South­East Asia 东南亚

On the rails

The economics of a new train line

第一段：

In the late 1860s, French sailors who had set off from Saigon to find the source of the Mekong river encountered the precipitous Khone Falls between Laos and Cambodia, and realised that the waters would be impassable for larger trading vessels. Their dreams of reaching the riches of southern China by river were dashed. Quixotic plans for rail networks followed, first from British and French imperialists, and then from the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which in 1995 outlined its ambition to connect Singapore with Kunming, in China’s Yunnan province.

19世纪60年代末，从西贡出发寻找湄公河源头的法国水手遇到了老挝和柬埔寨之间陡峭的孔尼瀑布，他们意识到大型商船无法通过这片水域。他们想通过河流到达富裕的中国南方的梦想破灭了。随之而来的是英法帝国主义者提出了不切实际的铁路网计划，随后，东南亚国家联盟(ASEAN)在1995年提出了将新加坡与中国云南省昆明市连接起来的雄心壮志。

第二段：

On December 3rd, at long last, a portion of those aspirations was realised. A high-speed rail line connecting Kunming to Vientiane, the capital of Laos, was opened after five years of construction. The route is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and the completed section comes with a hefty price tag of $5.9bn—equivalent to nearly a third of Laos’s annual GDP before the pandemic.

12月3日，这些愿望的一部分终于实现了。从昆明到老挝首都万象的高速铁路经过5年的建设终于开通。这条路线是中国“一带一路”倡议的一部分，完工的部分耗资59亿美元，相当于老挝疫情前年度GDP的近三分之一。

第三段：

For China, the rationale for closer links with South-East Asia is clear. Rising factory wages at home make the case for moving low-complexity manufacturing to cheaper nearby locations. In 2019 Vietnam was China’s fourth-largest trading partner for intermediate goods, between America and India, and up from 15th place a decade ago. China’s intermediate-goods trade with Cambodia and Laos has risen nine- and 11-fold, respectively, in the same time.

对中国来说，与东南亚建立更紧密联系的理由是显而易见的。中国国内工厂工资水平的不断上升，为将低复杂度的制造业转移到成本更低的周边地区提供了理由。2019年，越南是中国在美国和印度之间的第四大半成品贸易伙伴，10年前排在第15位。与此同时，中国与柬埔寨和老挝的半成品贸易分别增长了9倍和11倍。

第四段：

The strategy has historical precedent. Until the 1970s Japanese firms’ main interest in South-East Asia was buying raw materials. Then they began moving production to the region. The shift took off after the Plaza Accord of 1985, at which Japan agreed to let the yen appreciate, which widened the gap between domestic wages and those in low-cost countries. Firms were able to preserve their competitive advantage by moving, while also fostering technological expertise elsewhere.

这一战略有历史先例。直到20世纪70年代，日本公司在东南亚的主要兴趣是购买原材料。然后他们开始将生产转移到该地区。这种转变始于1985年的广场协议，当时日本同意让日元升值，这扩大了日本国内工资与低成本国家工资之间的差距。企业能够通过迁移来保持他们的竞争优势，同时也在别处培养技术专长。

第五段：

What does the new train line mean for Laos? The landlocked country suffers most from South-East Asia’s limited connectivity. The World Bank has been cautiously optimistic about the new route: Vientiane, it reckons, could become a logistical hub into China from Thai ports, but only if the Lao customs system were made more efficient and connecting roads improved. Although Laos has a land border with Yunnan and no coastline, as recently as 2016 almost two-thirds of its exports to China were transported via maritime routes.

这条新铁路线对老挝意味着什么?这个内陆国家深受东南亚有限的联系之苦。世界银行对这条新路线持谨慎的乐观态度:它认为，只有老挝海关系统更加高效，连接道路得到改善，万象才能成为从泰国港口进入中国的物流中心。尽管老挝与云南有陆地边界，没有海岸线，但就在2016年，老挝对中国的出口近三分之二是通过海上航线运输的。

第六段：

Other assessments, however, are less optimistic. A paper published by the Asian Development Bank Institute last year suggested that the investment was unlikely to be profitable given its expense. Opinions of the Belt and Road Initiative have soured since 2016, and fears have risen that the infrastructure acts as a debt trap which gives China influence over borrowers. Laos has assumed 30% of the liability for the project, most of the funding for which was borrowed from the Export-Import Bank of China. Nor will the line bring in Chinese tourists for the foreseeable future, given China’s zero-covid policy.

然而，其他评估却不那么乐观。亚洲开发银行研究所去年发表的一篇论文指出，考虑到投资成本，这项投资不太可能有利可图。自2016年以来，人们对“一带一路”倡议的看法开始恶化，人们越来越担心基础设施会成为一个债务陷阱，让中国对借款国施加影响。老挝为该项目承担了30%的责任，其中大部分资金来自中国进出口银行。考虑到中国的零疫情政策，在可预见的未来，这条线路也不会吸引中国游客。

第七段：

A wider network across the region would yield greater economic benefits for everyone, but that is outside any one country’s control. Thailand approved the first step of a Chinese-built high-speed line in March; it is intended to reach the Lao border at a later stage. Even the first half is not expected to be completed for five years, however, and such schemes often miss their deadline, if they materialise at all. The Malaysian government is studying a high-speed link to Bangkok, but serious discussion has barely begun. Until those longer-term benefits arrive, Laos may mainly be stuck with the bill.

在该地区建立更广泛的网络将为所有人带来更大的经济利益，但这是任何一个国家都无法控制的。今年3月，泰国批准了中国建造的一条高铁的第一步;它打算在稍后阶段到达老挝边界。然而，即使是上半年，预计也不会在5年内完成，而这些计划即使实现，也往往会错过最后期限。马来西亚政府正在研究修建通往曼谷的高速铁路，但认真的讨论才刚刚开始。在这些长期的利益到来之前，老挝可能主要会被账单缠住。