【学习笔记】数字平台经济指数2020

The DPE framework consists of four concepts: (1) Digital User Citizenship (DUC),  which includes users on the demand side and the supply side; (2) Digital Technology  Entrepreneurship (DTE), which includes app developers and various agents that  contribute to entrepreneurial innovation, experimentation, and value cre-ation on  platforms; (3) Digital Multi-sided Platforms (DMP), which orchestrate social and  economic activities between users and agents; and (4) Digital Technology  Infrastructure (DTI), which pertains to all regulations that govern technical, social, and  economic activities of the digital technology .

DPE 框架由四个概念组成: (1)数字公民(DUC) ，包括需求方和供应方的用户; (2)数字技术创业(DTE) ，包括应用程序开发人员和各种代理人，他们为平台上的创业创新、实验和价值创造做出贡献; (3)数字多边平台(DMP) ，它协调用户和代理人之间的社会和经济活动; (4)数字技术基础设施(DTI) ，它涉及管理数字技术的技术、社会和经济活动的所有法规。

It is immediately clear that the US and China dominate the platform landscape. Based on these top companies’ market value, the US alone represents 66% of the world platform economy and 41% in terms of numbers.  European platform-based companies play a marginal role, only 3% of the market  value. Moreover, the distribution of the top 100 platform-based companies is  uneven; the first 15 companies represent around 75% of the entire market value.

美国和中国主导着平台经济。基于这些顶级公司的市场价值，仅美国就代表了世界平台经济的 66% ，41家跻身Top100。欧洲的平台型公司只占市场价值的 3% ，处于边缘地位。此外，前 100 家基于平台的公司的分布是不均衡的; 前15 家公司代表了大约 整个市场价值的75%。

The other interesting statistic is the number of startups valued at more than $1  billion, which are called unicorns.1 As of February 2021, there were 546 unicorns,  most of them technology-oriented and platform-based companies. The US dominates these rankings, with more than 50% of all unicorns, followed by China with  22%. Europe has 67 unicorns (12.2%) and the European Union is home to 36  (6.6%). Because of Brexit, the EU lost 26 unicorns. 

另一个有趣的统计数据是估值超过 10 亿美元的创业公司的数量，这些公司被称为“独角兽”。截至 2021 年 2 月，共有 546 家“独角兽”公司，其中大多 数是技术型和平台型公司。美国以超过 50% 的独角兽企业位居榜首，中国以 22% 紧随其后。欧洲有 67 家独角兽(12.2%) ，欧盟有 36 家(6.6%)。由于英国退欧(Brexit) ，欧盟失去了 26 只独角兽。

While the UK is a leader in digital entrepreneurship,  Germany is a follower. This weaker position is holding Germany back from fully embracing a digital future. For example, as the engine of Europe, Germany’s lack  of startups has hindered it, especially in the area of information and digital  technolo-gies. The auto industry is a clear example: existing firms will not  introduce new technologies, and Tesla’s entry into Berlin (the information capital  of Europe) is a shot across the bow of the European auto empire.

英国是数字创业的领导者，而德国是一个追随者。 这种弱势地位阻碍了德国去迎接数字化的未来。例如，作为欧洲的发动机，德国缺乏创业公司阻碍了它的发展，特别是在信息和数字技术领域。汽车工业就是一个明显的例子: 现有的公司不会引进新技术，而特斯拉进入柏林(欧洲的信息之都)则是对欧洲汽车帝国的一次打击。

The German auto industry dominates the world in many respects, from the  mass market to the luxury market and even the racing world.  Hobijn and  Jovanovic (2001) sug-gested that existing firms will not implement new  technologies because of a lack of awareness and skill, vintage capital, and vested  interests. The German auto industry fits this analysis like a glove. The industry has  a huge investment in skills in the metal industry, engine transmissions,  suspensions, and steering but a shortage of computer skills. The huge investment  in vintage capital prevents it from easily writ-ing off this investment. Finally, the  heavy investment in governance of codetermina-tion between labor, business, and  government work councils makes meaningful restructuring almost impossible.  This is reinforced by the top-down rules of the European Union.

德国汽车工业在许多方面统治着世界，从大众市场到豪华车市场，甚至是赛车世界。Hobijn 和 Jovanovic (2001)认为，由于缺乏意识和技能，资本和既得利益，现有的公司将不会实施新技术。德国汽车工业完全符合这一分析。汽车工业在金属工业、发动机传动系统、悬挂系统和转向系统方面有着巨大的投资，但是缺乏计算机技术。对复古资本的巨额投资使得它无法轻易地将这些投资注销。最后，在劳工、企业和政府工作委员会之 间共同决策的管理上的大量投资使得有意义的重组几乎不可能。欧盟自上而下的规则强化了这一点。

Tesla’s move to Berlin, the digital capital of Europe, is an indication that the  future of the European auto industry may be with the startup and not the  incumbent. Electric cars and self-driving vehicles are already here; however, they  are not neces-sary evenly distributed. But, the direction of change is clear and the  only unknown is the rate of change. However, once resource allocation decisions  are redirected away from mechanical and diesel vehicles and toward electric  vehicles, which are cleaner and in alignment with the issue of climate change, the  rate of change could accelerate very quickly (Monsellato, 2016). 

特斯拉迁往欧洲数字之都柏林的举动表明，欧洲汽车业的未来可能取决于这家初创企业，而不是现有企业。电动汽车和自动驾驶汽车已经在这里了; 然而，它们并不是必需的——均匀分布。但是，变化的方向是明确的，唯一未知的是变化的速度。然而，一旦资源分配决定从机械车辆和柴油车辆转向更清洁和符合气候变化问题的电动车辆，变化速度可能会非常迅速地加快 (Monsellato，2016)。

A deeper analysis of Tesla’s global growth provides greater insight into the specific advantages of the company’s business model, why entrepreneurs like Elon Musk  chose to incorporate in the US, and what obstacles stand in the way of German  innovation and entrepreneurship. Tesla serves as an unprecedented case study because  “different government regulations have made entrance to the sector harder, since there  are different standards in safety, emissions and standards. Recent history has showed  that, besides Tesla Motors, no new player has entered the auto-motive industry in a  significant manner in the last decades” 

对特斯拉全球增长进行更深入的分析，可以让我们更深入地了解该公司商业模式的优势、埃隆•马斯克(Elon Musk)等企业家为何选择在美国注册公司， 以及德国创新和企业家精神面临哪些障碍。特斯拉是一个前所未有的案例研究， 因为“不同的政府规定使得进入该行业更加困难，因为在安全、排放和标准方面有不同的标准。历史表明，除了特斯拉汽车，在过去的几十年里没有新的参与者以重要的方式进入汽车工业”。

Indeed, the company has achieved what few previously thought was  possible—it has turned a profit on a premium-priced electric vehicle with a developing supply chain that could bring affordable and sustainable high-tech cars to  the middle class. If successful, such a profitable tech-driven business model would  create a domino effect in innovation at Musk’s other companies, SpaceX and  SolarCity. Naturally.

事实上，该公司已经实现了以前很少有人认为可能实现的目标——通过发展供应链，将价格低廉且可持续发展的高科技汽车带给中产阶级，该公司在一款高价电动汽车上实现了盈利。如果成功，这种利润丰厚的技术驱动型商业模式将对马斯克的其他公司 SpaceX 和 SolarCity 的创新产生多米诺骨牌效应。