balance between the three primordial divine potencies(A1, A2, A3) is disturbed that is, when the first potency (A1) which should serve as the passive ground for the other, higher potencies, usurps the leading place and thus changes from a benevolent enabling force effective from the background to an egotist contractive force destructive of every otherness. It is only through this perversion/inversion of potencies that the passage from mere potentiality to actuality can occur - the realm of harmony previous to the perversion of potencies is a realm of pure potentiality that lacks the firmness of actual being. Therein resides the great insight of German Idealism: the real, material world is not merely a (distorted) reflection of suprasensible Ideas in the mode of plotinus's emanation but involves a violent reversal of the proper hierarchical relation between Ideas. Schelling's name for this reversal is the force of egotism of contractive Self-sameness(Ichheit, Selbstheit) that provides the firm ground of reality: this Selfsameness is neither passive matter nor universal notional content, but the active force of absolute contraction to a point of self-relating that can only occur in the sphere of the Spirit - matter cannot absolutely contract itself into itself, since it has its center of gravity outside itself (as is proven by the phenomenon of gravity). In short, Schellings crucial point is that the domain of Ideas becomes actual Spirit only through its egotist" perversion/inversion, in the guise of the absolute contraction into a real Person. One must be careful not to miss the point here: it is not only that what we experience as material reality" is the perversion/inversion of the true ideal order; reality emerges insofar as the true ideal order gets inverted in itself, runs amok - in Schelling's terms, the inertia of external material reality is a proof of the divine madness, of the fact that God himself was "out of his mind." (What Schelling is not ready to accept is the logical consequence of his reasoning: this perversion is unsurpassable, the Spirit in its actuality is irreducibly out of joint, the stain of perversion is the unavoidable price for the Spirit's actualization - the notion of a Reconciliation that would sublate the contractive force of egotism in the ethereal medium of Spirit is purely fantasmatic, even when it puts on the technological dress of Virtual Reality and presents itself as the dream of cutting links with our material body and wandering freely in cyberspace.)

因此，作为主体之女性性内核的黑格尔的“世界之夜”概念，从其深层的含义上说，是“谢林式的”，因为它颠覆了理性之光与物质的不可透视之黑暗之间的简单对立。它最终的结论是：现实和宇宙本身的出现，奠基于本体性力量间的“恰当”关系之基本的、不可再被还原的扭曲与颠倒之上，如果它们的关系被“摆正”，现实就会崩解。谢林直到其晚期的神话哲学与天启哲学，都一直坚持着《世界时代》的这一基本洞见：宇宙自身（现实世界）是神圣“潜能”之原初扭曲与颠倒的结果：当三种原始的神圣潜能A1、A2、A3（译者注：即能在sein Könnende、必在sein Müssende、应在sein Sollende）之间的和谐平衡被打破时，即在第一种潜能A1——它本应作为另外两种更高潜能的被动性的根据——篡夺了主导地位，因而从背景性的、仁慈的、促成性的力量转变为毁灭一切他者的、以自我为中心的、收缩性的力量时，“现实”出现了。只有经过潜能的扭曲与颠倒，从单纯的潜能到现实的过渡才能发生——潜能扭曲之前的和谐的国度是一个单纯潜能的国度，其中缺乏实存的确定性。这就是德国唯心论的伟大洞见：现实的、物质的世界不仅如普罗提诺流溢说那般，是对超感性的理念的（扭曲）反映，而且涉及到诸理念间恰当的等级关系的剧烈颠倒。谢林赋予这一颠倒的名称是“收缩性的、自我同一的、以自我为中心的力量”，它为现实提供了坚实的根据：这里的自我同一性既不是消极被动的物质，也不是普遍的概念性内容，而是完全收缩进一个自我相关点的积极力量，这只能发生于精神的领域。物质不可能完全收缩进自身，因为它的重心在自身之外（这为重力现象所证明）。简言之，谢林的核心论点是：理念王国要变成现实的精神，只能通过完全收缩成一个实在的人格（译者注：指“三位一体”中的位格），即通过其“以自我为中心的”的扭曲与颠倒来实现。千万不要忽略这一点：不只被我们体验为“物质性现实”的东西，是对真实的理念秩序的扭曲与颠倒，当且仅当真实的理念秩序倒置自身，变得疯狂，现实才会出现。用谢林的话说，外在的物质性现实的“惯性”证明了神圣疯狂的存在，也证明了上帝自身“在其心灵之外”这一事实。（作者注：谢林不愿意接受他推理的逻辑结论：这样的颠倒是不可逾越的，实存着的精神作为“秩序的紊乱”这一点不可再被还原，“颠倒”作为污痕，是精神现实化所必须付出的代价。精神凭借一个空灵飘渺的中介，就可以“扬弃”以自我为中心的收缩性力量——这样一种“和解”观，即使披上了虚拟现实的科技外衣，表现为“切断与物质性身体的联系从而自由地徜徉于赛博空间”的理想，也不过是个纯粹的幻想而已。）

This perversion of the “proper” hierarchical relationship between potencies is the key feature of the German Idealist notion of a philosophical "system". Insofar as this perversion is a free act, the most elementary manifestation of freedom, one can see where the standard reproach (a topos from Kierkegaard to Heidegger), according to which the weak point of Schelling's essay on freedom is that it tries to think together what is incompatible (i.e., freedom and system), falls short. “System," in the precise sense of German Idealism, is a totality that is all-encompassing since it includes/contains its own inversion: in a “system," the relationship between A and B, the “higher" and the “lower" principle, is only fully actualized when, within the domain of B, their proper relationship is inverted, that is, A itself is subordinated to B. We can also see in what sense the notion of system is strictly equivalent to the project of conceiving the Absolute “not only as Substance, but also as Subject," as Hegel put it: the principle of subjectivity means that what is originally a subordinate moment of the Absolute can posit itself as its own Center and subordinate to itself its own substantial presuppositions. Or, to put it in more popular terms, the gesture of the subject par excellence is that of wilfully putting at stake the entire substantial content for a capricious meaningless detail: “I want this, even if the whole world goes down." Therein resides what Hegel calls the “infinite right of subjectivity”: the subject’s freedom has to actualize itself against Substance, and it can do so only by way of elevating a contingent, meaningless particular moment that the subject posits as its embodiment, over the entire substantial content.

这种诸潜能间“恰当的”等级关系的颠倒，是德国唯心论的哲学“体系”观的关键特征。这个颠倒是自由的行动，是自由的最基本的表现，依那种常见的批评（从克尔恺郭尔到海德格尔的传统论题），谢林论自由的弱点是他力图将不兼容的东西（自由与体系）放在一起思考，所以他失败了。在德国唯心论看来，“体系”是一个包罗万象的总体，因为它包含着自身的颠倒：在一个“体系”中，“高级”原则A与“低级”原则B之间的关系要完全实现出来，当且仅当在B的领域内，二者的恰当关系被颠倒时，也就是说，A反倒隶属于B时。我们可以看到，这样的体系观何等严格地等价于把绝对认作“不仅是实体，而且是主体”的设想，正如黑格尔所说：主体性原则意味着，原本隶属于绝对的要素，可以把自己设定成自己的中心，并且使自己的实体性前提隶属于自己。或者用更通俗的话说，最卓越的主体性姿态是这样的：为了一件变幻无常的、毫无意义的琐事，固执地赌上所有的实体性内容，“我就要这个，哪怕世界毁灭”。黑格尔所谓“主体性的无限权利”就在于此：主体必须反对实体才能实现自己的自由，而且，主体只有把一个偶然的、无意义的特殊要素看作是自己的化身，并把它提升到所有的实体内容之上，才能实现自己的自由。

This inclusion of the inversion of the "proper" relationship is not only the key feature of Schelling’s notion of freedom (as the freedom for good and evil, i.e., the freedom to invert the proper relationship), but also Fichte’s and Hegel’s, and even Kant's. Is not the aim of Fichte's "doctrine of science" to explain how the subject at the transcendental level, the pure 1, which “posits" the entire objective content, experiences itself as passively determined by the universe of objectivity; how the proper relationship between Subject and Object is inverted? Is not the whole point of Hegel’s theory of “alienation" to explain how the product of social activity is reified into an autonomous substantial content that subordinates to itself its own generative force? And do we not encounter the same inversion in the fundamental Kantian deadlock that resides in the overlapping of the condition of impossibility (the inaccessibility of the noumenal realm to finite human conscience) with the condition of possibility (humanity can act morally out of Duty only insofar as the noumenal realm is inaccessible to human beings) - humanity's limitation to finitude, that is, the very condition that prevents it from ever being able to fulfil its ethical destination, is at the same time a positive condition of its ethical activity? Subject, freedom, and system are thus three names for the same gesture of inversion.

这种对“恰当”关系的颠倒，不仅是谢林自由观的关键特征（即善与恶的自由，或者说，颠倒恰当关系的自由），而且是费希特的、黑格尔的，甚至是康德的。费希特“知识学”的目标不是解释先验主体——“设定出”所有客体性内容的纯粹的“一”——是如何体验到它自己被动地为客体的世界所决定的吗，不是解释主客间的恰当关系是如何被颠倒的吗？黑格尔“异化”理论的关键，不是解释社会活动的产物如何物化为一种自主的实体性内容，并反过来使生成它自己的力量隶属于它的吗？另外，在康德哲学的基本僵局中，我们不是也遇到了同样的颠倒吗？康德的僵局在于不可能性条件（有限的人类良知无法通达本体界）与可能性条件（人类只有在无法通达本体界的条件下，才能够出于责任而有道德地行动）的交叠——人类的有限性，即始终阻止人实现其伦理目标的条件，同时也是伦理行动的积极条件。因此，主体、自由和体系是同一个颠倒姿态的不同名称。

Jean-Pierre Dupuy developed a homologous notion of autonomous system by way of confronting Derridean deconstruction with the "theory of systems": the latter defines an autonomous system by the very feature that deconstruction denounces as the index of the system's failure to achieve autonomy, that is, by the fact that the system contains (in both senses of the term: to encompass and to restrain) its "condition of impossibility", an element that inverts/subverts its fundamental constellation - it was already Hegel who conceived the Absolute as that which, in its relation to its Otherness, relates to itself. . . Dupuy conceives this inherent inversion as the elementary "logical matrix of deconstruction": in the dominant field I, 2 is subordinated to 1, whereas in the subordinated field II, 1 itself is subordinated to 2. In general, Rhetoric is subordinated to Thought (rhetoric should serve as a mere device to express our thought more clearly); however, within the rhetorical domain itself. Thought is subordinated to Rhetoric (rhetorical manipulations sooner or later “contaminate” thought itself and subordinate it to its goal of achieving a persuasive “rhetorical effect") It is easy to discern the same matrix in Hegel’s treatment of the touchy subject of the relationship between Religion and State: Religion (God), of course, stands over the State, but within the domain of the State, State should exert power over Religion; that is. Religion qua social institution should follow the State’s regulations. The insight into the necessity of this inversion is what distinguishes Reason from Understanding: according to the stiff rules of Understanding, if State is subordinated to Religion, this means that theocracy is the only legitimate form of government. The clergy should act directly as politically sovereign; every subordination of Religion to nonreligious State regulations is a depraved compromise (the position of “religious fundamentalism”). Reason, however, tells us that Religion truly rules the world precisely by accepting its own subordinate role within the sphere that is subordinated to itself. A King can legitimately exert unlimited power over all terrestrial institutions, inclusive of the Church, only insofar as this power itself is legitimized as grounded in God. One is tempted to formulate this reversal, which, perhaps, is ideology at its purest, in the well-known Marxist terms of the difference between the dominant agency and the agency that determines “in the last instance’': God determines everything “in the last instance”, yet he exerts this determining role in the very form of the rule of the State over every social institution, inclusive of the Church. Another example is the way Gypsies function in the social perception of Balkan Slavic nations as a carnivalesque inversion of the “normal” patriarchal universe - the topsy-turvy world of disarranged social and sexual hierarchies (men with breasts, women with moustaches, etc.). This inversion is, however, internal to the (patriarchal) Order; it serves as its support: it is only through the supplement of this inversion that the Order is accomplished, fully actualized, that it becomes autonomous. We are dealing here with a mutual enveloping best illustrated by Eschers two hands drawing each other: “Sacred” is the all-encompassing sea from which the domain of the Profane has to separate itself, yet once we are within the Profane, the Sacred itself starts to function as a special domain within the Profane, enclosed by it, that is, as its "super-structure", its inherent “excess." (Far from being a surplus that comes after our profane needs are satisfied, the Sacred is thus at the beginning; that is, the story begins with an excessive expenditure and only then passes to its economization, to rational calculation of needs, or, as Schelling put it, the Beginning is the negation of the process, of what begins with it. For that reason, the enlightened perspective that takes as its starting point the priority of real needs and wonders at superfluous expenditure while so many basic needs remain unsatisfied, is misleading. A brief reminder from the history of early capitalism is very instructive as to this point: automatic machines were first developed as a surplus, as toys intended to amuse the kings gaze (the famous machines in the garden of Versailles); it was only afterward that they were put to real use and applied to increase productivity.)

为了以“系统论”对抗德里达的解构论，让·皮埃尔·迪皮伊提出了与上文相应的“自主系统”的概念，它的定义是这样的：包覆着contain（这个词有包含与抑制双重含义）自己的“不可能性条件”的系统，或者说包覆着“一个能够颠覆系统的基本架构的要素”的系统，而这一点正是为解构论所贬斥的、系统未能实现自主化的标志——这就是黑格尔早已提出的“绝对对他者的关系就是对自身的关系”。迪皮伊把这种内在的颠倒视为基本的“解构的逻辑矩阵”：在支配性的领域I中，2服从于1，而在从属性的领域II中，1反倒服从于2。总体上看，修辞服从于思想（修辞本应仅仅是一种有助于清晰表达思想的手段），然而，在修辞自身的领域中，思想服从于修辞（修辞的运用迟早要“污染”思想本身，并使它服从于“达到有说服力的修辞效果”的目标）……在黑格尔对宗教与国家间的关系这一难题的处理上，我们很容易辩识出相同的矩阵：宗教（上帝）当然监督着国家，但在国家的领域内，国家应当对宗教行使权力，作为社会组织的宗教应当服从国家的法律。能否洞察到这一颠倒的必要性，是理性与知性的区别：根据知性呆板的法则，假如国家从属于宗教，这就意味着神权政体是唯一一种合法的政体，神职人员应当直接掌握最高政治权力，宗教对世俗国家法律的任何一种服从都是堕落的妥协（即“原教旨主义”的立场）。然而，理性告诉我们，宗教真正统治世界的方法恰恰是承认：在从属于自己的领域内，自己反倒处于从属的地位。国王能合法地对人间的所有机构，包括对教会施加无限的权力，当且仅当这种权力在上帝那里有合法的根据。如果有人想确切地表达出这种颠倒的话（或许，这是最纯粹的意识形态），那么，他可以用众所周知的马克思主义术语——占统治地位的因素与“归根到底”起决定性作用的因素之间的区别（译者注：在一个社会结构中，上层建筑占据着统治地位，经济因素看起来处于上层建筑的支配之下，但是这个社会结构本身是由经济因素（生产方式）塑造的，生产方式“归根到底”起决定性的作用）——来阐述：一切“最终”都由上帝来决定，上帝却以国家统治的形式，对包括教会在内的一切社会机构发挥他的决定性作用。另一个例子是，吉普赛人在巴尔干斯拉夫国家的社会知觉中发挥的功能是：他们狂欢般地颠倒了“正常的”父权制系统，把它弄成了一个社会和性别的等级制通通混乱（男人有乳房，女人留胡子）的乱七八糟的世界。然而，这一颠倒却内在于父权制秩序，前者充当着后者的根据：只有经由这一颠倒的补充，父权秩序才得以完满地实现，才得以变得自主化。在此，我们所讨论的是一种相互包含的关系，埃舍尔的画作《手画手》是对这种关系的绝佳图示：“宗教”是包罗万象的大海，世俗领域不得不从其中分离出来，然而，一旦我们处于世俗领域之内，宗教自身就开始作为一个被世俗包裹在内的特殊领域而发挥作用，或者说，作为世俗的“上层建筑”和内在的“剩余”而发挥作用。（作者注：这种剩余绝非在我们的世俗需求被满足之后才出现的，相反，宗教一开始就存在。文明开端于过度的消费，然后才过渡到节约和对需求的理性计算，或者，正如谢林所说，开端是对进程的否定，是对自它而始者的否定。正因此，启蒙的这一观点具有欺骗性，它把优先满足真实需求当作开端，因此对“在如此多的基本需求尚未被满足时的过度消费”感到吃惊。简单回顾一下资本主义的早期历史能让我们更好地理解这一点：自动化机械最初是作为一种剩余、一种用来取悦国王的玩具（凡尔赛宫中的那个著名的机械）而发展起来的，后来它们才被应用于实际，以提高生产力。）