经济学顶刊American Economic Review 2023年第4期

American Economic Review 2023年第4期

Vol. 113 No. 4 April 2023

 

 

——更多动态，请持续关注gzh：理想主义的百年孤独

 

 

The Long and Short (Run) of Trade Elasticities

Christoph E. Boehm, Andrei A. Levchenko and Nitya Pandalai-Nayar

When countries change most favored nation (MFN) tariffs, partners that trade on MFN terms experience plausibly exogenous tariff changes. Using this variation, we estimate the trade elasticity at short and long horizons with local projections. We find that the elasticity of tariff-exclusive trade flows is −0.76 in the short run, and approximately −2 in the long run. Our long-run estimates are smaller than typical in the literature, and it takes 7 to10 years to converge to the long run, implying that (i) the welfare gains from trade are high and (ii) there are substantial convexities in the costs of adjusting exports.

当国家改变最惠国(MFN)关税时，按最惠国条款进行贸易的伙伴可能会经历外生关税变化。利用这一变化，我们用局部预测来估计短期和长期的贸易弹性。我们发现，不征收关税的贸易流动的弹性在短期内为- 0.76，在长期内约为- 2。我们的长期估计比文献中典型的要小，需要7到10年才能收敛到长期，这意味着(i)贸易带来的福利收益很高，(ii)调整出口的成本有很大的凸性。

 

 

How to Use Natural Experiments to Estimate Misallocation

如何利用自然实验来估计错配

David Sraer and David Thesmar

We propose a method to estimate the effect of firm policies (e.g., bankruptcy laws) on allocative efficiency using (quasi-)experimental evidence. Our approach takes general equilibrium effects into account and requires neither a structural estimation nor a precise assumption on how the experiment affects firms. Our aggregation formula relies on treatment effects of the policy on the distribution of output-to-capital ratios, which are easily estimated. We show this method is valid for a large class of commonly used models in macrofinance. We apply it to the French banking deregulation episode of the mid-1980s and find an increase in aggregate TFP of 5 percent.

我们提出了一种利用(准)实验证据来估计企业政策(如破产法)对配置效率的影响的方法。我们的方法考虑了一般均衡效应，既不需要对实验如何影响企业进行结构性估计，也不需要对实验如何影响企业进行精确假设。我们的汇总公式依赖于政策对产出资本比分布的处理效果，而产出资本比很容易估计。我们证明了这种方法对宏观金融中一大类常用模型是有效的。我们将其应用于20世纪80年代中期法国银行业放松管制的时期，发现总全要素生产率增长了5%。

 

 

Globalization and Pandemics

全球化和流行病

Pol Antràs, Stephen J. Redding and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg

We provide theory and evidence on the relationship between globalization and pandemics. Business travel facilitates trade and travel leads to human interactions that transmit disease. Trade-motivated travel generates an epidemiological externality across countries. If infections lead to deaths, or reduce individual labor supply, we establish a general equilibrium social distancing effect, whereby increases in relative prices in unhealthy countries reduce travel to those countries. If agents internalize the threat of infection, we show that their behavioral responses lead to a reduction in travel that is larger for higher-trade-cost locations, which initially reduces the ratio of trade to output.

我们为全球化和流行病之间的关系提供理论和证据。商务旅行促进贸易，旅行导致人际交往，传播疾病。贸易驱动的旅行在各国之间产生了流行病学的外部性。如果感染导致死亡，或减少个人劳动力供应，我们就会建立一般均衡的社会距离效应，即不健康国家的相对价格上涨会减少前往这些国家的旅行。如果代理人内化了感染的威胁，我们发现他们的行为反应会导致贸易成本较高地区的旅行减少，这在最初会降低贸易与产出的比率。

 

 

The Matching Multiplier and the Amplification of Recessions

匹配乘数和衰退的放大

Christina Patterson

This paper shows that the unequal incidence of recessions in the labor market amplifies aggregate shocks. Using administrative data from the United States, I document a positive covariance between workers' marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) and their elasticities of earnings to GDP, which is a key moment for a new class of heterogeneous-agent models. I define the matching multiplier as the increase in the multiplier stemming from this matching of high MPC workers to more cyclical jobs. I show that this covariance is large enough to increase the aggregate MPC by 20 percent over an equal exposure benchmark.

本文表明，劳动力市场衰退的不平等发生率放大了总冲击。利用来自美国的行政数据，我证明了工人的边际消费倾向(MPCs)与他们的收入对GDP的弹性之间的正协方差，这是一类新的异质代理模型的关键时刻。我将匹配乘数定义为高MPC工人与更具周期性工作的匹配所带来的乘数增加。我表明，这个协方差大到足以使总MPC在同等风险基准上增加20%。

 

 

What Happens When Employers Can No Longer Discriminate in Job Ads?

当雇主在招聘广告中不再歧视时会发生什么?

Peter Kuhn and Kailing Shen

When employers' explicit gender requests were unexpectedly removed from a Chinese job board overnight, pools of successful applicants became more integrated: women's (men's) share of callbacks to jobs that had requested men (women) rose by 61 (146) percent. The removal "worked" in this sense because it generated a large increase in gender-mismatched applications, and because those applications were treated surprisingly well by employers, suggesting that employers' gender requests often represented relatively weak preferences or outdated stereotypes. The job titles that were integrated by the ban, however, were not the most gendered ones, and were disproportionately lower-wage jobs.

当雇主们在一夜之间意外地从中国的招聘公告栏上删除了明确的性别要求时，成功的求职者群体变得更加融合:要求男性(女性)的职位的女性(男性)比例上升了61%(146%)。从这个意义上说，删除“起作用了”，因为它导致性别不匹配的申请大幅增加，而且雇主对这些申请的待遇出奇地好，这表明雇主的性别要求通常代表了相对较弱的偏好或过时的刻板印象。然而，这项禁令纳入的职位头衔并不是性别最明显的，而且是不成比例的低工资工作。

 

 

Why Do Households Leave School Value Added on the Table? The Roles of Information and Preferences

为什么家庭不把学校附加值放在桌面上?信息和偏好的作用

Robert Ainsworth, Rajeev Dehejia, Cristian Pop-Eleches and Miguel Urquiola

Romanian households could choose schools with one standard deviation worth of additional value added. Why do households leave value added "on the table"? We study two possibilities: (i) information and (ii) preferences for other school traits. In an experiment, we inform randomly selected households about schools' value added. These households choose schools with up to 0.2 standard deviations of additional value added. We then estimate a discrete choice model and show that households have preferences for a variety of school traits. As a result, fully correcting households' beliefs would eliminate at most a quarter of the value added that households leave unexploited.

罗马尼亚家庭可以选择有一个标准差的额外附加值的学校。为什么家家户户都把附加值留在“桌面上”?我们研究了两种可能性:(i)信息和(ii)对其他学校特征的偏好。在一项实验中，我们随机选择了一些家庭，告知他们学校的附加值。这些家庭选择的学校的附加价值最高可达0.2个标准差。然后，我们估计了一个离散选择模型，并显示出家庭对各种学校特征的偏好。因此，如果完全纠正家庭的观念，最多将消除家庭未被利用的四分之一的附加价值。

 

Mobility and Congestion in Urban India

印度城市的流动性和拥堵

Prottoy Akbar, Victor Couture, Gilles Duranton and Adam Storeygard

We develop a methodology to estimate robust city-level vehicular speed indices, exactly decomposable into uncongested speed and congestion. We apply it to 180 Indian cities using 57 million simulated trips measured by a web mapping service. We verify the reliability of our simulated trips using a number of alternative data sources, including data on actual trips. We find wide variation in speed across cities that is driven more by differences in uncongested speed than congestion. Denser and more populated cities are slower, only in part because of congestion. Urban economic development is correlated with faster speed despite worse congestion.

我们开发了一种方法来估计稳健的城市级车辆速度指数，准确地分解为不拥堵的速度和拥堵。我们将其应用于180个印度城市，使用网络地图服务测量的5700万次模拟旅行。我们使用许多替代数据源(包括实际行程数据)来验证模拟行程的可靠性。我们发现城市之间的速度差异很大，这更多地是由不拥堵的速度差异而不是拥堵造成的。人口密集和人口较多的城市速度较慢，部分原因是拥堵。城市经济发展与速度加快相关，尽管拥堵程度更严重。

 

 

Is There Too Much Benchmarking in Asset Management?

资产管理中是否存在太多的基准?

Anil K Kashyap, Natalia Kovrijnykh, Jian Li and Anna Pavlova

We propose a tractable model of asset management in which benchmarking arises endogenously, and analyze its welfare consequences. Fund managers' portfolios are not contractible and they incur private costs in running them. Incentive contracts for fund managers create a pecuniary externality through their effect on asset prices. Benchmarking inflates asset prices and creates crowded trades. The crowding reduces the effectiveness of benchmarking in incentive contracts for others, which fund investors fail to account for. A social planner, recognizing the crowding, opts for contracts with less benchmarking and less incentive provision. The planner also delivers lower asset management costs.

我们提出了一个可处理的资产管理模型，其中基准产生于内生性，并分析了其福利后果。基金经理的投资组合是不可收缩的，他们在运营这些投资组合时会产生私人成本。基金经理的激励合同通过对资产价格的影响，产生了货币上的外部性。基准测试抬高了资产价格，造成了拥挤的交易。这种拥挤降低了激励合同中对其他人进行基准测试的有效性，而基金投资者没有考虑到这一点。一个社会规划者，认识到拥挤，选择较少基准和较少激励条款的合同。计划表还提供更低的资产管理成本。