THE SYSTEM OF ARISTOTLE 3

Words and Things 

文字与事物

Unlike his work in the empirical sciences, there are aspects of Aristotle’s theoretical philosophy which still have much to teach us. In particular, he says things of the highest interest about the nature of language, about the nature of reality, and about the relationship between the two. 

与他在经验科学中的工作不同，亚里士多德的理论哲学有一些方面仍然有很多东西可以教给我们。特别是，他说了一些关于语言的本质、现实的本质和两者之间关系的最有趣的事情。

In his Categories Aristotle drew up a list of different types of things which might be said of an individual. It contains ten items: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, clothing, activity, and passivity. It would make sense to say of Socrates, for instance, that he was a human being (substance), was five feet tall (quantity), was gifted (quality), was older than Plato (relation), lived in Athens (place), was a man of the fifth-century bc (time), was sitting (posture), had a cloak on (clothing), was cutting a piece of cloth (activity), was killed by a poison (passivity). This classification was not simply a classification of predicates in language: each irreducibly different type of predicate, so Aristotle believed, stood for an irreducibly different type of entity. In ‘Socrates is a man’, for instance, the word ‘man’ stood for a substance, namely Socrates. In ‘Socrates was poisoned’ the word ‘poisoned’ stood for an entity called a passivity, namely the poisoning of Socrates. 

在他的《范畴论》中，亚里士多德列出了一个关于个体可能说的不同类型的事物的清单。它包含了十项：实体、数量、质量、关系、地点、时间、姿态、衣着、活动和被动。比如，对苏格拉底来说，有意义的是说他是一个人（实体），身高五英尺（数量），有才华（质量），比柏拉图年长（关系），住在雅典（地点），是公元前五世纪的一个人（时间），坐着（姿态），披着斗篷（衣着），剪一块布（活动），被毒药杀死（被动）。这个分类不仅仅是语言中谓词的分类：每一种不可约化的不同类型的谓词，亚里士多德相信，代表了一种不可约化的不同类型的实体。例如，在“苏格拉底是人”中，单词“人”代表了一种实体，即苏格拉底。在“苏格拉底被毒死”中单词“毒死”代表了一种叫做被动的实体，即苏格拉底的中毒。

Aristotle perhaps believed that every possible entity, however it might initially be classified, would be found ultimately to belong to one and only one of the ten categories. Thus, Socrates is a man, an animal, a living being, and ultimately a substance; the murder committed by Aigisthos is a murder, a homicide, a killing, and ultimately an activity. 

亚里士多德或许相信，每一种可能的实体，无论最初如何分类，最终都会发现只属于十个范畴中的一个。因此，苏格拉底是一个人，一个动物，一个生命体，最终是一个实体；埃吉斯托斯犯下的谋杀是一场谋杀，一场杀人，一场杀戮，最终是一种活动。

The category of substance was of primary importance. Substances are things like women, lions, and cabbages which can exist independently, and can be identified as individuals of a particular kind; a substance is, in Aristotle’s homely phrase, ‘a this such-and-such’ – this cat, or this carrot. Things falling into the other categories (which Aristotle’s successors would call ‘accidents’) are not separable; a size, for instance, is always the size of something. Items in the ‘accidental’ categories exist only as properties or modifications of substances. 

实体的范畴是最重要的。实体是像女人、狮子和卷心菜这样的东西，它们可以独立存在，并且可以被识别为特定种类的个体；一个实体，用亚里士多德的朴素说法，就是“一个这样的东西”——这只猫，或者这根胡萝卜。属于其他范畴的事物（亚里士多德的后继者会称之为“偶然”）是不可与实体分离的；例如，一个大小总是某物的大小。属于“偶然”范畴的事物只作为实体的属性或变化而存在。

Aristotle’s categories do not seem exhaustive, and appear to be of unequal importance. But even if we accept them as one possible classification of predicates, is it correct to regard predicates as standing for anything? If ‘Socrates runs’ is true, must ‘runs’ stand for an entity of some kind in the way that ‘Socrates’ stands for Socrates? Even if we say yes, it is clear that this entity cannot be the meaning of the word ‘runs’. For ‘Socrates runs’ makes sense even if it is false; and so ‘runs’ here has meaning even if there is no such thing as the running of Socrates for it to stand for. 

亚里士多德的范畴似乎不是完备的，而且看起来重要性不一。但即使我们接受它们作为谓词的一种可能的分类，把谓词看作代表某物是否正确呢？如果“苏格拉底跑步”是真的，那么“跑步”是否必须像“苏格拉底”代表苏格拉底一样，代表某种实体呢？即使我们说是，也很明显，这个实体不能是单词“跑步”的意义。因为“苏格拉底跑步”即使是假的也有意义；所以这里的“跑步”即使没有苏格拉底的跑步这样的事物可以代表，也有意义。

If we take a sentence like ‘Socrates is white’ we may, on Aristotelian lines, think of ‘white’ as standing for Socrates’ whiteness. If so, what does the ‘is’ stand for? 

如果我们拿一个像“苏格拉底是白的”这样的句子，我们可能按照亚里士多德的思路，把“白的”看作代表苏格拉底的白色。如果是这样，那么“是”代表什么呢？

To this question several answers seem possible. 

对于这个问题，似乎有几种可能的答案。

(i) We may say that it stands for nothing, but simply marks the connection between subject and predicate. 

(i) 我们可以说它代表什么也没有，只是标志着主语和谓语之间的联系。

(ii) We may say that it signifies existence, in the sense that if Socrates is white then there exists something – perhaps white Socrates, perhaps the whiteness of Socrates – which does not exist if Socrates is not white. 

(ii) 我们可以说它表示存在，意思是如果苏格拉底是白的，那么就存在某物——也许是白色的苏格拉底，也许是苏格拉底的白色——如果苏格拉底不是白的，这个东西就不存在。

(iii) We may say that it stands for being, where ‘being’ is to be taken as a verbal noun like ‘running’. 

(iii) 我们可以说它代表存在，其中“存在”要被看作是一个像“跑步”一样的动词名词。

 

If we say this, it seems that we must add that there are various types of being: 

如果我们这样说，似乎我们必须补充说，有不同类型的存在：

the being that is denoted by ‘is’ in the substantial predicate ‘. . . is a horse’ is substantial being, while the being that is denoted by ‘is’ in the accidental predicate ‘. . . is white’ is accidental being. 

在实体谓词“……是马”中被“是”所表示的存在是实体存在，而在偶然谓词“……是白的”中被“是”所表示的存在是偶然存在。

In different places Aristotle seems to favour now one, now another, of these interpretations. His favourite is perhaps the third. 

在不同的地方，亚里士多德似乎时而偏向这一种，时而偏向另一种解释。他最喜欢的可能是第三种。

In the passages where he expresses it, he draws the consequence from it that ‘be’ is a verb of multiple meaning, a homonymous term with more than one sense ( just as ‘healthy’ has different, but related, senses when we speak of a healthy person, a healthy complexion, or a healthy climate). 

在他表达它的段落中，他从中得出了一个结论，即“是”是一个多义动词，一个有多种意义的同音词（就像“健康”在我们谈论健康的人、健康的肤色或健康的风气时有不同但相关的意义一样）。

I said above that in ‘Socrates is a man’, ‘man’ was a predicate in the category of substance which stood for the substance Socrates. 

我在上面说过，在“苏格拉底是人”这句话中，“人”是属于实体范畴的一个谓词，代表着苏格拉底这个实体。

But that is not the only analysis which Aristotle gives of such a sentence. 

但这并不是亚里士多德对这样的句子给出的唯一分析。

Sometimes it appears that ‘man’ stands rather for the humanity which Socrates has. 

有时候，“人”似乎更多地指的是苏格拉底所具有的人性。

In such contexts, Aristotle distinguishes two senses of ‘substance’. 

在这样的语境中，亚里士多德区分了“实体”的两种意义。

A this such-and-such, e.g. this man Socrates, is a first substance; the humanity he has is a second substance. 

一个这样那样的东西，例如这个人苏格拉底，是第一实体；他所具有的人性是第二实体。

When he talks like this, Aristotle commonly takes pains to avoid Platonism about universals. 

当他这样说的时候，亚里士多德常常努力避免关于普遍共相的柏拉图主义。

The humanity that Socrates has is an individual humanity, Socrates’ own humanity; it is not a universal humanity that is participated in by all men.

苏格拉底所具有的人性是一个个体的人性，苏格拉底自己的人性；它不是一个被所有人所参与的普遍共相的人性。

Motion and Change 

运动和变化

One of the reasons why Aristotle rejected Plato’s Theory of Ideas was that, like Eleatic metaphysics, it denied, at a fundamental level, the reality of change. 

亚里士多德拒绝柏拉图的理型论的原因之一是，它像伊利亚派的形而上学一样，在根本层面上否认了变化的现实性。

In his Physics and his Metaphysics Aristotle offered a theory of the nature of change intended to take up and disarm the challenge of Parmenides and Plato. This was his doctrine of potentiality and actuality.

在他的《物理学》和《形而上学》中，亚里士多德提出了一种关于变化本质的理论，旨在接受并化解巴门尼德和柏拉图的挑战。这就是他的潜能性和实动性的学说。

If we consider any substance, such as a piece of wood, we find a number of things which are true of that substance at a given time, and a number of other things which, though not true of it at that time, can become true of it at some other time. 

如果我们考虑任何一种实体，比如一块木头，我们会发现有许多事情在某一时刻是关于那种实体的真理，还有许多其他的事情，虽然在那一时刻不是关于它的真理，但可以在另一时刻成为关于它的真理。

Thus, the wood, though it is cold, can be heated and turned into ash. 

因此，木头虽然是冷的，但可以被加热并变成灰烬。

Aristotle called the things which a substance is, its ‘actualities’, and the things which it can be, its ‘potentialities’: thus the wood is actually cold but potentially hot, actually wood, but potentially ash. 

亚里士多德称实体所是的东西为“实动性”，实体所能是的东西为“潜能性”：因此，木头实际上是冷的，但可能是热的，实际上是木头，但可能是灰烬。

The change from being cold to being hot is an accidental change which the substance can undergo while remaining the substance that it is; the change from wood to ash is a substantial change, a change from being one kind of substance to another. 

从冷变热是一种偶然的变化，实体可以在保持自身实体性的同时经历这种变化；从木头变成灰烬是一种本质的变化，一种从一种实体变成另一种实体的变化。

In English, we can say, very roughly, that predicates which contain the word ‘can’, or a word with a modal suffix such as ‘able’ or ‘ible’, signify potentialities; predicates which do not contain these words signify actualities. 

在英语中，我们可以非常粗略地说，包含“can”这个词或者有“able”或“ible”这样的情态后缀的词的谓词表示潜能性；不包含这些词的谓词表示实动性。

Potentiality, in contrast to actuality, is the capacity to undergo a change of some kind, whether through one’s own action or through the action of other agents.

潜能性与实动性相对应，是一种经历某种变化的能力，无论是通过自己的行动还是通过其他行动者的行动。

The actualities involved in changes are called ‘forms’, and ‘matter’ is used as a technical term for what has the capacity for substantial change. 

参与变化的实动性被称为“形式”，而“物质”被用作一个技术术语，指具有本质变化能力的东西。

In everyday life we are familiar with the idea that one and the same parcel of stuff may be first one kind of thing and then another kind of thing. 

在日常生活中，我们熟悉这样一个想法：同一堆东西可能先是一种东西，然后又是另一种东西。

A bottle containing a pint of cream may be found, after shaking, to contain not cream but butter. 

一个装有一品脱奶油的瓶子，在摇晃之后，可能发现不是奶油而是黄油。

The stuff that comes out of the bottle is the same stuff as the stuff that went into the bottle: nothing has been added to it and nothing has been taken from it. 

从瓶子里出来的东西和进入瓶子里的东西是同样的东西：没有增加也没有减少。

But what comes out is different in kind from what goes in. 

但出来的东西和进去的东西在种类上是不同的。

It is from cases such as this that the Aristotelian notion of substantial change is derived.

正是从这样的例子中，亚里士多德关于本质变化的概念得以产生。

Substantial change takes place when a substance of one kind turns into a substance of another kind. 

本质变化发生在一种实体转变为另一种实体时。

The stuff which remains the same parcel of stuff throughout the change was called by Aristotle matter. 

在整个变化过程中保持同一堆东西不变的东西被亚里士多德称为物质。

The matter takes first one form and then another: first it is cream and then it is butter. 

物质先取一个形式然后再取另一个形式：先是奶油然后是黄油。

A thing may change without ceasing to belong to the same natural kind, by a change falling not under the category of substance, but under one of the other nine categories: 

一个东西可能发生变化而仍然属于同一自然种类，通过一个不属于实体范畴，而属于其他九个范畴之一的变化：

thus a human may grow, learn, blush and be vanquished without ceasing to be a human. 

因此，一个人可能成长、学习、脸红和被征服而仍然是一个人。

When a substance undergoes an accidental change there is always a form which it retains throughout the change, namely its substantial form.

当一个实体经历一个偶然的变化时，总有一个形式是它在整个变化过程中保持的，即它的本质形式。 

Aristotle gives straightforwardly biological accounts of the activities of nutrition, growth, and reproduction which are common to all living things. 

亚里士多德直接地从生物学的角度描述了所有生物共有的营养、生长和繁殖等活动。

Matters become more complicated, and more interesting, when he turns to explain sense perception (peculiar to higher animals) and intellectual thought (peculiar to human beings).

当他转向解释感觉知觉（高等动物特有的）和智力思维（人类特有的）时，物质变得更加复杂和有趣。

In explaining sense-perception, Aristotle adapts the account in Plato’s Theaetetus according to which sensation is the outcome of an encounter between a sense-faculty (such as vision) and a sense-object (such as a visible object). 

在解释感觉知觉时，亚里士多德借用了柏拉图《泰阿泰德》中的说法，即感觉是感觉能力（如视觉）和感觉对象（如可见物）之间相遇的结果。

Only, whereas on Plato’s account the eye’s seeing a white object, and the whiteness of the object itself, are two twins begotten of the same intercourse, for Aristotle the seeing and the being seen are one and the same thing. 

只是，柏拉图认为眼睛看到一个白色的物体，和物体本身的白色，是同一交合所生的双胞胎，而亚里士多德认为看和被看是一回事。

He propounds the general thesis: a sense-faculty in actuality is identical with a sense-object in actuality.

他提出了一个一般的论题：实际上的感觉能力与实际上的感觉对象是相同的。

This initially obscure thesis is yet another application of Aristotle’s theory of actuality and potentiality. 

这个最初模糊的论题是亚里士多德关于实动性和潜能性理论的又一种应用。

Let me illustrate its meaning by taking the example of taste. 

让我用味道的例子来说明它的意义。

The sweetness of a piece of sugar, something which can be tasted, is a sense-object, and my sense of taste, my ability to taste things, is a sense-faculty. 

一块糖的甜味，是可以被品尝的东西，是一个感觉对象，而我的味觉，我的品尝东西的能力，是一个感觉能力。

The operation of my sense of taste upon the sensible object is the same thing as the action of the sense-object upon my sense. That is to say, the sugar’s tasting sweet to me is one and the same event as my tasting the sweetness of the sugar. 

我的味觉对可感知对象的作用与感觉对象对我的味觉的作用是同一件事。也就是说，糖对我品尝起来甜是与我品尝糖的甜味同一事件。

The sugar itself is actually sweet all the time; but until the sugar is put into the mouth its sweetness is not actually, but only potentially, tasting sweet. (Being sweet is a first actuality, tasting sweet a second actuality.) 

糖本身始终是甜的；但直到糖放进嘴里，它的甜味才不是实际性上的，而只是潜能性上的，品尝起来甜。（甜是第一实动性，品尝甜是第二实动性。）

The sense of taste is nothing other than the power to do such things as taste the sweetness of sweet objects. 

味觉不过是做这样的事情的能力，比如品尝甜物的甜味。

The sensory property of sweetness is nothing other than the power to taste sweet to a suitable taster. 

甜味这种感觉属性不过是对适当的品尝者品尝起来甜的能力。

Thus Aristotle is correct to say that the property in action is one and the same thing as the faculty in operation. 

因此，亚里士多德说属性在行动中与能力在运作中是同一件事是正确的。

Of course the power to taste and the power to be tasted are two very different things, the one in the taster and the other in the sugar.

当然，品尝的能力和被品尝的能力是两种非常不同的东西，一个在品尝者身上，另一个在糖身上。

This account of sense-perception is superior to the Platonic one, because it allows us to say that things in the world really do have sensory qualities, even when not being sensed. 

这种对感觉知觉的解释优于柏拉图的解释，因为它允许我们说世界上的事物真的具有质感，即使没有被感知。

Things not being looked at are really coloured, things not being sniffed really do smell sour, sounds unheard may really be deafening. 

没有被看到的东西真的有颜色，没有被闻到的东西真的有酸味，没有被听到的声音可能真的震耳欲聋。

Aristotle can say this because his analysis of actuality and potentiality allows him to explain that sensory qualities are really powers of a certain kind.

亚里士多德可以这样说，因为他对实动性和潜能性的分析使他能够解释质感实际上是某种能力。

Metaphysics 

形而上学 

‘There is a discipline,’ Aristotle says in the fourth book of his Metaphysics, ‘which theorizes about Being qua being, and the things which belong to Being taken in itself.’ 

“有一门学科，”亚里士多德在他的《形而上学》的第四卷中说，“它是关于作为存在的存在，以及自身属于存在的事物的理论。”

This discipline is called ‘first philosophy’, which he elsewhere describes as the knowledge of first principles and supreme causes. 

这门学科叫做“第一哲学”，他在别处描述它是对第一原则和最高原因的知识。

Other sciences, he says, deal with a particular kind of being, but the science of the philosopher concerns Being universally and not merely partially. 

其他的科学，他说，处理一种特定的存在，但哲学家的科学关注普遍的存在而不仅仅是部分的存在。

However, in other places Aristotle seems to restrict the object of first philosophy to a particular kind of being, namely divine, independent and immutable substance. 

然而，在其他地方，亚里士多德似乎把第一哲学的对象限制为一种特定的存在，即神圣的、独立的和不可变的实体。

There are three theoretical philosophies, he says in one place – mathematics, physics, and theology; and the first, or most honourable philosophy, is theology.

他在一个地方说，有三种理论哲学——数学、物理学和天论；而第一或最尊贵的哲学是天论。

Theology is the best of the theoretical sciences because it deals with the most honourable among beings; it is prior to, and more universal than, physics or natural philosophy.

天论是理论科学中最好的，因为它处理最尊贵的存在；它先于、也比物理学或自然哲学更普遍。

Both sets of definitions so far considered treat of first philosophy as concerned with Being or beings; it is also spoken of as the science of substance or substances. 

到目前为止考虑过的两组定义都把第一哲学看作是关注存在或存在者；它也被称为实体或实体们的科学。

In one place Aristotle tells us that the old question, what is Being?, comes to the same as the question, what is substance? So that first philosophy can be called the theory of first and universal substance.

亚里士多德在一个地方告诉我们，古老的问题，什么是存在？等同于问题，什么是实体？因此，第一哲学可以被称为第一和普遍实体的理论。

Are all these definitions of the subject matter of philosophy equivalent to each other – or indeed compatible with each other? 

这些关于哲学主题的定义是否彼此等价——或者确实相容？

Some historians, thinking them incompatible, have attributed the different kinds of definition to different periods of Aristotle’s life. 

有些历史学家认为它们不相容，把不同种类的定义归因于亚里士多德生命中不同的时期。

But with an effort we can show that the definitions can be reconciled. 

但是经过努力我们可以证明这些定义可以被调和。

Before asking what Being qua being is, we need to settle what Being is. 

在问什么是作为存在的存在之前，我们需要确定什么是存在。

Aristotle is using the Greek phrase to on in the same way as Parmenides did: Being is whatever is anything whatever. 

亚里士多德使用希腊语短语to on的方式与巴门尼德相同：存在是任何“”是任何东西"的东西。

Whenever Aristotle explains the senses of ‘to on’ he does so by explaining the sense of ‘einai’, the verb ‘to be’. 

每当亚里士多德解释“to on”的意义时，他都是通过解释“einai”，即动词“to be”的意义来做的。

Being, in its broadest sense, is whatever can appear, in some true sentence, followed by ‘is’.

存在，在它最广泛的意义上，是任何可以出现在某个真实的句子中，后面跟着“is”的东西。

On this view, a science of being would be less like a science of the existent than a science of true predication.

从这个观点来看，存在的科学与其说是存在者的科学，不如说是真实陈述的科学。

All the categories, Aristotle tells us, signify being, because any verb can be replaced by a predicate which will contain the verb ‘to be’: ‘Socrates runs’, for instance, can be replaced by ‘Socrates is a runner’. 

所有的范畴，亚里士多德告诉我们，都表示存在，因为任何动词都可以被一个包含动词“to be”的谓语所替代：“苏格拉底跑步”，例如，可以被替换为“苏格拉底是一个跑步者”。

And every being in any category other than substance is a property or modification of substance. 

而除了实体之外的任何范畴中的每一个存在都是实体的属性或变化。

This means that wherever you have a subject–verb sentence in which the subject is not a term for a substance, you can turn it into another subject–verb sentence in which the subject term does denote a substance – a first substance, like a particular man or cabbage.

这意味着无论你在哪里有一个主语-动词句子，其中主语不是一个实体的术语，你都可以把它变成另一个主语-动词句子，其中主语术语确实表示一个实体——一个第一实体，比如一个特定的人或卷心菜。

With Aristotle, as with Parmenides, it is a mistake simply to equate being with existence. 

在亚里士多德那里，就像在巴门尼德那里一样，仅仅把存在(being)等同于existence是一个错误。

When he discusses the senses of ‘being’ and ‘is’ in his philosophical lexicon in the Metaphysics Aristotle does not even mention existence as one of the senses of the verb ‘to be’, a use to be distinguished from the use of the verb with a complement in a predicate, as in ‘to be a philosopher’. 

当他在《形而上学》中的哲学词典中讨论“存在”和“是”的意义时，亚里士多德甚至没有提到存在作为动词“to be”的一种意义，这种用法要与动词带有谓语补足语的用法区分开来，比如“to be a philosopher”。

This is surprising, because he seems himself to have made the distinction in earlier books. In the Sophistical Refutations, to counter the sophism that whatever is thought of must exist in order to be thought of, Aristotle distinguishes between ‘to be F’, where the verb is followed by a predicate (e.g. ‘to be thought of’) and ‘to be’ period. 

这令人惊讶，因为他似乎自己在早期的书中就做了这种区分。在《对智者诡辩术的反驳》中，为了反驳任何被思考的东西必须存在才能被思考的诡辩，亚里士多德区分了“to be F”，其中动词后面跟着一个谓语（例如“to be thought of”）和“to be.” 。

He makes a similar move in connection with the being F of that which has ceased to be, period: e.g. from ‘Homer is a poet’ it does not follow that he is.

他在关于“曾经是F现在已经不存在了”的问题上做了类似的区分：例如，从“荷马是一个诗人”不一定推出他存在。

It is a mistake, perhaps, to look in Aristotle for a single treatment of existence. 

也许，在亚里士多德那里寻找一个关于存在的单一处理是一个错误。

When philosophers pose problems about what things really exist and what things do not, they may have three different contrasts in mind: that between the abstract and the concrete (e.g. wisdom vs. Socrates), that between the fictional and the factual (e.g. Pegasus vs. Bucephalus), and that between the extant and the defunct (e.g. the Great Pyramid vs. the Colossus of Rhodes). 

当哲学家提出关于什么东西真的存在和什么东西不存在的问题时，他们可能心中有三种不同的对比：抽象和具体之间的对比（例如，智慧与苏格拉底），虚构和事实之间的对比{例如，飞马与布西发拉斯(古代的真实马匹)} ，以及现存和消亡之间的对比（例如，大金字塔与罗得岛巨像）。

In different places, Aristotle treats of all three problems.

在不同的地方，亚里士多德处理了这三个问题

He deals with the problem about abstractions when he discusses accidents: they are all modifications of substance. 

他在讨论偶然性时处理了关于抽象的问题：它们都是实体的变化。

Any statement about abstractions (such as colours, actions, changes) must be analysable into one about concrete first substances. 

任何关于抽象的陈述（如颜色、动作、变化）都必须能够分析成关于具体的第一实体的陈述。

He deals with the problem about fictions by introducing a sense of ‘is’ in which it means ‘is true’: a fiction is a genuine thought, but it is not, i.e. is not true. 

他通过引入一种“是”的意义来处理关于虚构的问题，表示“是真的”：虚构是一种真实的思想，但它不存在，即不是真的。

The problem about the extant and the defunct, problems about things which come into existence and go out of existence, are solved by the application of the doctrine of matter and form. 

关于现存和消亡的问题，关于进入存在和退出存在的事物的问题，是通过运用质料和形式的学说来解决的。

To exist, in this sense, is to be matter under a certain form, it is to be a thing of a certain kind: Socrates ceases to exist if he ceases to be a human being. Being, for Aristotle, includes anything that exists in any of these ways.

在这个意义上，存在就是在某种形式下的质料，就是一种特定种类的东西：苏格拉底如果不再是一个人类，就不再存在。对于亚里士多德来说，存在（Being）包括任何以这些方式存在的东西。

If that is what Being is, what then is Being qua Being? The answer is that there is no such thing. 

如果这就是存在的意思，那么作为存在的存在又是什么呢？答案是没有这样的东西。

Certainly, you can study Being qua being, and you can look for causes of Being qua being. 

当然，你可以研究作为存在的存在，也可以寻找存在作为存在的原因。

But this is to engage in a special sort of study, to look for a special sort of cause. 

但这是一种特殊的研究，寻找一种特殊的原因。

It is not to study a special kind of Being, or to look for the causes of a special kind of Being. 

它不是研究一种特殊的存在，也不是寻找一种特殊的存在的原因。

Aristotle more than once insisted that ‘An A qua F is G’ must be regarded as consisting of a subject A, and a predicate ‘is, qua F, G’. 

亚里士多德不止一次地坚持，“An A qua F is G”必须被看作由一个主语A和一个谓语“is, qua F, G”组成。

It should not be regarded as consisting of a predicate ‘is G’ which is attached to a subject An-A-qua-F. 

它不应该被看作由一个谓语“is G”组成，这个谓语附着在一个主语An-A-qua-F上。

One example he gives is that ‘A good can be known as good’ should not be analysed as ‘a good as good can be known’, because ‘a good as good’ is nonsense. 

他给出的一个例子是，“A good can be known as good”不应该被分析为“a good as good can be known”，因为“a good as good”是无意义的。

But if ‘A qua F’ is a pseudo-subject in ‘An A qua F is G’, equally, ‘A qua F’ is a pseudo-object in ‘We study A qua F’. 

但是如果“A qua F”在“An A qua F is G”中是一个伪主语，同样地，“A qua F”在“We study A qua F”中也是一个伪对象。

The object of that sentence is A, and the verb is ‘study qua F’. 

这个句子的对象是A，而动词是“study qua F”。

We are talking, not of the study of a special kind of object, but of a special kind of study, a study which looks for special kinds of explanation and causes, causes qua F. 

我们说的不是对一种特殊对象的研究，而是对一种特殊研究的研究，一种寻找特殊种类的解释和原因的研究，即qua F的原因。

For instance, when we do human physiology, we study men qua animals, that is to say, we study the structures andfunctions which humans have in common with animals. 

例如，当我们做人类生理学时，我们研究人类作为动物，也就是说，我们研究人类与动物共有的结构和功能。

There is no object which is a man qua animal, and it would be foolish to ask whether all men, or only some specially brutish men, are men qua animals. 

没有一个对象是作为动物的人类，问所有人或只有一些特别野蛮的人是否是作为动物的人类是愚蠢的。

It is equally foolish to ask whether Being qua Being means all beings or only some specially divine beings.

同样地，问作为存在的存在是否意味着所有存在者或只有一些特别神圣的存在者也是愚蠢的。

However, you can study any being from the particular point of view of being, that is you can study it in virtue of what it has in common with all other beings. 

然而，你可以从存在的特定角度来研究任何存在者，也就是说，你可以根据它与所有其他存在者共有的东西来研究它。

That, one might think, is surely very little: and indeed Aristotle himself says that nothing has being as its essence or nature: there is nothing which is just a being and nothing else. 

有人可能认为，这一点肯定很少：而且亚里士多德自己也说没有什么东西以存在为本质或性质：没有什么东西只是一个存在而没有别的。

But to study something as a being is to study something about which true predications can be made, precisely from the point of view of the possibility of making true predications of it. 

但作为一个存在者来研究某个东西就是研究关于可以做出真实陈述的东西，正是从做出真实陈述的可能性的角度来看。

Aristotle’s first philosopher is not making a study of some particular kind of being; he is studying everything, the whole of Being, precisely as such. 

亚里士多德的第一哲学不是在研究某一种特定的存在；他在研究一切事物，整个存在，正如它本身那样。

Now an Aristotelian science is a science of causes, so that the science of Being qua being will be a science which assigns the causes of there being any truths whatever about anything. Can there be such causes?

现在亚里士多德式的科学是一门原因之学，所以作为存在之学将会是一门指定任何关于任何事物都有真理之原因的科学。有这样的原因吗？

It is not too difficult to give sense to a particular being’s having a cause qua being. 

要让一个特定的存在者有一个作为存在者的原因，并不太困难。

If I had never been conceived, there would never have been any truths about me; Aristotle says that if Socrates had never existed neither ‘Socrates is well’ nor ‘Socrates is unwell’ would ever have been true. 

如果我从未被受孕，就永远不会有任何关于我的真理；亚里士多德说如果苏格拉底从未存在过，“苏格拉底身体好”或“苏格拉底身体不好”就永远不会成立。

So my parents who brought me into existence are causes of me, qua being. (They are, of course, also causes of me qua human.) 

所以把我带入存在中的父母就是我作为存在之原因。（他们当然也是我作为人类之原因。）

So also are their parents, and their parents in turn, and ultimately, Adam and Eve, if we are all descended from a single pair. 

他们的父母，以及他们父母的父母，最终，亚当和夏娃，如果我们都是从一对夫妇衍生出来的。

And if there was anything which produced Adam and Eve, that would be the cause of all human beings, qua beings.

如果有什么东西产生了亚当和夏娃，那就是所有人类作为存在之原因。

 

We can see from this clearly enough how the Christian God, the maker of the world, could be regarded as the cause of Being qua being – the cause, in his own existence, of truths about himself, and as creator the efficient cause of the possibility of any truth about anything else. 

我们可以从这里清楚地看出，基督教的上帝，世界的造物主，如何能被视为存在之所以存在的原因——他自己的存在是关于他自己的真理的原因，而作为创造者，他是任何其他事物的真理可能性的有效原因。

But what is the cause of Being qua being in Aristotle’s system, in which there is no maker of the world? 

但是在亚里士多德的体系中，没有世界的造物主，那么存在之所以存在的原因是什么呢？

At the supreme point of Aristotle’s hierarchy of beings are the moved and unmoved movers which are the final causes of all generation and corruption. They are therefore in one respect the causes of all perceptible and corruptible beings, in so far as they are beings. 

在亚里士多德的存在层级中，最高点是动者和不动者，它们是一切生成和腐败的终极原因。因此，在某种意义上，它们是所有可感知和可腐败的存在的原因，只要它们是存在。

The science which reaches up to the unmoved mover will be studying the explanation of all true predication whatever, and therefore will be studying every being qua being. 

能够达到不动者的科学将会研究一切真实陈述的解释，因此也将会研究每一个作为存在的存在。

In his Metaphysics Aristotle explains that there are three kinds of substances: perishable bodies, eternal bodies, and immutable beings. 

在他的《形而上学》中，亚里士多德解释说有三种实体：可灭亡的身体，永恒的身体，和不变的存在。

The first two kinds belong to natural science and the third to first philosophy. 

前两种属于自然科学，而第三种属于第一哲学。

Whatever explains substances, he says, explains all things; since without substances there would be neither active nor passive change. 

他说，只要能够解释实体，就能够解释一切事物；因为没有实体就不会有主动或被动的变化。

He then goes on to prove the existence of an unmoved mover; and concludes ‘on such a principle the heavens and nature depend’ – i.e. eternal bodies and perishable bodies alike depend on immutable being. 

他接着证明了不动者的存在；并且总结说“诸天和自然都依赖于这样一个原则”——也就是说，永恒的身体和可灭亡的身体都依赖于不变的存在。

And this is the divine, the object of theology. 

而这就是神圣的，天论的对象。

The unmoved mover is prior to other substances and substances are prior to all other beings. 

不动者先于其他实体，而实体先于所有其他存在。

‘Prior’ is here used not in a temporal sense, but to denote dependency: A is prior to B if you can have A without B and you cannot have B without A. 

“先于”在这里不是用来表示时间上的意义，而是用来表示依赖关系：如果你可以有A而没有B，并且你不能有B而没有A，那么A就先于B。

If there was no unmoved mover, there would be no heavens and no nature; if there were no substances there would be no other beings. 

如果没有不动者，就不会有诸天和自然；如果没有实体，就不会有其他存在。

We can see now why Aristotle says that what is prior has greater explanatory power than what is posterior, and why the science of the divine beings can be said to be the most universal science because it is prior: it deals with beings which are prior, i.e. further back in the chain of dependence. 

我们现在可以看出，为什么亚里士多德说先东西比后东西有更大的解释力，以及为什么神圣存在的科学可以被说是最普遍的科学，因为它是先于的：它处理的是先于的存在，也就是说，在依赖链中更靠后的存在。

The science of divine beings is more universal than the science of physics because it explains both divine beings and natural beings; the science of physics explains only natural beings and not also divine beings. 

神圣存在的科学比物理学更普遍，因为它解释了神圣存在和自然存在；物理学只解释了自然存在，而不也解释了神圣存在。

We can at last see how the different definitions of first philosophy cohere together. 

我们终于可以看出，第一哲学的不同定义是如何相互协调的。

Any science can be defined either by giving the field it is to explain, or by specifying principles by which it explains. 

任何科学都可以通过给出它要解释的领域，或者通过指定它用来解释的原则来定义。

First philosophy is universal in its field: it undertakes to offer one kind of explanation of everything whatever, to assign one of the causes of the truth of every true predication. 

第一哲学在它的领域中是普遍的：它承担了提供一种对一切事物的解释，给出每一个真实陈述的真理的一个原因。

It is the science of Being qua being. 

它是存在之所以存在的科学。

But if we turn from the explicandum to the explicans, we can say that first philosophy is the science of the divine; for what it explains, it explains by reference to the divine unmoved mover. 

但是如果我们从被解释者转向解释者，我们可以说第一哲学是神圣的科学；因为它所解释的，它是通过参照神圣的不动者来解释的。

It does not deal just with a single kind of Being, for it gives an account not only of the divine itself, but of everything else that exists or is anything.

它不仅仅处理一种存在，因为它不仅给出了关于神圣本身的描述，而且还给出了关于其他一切存在或任何事物的描述。

But it is par excellence the science of the divine, because it explains everything not, like physics, by reference to nature, but by reference to the divine. 

但是它是最优秀的神圣科学，因为它不像物理学那样通过参照自然来解释一切，而是通过参照神圣来解释一切。

Thus theology and the science of Being qua being are one and the same first philosophy. 

因此，天论和存在之所以存在的科学是同一个第一哲学。

One is sometimes invited to believe that the final stage in the understanding of Aristotle’s metaphysics is an appreciation of the profound and mysterious nature of Being qua Being. 

在理解亚里士多德时，有时候亚里士多德会请求人们认同形而上学的最后阶段是对存在作为存在深刻和神秘本质的欣赏。

Rather, the first step towards such an understanding is the realization that Being qua Being is a chimerical spectre engendered by inattention to Aristotle’s logic. 

相反，迈向这种理解的第一步是认识到，存在作为存在是一个因不注意亚里士多德逻辑而产生的虚幻幽灵。