Byzantium at War AD 600-1453（战争中的拜占庭：公元600-1453年）（10）
作者：John Haldon约翰·哈尔顿
出版商：Routledge Taylor & Francis Group
自翻：流潋紫琳
The fighting：Organising for war
战斗：组织的战争
The evolution of tactical administration
战术管理的演变
There were important changes in tactical structures over the period from the 6th to the 11th century, and again from the later 11th to the 12th centuries and beyond. Units of the middle of the 6th century varied considerably in their regimental organisation. The older legions and auxiliary forces continued to exist through the 3rd and 4th centuries, divided into alae of cavalry and cohortes of infantry, nominally of 500 and 1,000 men respectively; although under Constantine 1 (324-37), new infantry units called auxilia often replaced these cohortes. Newer legions, numbering 1,000-1,500, had also been created during the 2nd and 3rd centuries, and this number seems also to have applied to the original legions by the 4th century. Apart from these were units called vexillationes, originally detachments from various units formed for a particular reason during the period c.150-250, which had been turned into permanent units in their own right. This term, vexillation, was applied in the 4th century to most of the new cavalry units recruited at that time. Although some of these technical differences survived into the 6th century, the general term for most units was by then the word ailments or its Greek equivalent, arithmos or tagma, which simply meant 'unit' or 'number' (of soldiers).
（从6世纪到11世纪，战术结构发生了重大变化，从11世纪后期到12世纪，以及以后的时期也发生了重大变化。6 世纪中叶的部队在团组织上有很大差异。旧的军团和辅助部队一直存在到 3 世纪和 4 世纪，分为骑兵部队和步兵部队，名义上分别有 500 人和 1,000 人；尽管在君士坦丁一世（324-37）的统治下，称为辅助的新步兵部队经常取代这些部队。2 世纪和 3 世纪还创建了编号为 1,000-1,500 的新军团，这个数字似乎也适用于 4 世纪的原始军团。除了这些单位之外，还有称为 vexillationes 的单位，最初是在 150-250 年期间出于特定原因从各种单位组成的分遣队，这些分遣队本身已经变成了永久性单位。这个术语，vexillation，在 4 世纪被应用于当时招募的大多数新骑兵部队。尽管其中一些技术差异一直延续到 6 世纪，但当时大多数单位的通用术语是“ailments”一词或其希腊的等量、arithmos 或 tagma，仅表示“单位”或“数量”（士兵）。）
Byzantine tactics and strategy had to adapt quickly to the situation following the Arab conquests in the middle of the 7th century. Armies along the frontiers are often referred to as kaballarika themata 'cavalry armies' - showing that light cavalry had come to dominate the warfare of the period, much of which involved skirmishing and hit-and-run raids. But while infantry continued to be needed, and played an important part in many campaigns, their value appears slowly to have declined, to some extent reflecting social factors, since they were drawn mostly from the poorest of the provincial soldiery. The development of infantry tactics after the period of the first Islamic conquests, along with the higher profile of mounted warfare, therefore, reflected the strategic situation in which the empire found itself. During the period from the later 7th to the 9th or early 10th centuries, the differences which once existed between the different types of infantry and cavalry were subject to a general levelling out of the different arms, into light cavalry and infantry. Only the tagmata at Constantinople seem to have provided a heavy cavalry force. It seems to have been the responsibility of local officers in the provinces to establish field units and to arm them as each specific occasion required. The sizes of units on the battlefield varied according to tactical need; there seems to have been no fixed number for the different formations, with figures recommended for the smallest infantry units, the banda, for example, ranging from as few as 150 to as many as 400. Several tourmai could appear on campaign as a single large division, for example, or vice versa. Most themes had two or three divisions or tourmai, but this does not mean that they were the same size or could muster the same number of soldiers.
（拜占庭的战术和战略必须迅速适应 7 世纪中叶阿拉伯征服之后的形势。 边境沿线的军队通常被称为 kaballarika 军区'骑兵军队' - 表明轻骑兵已经主导了这一时期的战争，其中大部分涉及小规模冲突和打了就跑的袭击。但是，虽然步兵仍然需要，并在许多战役中发挥重要作用，但他们的价值似乎慢慢下降，在某种程度上反映了社会因素，因为他们大多来自省内最贫穷的士兵。因此，第一次伊斯兰征服时期后步兵战术的发展，以及更高调的骑兵战，反映了帝国所处的战略形势。7世纪后期至9世纪或10世纪初期，不同类型的步兵和骑兵之间曾经存在的差异受到了不同兵种的普遍拉平，分为轻骑兵和步兵。 只有君士坦丁堡的塔格玛塔似乎提供了一支重骑兵部队。各省的地方官员似乎有责任建立野战部队，并根据每个特定场合的需要武装他们。 战场上的单位大小因战术需要而异； 不同的编队似乎没有固定的人数，建议最小的步兵单位（例如班达）的人数从少至 150 人到多至 400 人不等。战役中可能会出现几支大部队 例如，除法，反之亦然。大多数主题有两三个师或图尔迈，但这并不意味着它们的规模相同或可以召集相同数量的士兵。）
The provincial armies were organised into what we would refer to as divisions, brigades and regiments — tourmai, drouggoi and banda. The first and last were also districts of their thema, or military region. Each Murata had a headquarters or base in a fortified town or fortress. Each bandon was identified with a particular locality from which its soldiers were recruited. Each tourmarthes, or commander of a tourma, was an important figure in the military administration of his theme, responsible for the fortresses and strongpoints in his district, as well as for the safety of the local population and their goods and chattels. His most important responsibility before the middle of the 10th century, however, was dealing with raids into his territory and informing his superiors of enemy movements.
（省级军队被组织成我们所说的师、旅和团——图尔迈、德鲁戈伊和班达。第一个和最后一个也是他们的主题区或军区。每个村田在一个设防的城镇或要塞中都有一个总部或基地。每个班都有一个特定的地方，其士兵是从那里招募的。 每个图尔玛特，或图尔玛的统帅，都是其主题军事管理中的重要人物，负责其地区的堡垒和据点，以及当地居民及其货物和动产的安全。然而，在 10 世纪中叶之前，他最重要的职责是处理对他领土的袭击，并向他的上级通报敌人的动向。）
During the course of the 10th century the army evolved a much more offensive tactical structure, the main causes being the need to recruit more professional soldiers, and the need to operate effectively on campaigns which demanded more than the seasonally available theme armies. The main changes were the introduction of a corps of heavy cavalry armed with lances and maces, which could operate effectively alongside infantry, and which substantially enhanced the aggressive power of the Byzantine cavalry, together with the revival of a corps of disciplined, effective heavy infantry, able to stand firm in the line of battle, confront enemy infantry and cavalry, march long distances and function as garrison troops away from their home territory on a permanent basis. At the same time, the army leadership developed new battlefield tactics, so that commanders had a flexible yet hard-hitting force at their disposal that could respond appropriately to a range of different situations.
（在10世纪的过程中，军队发展了更具进攻性的战术结构，主要原因是需要招募更多的专业士兵，以及需要在需要比季节性可用的主题军队更多的战役中有效运作。主要的变化是引入了一支装备长矛和狼牙棒的重骑兵部队，它们可以与步兵一起有效地作战，大大增强了拜占庭骑兵的攻击力，同时复兴了一支训练有素、有效的重步兵部队，能够在战线中站稳脚跟，对抗敌军步兵和骑兵，长距离行军，并作为驻军长期远离家乡领土。同时，军队领导层开发了新的战场战术，使指挥官拥有一支灵活而有力的力量，可以对各种不同的情况做出适当的反应。）
The remarkable successes achieved by Byzantine armies in the second half of the 10th century in particular, under a series of very able commanders, and described in the historical accounts of the period, corroborate the evidence of the tactical treatises. In one tract a new formation of infantry soldiers is described, consisting of troops wielding thick-stocked, long-necked javelins or pikes, whose task it was to face and turn back enemy heavy cavalry attacks. Twenty years later the tactic had evolved further, so that there were in each major infantry unit of 1,000 men 100 soldiers so equipped, integrated with 400 ordinary spearmen, 300 archers and 200 light infantry (with slings and javelins). This important change in the role of infantry was reflected in the changed political and military situation of the 10th century. In the late 6th century cavalry began to achieve a certain pre-eminence in military organisation and tactics, whereas the 10th-century texts give infantry formations equal or even preferential treatment. Infantry became once more a key element in the army, both in terms of numbers as well as tactics, a clear contrast to the situation in the preceding centuries. The new tactics were embodied in a new formation, in which infantry and cavalry worked together, essentially a hollow square or rectangle, depending on the terrain, designed to cope with encircling movements from hostile cavalry, as a refuge for Byzantine mounted units when forced to retreat, and as a means of strengthening infantry cohesiveness and morale. Infantry were no longer drawn up in a deep line with a largely defensive role, but actively integrated into the offensive heavy cavalry tactics of the period. And a very important aspect of the change was a focus on the recruitment of good infantry from war-like peoples within the empire, especially Armenians. The demand for uniformity in tactical function and therefore equipment and weaponry meant that the Byzantine infantry of this period were more like their classical Roman predecessors than anything in the intervening period.
（特别是在 10 世纪下半叶，拜占庭军队在一系列非常能干的指挥官的领导下取得的显着成功，并在该时期的历史记载中有所描述，证实了战术论文的证据。 在一篇短文中，描述了一种新的步兵编队，由挥舞着厚实长颈标枪或长矛的部队组成，其任务是面对和击退敌人的重骑兵攻击。20年后，战术进一步发展，每个1000人的主要步兵单位都有100名士兵，配备400名普通长矛手、300名弓箭手和200名轻步兵（带投石索和标枪）。步兵角色的这一重要变化反映在 10 世纪政治和军事形势的变化中。6 世纪后期，骑兵开始在军事组织和战术上取得某种优势，而 10 世纪的文本则给予步兵编队同等甚至优惠待遇。步兵再次成为军队中的一个关键因素，无论是在数量上还是战术上，这与前几个世纪的情况形成鲜明对比。新战术体现在一种新的编队中，其中步兵和骑兵一起工作，基本上是一个空心的正方形或矩形，取决于地形，旨在应对敌方骑兵的包围运动，作为拜占庭骑兵部队被迫逃跑时的避难所。撤退，并作为加强步兵凝聚力和士气的一种手段。步兵不再以防守为主，而是积极融入当时的重骑兵进攻战术。变化的一个非常重要的方面是专注于从帝国内好战的民族，尤其是亚美尼亚人中招募优秀的步兵。对战术功能以及装备和武器的统一要求意味着这一时期的拜占庭步兵更像是他们的古典罗马前辈，而不是中间时期的任何东西。）
New formations of cavalry appear, heavily armoured troops armed from head to foot in lamellar, mail and quilting, whose horses were likewise protected. Face, neck, flanks and forequarters were all to be covered with armour to prevent enemy missiles and blows from injuring the cavalryman's mount. Known as kataphraktoi or klibarrophoroi, they were relatively few in number due to the expense of maintaining them, and were the elite strike force in each field army, drawn up in a broad-nosed wedge with their only function to smash through the enemy heavy cavalry or infantry line, disrupt his formation, and open it up to permit supporting horse- and foot-soldiers to exploit the situation. Contemporary writers, both Byzantine and Arab, comment on the effects of this formation on their foes. The imperial armies achieved a powerful reputation, to the extent that by the 1030s the mere threat of an imperial army marching into northern Syria was enough to keep the local Muslim emirs in check. Yet while these successes were the result of a combination of good organisation and logistics, intelligent tactics, well-armed, trained and disciplined soldiers, and good morale, the key always remained the competence and effectiveness of the general in command. An army is only as good as its leadership, however, and although tactical order and training certainly gave Byzantine armies through much of the empire's history an obvious advantage, incompetent officers were the bane of the system: dependence on the charisma and intelligence of its leaders was one of the most significant in-built weaknesses of the imperial military system at the tactical level. During the middle of the 11th century, and in a context of short-sighted strategic planning and internal political conflict, this produced serious problems and led to the erosion of the effectiveness of both the field armies and the provincial defences.
（新的骑兵编队出现了，全副武装的部队从头到脚用板甲、链甲和绗缝武装，他们的马匹同样受到保护。面部、颈部、侧腹和前躯都被装甲覆盖，以防止敌人的导弹和打击伤害骑兵的坐骑。被称为 kataphraktoi 或 klibarrophoroi，由于维护它们的费用，它们的数量相对较少，并且是每个野战军中的精锐打击力量，被编成一个宽阔的楔子，唯一的功能是粉碎敌人的重骑兵 或步兵线，扰乱他的阵型，并打开它以允许支持的马和步兵利用这种情况。拜占庭和阿拉伯的当代作家都评论了这种形式对他们的敌人的影响。帝国军队赢得了强大的声誉，以至于到 1030 年代，仅凭帝国军队进入叙利亚北部的威胁就足以控制当地的穆斯林埃米尔。然而，尽管这些成功是良好的组织和后勤、聪明的战术、装备精良、训练有素和纪律严明的士兵以及士气高涨的结果，但关键始终是指挥官的能力和有效性。然而，一支军队的好坏取决于它的领导能力，尽管在帝国历史的大部分时间里，战术秩序和训练确实给拜占庭军队带来了明显的优势，但无能的军官是该系统的祸根：依赖其领导人的魅力和智慧是帝国军事系统在战术层面上最重要的内在弱点之一。在 11 世纪中叶，在短视的战略规划和内部政治冲突的背景下，这产生了严重的问题，导致野战军和省级防御的有效性受到侵蚀。）
As the demands of offensive warfare required the employment of ever greater numbers of professional, mercenary soldiers, both indigenous and foreign, so many of the provincial, thematic units of the imperial armies were neglected, especially in the period after the death of Basil II in 1025. Michael Attaleiates, a contemporary of the Mantikert campaign who travelled with the imperial entourage, paints a sad picture of the state of the thematic levy raised for the campaign of 1071, remarking that the provincial troops were entirely unfitted for warfare — they had been neither mustered nor paid or supplied with their traditional provisions for many years. Yet his account of the campaigns of the dynamic emperor Romanos IV in the years 1068-71 shows that the imperial armies still possessed an order, discipline and cohesion when properly led.
（由于进攻战的需要，帝国雇用越来越多的本地和外国专业雇佣兵，因此帝国军队的许多省级军区单位被忽视，特别是在巴西尔二世去世后的时期。1025年与帝国随行人员一起旅行的 Mantikert 战役的同时代人 Michael Attaleiates 描绘了为 1071 年战役征集的军区征兵的悲惨画面，并指出省级军队完全不适合战争——他们已经多年来，既没有召集，也没有支付或提供他们的传统食品。然而，他对充满活力的罗马诺斯四世皇帝在 1068-71 年的战役的描述表明，如果领导得当，帝国军队仍然拥有秩序、纪律和凝聚力。）
Byzantine armies in the middle and later 11th century were a mixture of regular mercenary units from the different parts of the empire, the older thematic soldiers, and foreign units. The growing political and cultural influence of the world around Byzantium, which had been held at bay for so long, meant that the empire was becoming more and more integrated into the tactical world of the lands around it. Byzantine order and discipline remained a significant element in the empire's armies, but the latter were a polyglot and multi-ethnic mixture of Seljuk, Pecheneg or Cuman horse archers, Norman, German and Frankish knights, Bulgarian and Anatolian light infantry, Georgians and Alans from the Caucasus, imperial guards recruited from outside the empire (Varangians, for example, from the 1070s chiefly made up of Anglo-Saxons who had left recently conquered Norman England). The Byzantine army was no longer, strictly speaking, Byzantine.
（11世纪中后期的拜占庭军队是来自帝国不同地区的正规雇佣军、较老的主题士兵和外国部队的混合体。长期以来，拜占庭周围世界的政治和文化影响力不断增强，这意味着帝国越来越融入周围土地的战术世界。拜占庭的秩序和纪律仍然是帝国军队的一个重要元素，但后者是塞尔柱人、佩切涅格人或库曼人弓箭手、诺曼人、德国和法兰克骑士、保加利亚和安纳托利亚轻步兵、格鲁吉亚人和阿兰人的多语言混合体。在高加索地区，从帝国以外招募的皇家卫队（例如，来自 1070 年代的瓦兰吉人主要由最近离开征服诺曼英格兰的盎格鲁撒克逊人组成）。 拜占庭军队不再是严格意义上的拜占庭军队。）
One of the tactical innovations of the period with which Byzantine soldiers and generals had to contend was the massed heavy cavalry charge favoured by the Normans. Although they were quite familiar with Norman tactics (Norman mercenaries had served in the imperial armies in Italy and Sicily in the 1030s and 1040s), the Byzantines had only rarely needed to confront it themselves. Most of the warfare they had been involved in since the 1060s had been against light-armed, highly mobile enemies such as Turks and Pechenegs. And whereas the Byzantine heavy cavalry of the later 10th century had been armed with lances and maces, they had advanced at a trot, not at the charge, with the aim of simply rolling over the enemy force facing them.
（拜占庭士兵和将军不得不与之抗衡的那个时期的战术创新之一是诺曼人青睐的大规模重骑兵冲锋。 尽管他们非常熟悉诺曼人的战术（诺曼人雇佣军在 1030 和 1040 年代曾在意大利和西西里的帝国军队中服役），但拜占庭人很少需要亲自面对它。自 1060 年代以来，他们参与的大部分战争都是针对轻武装、机动性强的敌人，如土耳其人和佩切涅格人。 虽然 10 世纪后期的拜占庭重骑兵装备了长矛和狼牙棒，但他们以小跑而不是冲锋前进，目的是简单地碾压面对他们的敌军。）
In spite of efforts under the emperors of the Komnenos dynasty, many indigenous units were re-equipped and trained in western style, so that the result was an army no different from any other multi-ethnic, polyglot mercenary army in its tactics and formations. The difference lay in the superior order and tactical dispositions of the imperial troops, when these were properly exploited by an able commanding officer, and this is still evident on occasion in the later years of the 12th century. By the middle of the 13th century, and following the fall of Constantinople to the armies of the fourth crusade, while Byzantine technical terms, titles, and names for types of unit continued to be employed in the shrinking territories of the empire, tactics, armour and weaponry were no different from those of the surrounding cultures and states with whom the Byzantines were alternately at peace and war.
（尽管在科穆尼诺斯王朝皇帝的努力下，许多土著部队被重新装备和西方风格的训练，结果是一支军队在战术和阵型上与其他多民族、多语言的雇佣军没有什么不同。不同之处在于帝国军队的上级秩序和战术部署，当这些被一个能干的指挥官适当利用时，这在 12 世纪后期仍然很明显。到 13 世纪中叶，随着君士坦丁堡被第四次十字军东征的军队攻陷，拜占庭的技术术语、头衔和单位类型的名称继续在帝国、战术、盔甲的收缩领土上使用 和武器与周围的文化和国家没有什么不同，拜占庭人与这些文化和国家交替处于和平和战争状态。）
未完待续
