2010 TEXT 4

Bankers have been blaming themselves for their troubles in public. Behind the scenes, they have been taking aim at someone else: the accounting standard-setters. Their rules, moan the banks, have forced them to report enormous losses, and it's just not fair. These rules say they must value some assets at the price a third party would pay, not the price managers and regulators would like them to fetch.

Unfortunately, banks' lobbying now seems to be working. The details may be unknowable, but the independence of standard-setters, essential to the proper functioning of capital markets, is being compromised. And, unless banks carry toxic assets at prices that attract buyers, reviving the banking system will be difficult.

After a bruising encounter with Congress, America's Financial Accounting Standards Board (F ASB) rushed through rule changes. These gave banks more freedom to use models to value illiquid assets and more flexibility in recognizing losses on long-term assets in their income statements. Bob Herz, the FASB's chairman, cried out against those who "question our motives." Yet bank shares rose and the changes enhance what one lobbying group politely calls "the use of judgment by management."

European ministers instantly demanded that the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) do likewise. The IASB says it does not want to act without overall planning, but the pressure to fold when it completes its reconstruction of rules later this year is strong. Charlie McCreevy, a European commissioner, warned the IASB that it did "not live in a political vacuum" but "in the real world" and that Europe could yet develop different rules.

It was banks that were on the wrong planet, with accounts that vastly overvalued assets. Today they argue that market prices overstate losses, because they largely reflect the temporary illiquidity of markets, not the likely extent of bad debts. The truth will not be known for years. But banks' shares trade below their book value, suggesting that investors are skeptical. And dead markets partly reflect the paralysis of banks which will not sell assets for fear of booking losses, yet are reluctant to buy all those supposed bargains.

To get the system working again, losses must be recognized and dealt with. America's new plan to buy up toxic assets will not work unless banks mark assets to levels which buyers find attractive. Successful markets require independent and even combative standard-setters. The FASB and IASB have been exactly that, cleaning up rules on stock options and pensions, for example, against hostility from special interests. But by giving in to critics now they are inviting pressure to make more concessions .

银行家们公开把过失归咎于他们自己。在幕后，他们已经开始把目光转向其他人：会计标准设定者。它们的裁决，抱怨银行，已经迫使他们报道了巨量的损失，这不公平。他们的裁决说他们必须以第三方愿意付出的价格评估一些资产的价值，而不是管理者们想要卖的价格。

不幸的是，银行的说客现在看起来在工作。细节可能是不知道的，但是对主要市场功能的基本偏爱，会计标准设定者的独立性正在妥协。并且，除非银行以购买者想买的价格交易不良资产，否则复兴银行将会很困难。

在跟国会经过一顿摩擦协商后，美国金融会计标准委员会匆匆改变了规则。这给了银行更多自由使用模型去给固定资产估值，有更多灵活性去认识收入清单中长期资产的损失。FASB的主席，Bob Herz，向那些“质疑我们的动机”的人哭诉。然而银行股价的上升，某个游说团体美其名曰“管理层判断的运用”。

欧洲打针直接要求国际会计标准委员会也这么做。IASB说他不想在没有全盘计划的情况下行动，但是当他今年晚些时候完成规则重建时，妥协的压力巨大。欧洲委员会成员，Charlie McCreevy，警告IASB他“不是活在政治真空中”，而是“在真实世界中”，并且欧洲还可以发展不同的规则。

银行处在过高估值资产的错误的幻想中。今天他们认为市场价格夸大了损失，因为他们很大程度上反应了市场的暂时不流动性，而不是坏账的程度。真相好几年不为人知。但是银行的股份交易少于他们的纸面交易，这表明投资者持怀疑态度。并且死掉的市场很大程度上反映了银行很多年不交易的资产纸面损失的分析，而不是勉强买下所有假定的利润。

为了让系统再次运转，损失必须被认识和处理。美国收购不良资产的新计划不会开始，除非银行标记购买者发现有吸引力的资产的级别。成功的市场要求独立性，甚至与标准制定者战斗。例如，FASB和IASB已经确实清理股票选择和退休金的规则，而不是对特定的生意持敌意。但是现在由于屈服于批评，他们正招致更多做出让步的压力。