劳动的价值理论（二）
本篇文章由我翻译，全文共63页，本篇为节选的第二部分约9页内容，原文为英文并附于末尾，红色标注为原文附带的注释，蓝色标注为我添加的补充和注释。文章中引用部分若已有汉译本，则一概使用汉译本的翻译，并补充标注汉译本的引用文献。
3.抽象劳动价值理论？(An abstract labour theory of value?)
当然，对上一节中的“劳动价值理论”(“labour theory of value”)是否存在于马克思的著作中的质疑并非首次提出(参见Pilling, 1972; Banaji, 1976)。在最近的社会主义经济学家联合会的辩论中，抽象劳动被人们置于非常重要的地位上，以将马克思的价值理论与前面所讨论的两种适用于李嘉图理论而不适用于马克思理论的解读方式区分开来。马克思确信，他的价值理论与李嘉图的不同之处在于他对劳动形式的关注，以及他对抽象劳动(abstract labour)和具体劳动(concrete labour)的区分。（例如，参见《剩余价值理论》，第二卷，p.164, 172.）（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第34卷第181-2页、第190-1页）在《资本论》中，马克思告诉我们，
“商品中包含的劳动的这种二重性，是首先由我批判地证明的。这一点是理解政治经济学的枢纽……”(Capital, I, p. 132.)（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第54-55页）
希梅尔魏特(Himmelweit)和莫恩(Mohun)基于他们对斯蒂德曼的回复，于1978年提出了这一观点：
“我们在李嘉图主义的凝结劳动价值论(embodied-labour theory of value)和基于抽象劳动范畴的马克思主义价值论之间做了区分。前者打算直接成为一种价格理论，而后者要成为一种价格理论只有经过几个中间过渡阶段或媒介。”(Himmelweit and Mohun, 1978, p. 94.)（伊恩•斯蒂德曼和保罗•斯威齐等，2016，p. 289.）
他们暗示，如果我们将马克思强调的这一区别牢记于心，我们就会发现，冗余性和逻辑不一致的指控虽然适用于李嘉图的价值理论，但是不适用于马克思的价值理论。
他们的观点并不完全令人信服，原因有二。首先，斯蒂德曼声称已将劳动视为抽象劳动，并将其批判目标准确地指向抽象劳动价值理论(abstract labour theory of value)（见Steedman, 1977, p. 19）（扬•斯蒂德曼，1991，6），希梅尔魏特和莫恩没有明确面对这一主张。显然，这在很大程度上取决于如何理解抽象劳动的概念。例如，斯威齐认为抽象劳动概念并非李嘉图和斯密劳动概念的替代品，而是对他们著作的进一步发展和澄清。(Sweezy, 1962, p. 31.)（保罗•斯威齐，2016，p. 53.）马克思自己并没有把“物化劳动”(“embodied labour”)和“抽象劳动”对立起来的倾向，比如说，“充当等价物的商品的物体总是当作抽象人类劳动的化身”(“The body of the commodity, which serves as the equivalent, always figures as the embodiment of abstract human labour”)。(Capital ,1, p. 150.)（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第73页）
其次，他们在进行循环论证：他们从商品形式推导出抽象劳动的概念，然后希望用抽象劳动范畴再来解释商品形式(Himmelweit and Mohun, 1978, p. 73.)（伊恩•斯蒂德曼和保罗•斯威齐等，2016，p. 270.）。
在我看来，抽象劳动和具体劳动的区别是马克思和李嘉图理论之间的一个重要区别，但不是唯一的区别。更根本的是理论对象和分析方法方面的区别。在抽象劳动范畴的含义和意义变得清晰之前，需要厘清这些区别到底是什么。
4.劳动作为马克思价值理论的对象
我的观点是马克思的价值理论的对象根本不是价格，我这里的意思不是说马克思关于价格的价值理论(Marx's value theory of price)比李嘉图的更复杂。这不意味着马克思不关心价格，也不关心价格的数值如何由价值决定，而是说交换现象并非这一理论的对象。（同样的，这并非完全是一个新观点，见Hussain, 本卷, p. 84.）我的观点是，马克思价值理论的对象是劳动。这不是一个试图解释价格如何决定和如何从劳动中找出这种决定关系的理论。而是试图解释为什么劳动采取这种形式，以及其在政治上会产生什么结果的理论。
我们在马克思第一次深入研究亚当•斯密时（见《早期著作》中的《经济学哲学手稿》，特别是p. 287-9.）（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第3卷第223页起）就可以发现他在关注这一方面。《德意志意识形态》为这一观点提供了支撑性证据：
“个人怎样表现自己的生活，他们自己也就怎样。因此，他们是什么样的，这同他们的生产是一致的——既和他们生产什么一致，又和他们怎样生产一致。”（同前，p. 42.）（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第5卷，未出版；《马克思恩格斯全集》第一版第3卷第24页）
以及在《资本论》中，马克思指出了一个将他的分析方向与政治经济学区分开来的关键问题：
“为什么这一内容采取这种形式呢？为什么劳动表现为价值，用劳动时间计算的劳动量表现为劳动产品的价值量呢？一些公式本来在额上写着，它们是属于生产过程支配人而人还没有支配生产过程的那种社会形态的，但在政治经济学的资产阶级意识中，它们竟像生产劳动本身一样，成了不言而喻的自然必然性。”(Capital, I, p. 174-5.)（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第98-99页）
马克思在这里表示的不是在政治经济学中“加入历史视角”，而是理论对象上的差异（另见Hussain, 本卷, p. 86.）。正因劳动是马克思理论的对象，所以马克思从生产性商品开始分析，认为它是“劳动产品在当代社会中表现出来的最简单的社会形式”（见《瓦格纳的批注》，p.50.）。而且，并不像庞巴维克(Böhm-Bawerk)所声称的那样，与价格决定相矛盾（另见Kay, 本卷, p. 48-50）。
5.一种可能的误解：劳动力的社会分配
为什么劳动采取这种形式的问题不仅仅是一个分配问题。在这里，马克思于1868年7月写给库格曼(Kugelmann)的那封著名的信可能非常误导人，马克思写道：
“要想得到和各种不同的需要量相适应的产品量，就要付出各种不同的和一定数量的社会总劳动量。这种按一定比例分配社会劳动的必要性，决不可能被社会生产的一定形式所取消，而可能改变的只是它的表现形式，这是不言而喻的。自然规律是根本不能取消的。在不同的历史条件下能够发生变化的，只是这些规律借以实现的形式。而在社会劳动的联系体现为个人劳动产品的私人交换的社会制度下，这种劳动按比例分配所借以实现的形式，正是这些产品的交换价值。”（《通信集》，p. 251.）（《马克思恩格斯全集》第一版第32卷第541页）
就这封信本身来说，它可以支持这样一种观点：该理论的对象仅仅是各个个体在预先给定的工作结构中分配和联系在一起的方式。这种观点可以从“黑格尔主义”的鲁宾(I. I. Rubin)到“反黑格尔主义”的阿尔都塞(Althusser)等一系列数量庞大且观点各异的学者中找到。
对于鲁宾来说，价值理论是一个与商品经济中的生产调节有关的理论。在商品生产中，“没有人有意识地组织或调节社会劳动力在各种各样的产业部门之间分配，以适应给定的生产力状态。”(Rubin, 1973, p. 77.)在他著作的开头，鲁宾清晰地表示，组成各个产业部门的生产力是物质—技术过程的产品(Rubin, 1973, p. 1-3)。对于他来说，社会仅仅只是在这个预先给定的结构中，人们之间的联系网络：
“把马克思的理论看做对劳动与作为劳动产品的物的分析也同样是不正确的。劳动与物的关系是一种给定的具体劳动形式与一种给定的具体的物的关系。这是一种技术关系，其本身并非价值理论关注的内容。价值理论关注的是各种劳动形式在它们的分配过程中的内在联系，这种联系建立在这些物的交换关系之上，即建立在劳动产品的交换关系之上。” (Rubin, 1973, p. 67.)
但起到最终决定作用的是预先给定的结构：
“我们可以注意到，人与人之间的社会生产关系由生产的物质条件和技术生产资料在不同社会群体之间的分配所决定……从唯物史观的角度来看，这是一条适用于所有社会形式的普遍社会规律。” (Rubin, 1973, p. 29.)
显然，阿尔都塞对马克思的解读与鲁宾的解读之间存在很多差别，但阿尔都塞也引用了马克思写给库格曼的信，并写道：
“马克思的劳动价值理论(Marx's labour theory of value)……只能被理解为理论的一种特例，马克思和恩格斯将其称为‘价值规律’或各个产业部门之间可用劳动力分配定律……”(Althusser, 1977, p. 87.)
或，
“人分成各个社会阶级(the distribution of men into social classes exercising functions in the production process)（人分成在生产过程中行使不同职能的各个社会阶级）。”(Althusser, 1975, p. 167.)（阿尔都塞, 巴里巴尔, 2008, p. 152.）
这些“生产过程中的职能”由生产中的物质和技术条件决定。
“因此，劳动过程就是人类的劳动力按照相应的（技术）规则，使用一定的劳动工具把劳动对象（原材料，已经加工过的材料或未加工过的原料）加工成有用产品时的耗费……作为物质机制的劳动过程，是由自然和工艺的物质规律来支配的。”(Althusser, 1975, p. 170-1.) （阿尔都塞, 巴里巴尔, 2008, p. 155.）
虽然这种观点确实“否定了任何将人类劳动视为纯粹创造能力的‘人道主义’概念”，但它并没有否定（实际上鼓励了）对马克思的技术主义解读而具有潜在的灾难性政治意义。
对我们对马克思的价值理论的分析来说更为重要的是，由于技术主义解读的对象是将各个个体分配到生产过程中预先给定的场所或职能的分配过程，因此其往往会重新引入劳动价值理论(the labour theory of value)，尽管其形式更复杂，且因果关系相互交错。劳动时间不仅仅被视为交换价值的决定因素；交换价值也被视为劳动时间的决定因素。也就是说，交换价值都处于均衡状态且等于体现在商品中的社会必要劳动时间；而且在不同商品上的总劳动时间分配情况由不同商品之间的市场价格和要求的相对劳动时间之差调节。鲁宾对这一过程的解释实际上与斯威齐相同。(见Rubin, 1973, 第8、9、10章; Sweezy, 1962, 第2、3章.) （保罗•斯威齐，2016，第2、3章.）
“在一个简单商品经济中，一个生产部门，例如制鞋部门的10小时劳动与另一个部门例如制衣部门的8小时劳动的产品相交换，必然会导致（如果制鞋和制衣使用的劳动力复杂程度相当）两个部门生产的收益不同，以及劳动力从制鞋部门向制衣部门转移。”(Rubin, 1973, p. 103.)
不同之处在于斯威齐明确承认了这种观点的出处是《国富论》，但鲁宾声称他没有重复“亚当•斯密的错误”。(Rubin, 1973, p. 167.)他声称他的不同之处在于他证明了“收益相等”是由一个客观的社会过程来强制执行的，这个社会过程强迫个人以这种方式行动。但这种观点站不住脚。并不存在这样一个社会压力使一个使用自己和家庭劳动力而非雇佣劳动的简单商品生产者比较不同生产部门每小时劳动的报酬差异。（关于小农经济案例的讨论，参见Banaji, 1977, p. 32.）只有资本家才会被迫计算生产中耗费的劳动时间，因为他们总是在与其他资本家在劳动市场（以及其他所有市场）上竞争。但资本家是以货币计算的成本，而不是直接用劳动时间与市场价格相比较，因为他们计算的不是自己的劳动时间。(5)
鲁宾的观点与斯威齐稍有不同，前者并没有将价值视为生产领域中形成的一个范畴，而斯威齐则相反。但这一点仅仅意味着在鲁宾的分析中，价值和交换价值之间的关系被模糊了，而在斯威齐（以及米克、多布等人）的分析中，则是价值和劳动时间的关系被模糊了。这四位学者的共同点是将马克思著作中的三个范畴（劳动时间、价值和交换价值）简化为两个。鲁宾认为价值是
“市场价格波动的中心且所有价格都与之重合的平均水平，如果社会劳动在生产部门之间按比例分配的话。”(Rubin, 1973, p. 64)
因此，它只是一个流通中形成的范畴，且交换价值和价值之间并不存在系统性的区别。(6)
斯威齐、多布和米克（以及他们所代表的传统）认为价值是劳动时间；例如，
“马克思一开始将商品的价值定义为从始至终为生产它所普遍需要的劳动总量。” (Meek, 1977, p. 95)
因此，其只是生产中形成的一个范畴。
不过鲁宾也与他们赞同这样一个相同的观点，即生产是一个相对独立的过程，在这一过程中可以发现具有最终决定作用的“独立变量”。
“……改变整个价值体系的动力来源于物质—技术生产过程。劳动生产力的增长表现为生产中投入的具体劳动平均数量的减少。由于劳动作为具体劳动和抽象劳动的双重性，因此，这种被视为‘社会’或‘抽象’的劳动数量，作为社会总同质劳动的一部分减少了。劳动生产力的提高改变了生产所需的抽象劳动的数量，它引起了劳动产品价值的改变。产品价值的改变反过来影响力社会劳动在各生产部门的分配。劳动生产力——抽象劳动——价值——社会劳动分配：这就是商品经济的机制。”(Rubin, 1973, p. 66.)
因此，鲁宾依然站在劳动价值理论(the labour theory of value)的立场上。这一理论的对象依然处于循环论证过程中——它只是扩大到了包括劳动时间以及劳动产品的流通上了。
6.人类劳动的不固定性(7)
但是，如果马克思的价值理论并不是以劳动的流动（或分配）作为对象，来填补给定生产结构的空缺，那么它的对象是什么？ 有人尝试将其解释为生产结构的决定与该结构中劳动分配。但这仍然是一个过于机械、过于结构化的隐喻。马克思在《政治经济学批判大纲》中有一段生动的描写：
“劳动是活的、造形的火；是物的易逝性，物的暂时性，这种易逝性和暂时性表现为这些物通过活的时间而被赋予形式。”(Op. cit., p. 361.)（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第30卷第329页）
劳动是流动的，也是一种潜能，在任何社会中，都必须由特定的人以特定的方式在特定物品的生产中社会性地“固定”或对象化。人类在生物学上并没有被预先设计来进行特定的活动。与蚂蚁和蜜蜂不同，人类社会中存在着各种各样的职业，任何人都有可能从事其中任何一种。正如Braverman所说，
“人类劳动摆脱了由动物本能支配的刻板轨道，变成了不确定的东西” (Braverman, 1974, p. 51.)（《劳动与垄断资本》，哈里·布雷德曼，商务印书馆，1978年，第48页）
劳动的流动性不仅仅是不断发展的工业经济的一个特征：人类劳动在任何社会形态中都是流动的，因此需要确定。但是，只有随着工业化发展，劳动的流动性才会直接显现出来，因为个人从事的职业显然并非完全由“传统”、宗教、家庭关系等等因素决定[3]，而且人们确实经常更换他们所从事的工作。正如马克思所说：
“……一看就知道，在我们资本主义社会里，随着劳动需求方向的改变，总有一定部分的人类劳动时而采取缝的形式，时而采取织的形式。劳动形式发生这种变换时不可能没有摩擦，但这种变换是必定要发生的。”(Capital, I, p. 134.)（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第57页）
Arthur承认“在发达的工业经济中，社会劳动作为一种生产力，其在表现形式上具有流动性”(Arthur, 1978, p.89.)；但由于他没能区分表现形式与本质，因此他将这种流动性，这种对确定劳动的要求局限于资本主义经济中。在前资本主义社会中，人类劳动本质上的不固定性并不显而易见，但这并不意味着它不存在。
因此，根本问题是，所有社会中的人类劳动是如何确定的？当然，这里提到的“确定”并不意味着否定个体对其职业所具有的选择权。它指的是这样一个事实，即个人不能随意做出选择，他们不能从零开始重新创造世界，而必须从提供给他们的可选方案中选择。[4]正如几位学者所指出的，马克思的确定范畴不是“决定性的”。（例如，见Oilman, 1976, p. 17; Thompson 1978, p. 241-242.）尽管马克思强调，确定永远不能仅仅是个人意志的行使，但他也强调，确定并不独立于个人的行动，也不完全在个人行动之外：
“社会结构和国家经常是从一定个人的生活过程中产生的。”（《德意志意识形态》，p. 46.）（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第5卷，未出版；《马克思恩格斯全集》第一版第3卷第29页）
但是
“这里所说的个人不是他们自己或别人想像中的那种个人，而是现实中的个人，也就是说，这些个人是从事活动的，进行物质生产的，因而是在一定的物质的、不受他们任意支配的界限、前提和条件下能动地表现自己的。” （同上，p. 47.）（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第5卷，未出版；《马克思恩格斯全集》第一版第3卷第29页）
社会劳动的分配并不是对这个确定过程的一个合适描述，因为这种分配总是从某种预先给定的、固定的、确定的结构开始，这种结构被置于社会确定过程之外。我们所需要的是从不固定到确定的社会确定过程的概念化；从可能性到实际性；从无形到有形。《资本论》就在试图提供这一点。它使用了一种马克思自己的研究方法论，他声称这种方法论在过去从来没有人在经济学科上应用过（法文版前言，Capital, I, p. 104.）（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第43卷第13页），此后也没有得到太多应用。我认为，对马克思价值理论的误读在很大程度上是由于在理解马克思的方法论时面临的困难。下一节将更详尽地分析马克思的方法论，并将其与“劳动价值理论”(“the labour theory of value”)的传统解读作比较。
当然，《资本论》是从很多年前就已经开始的在社会劳动确定方面著作的顶峰。我不会讨论《资本论》中价值理论的形成。我只是注意到，马克思的许多早期文本都极度含糊，很有可能是因为在研究劳动所采取的社会形式时，马克思从政治经济学的问题起步。他对这一问题的部分转变是通过理解哪些政治经济学问题是马克思自己所关注的，而不是李嘉图和斯密所关注的，特别是对价值实体的关注来实现的。（见Aumeeruddy and Tortajada, 本卷, p. 11-12.)）在一些文本中，我们可以同时发现有关于“劳动价值理论”(“labour theory of value”)和“劳动的价值理论”(“a value theory of labour”)的要素。甚至在1859年出版的《政治经济学批判》中也存在这种现象，这比《资本论》第一卷早了八年。在这篇文本中，价值与交换价值之间，内在联系与其表现形式之间并没有清晰地区分，而这一区分在《资本论》的论点中起着重要作用，我们可以在《剩余价值理论》的评注中看出其成熟形式，尤其是在第三部分的批判贝利的部分中可以看出。因此，本文将重点关注《资本论》中的价值理论，必要时补充《剩余价值理论》中的解释，以及在少数与货币有关的情形中，补充《政治经济学批判》中的解释。
注释：
[3]一个明显的例外是性别分工。这种情况是由“自然”的生物性因素决定的，且尚未完全消失。
[4]在选择理论的技术分析中，单个个体在选择集内进行选择，但不选择选择集本身。谁选择选择集的问题，或者更严格地说，选择集如何解释则是一个更严重的问题，这一问题通常被选择逻辑的拥护者们假定不存在。
译者注：
(5)鲁宾可能如传统马克思主义理论的观点一样将简单商品经济视为一个与资本主义商品经济不同的前资本主义经济，但又没能正确区分这两者，这导致鲁宾将商品交换视为资本主义的本质性特征，从而忽视了资本主义真正的本质性特征，进而引发了一系列混乱和错误。
(6)鲁宾因此被批判：抽象劳动只能产生于交换活动，进而价值也只能产生于交换活动，如果商品出售失败就意味着劳动没能生产出价值。（而在传统马克思主义理论中，价值生产是在生产领域中进行的，而价值实现则是在流通领域中进行的，出售失败仅仅意味着价值未能实现，但若使用价值并没有消灭，价值并不会因为出售失败而消失。）他试图补救这一点，但就结果而言并没有成功。这是因为他将商品交换视为资本主义的本质性特征，进而将资本主义生产关系也视为简单的价值关系，与简单商品生产并无本质不同。鲁宾虽然如传统马克思主义理论那样将简单商品经济与资本主义经济区分开，但他没能像传统马克思主义理论一样把握住这两者的区别，因此他实际上是一直在简单商品经济的背景下分析价值。最终，鲁宾虽然对传统马克思主义理论的非历史性方面进行了正确的批判，但他并没能发展出一套能够帮助我们正确理解资本主义的完整理论。尽管如此，鲁宾的理论依然非常富有启发性，经过改进（去除其中的一些“黑格尔”特征）并与其他一些理论的结合后依然是一个非常有吸引力和说服力的理论。（不过我依然觉得新解NI看起来有点蠢）
(7)在这一小节中，据我理解，“不固定性”(indeterminateness)、“不固定”(indeterminate)、“确定”(determination)、“确定”(determinate)、“决定性的”(deterministic)虽然具有相同的词根，但其含义的方面并不相同。人类劳动具有流动性，即可以根据个人意愿，在一定程度上从一个工作转移至另一个工作上，因此人类劳动并不像蚂蚁、蜜蜂一样被事先“固定”或“决定”。但又因为人类劳动具有流动性，所以人类劳动总要被“确定”在某一特定工作上，因此产生了“固定”、“决定”和“确定”之间的区别。
参考文献
阿尔都塞, 巴里巴尔. (2008). 读《资本论》. 中央编译出版社.
保罗•斯威齐. (2016). 资本主义发展论. 商务印书馆.
扬•斯蒂德曼. (1991). 按照斯拉法思想研究马克思. 商务印书馆.
伊恩•斯蒂德曼和保罗•斯威齐等. (2016). 价值问题的论战. 商务印书馆.
Althusser, L (1975), Reading Capital, New Left Books, London.
Althusser, L (1977), Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, New Left Books, London.
Arthur, C J (1978), 'Labour: Marx's Concrete Universal', Inquiry, No. 2.
Aumeeruddy, A and Tortajada, R (1979), 'Reading Marx on Value: A Note on the Basic Texts' in Elson, D (ed.) op. cit.
Banaji, J (1976), 'Marx, Ricardo and the Theory of the Value-Form. Prelude to a Critique of Positive Marxism , Marxistisk Antropologi, 2,2-3.
Banaji, J (1977), 'Modes of Production in a Materialist Conception of History, Capital & Class, No. 3.
Braverman, H (1974), Labour and Monopoly Capital, Monthly Review Press, New York and London.
Himmelweit, S and Mohun, S (1978), 'The Anomalies of Capital', Capital & Class No. 6.
Hussain, A (1979), 'Misreading Marx's Theory of Value: Marx's Marginal Notes on Wagner', in Elson, D (ed.), op. cit.
Kay, G (1979), 'Why Labour is the starting point of Capital', in Elson, D (ed.), op. cit.
Marx, K (1969-72), Theories of Surplus Value, Parts One, Two and Three, Lawrence and Wishart, London.
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Marx, K (1974), Capital, translated by Moore and Aveling in three volumes, Lawrence and Wishart, London.
Marx, K (1915), Early Writings, Penguin Books, London.
Marx, K (1976), Capital, Vol. I, translated by Ben Fowkes, Penguin Books, London.
Marx, K and Engels, F (n.d.), Selected Correspondence, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow.
Marx, K and Engels, F (1974), The German Ideology, Lawrence and Wishart, London.
Meek, R L (1977), Smith, Marx and After, Chapman and Hall, London.
Oilman, B (1976), Alienation (Second Edition), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
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Thompson, E P (1978), The Poverty of Theory, Merlin Press, London.
3. An abstract labour theory of value?
It is, of course, by no means original to question whether the 'labour theory of value' discussed in the last section is to be found in the works of Marx, (see for instance Pilling, 1972; Banaji, 1976). In recent CSE debates much stress has been placed on abstract labour as a means of differentiating Marx's theory of value from the interpretations so far discussed which are held to apply to Ricardo rather than to Marx. Marx certainly claims that his theory of value differes from that of Ricardo in the attention he pays to the form of labour, and the distinction he introduces between abstract labour and concrete labour. (See for instance, Theories of Surplus Value, Part 2, p. 164, 172.) In Capital we are told that the author,
Svas the first to point out and examine critically this two-fold nature of labour contained in commodities... this point is crucial to an understanding of political economy.' (Capital, I, p. 132.)
This point is taken up by Himmelweit and Mohun, 1978, who base their reply to Steedman, 1977, on
'a distinction between Ricardian embodied-labour theory of value and a Marxian theory of value based on the category of abstract labour. While the former is intended immediately to be a theory of price, the latter is only so after several mediations.' (op. cit., p. 94.)
They suggest that if we bear this distinction in mind, we shall find that the allegations of redundancy and incoherence, while they apply to Ricardo's theory of value, cannot be sustained for that of Marx.
Their argument is not altogether convincing for two reasons. The first is that Steedman claims to have treated labour as abstract labour and to direct his critique precisely at an abstract labour theory of value (see Steedman, 1977, p. 19), and Himmelweit and Mohun nowhere explicitly confront this claim. Clearly much depends on how the concept of abstract labour is understood. Sweezy, for instance, sees in the concept of abstract labour not an alternative to the concepts of Ricardo and Smith, but a further development and clarification of their work. (Sweezy, 1962, p. 31.) Marx himself did not tend to use 'embodied labour' and 'abstract labour' as if they were opposites, stating for instance that,
'The body of the commodity, which serves as the equivalent, always figures as the embodiment of abstract human labour,' (Capital ,1, p. 150.)
The second reason is that their argument becomes circular: they derive the concept of abstract labour from the commodity form, and then wish to use the concept of abstract labour to explain the commodity form (op. cit., p. 73).
In my view the distinction between abstract and concrete labour is an important differentiation between Marx's and Ricardo's theories, but it is not the only differentiation. More fundamental are differences in the object of the theory and the method of analysis. The clarification of these is required before the meaning and significance of the concept of abstract labour becomes apparent.
4. Labour as the object of Marx's theory of value
My argument will be, not that Marx's value theory of price is more complex than Ricardo's, but that the object of Marx's theory of value is not price at all. This does not mean that Marx was not concerned with price, nor its relation to the magnitude of value, but that the phenomena of exchange are not the object of the theory. (Again this is not a completely new thought, see Hussain, this volume, p. 84.) My argument is that the object of Marx's theory of value was labour. It is not a matter of seeking an explanation of why prices are what they are and finding it in labour. But rather of seeking an inderstanding of why labour takes the forms it does, and what the political consequences are.
We can see Marx focusing on this question in his first intensive study of Adam Smith ('Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' in Early Writings, esp. p. 287-9). The German Ideology is a sustained argument for the centrality of this question:
'As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce.' (Op. cit., p. 42.)
And in Capital, Marx notes the critical question that separates the direction of his analysis from that of political economy as:
Svhy this content has assumed that particular form, that is to say why labour is expressed in value, and why the measurement of labour by its duration is expressed in the magnitude of the value of the product. These formulas, which bear the unmistakable stamp of belonging to a social formation in which the process of production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite, appear to the political economists' bourgeois consciousness to be as much a self evident and nature-imposed necessity as productive labour itself.' (Capital, I, p. 174-5.)
Here Marx is signaEing, not an 'addition of historical perspective' to political economy, but a difference in the object of the theory, (see also Hussain, this volume, p. 86). It is because labour is the object of the theory that Marx begins his analysis with produced commodities, as being 'the simplest social form in which the labour product is represented in contemporary society.' (Marginal Notes on Wagner, p. 50); and not, as Bohm-Bawerk claimed, to rig the terms of the explanation of prices (see also Kay, this volume, p. 48-50).
5. A possible misconception: the social distribution of labour
The question of why labour takes the forms it does is not simply a distributional question. Here the famous letter to Kugelmann in July 1868 can be very misleading, for Marx writes:
'the mass of products corresponding to the different needs require different and quantitatively determined masses of the total labour of society. That this necessity of distributing social labour in definite proportions cannot be done away with by the particular form of social production, but can only change the form it assumes, is self evident. No natural laws can be done away with. What can change in changing historical circumstances, is the form in which these laws operate.' (Selected Correspondence, p. 251.)
Taken by itself, this letter can lend support to the view that the object of the theory is simply the way in which individuals are distributed and linked together in a pre-given structure of tasks. This view is held by a wide spectrum of writers from the 'Hegelian' I. I. Rubin to the 'anti-Hegelian' Althusser.
For Rubin the theory of value is about the regulation of production in a commodity economy, where 'no one consciously supports or regulates the distribution of social labour among the various industrial branches to correspond with the given state of productive forces.' (Rubin, 1973, p. 77.) From the beginning of his book, Rubin makes it quite clear that the productive forces which constitute the various industrial branches are autonomous products of a material-technical process (Rubin, 1973, p. 1-3). What for him is social is merely the network of links between people in this pre-given structure:
'It is also incorrect to view Marx's theory as an analysis of relations between labour and things, things which are the products of labour. The relation of labour to things refers to a given concrete form of labour and a given concrete thing. This is a technical relation which is not, in itself, the subject of the theory of value. The subject matter of the theory of value is the interrelations of various forms of labour in the process of their distribution, which is established through the relation of exchange among things, i.e. products of labour.' (Rubin, 1973, p. 67).
But it is the pre-given structure which has ultimate causal significance:
'We can observe that social production relations among people are causally dependent on the material conditions of production and on the distribution of the technical means of production among the different social groups . . . From the point of view of the theory of historical materialism, this is a general sociological law which holds for all social formations.' (Rubin, 1973, p. 29.)
Clearly there are many differences between Rubin's reading of Marx and that of Althusser, but the latter also invokes the letter to Kugelmann, and writes:
'Marx's labour theory of value . . . is intelligible, but only as a special case of a theory which Marx and Engels called the law of value' or the law of the distribution of the available labour power between the various branches of production . . . ' (Althusser, 1977, p. 87.)
or,
'the distribution of men into social classes exercising functions in the production process'. (Althusser, 1975, p. 167.)
These 'functions in the production process' are determined by the material and technical conditions of production.
The labour process therefore implies an expenditure of the labour-power of men who, using defined instruments of labour according to adequate (technical) rules, transform the object of labour (either a natural material or an already worked material or raw material) into a useful product. . . the labour process as a material mechanism is dominated by the physical laws of nature and technology.' (Althusser, 1975, p. 170-1.)
While it is true that such a thesis is 'a denial of every 'humanist' conception of human labour as pure creativity', it is not a denial of, (indeed it positively encourages) a technieist reading of Marx, with potentially disastrous political implications.
What is more immediately important for our consideration of Marx's theory of value is that the technicist reading of the theory, as having as its object the process of distribution of individuals to pregiven places or functions in the production process, tends to lead to a re-introduction of the labour theory of value, albeit in more complex form with reciprocal causality. Not only is labour-time seen as the determinant of exchange-value; exchange-value is also seen as the determinant of labour-time. That is, exchange-values are in equilibrium equal to socially necessary labour-time embodied in commodities; and the distribution of total labour-time between different commodities is regulated by the difference between market price and relative labour-time requirements of different commodities. Rubin in fact presents an exposition of the way in which this works which is practically the same as that of Sweezy. (See Rubin, 1973, chapters 8, 9 and 10; Sweezy, 1962, chapters II and III.)
'In a simple commodity economy, the exchange of 10 hours of labour in one branch of production, for example shoe-making, for the product of 8 hours labour in another branch, for example clothing production, necessarily leads (if the shoe-maker and clothes-maker are equally qualified) to different advantages of production in the two branches, and to the transfer of labour from shoe-making to clothing production.' (Rubin, 1973, p. 103.)
The difference is that while Sweezy explicitly acknowledges the provenance of this type of argument in The Wealth of Nations, Rubin claims that he has not repeated 'the mistakes of Adam Smith'. (Rubin, 1973, p. 167.) He claims to differ from Smith in showing that the 'equalisation of advantage' is enforced by an objective social process which compels individuals to behave in this way. But this argument is invalid. There is no social pressure on a simple commodity producer who uses his own or his family's labour (but not hired labour) to compare the different rewards of an hour of labour in different branches of production. (See Banaji, 1977, p. 32 for discussion in the case of peasant agriculture.) It is only capitalists who are forced to account for all labour-time spent in production because they are in competition with other capitalists in the labour market (and all other markets). But capitalists make their calculations in money terms, not by a direct comparison of labour-time with market price, because it is not their own labour-time that they are accounting for.
There is some difference between Rubin's position and Sweezy's position, insofar as the former does not pose value as a category of the production process, whereas the latter does. But this simply means that in Rubin it is the relation between value and exchange-value which is obscured, while in Sweezy (and Meek, Dobb etc.) it is the relation between value and labour-time. What all four authors have in common is a tendency to reduce the categories of the analysis from the three found in Marx's writings (labour-time, value and exchange-value) to two. Rubin identifies value with
'that average level around which market prices fluctuate and with which prices would coincide if social labour were proportionately distributed among the various branches of production'. (Rubin, 1973, p. 64);
and thus poses it simply as a category of circulation, and has no systematic distinction between exchange value and value.
Sweezy, Dobb, Meek (and the tradition they represent) identify value with labour-time; for example,
'Marx began by defining the Value' of a commodity as the total quantity of labour which was normally required from first to last to produce it.' (Meek, 1977, p. 95);
and thus pose it simply as a category of production.
Rubin also shares the view that production is a discretely distinct process in which are to be found the 'independent variables' which are of ultimate causal significance.
' . . . the moving force which transforms the entire system of value originates in the material-technical process of production. The increase of productivity of labour is expressed in a decrease in the quantity of concrete labour which is factually used up in production, on the average. As a result of this (because of the dual character of labour as concrete and abstract), the quantity of this labour, which is considered 'social' or 'abstract', i.e. as a share of the total, homogeneous labour of the society, decreases. The increase of productivity of labour changes the quantity of abstract labour necessary for production. It causes a change in the value of the products of labour. A change in the value of products in turn affects the distribution of social labour among the various branches of production. Productivity of labour - abstract labour-value -distribution of social labour: this is the scheme of a commodity economy.' (Rubin, 1973, p. 66.)
Thus Rubin is still on the terrain of the labour theory of value. The object of the theory is still located in the process of circulation—it has simply been widened to include the circulation of labour time as well as of the products of labour.
6. The indeterminateness of human labour
But if Marx's theory of value does not have as its object the circulation (or distribution) of labour so as to fill the slots in a pre-given structure of production, what is its object? One way of trying to explain would be to say that it is about the determination of the structure of production as well as the distribution of labour in that structure. But that is still far too mechanical, too structural a metaphor. In a vivid passage in the Grundrisse, Marx describes labour thus:
'Labour is the living, form-giving fire; it is the transitoriness of things, their temporality, as their formation by living time.' (Op. cit., p. 361.)
It is a fluidity, a potential, which in any society has to be socially 'fixed' or objectified in the production of particular goods, by particular people in particular ways. Human beings are not preprogrammed biologically to perform particular tasks. Unlike ants or bees, there is a potentially vast range in the tasks that any human being can undertake. As Braverman puts it,
'Freed from the rigid paths dictated in animals by instinct, human labour becomes indeterminate.' (Braverman, 1974, p. 51).
This fluidity of labour is not simply an attribute of growing industrial economies: human labour is fluid, requiring determination, in all states of society. But it is true that only with industrialisation does the fluidity of labour become immediately apparent, because the jobs that individuals do are obviously not completely determined by 'tradition', religion, family ties etc.,3 and individuals do quite frequently change the job they do. As Marx put it:
' . . . We can see at a glance that in our capitalist society a given portion of labour is supplied alternatively in the form of tailoring and in the form of weaving, in accordance with changes in the direction of the demand for labour. This change in the form of labour may well not take place without friction, but it must take place.' (Capital, I, p. 134.)
Arthur, 1978, recognises that 'in a developed industrial economy social labour, as a productive force, has a fluidity in its forms of appearance' (op. cit. p. 89); but because he fails to distinguish between essence and forms of appearance, he limits this fluidity, this requirement for determination, to capitalist economies. The fact that the essential indeterminateness of human labour is not immediately apparent in pre-capitalist societies does not mean that it does not exist.
So the fundamental question about human labour in all societies is, how is it determined? To speak of 'determination' here does not, of course, mean the denial of any choice on the part of individuals about their work. Rather it is to point to the fact that individuals can't just choose anything, are unable to re-invent the world from scratch, but must choose from among alternatives presented to them.4 As several authors pointed out, Marx's concept of determination is not 'deterministic'. (See for instance, Oilman, 1976, p. 17; Thompson 1978, p. 241-242.) Although Marx stresses that determination can never be simply an exercise of individual wills, he also stresses that it is not independent of and completely exterior to the actions of individuals:
"The social structure and the state are continually evolving out of the life process of definite individuals.' (German Ideology, p. 46.)
But
'of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, pre-suppositions and conditions independent of their will'. (German Ideology, p. 47.)
Distribution of social labour is not an adequate metaphor for this process of determination, because such distribution always begins from some pre-given, fixed, determinate structure, which is placed outside the process of social determination. What is required is a conceptualisation of a process of social determination that proceeds from the indeterminate to the determinate; from the potential to the actual; from the formless to the formed. Capital is an attempt to provide just that. It uses a method of investigation which is peculiarly Marx's own, a method which he claimed had not previously been applied to economic subjects (Preface to French Edition, Capital, I, p. 104), and which has not been much applied since. I think that it is in large part the difficulties of understanding this method which have lead to misreadings of Marx's theory of value. The next section considers this method in some detail, and contrasts it with the method of 'the labour theory of value' as traditionally understood.
Capital is, of course, the culmination of work on the social determination of labour that began many years before, and went through various phases. I shall not be discussing the formation of the theory of value presented in Capital. I merely note that many of Marx's earlier texts are extremely ambiguous, probably because in investigating the social form that labour takes, Marx began from the problematic of political economy. Part of his transformation of this problematic was carried out by reading into the texts of political economy concerns which were those of Marx, rather than of Ricardo, Smith etc., in particular the concern to locate the substance of value. (See Aumeeruddy and Tortajada, this volume, p. 11-12.) In some texts we may find elements of both a "labour theory of value' and a Value theory of labour'. There are symptoms of this even in Critique of Political Economy, published in 1859, eight years before the first volume of Capital. In this text there is no clear distinction between value and exchange-value, between the inner relation and its form of appearance, a distinction which plays an important role in the argument of Capital, and which one can see being developed in the commentaries of Theories of Surplus Value, particularly in the critique of Bailey in Part 3. Accordingly, this paper will focus on the theory of value as it appears in Capital, supplementing this where necessary with clarifications deriving from Theories of Surplus Value, and, in a few cases relating to money, from Critique of Political Economy.
