（文章翻译）拜占庭兵役、军事土地和士兵的地位：当前的问题和解释（第三部分）

Military Service, Military Lands, and the Status of Soldiers: Current Problems and Interpretations Author(s): John Haldon
敦巴顿橡树园论文，1993 年
翻译：神尾智代

IV. THE STATE AND ITS ARMIES-A CRISIS OF RESOURCES

四、 国家及其军队——资源危机

It is clear that in carrying out this planned withdrawal the state had to face the problems of both supplying and recruiting its forces in the territory which remained under imperial authority and effective political and fiscal control. And it is at precisely this point that the question of the sources of income, equipment, and provisions for the armies has to be raised. The problem of the origins of the so-called military lands, and more recently what has been identified as the clearly related problem of the role of the kommerkiarioi, have played a central role in this connection.

          很明显，在执行这一计划撤军时，国家必须面临在仍处于帝国权威和有效政治和财政控制之下的领土上供应和招募军队的问题。 正是在这一点上，必须提出军队的收入、装备和供给的来源问题。 所谓的军事土地的起源问题，以及最近被确定为与 kommerkiarioi 作用明显相关的问题，在这方面发挥了核心作用。

In spite of two attempts recently to reassert the possibility that the Emperors in the seventh century deliberately settled troops on the land as a means of providing for their upkeep, there is, as far as I can see, no hint of any formal settling of soldiers by the state on a massive scale of the sort favored by Ostrogorsky and, latterly, both Hendy and Treadgold. Let us look at these two, in part complementary, arguments in greater detail.

          尽管最近有两次尝试重申 7 世纪的皇帝故意在这片土地上安置军队作为维持他们的手段的可能性，但据我所知，没有任何正式安置士兵的迹象，像奥斯特罗戈尔斯基以及后来的亨迪和特雷德戈尔德所青睐的那种大规模的国家。让我们更详细地看一下这两个部分互补的论点。

First, as a result of a dramatic fall in the gold reserves from the later years of the sixth century, the state was compelled to start paying the soldiers at least partly in copper rather than gold or silver. Gold continued to be paid out on a restricted basis, of course, especially for donatives. But from the early 640s-when, as has been shown, the state could afford to issue its armies with only one third of the usual accessional donative-the finances of the state must have been near collapse. Some changes in the mode of maintaining and equipping the armies appear to date from this period.

          首先，由于 6 世纪后期黄金储备急剧下降，国家被迫开始至少部分用铜而不是金或银来支付士兵的工资。 当然，黄金继续在有限的基础上支付，特别是对于捐赠者。 但是，从 640 年代初期开始——正如已经表明的那样，当国家只用通常的追加捐赠的三分之一就可以负担得起向军队派遣——国家的财政一定已经接近崩溃。 从这一时期开始，军队的维护和装备方式似乎发生了一些变化。

The state may have reduced the burden on the fisc by paying the troops on a rotational basis, according to one suggestion, at least for extraordinary payments such as donatives (which were normally issued on a quinquennial basis and on the occasion of imperial accessions). But this can hardly have affected the normal maintenance costs of the armies. Reducing the numbers of troops may also have been considered, and indeed carried out in certain areas, but there were again obvious limits, given the situation and the effectiveness of Muslim attacks, to this alternative.

          根据一项建议，国家可能通过轮流支付军队的费用来减轻财政负担，至少是为了特别支付，例如捐赠（通常每五年发放一次，并在帝国加入时发放）。 但这几乎不能影响军队的正常维护成本。 也可能考虑过减少军队数量，并且确实在某些地区进行了削减，但鉴于穆斯林袭击的情况和有效性，这种替代方案再次存在明显限制。

On the other hand, a reversion to the payment of the field forces largely or entirely in kind would have gone much of the way to solve the problem. The permanent establishment of ad hoc praetorian prefects attached to each field army in the sixth century to ensure that they were adequately supplied-a point first brought out clearly by Kaegi-seems to have continued to play a role in this respect, liaising between the civil administration and the civilian population, on the one hand, and the armies, on the other. That such an official continued to exist until the ninth century is also reasonably clear (at which point he was replaced by a reformed or rationalized establishment headed by, among others, the thematic protonotarios). It seems likely that it was the withdrawal of the armies into Asia Minor which marked the moment at which this arrangement became, of necessity, permanent.

          另一方面，基本上或完全以实物支付外勤部队的费用将在很大程度上解决问题。 六世纪时，为确保他们得到充足的供应——Kaegi 首次明确提出的这一点——在每支野战军中都设立了常设的临时行政长官，似乎在这方面继续发挥着作用，在民事之间进行联络。 一方面是政府和平民，另一方面是军队。 这样一位官员一直存在到 9 世纪也是相当清楚的（此时他被一个改革或合理化的机构所取代，该机构以专题原公证人等为首）。 似乎是军队撤退到小亚细亚标志着这种安排必然成为永久性的时刻。

At the same time, however, the numismatic evidence shows that finds of copper coin die out almost completely during the later years of Constans 11, and the fact of the disappearance of this medium from Anatolian sites over the period in question, together with the proven shortage of gold, would appear to confirm the suggestion that the state began to maintain its forces by some means other than relying upon the use of cash as a means of translating wealth into military effectiveness.

          然而，与此同时，钱币证据表明，在君士坦斯 11 世的晚年，铜币的发现几乎完全消失了，而且在所讨论的时期内这种介质从安纳托利亚遗址消失的事实，以及已证实的 黄金短缺，似乎证实了国家开始通过某种方式维持其军队而不是依靠使用现金作为将财富转化为军事效力的手段的建议。

It is thus a reasonable inference that the state faced grave problems in remunerating its armies at this time and thereafter-the massive loss of territories and revenue from the areas overrun by Islam alone must have reduced imperial revenue catastrophically, quite apart from the fiscal problems the state clearly already faced in the later sixth century. And it is equally significant that the districts into which the divisional armies of the various magistri militum were withdrawn from 637 or thereabouts appear to have been allotted on the basis of their ability to provide for the needs of the armies in question. The conclusion that the state turned to a system of supporting the armies directly, either through issuing the soldiers with land, according to one theory, or through the levying and distribution of most, if not all, their requirements in kind is unavoidable.

           因此，一个合理的推论是，国家在此时和此后的军队薪酬方面面临着严重的问题——领土和收入的大量损失仅来自伊斯兰教所侵占的地区，除了财政问题之外，帝国的收入肯定会灾难性地减少。 国家显然已经在六世纪后期面临。 同样重要的是，从 637 年左右各军区的师军撤出的地区似乎是根据它们满足有关军队需要的能力而分配的。 国家转向直接支持军队的制度的结论是，根据一种理论，要么通过向士兵发放土地，要么通过征收和分配他们的大部分（如果不是全部）实物需求，这是不可避免的。

The fact that the later (ninth century and after) term for the regular land-tax assessment was synone, whereas in the sixth century and before, this term, rendered in Latin as coemptio, referred to the compulsory purchase of provisions, is suggestive. For in the so-called Farmer's Law, which probably dates to the later seventh or first half of the eighth century, the term used to describe the ordinary state land-tax levy imposed upon the village community is ta extraordina, a Greek rendering of the Latin term extraordinaria, a word used to describe precisely such exceptional levies or impositions in kind in the sixth century and before. This can only be explained by assuming that the state, faced with a drastic shortage of cash, adopted one of the procedures suggested already, returning to a system familiar from the fifth and especially the fourth century, of provisioning and, as we shall see in a moment, equipping its troops in kind. Some payments in gold continued, of course. The legal texts refer to soldiers being remunerated by both annonai and by a rhoga. But payments in kind appear to have become a major element in the state's fiscal operations.33 And a regularized extraordinary levy in kind to maintain the newly transferred field armies-referred to initially quite accurately (according to traditional usage) as the coemptio or synone-thus becomes in the course of time the main form in which the land tax was actually assessed, levied, and distributed.

          事实上，后期（9 世纪及之后）用于定期土地税评估的术语是同义词，而在 6 世纪及之前，这个术语在拉丁语中被翻译为 coemptio，指的是强制购买规定，具有启发性。因为在所谓的农民法中，它可能可以追溯到七世纪后期或八世纪上半叶，用来描述对村庄社区征收的普通国家土地税的术语是非常特殊的，希腊语对拉丁语extraordinaria，这个词用来准确描述六世纪及之前的此类特殊征税或实物征收。这只能通过假设国家面临现金严重短缺，采用已经建议的程序之一，返回到 5 世纪，尤其是 4 世纪熟悉的供应系统来解释，正如我们将在片刻，以实物装备其部队。当然，一些黄金支付仍在继续。法律文本提到士兵由 annonai 和 rhoga 支付报酬。但实物支付似乎已成为国家财政运作的一个主要因素。以及为维持新转移的野战军而进行的正规化的特别征税——最初相当准确地（根据传统用法）称为 coemptio 或 Synone——因此，随着时间的推移，土地税成为实际评估、征收和分配土地税的主要形式。

An objection to this is the fact that the collection and distribution of supplies in kind to the armies would be very expensive in respect of transport and storage. In other circumstances this would be true, since the movement of large amounts of produce overland to central points at which troops were assembled would indeed be very costly. And if the state were trying to save its resources, this would seem to be a very inefficient way of achieving this end. But the situation of the seventh century, combined with what we know of the actual distribution of thematic forces in the eighth century and later, provides an adequate explanation. For it is quite clear that the various units which made up each field division were themselves spread across the areas in which they were based. And this meant that the supplies collected could be consumed locally and would not need to be transported great distances. Kaegi long ago pointed out that the thematic system, with its soldiers and units spread across great tracts of the country, was in fact quite an inefficient way of defending the Anatolian hinterland, although it was efficacious in protecting local strongpoints and the indigenous population.

           对此的反对意见是，向军队收集和分发实物供应品在运输和储存方面将非常昂贵。在其他情况下，这是正确的，因为将大量农产品通过陆路运送到集结部队的中心点确实成本很高。如果国家试图节省资源，这似乎是实现这一目标的一种非常低效的方式。但七世纪的情况，结合我们所知道的八世纪及以后军区力量的实际分布，提供了一个充分的解释。因为很明显，组成每个野战师的各个单位本身分散在他们所在的地区。这意味着收集到的物资可以在当地消费，不需要长途运输。 Kaegi 很久以前就指出，其士兵和部队遍布全国大片地区的主题系统实际上是一种非常低效的保卫安纳托利亚腹地的方式，尽管它在保护当地据点和土著居民方面很有效。

But if we ask why, given this relative strategic inefficiency, the soldiers were so widely dispersed, the answer lies in just this need to minimize the costs of transporting provisions and to attain the closest relationship possible between each unit or group of units and the districts from which they were to be supported. In other words, the dispersal of the thematic forces across the provinces they "garrisoned" reflects not only, or even primarily, tactical or strategic planning, but rather the fiscal and logistical priorities of the seventh-century state, at least in the first instance.36 This dispersal and localization must also have had important consequences for the tactical structure of the armies the different corps under their respective magistri militum were each made up of a variety of types of unit, including heavy and light cavalry, infantry, archers, and so on. How did the process described above affect this structure and, more importantly, to what extent did the traditional armament and tactical function of such units change or evolve in this very different context? This is a difficult question, and one which has not been raised before. I will deal with it briefly later in this paper.

          但如果我们问为什么，鉴于这种相对的战略低效率，士兵如此分散，答案就在于需要最大限度地减少运输物资的成本，并在每个单位或单位组与地区之间实现尽可能密切的关系。他们将得到支持。换句话说，主题力量在他们“驻守”的省份中的分散不仅反映了，甚至主要反映了战术或战略规划，而且反映了 7 世纪国家的财政和后勤优先事项，至少首先是.这种分散和局部化对军队的战术结构也产生了重要的影响，在各自的统帅军下的不同军由各种类型的单位组成，包括重型和轻型骑兵、步兵、弓箭手和很快。上述过程如何影响这种结构，更重要的是，在这种截然不同的背景下，这些部队的传统武器和战术功能在多大程度上发生了变化或演变？这是一个困难的问题，而且以前没有人提出过。我将在本文后面简要介绍它。

The process through which the soldiers were armed and equipped must also have changed as a result of the abandonment of the traditional system of cash payments and allowances for weapons, mounts, and clothing. And here the significance of the kommer-kiarioi, whose lead seals become frequent from the middle years of the seventh century, may be relevant. Several historians have noted that certain seals become prominent at this time, seals on which there is an imperial apotheke and a region, or group of provinces within the empire, and which suggest that one official, sometimes a group of officials, had jurisdiction over a number of dispersed areas. Contrary to the received view that these are connected with imperial control over trading in luxury or other goods, Hendy has suggested that the apothekai may represent a system for the disposal of surplus materials from state workshops (silks, gold- and silverware, dyed cloths, and so forth). Private merchants might also have an interest in these state depots and the system they represented. More importantly for our concerns, Hendy has also argued that the apotheke system and its kommerkiarioi were connected with supplying the imperial armies. On a number of occasions, dated seals of kommerkiarioi and apothekai for particular areas can be related to specific military undertakings mentioned in the sources and connected with those areas; and the inference is that the kommerkiarioi were entrusted with the sale of equipment and weapons to the soldiers." While not every such seal can be tied in to a particular military undertaking, the number of those that can is impressive, and the connection is too strong simply to be dismissed as coincidence.

          由于放弃了传统的现金支付和武器、坐骑和服装津贴制度，士兵的武装和装备过程也发生了变化。在这里，kommer-kiarioi 的重要性可能是相关的，其铅印章从 7 世纪中叶开始变得频繁。几位历史学家指出，某些印章在此时变得显眼，印章上有一位帝王和帝国内的一个地区或一组省份，这表明一个官员，有时是一群官员，对一个国家有管辖权。分散区域的数量。与公认的观点相反，这些与帝国对奢侈品或其他商品贸易的控制有关，Hendy 建议药剂师可能代表一种处理来自国家作坊的剩余材料（丝绸、金银器、染色布、等等）。私人商人也可能对这些国家仓库及其所代表的系统感兴趣。更重要的是，对于我们的担忧，Hendy 还认为药剂系统及其 kommerkiarioi 与供应帝国军队有关。在许多情况下，特定地区的 kommerkiarioi 和 apothekai 印章可能与来源中提到的特定军事事业有关，并与这些地区有关；推论是 kommerkiarioi 被委托向士兵出售装备和武器。”虽然不是每一个这样的印章都可以与特定的军事事业联系在一起，但那些印章的数量令人印象深刻，而且这种联系也是强到简直被当成巧合不屑一顾。

Oikonomides has raised some objections to this idea, however, particularly with regard to the correlation between certain campaigns and the dates of the seals (by indictional year) associated by Hendy with them. But while this example may not be as good an illustration of Hendy's argument as he suggested originally, Oikonomides' remaining suggestions are equally hypothetical and certainly dubious, especially as regards the movement of the apothekai and the kommerkiarioi, as evidenced in the seals, and representing supposedly a movement of the silk industry itself away from the war zone, from the Anatolian to the Balkan region in the period from the later seventh century to the middle of the eighth century. Indeed, the seals of this institution seem rather to follow the warfare, as the strategic priorities of the empire move from one front to the other at this time, a fact which surely reinforces Hendy's basic argument. And while this is not to say either that the apothekai were connected only with the provision of military equipment, I have further argued that with the cessation of cash grants for equipment and weapons, the latter had to be supplied and distributed in kind as well, and the apotheke system provided an appropriate and available structure for this.

          然而，Oikonomides 对这个想法提出了一些反对意见，特别是关于某些运动与 Hendy 与它们相关的印章日期（按年份）之间的相关性。但是，虽然这个例子可能不像他最初建议的那样很好地说明了 Hendy 的论点，但 Oikonomides 的其余建议同样是假设性的，肯定是可疑的，尤其是关于 apothekai 和 kommerkiarioi 的运动，正如印章所证明的那样，并代表据推测，丝绸工业本身在七世纪后期到八世纪中叶期间从战区，从安纳托利亚到巴尔干地区的运动。事实上，这个机构的印章似乎更像是战争，因为此时帝国的战略重点从一个战线转移到另一个战线，这一事实肯定会加强亨迪的基本论点。虽然这并不是说药剂师只与提供军事装备有关，但我进一步认为，随着装备和武器的现金补助停止，后者也必须以实物供应和分发，而 apotheke 系统为此提供了适当且可用的结构。

But I do not believe, as Hendy has also suggested, that the state sold weapons and equipment through the kommerkiarioi to the soldiers, who paid with revenue from theirlands. As we shall see, some soldiers might indeed have held land and may well have been able to purchase equipment privately or through the kommerkiarioi. But there are also objections to the majority having been in this position, objections which I have outlined elsewhere. Indeed, since nearly all the known arms- and armor-manufactories of the empire lay by this time in hostile territory, or areas so exposed to hostile action that they can hardly have remained operational, where were these weapons and other types of equipment to be purchased? The state must have had to turn to provincial, and therefore private (even if supervised) production, and the kommerkiarioi, with their local subordinates and their storehouses, would have made ideal middlemen to whom the state could farm out this task.

          但我不相信，正如 Hendy 所暗示的那样，国家通过 kommerkiarioi 向士兵出售武器和设备，而士兵则从他们的土地上获得收入。 正如我们将看到的，一些士兵可能确实拥有土地，并且很可能能够私下或通过 kommerkiarioi 购买设备。 但也有人反对大多数人处于这一立场，我在别处概述了这些反对意见。 事实上，由于此时帝国几乎所有已知的武器和盔甲制造厂都位于敌对领土，或处于敌对行动的地区，以至于它们几乎无法继续运作，那么这些武器和其他类型的设备在哪里购买？国家必须转向省级生产，因此必须转向私人（即使受到监督）生产，而 kommerkiarioi 及其当地下属和仓库将成为理想的中间人，国家可以将这项任务交给他们。

According to an alternative suggestion (which will be discussed below), soldiers were given land on imperial estates from which to support themselves. But even with tenants to carry on their agricultural labor and produce an income for them (equivalent, in effect, to the later pronoia), it is difficult to see how such holdings came to be reduced to the degree of penury implicit in the case of the soldier Mousoulios and others from the later eighth and ninth centuries. For surely in making such grants the state would have taken some steps to protect such lands against alienation and impoverishment, and there is not a shred of evidence that such measures (such as were taken in the tenth century, for example) were carried out. The provision of soldiers with land (as opposed to the acquisition by soldiers of land through other means) can at best have been a slow and partial process.

          根据另一种建议（将在下面讨论），士兵获得了帝国庄园的土地，以供他们养活自己。 但是，即使有佃户继续他们的农业劳动并为他们创造收入（实际上相当于后来的 pronoia），也很难看出这些财产是如何减少到隐含的贫困程度的 8 世纪后期和 9 世纪后期的士兵 Mousoulios 和其他人。 因为在提供此类赠款时，国家肯定会采取一些措施来保护这些土地免遭异化和贫困化，而且没有任何证据表明采取了此类措施（例如在 10 世纪采取的措施）。 为士兵提供土地（而不是士兵通过其他方式获得土地）充其量只是一个缓慢而局部的过程。

Indeed, the available textual evidence from the eighth and ninth centuries is either silent on the relationship between soldiers and land, or positively assumes that there was no connection between land and military service. There was, as we shall also see in a moment, no obligation upon soldiers' families to support them, even if they often did contribute toward their upkeep and maintenance.

          事实上，8 世纪和 9 世纪的可用文本证据要么对士兵与土地之间的关系保持沉默，要么肯定地假设土地与兵役之间没有联系。 正如我们稍后还将看到的，士兵的家人没有义务支持他们，即使他们经常为他们的保养和维护做出贡献。

The probability thus remains strongest that it was indeed the kommerkiarioi who supplied the troops with their equipment by means of requisitions and the extraction by the state through these officials of certain forms of tax or corv6e (both in materials and in the skills and labor required to produce finished goods). We know in some detail how this system operated in the later ninth and tenth centuries, albeit no longer through the kommerkiarioi, and it involved in effect the state, through the local military administration in each province, contracting out the production of certain quantities and types of weapon or items of equipment.47 This is very different from the more centralized and more strictly controlled system of production based upon an imperial monopoly in state-controlled fabricae or manufactories, which had operated until the first half of the seventh century and which is described in some detail in both narrative and legislative sources.48 And it seems highly likely that it was during the seventh century that this new system itself came into being, as we know so many other aspects of the middle Byzantine administrative apparatus did too.

          因此，很有可能确实是 kommerkiarioi 通过征用和国家通过这些官员提取某些形式的税收或 corv6e（包括材料以及所需的技能和劳动力）为部队提供了装备。生产成品）。我们详细了解这个系统在 9 世纪后期和 10 世纪是如何运作的，尽管不再通过 kommerkiarioi，它实际上涉及国家，通过每个省的地方军事管理部门，将某些数量和类型的生产承包出去，这与更集中、更严格控制的生产系统大不相同，这种生产系统基于对国家控制的制造厂或工厂的帝国垄断，这种系统一直运行到 7 世纪上半叶，现在在叙述和立法来源中都有一些详细的描述。这个新系统本身很可能是在 7 世纪形成的，正如我们所知，中间拜占庭行政机构的许多其他方面也是如此。

The conclusion is, of course, that the state did not need to issue soldiers with land to maintain them properly. But other arguments for the state's issuing soldiers with land have also been adduced. Both Hendy and Treadgold, for example, have suggested that the state settled soldiers on land which belonged to the imperial estates, pointing out that, whereas in the sixth century and before the state seems to have possessed fairly extensive lands in the provinces of Asia Minor (in particular in Bithynia, Caria, Pamphylia, Phrygia Salutaris, Pontus, and Cappadocia I and II), it appears to have had no such lands by the twelfth century. The difference has been explained by the plausible suggestion that such estate land was granted away by the Emperors to soldiers in return for military service.

           结论当然是，国家不需要向士兵发放土地来妥善维护他们。 但也有人提出了其他关于国家向士兵发放土地的论据。 例如，Hendy 和 Treadgold 都建议国家将士兵安置在属于帝国地产的土地上，并指出，而在 6 世纪和之前，国家似乎在小亚细亚各省拥有相当大的土地 （特别是在比提尼亚、卡里亚、潘菲利亚、弗里吉亚·萨卢塔里斯、本都和卡帕多西亚一世和二世），到 12 世纪似乎没有这样的土地。 之所以有这种差异，是因为有一种合理的说法是，这些庄园土地是由皇帝授予士兵以换取兵役的。

Now there is no reason to reject this hypothesis in its entirety. There is no doubt that the state did give land to individuals, from among whom it intended to recruit soldiers. Emperor Maurice is supposed to have decreed the forced transfer of a number of Armenian families to Thrace so that soldiers could be raised from them. There are other examples from the sixth century. It is likewise apparent that the Slavs whom Justinian II transferred to various districts of Anatolia in 688/9 or 689/90, together with their families, also provided soldiers. Nor is there any reason to doubt that the only means of supporting such large numbers would have been by grants of land. The principle is fairly clear and has been discussed in detail by several historians-to draft in new populations, whole communities and families, from among whom soldiers could be conscripted. In the tenth century, it is clear that the practice of granting land to refugees, whether or not in return for state service, was well established.

           现在没有理由完全拒绝这个假设。毫无疑问，国家确实给了个人土地，它打算从这些人中招募士兵。莫里斯皇帝应该下令将一些亚美尼亚家庭强制转移到色雷斯，以便可以从他们那里招募士兵。六世纪还有其他例子。同样明显的是，查士丁尼二世在 688/9 或 689/90 年转移到安纳托利亚各个地区的斯拉夫人，连同他们的家人，也提供了士兵。也没有任何理由怀疑支持如此大量人口的唯一手段是授予土地。该原则相当明确，并已被几位历史学家详细讨论过——在新的人群、整个社区和家庭中起草，士兵可以从中征募。很明显，在 10 世纪，向难民提供土地（无论是否以换取国家服务）的做法已经确立。

But one point needs to be stressed. In the case of mass settlement, these were ethnic groups and, if the Slavs of the second half of the seventh century are anything to judge by, were organized as such under their own leaders, similarly to the late Roman foederati or, much more probably, the laeti (less independent) of the Western Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries. Like the earlier laeti, the Slavs were intended by Justinian II to operate in conjunction with Byzantine troops. Similar examples, from areas outside the empire, suggest that the practice was not unusual in this period of generalized demographic decline and manpower shortage. So that while it is not, in itself, a new principle, neither must it be seen as a generalized means of recruitment and supporting soldiers through grants of land, for which there is, of course, no evidence at all. In fact, the probability that the captured Slavs were given land on a "laetic" basis makes the idea that the land they were given was drawn from imperial estates more likely. For part of the purpose of introducing such new populations-as the sources sometimes state explicitly-was the revitalization of the rural population and the bringing back into cultivation of abandoned or deserted lands from which the state could then derive a revenue. Imperial lands paid not only regular taxes, of course; the tenants also paid a rent to the relevant state bureau. Such a policy will thus have been to the considerable advantage of the state.

           但有一点需要强调。在大规模定居的情况下，这些是种族群体，如果可以判断七世纪下半叶的斯拉夫人，他们是在他们自己的领导下组织起来的，类似于已故的罗马foederati，或者更有可能，第四和第五世纪西方帝国的laeti（不太独立）。与早期的 laeti 一样，查士丁尼二世打算让斯拉夫人与拜占庭军队联合作战。来自帝国以外地区的类似例子表明，这种做法在这个人口普遍下降和人力短缺的时期并不少见。因此，尽管它本身并不是一项新原则，但也不能将其视为通过授予土地来招募和支持士兵的普遍手段，当然，对此根本没有任何证据。事实上，被俘的斯拉夫人获得土地的可能性是基于“法律”的，因此更有可能认为他们获得的土地来自帝国庄园。引入这些新人口的部分目的——正如消息来源有时明确指出的那样——是为了振兴农村人口，并重新种植废弃或荒芜的土地，然后国家可以从中获得收入。当然，帝国土地不仅缴纳常规税款；租户还向有关国家局支付了租金。因此，这样的政策对国家来说是相当有利的。

But once again, I do not believe that this can have accounted for more than a relatively small proportion of the total number of soldiers. Perhaps more importantly, there is nothing in the tenth-century legislation, nor in the evidence which I shall consider in a moment from the eighth and ninth centuries, to suggest that this sort of arrangement lies behind the "military lands" of the later period.

          但再一次，我不相信这能占到士兵总数的一小部分。 也许更重要的是，在十世纪的立法中，也没有在我将要考虑的八、九世纪的证据中，没有任何迹象表明这种安排是在后期的“军事土地”背后的。 .

Finally, the clear evidence for a personal and hereditary military obligation during the eighth and ninth centuries, together with the fact that the Macedonian legislation states quite explicitly that until the time of Constantine VII the military lands were neither protected by law nor did they have any special juridical status, an important point recently emphasized once again by G6recki, makes any argument to the effect that such lands had been established in the seventh century as a deliberate act of policy quite untenable.

          最后，在 8 世纪和 9 世纪期间个人和世袭军事义务的明确证据，以及马其顿立法非常明确地规定，直到君士坦丁七世时期，军事土地既不受法律保护，也没有任何 特殊的法律地位，最近 G6recki 再次强调的一个重要观点，使得任何关于这些土地在 7 世纪作为蓄意的政策行为建立起来的论点都是站不住脚的。

预告：V. THE QUESTION OF THE ORIGINS OF THE “MILITARY LANDS”

五、“军地”的起源问题

未完待续