（文章翻译）拜占庭兵役、军事土地和士兵的地位：当前的问题和解释（第八部分）
Military Service, Military Lands, and the Status of Soldiers: Current Problems and Interpretations Author(s): John Haldon
敦巴顿橡树园论文，1993 年
翻译：神尾智代
接上：
What I have been describing, therefore, represents a fundamental change in the role of one aspect of East Roman or Byzantine society, and of the state apparatuses, in the period from the sixth to the eighth century. The army becomes political in a way that it really had not before, in spite of the fact that, as we know, there was in "constitutional" terms always a military element in, for example, the acclamation or choice of a new emperor, so that "politics" in the very broadest sense was not new for soldiers. But I do not think that alters the basic case I have tried to outline.
因此，我所描述的内容代表了东罗马或拜占庭社会以及国家机器在 6 世纪到 8 世纪期间角色的根本变化。 军队以前所未有的方式变得具有政治性，尽管正如我们所知，在“宪法”术语中始终存在军事因素，例如，鼓掌或选择新皇帝， 因此，最广泛意义上的“政治”对士兵来说并不新鲜。 但我认为这不会改变我试图概述的基本情况。
During the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries, soldiers and the army continue to evolve, and it is important to emphasize that their evolution is only one aspect of the evolution of the state and its apparatuses, part of the social and cultural evolution of Byzantine society in the larger sense. This becomes particularly obvious when we refer, albeit very briefly, to two themes: first, the role of soldiers in the iconoclastic controversy; and second, the relationship between soldiers and the provincial armies in particular and the increasing power and importance of the new class of provincial and Constantinopolitan magnates who, growing out of the state-promoted meritocratic elite of the later seventh and early eighth century, become the aristocracy of the middle and later Byzantine periods.
在九、十和十一世纪，士兵和军队不断演变，需要强调的是，他们的演变只是国家及其机构演变的一个方面，是拜占庭社会和文化演变的一部分。 更大意义上的社会。 当我们提到两个主题时，这一点变得特别明显，尽管非常简短：第一，士兵在反传统争议中的作用； 其次，士兵与省级军队之间的关系，以及新的省级和君士坦丁堡大亨阶层的权力和重要性日益增加，他们从 7 世纪后期和 8 世纪初期由国家提拔的精英精英中成长起来，成为 拜占庭中后期的贵族。
There is no doubt that the politics of soldiers during the period of iconoclast rule are highly provincialized, that is to say, rebellions, civil wars, and similar disturbances, while often led by political men aiming at absolute (imperial) power, have very clearly localized roots, in respect of the sources of discontent, the nature of the opposition and competitive loyalties of one theme versus another, and so on. This is something which I think Kaegi's work on the subject, and on military unrest in general, brings out quite clearly."4 The creation of the tagmata by Constantine V, and the evolution of a "guards" army at Constantinople through the establishment by successive emperors of their own elite corps, marks a radical shift in the center of political attention in the army from the provinces to Constantinople. It also marks an increasing polarization between center and province, and the intentional involvement of military units by emperors in both ideological and power struggles-Constantine V, Leo IV, Constantine VI and Irene, Nicephorus I, Michael I, Leo V, Michael II, Theophilus all bring into the Constantinopolitan political arena their own military formations, whether they create them from scratch or promote loyal provincial units to metropolitan duties and rewards. Thus with the second half of the eighth century there takes place what I would characterize as an explicit politicization of the army from above (in contrast to the largely unpremeditated response of soldiers in the preceding period to issues which they saw as of concern to them), on the one hand, accompanied by the creation of a two-tier army: tagmata as contrasted with themata.
毫无疑问，在反传统统治时期，士兵的政治是高度地方化的，也就是说，叛乱、内战和类似的骚乱，虽然往往是由以绝对（帝国）权力为目标的政治人物领导的，但具有非常明显的特点。本地化根源，就不满的根源、反对的性质和一个军区与另一个军区的竞争忠诚度等而言。这是我认为 Kaegi 在这个主题上的工作以及关于一般军事动乱的工作非常清楚。君士坦丁五世创造了 tagmata，以及君士坦丁堡的“卫兵”军队通过建立自己精锐军团的历任皇帝，标志着军队的政治关注中心从行省到君士坦丁堡发生了根本性的转变。和权力斗争——君士坦丁五世、利奥四世、君士坦丁六世和艾琳、尼斯弗鲁斯一世、迈克尔一世、利奥五世、迈克尔二世、泰奥菲勒斯都将他们自己的军事阵型带入君士坦丁堡的政治舞台，无论是从头开始创建它们还是促进忠诚的省级大都会职责和奖励的单位。因此，在 8 世纪下半叶发生了我所描述的明确的政治化军队自上而下（与前一时期士兵对他们认为他们关心的问题的反应基本上是没有预谋的反应形成对比），一方面，伴随着两级军队的建立：与themata形成对比的tagmata。
These changes cannot be divorced from what is happening in Byzantine society in general, of course. They represent part of the relationship between the state and its rulers, on the one hand, and the new elite which the state created during the later seventh and early eighth century, referred to above. They reflect also the economic recovery and the political stabilization of the empire (one of the results, in part at least, of the policies of the iconoclastic emperors and the forces which lay behind those policies). They represent further the consequent emergence of new sets of power relationships, both within the elite, between Constantinople and the provinces, and in particular for our concerns, between the provincial soldiery and their modes of recruitment, on the one hand, and on the other the elite of magnates and imperial office- and titleholders, in Asia Minor especially; and they are, at a slightly later date, tied in closely with the expansionist politics of the second half of the ninth century and after.
当然，这些变化与一般拜占庭社会正在发生的事情是分不开的。一方面，它们代表了国家与其统治者之间关系的一部分，以及国家在 7 世纪后期和 8 世纪早期创造的新精英，如上文所述。它们也反映了帝国的经济复苏和政治稳定（至少部分是反传统的皇帝的政策和这些政策背后的力量的结果之一）。它们进一步代表了随之而来的一系列新权力关系的出现，无论是在精英内部，君士坦丁堡和各省之间，尤其是我们所关注的，一方面是省士兵与其招募模式之间，另一方面小亚细亚的权贵精英、宫廷官员和头衔持有者；稍后，它们与 9 世纪下半叶及之后的扩张主义政治密切相关。
With the tenth and eleventh centuries a number of developments regarding the political role or function of the army are of particular significance. On the one hand, we have the increasingly high profile of the so-called military clans in Anatolia, especially with respect to their local power which, as far as the sources seem to suggest, represents extensive networks of clientage and patronage, especially between the middling- and higher-status provincial elites, and between the soldiers and their leaders who were drawn from these elites. The evidence of the novels of Romanus I and Constantine VII suggests a growing "private" aspect to the thematic armies, dependent as they appear to have been socially and economically on the magnate landlords of their provinces. Even regions which traditionally appear to have been dominated by small-scale landed property and relatively dispersed estates such as the Thrakesion district in western Anatolia appear increasingly to have come under the sway of big landlords. References to soldiers being permitted to function in a private capacity suggest the nature of the changes.
10 世纪和 11 世纪，关于军队的政治角色或功能的一些发展具有特别重要的意义。一方面，我们对安纳托利亚所谓的军事部族的知名度越来越高，尤其是在他们的地方权力方面，据消息来源似乎表明，这代表着广泛的客户和赞助网络，特别是在中上级省级精英，以及从这些精英中抽调出来的士兵和他们的领导人之间。罗曼努斯一世和君士坦丁七世的小说证据表明，主题军队有一个日益增长的“私人”方面，他们似乎在社会和经济上依赖于他们省份的地主。即使是传统上似乎由小规模地产和相对分散的庄园主宰的地区，例如安纳托利亚西部的 Thrakesion 区，似乎也越来越多地受到大地主的控制。士兵被允许以私人身份工作的提及表明了这些变化的性质。
On the other hand, the increasingly significant contrast between the traditional thematic militia soldiery, and the ever more numerous units raised on a "tagmatic" basis，recruited either permanently or for the duration of a specific campaign, and remunerated much more generously than the theme soldiers, marks the process of Byzantine reconquests in the East and in the North. While thematic forces, or rather their elite elements, continue to play a role, the lead in campaigns is now taken by brigades of centrally administered and controlled mercenary or professional troops-initially the various tagmata based in or around Constantinople, in turn extended by the establishment of greater numbers of tagmatic banda in the provinces, under their own commanders. In addition, the spearhead forces which led the reconquests in northern Syria and Jazira were mostly, as far as we can see, based around such mercenary forces, which included also large numbers of "ethnic" troops such as Turks and especially Armenians.
另一方面，传统的军区民兵与越来越多的以“标签化”为基础招募的部队之间的对比越来越明显，无论是永久招募还是在特定战役期间，其报酬都比军区要丰厚得多。士兵，标志着拜占庭在东部和北部重新征服的过程。虽然军区部队，或者更确切地说是他们的精英分子继续发挥作用，但现在由中央管理和控制的雇佣军或专业部队的旅占据主导地位——最初是驻扎在君士坦丁堡或周围的各种塔格玛塔，依次由在各省建立更多的塔玛克班达，由他们自己的指挥官领导。此外，在我们看来，主导叙利亚北部和贾兹拉收复失地的先头部队，大多以雇佣军为基础，其中还包括大量的土耳其人，尤其是亚美尼亚人等“民族”部队。
At the same time, we must remark on a contradiction within the policies of successive emperors, especially those of Nicephorus II. There can be little doubt that the state, as represented in the legislation of Constantine VII, tried to maintain the thematic forces, recruited on the basis of the strateia, as an effective and fundamental element in the imperial armies. Commutation of the strateia, or rather its partial fiscalization, existed, but personal service was still usual. In contrast, all the evidence suggests that the legislation of Nicephorus II, as well as that of Basil II, while certainly designed to protect the fiscal base of the strateia, had in practice the effect of further generalizing the fiscalization of military service among stratiotic households. Whether it served at the same time to further deepen the gulf between those households registered as military (stratiotikos) and those defined as "civilian" (politikos), by increasing dramatically the amount of land which was thenceforth inalienably connected with military service, as suggested by Dagron, is unclear. But it must have dramatically increased the total land nominally subject to the strateia in one form or another. More significantly, the traditional system involved usually only a partial call up of those listed on the registers, as we have seen. A fully fiscalized strateia would make it possible for the state both to regularize and to maximize the extraction of resources drawn from this category of land, and thus enhance its revenue. The evidence from the tenth- and eleventh-century sources suggests that the state always kept its options open in this respect-it was the political and fiscal, as well as the military context of a given campaign which determined whether the fiscal option or that of personal service, or some combination of the two, was taken up. Zonaras' account of Nicephorus' reform of the strateia, by which each group of holders was transferred from one set of obligations to a more onerous one, and by which the minimum amount of inalienable stratiotic land (for those who possessed it) was increased from a value of 4 to a value of 12 pounds of gold, makes it quite clear that what the emperor had in mind (certainly in the case of holders of naval strateiai transferred to infantry obligations, for example) was the raising of cash or materials, as much as manpower, with which hired troops-mercenary, professional soldiers-could be equipped. The result seems to have been-especially in respect of the report of Ibn Hawkal already referred to-on the one hand the entrenching of a fiscal distinction between military and nonmilitary households, the better to protect or even broaden the fiscal base upon which the strateia as a state obligation could be extracted; and on the other, a decline in state dependence on personal service from thematic holders of strateiai, accompanied by a considerable increase in general state demands for cash and resources-livestock, materials-imposed upon that part of the nonstratiotic population of the empire not otherwise exempt from such prestations.
同时，我们必须注意到历任皇帝的政策中的一个矛盾，尤其是尼斯弗鲁斯二世的政策。毫无疑问，如君士坦丁七世的立法所代表的国家，试图维持在战略基础上招募的军区部队，作为帝国军队的有效和基本要素。战略的减免，或者更确切地说是它的部分财政化，存在，但个人服务仍然很常见。相比之下，所有的证据都表明，尼斯弗鲁斯二世和巴西尔二世的立法虽然肯定旨在保护国家的财政基础，但在实践中产生了进一步推广军事服务财政化的效果。是否如建议的那样，通过大幅增加此后与兵役密不可分的土地数量，同时进一步加深登记为军人的家庭 (stratiotikos) 与定义为“平民”的家庭 (politikos) 之间的鸿沟由 Dagron，不清楚。但它一定显着增加了名义上以一种或另一种形式受制于该地层的总土地。更重要的是，正如我们所看到的，传统系统通常只涉及对寄存器中列出的部分的调用。一个完全财政化的战略将使国家有可能规范和最大限度地从这类土地中提取资源，从而增加其收入。来自 10 世纪和 11 世纪的证据表明，国家在这方面始终保持开放的选择——是特定运动的政治和财政以及军事背景决定了是财政选择还是接受了个人服务，或两者的某种结合。佐纳拉斯 (Zonaras) 对尼斯弗鲁斯 (Nicephorus) 的地盘改革的描述，通过该计划，每一组持有人都从一组义务转移到更繁重的一组义务，并由此将不可转让的地层土地（对于拥有它的人）的最低数量从价值 4 到 12 磅的黄金，这清楚地表明皇帝的想法（例如，在海军战略持有人转移到步兵义务的情况下）是筹集现金或材料，雇佣的军队——雇佣兵、职业士兵——可以配备多少人力。结果似乎是——尤其是就伊本霍卡尔已经提到的报告而言——一方面巩固了军人家庭和非军人家庭之间的财政区别，从而更好地保护甚至扩大了战略所依据的财政基础。因为可以提取国家义务；另一方面，国家对战略持有者个人服务的依赖下降，伴随着国家对现金和资源——牲畜、材料——的总体需求显着增加，强加给帝国的那部分非阶层人口免于此类预托。
Here, however, the picture becomes rather more complicated, for there are a number of interlinking phenomena underlying and affecting these developments. To begin with we need to take into consideration the struggle between those factions which dominated the central power at given moments (factions represented by coalitions around various powerful figures at court in a constant struggle for influence, together with those families or fractions of families with vested interests in the capital and the provinces) and other factions, notably the leading provincial magnate clans not represented in a given dominant court power elite. Such oppositions can be detected in the rivalries between the Phokas and Skleros clans, for example, and also between them and the clique focused around the young Basil II during the later tenth century. But it is important to stress that these families had as yet no developed political unity of purpose they were out for their own interests, even if they often coincided structurally, in respect of control over the state apparatus, with the interests of the whole social-economic class which they represented.
然而，这里的情况变得相当复杂，因为有许多相互关联的现象作为这些发展的基础和影响。首先，我们需要考虑在特定时刻主导中央权力的派系之间的斗争（以宫廷中各种权势人物为代表的联盟，不断争取影响力，以及那些拥有既得利益的家族或部分家族）之间的斗争。在首都和省份的利益）和其他派系，特别是主要的省级巨头氏族，在特定的主导法院权力精英中没有代表。例如，在 Phokas 和 Skleros 氏族之间的竞争中，以及他们与 10 世纪后期集中在年轻的 Basil II 周围的集团之间的竞争中，可以发现这种对立。但必须强调的是，这些家庭尚未形成政治统一的目的，他们为了自己的利益而出走，即使在控制国家机器方面，他们经常在结构上与整个社会的利益相吻合——他们所代表的经济阶层。
It is apparent in the light of these considerations that we have to interpret the ways in which the reconquests took place, and more particularly the ways in which the state administered the conquered districts or cities, very carefully. In particular, the establishment of large numbers of small units of military administration, while it certainly reflects the bite-by-bite nature of the Byzantine absorption of new territories, entailing a sit did the setting up of new administrative and fiscal units to cope with each new territory gained, reflected also the reluctance of the central administration to hand over large territories to magnate domination and exploitation. Conquered districts were often absorbed directly as imperial episkepseis, autonomous fiscal units subject directly to the fisc. The imperial re-organization of the administration of the newly conquered Bulgarian lands between 998 and 1018, the exclusion from positions of authority thereof Anatolian magnates from the Phokas-Maleinos faction, the increasing trend toward centralization of fiscal and military matters at Constantinople in the time of Basil II and after, and the growing divergence between the military and civil circumscriptions, all represent the same fear and the same policy. These developments also reflect, of course, the natural evolution of the different organs of state administration and control-fiscal, civil, and military-as the conditions generated by the reconquests and the conflict of interests already pointed to worked themselves out. By the same token, the centralization of control over public fiscal lands in the department of the epi ton oikeiakon, and the decline of the general logothesion, reflect the emperors' efforts, especially Basil II, to maximize state control over its resources and to minimize thereby the danger of alienation of such resources to other interests.
鉴于这些考虑，显然我们必须非常仔细地解释重新征服发生的方式，尤其是国家管理被征服地区或城市的方式。尤其是大量小军政单位的设立，虽然肯定反映了拜占庭吸收新领土的逐粒性质，需要坐下来设立新的行政和财政单位来应对每获得一个新领土，也反映了中央政府不愿将大片领土交给权贵统治和剥削。被征服的地区经常被直接吸收为帝国的episkepseis，自治的财政单位，直接受制于财政。 998 年至 1018 年间对新征服的保加利亚土地进行帝国重组，将安纳托利亚大亨从福卡斯-马莱诺斯派系中排除在其权力职位之外，当时君士坦丁堡的财政和军事事务日益集中Basil II 及之后，以及军事和民事界限之间日益扩大的分歧，都代表着同样的恐惧和同样的政策。当然，这些发展也反映了国家行政和控制的不同机构——财政、文职和军事——的自然演变，因为重新征服和利益冲突所产生的条件已经表明已经解决了。同样的道理，上议院对公共财政土地的集中控制，以及总督的衰落，反映了皇帝们，特别是巴西尔二世，最大限度地控制其资源并最小化国家控制权的努力。从而存在将这些资源转让给其他利益的危险。
We are thus confronted with several reciprocally influencing elements: conflict between different factions at the center over resource control and allocation; structural administrative changes which reflect both this struggle and the process of reconquest and its administrative demands; the consequent effects upon the traditional or inherited system of provincial civil and military administration; and, for our purposes especially, the differentiated roles of the different types of soldier in the political structure of the state and its various conflicting social-economic interest groups.
因此，我们面临着几个相互影响的因素：以资源控制和分配为中心的不同派系之间的冲突； 反映这种斗争和重新征服过程及其行政要求的结构性行政变化； 对省级民政和军事管理的传统或继承体系的后续影响； 以及，特别是为了我们的目的，不同类型的士兵在国家政治结构及其各种相互冲突的社会经济利益集团中的不同作用。
The results of these developments, which can be observed from the early tenth century on, can be summarized as follows.
这些发展的结果可以从 10 世纪早期开始观察，总结如下。
First, the more visible evolution of a personalized relationship of loyalties and patronage between magnate leaders and their soldiers, especially those from the provinces where the former had landed property. Second, the centralization in respect of the state's control or authority over, and the considerable increase in the number of, the units which were established to defend the interests of the central power against those of the provinces, the tagmata. Third, the increased recruitment by the state of mercenary soldiers who were outside the relationships of provincial or thematic patronage, and therefore loyal to their paymasters. In this respect, Basil II's recruitment of the Varangians is qualitatively of a very different order, and responds to a quite different situation and context, from the recruitment by earlier emperors from the large eighth century onward (right up to the reign of John Tzimiskes) of their own units, whether indigenous or foreign. The use of Norman and Petcheneg troops in the middle and later eleventh century, which reflects likewise the degrading of the traditional thematic forces, and at the same time the weakening of some elements of the provincial elite, must be seen in this context, that is to say, of the conflicting interests and antagonistic politics of those factions in the power elite which dominated the center, and those in the provinces. In fact, it is important to stress that, in spite of the increasing irrelevance of the thematic militias, and the increased "tagmatization" of the armies, provincially recruited tagmata tended to retain or reproduce similar local identities and solidarities to those which are known to have existed within and between the older themata. Local networks of patronage continued to operate, and local loyalties survived, in such units. The state's policy proved, in the end, to provide only a temporary respite from the provincialized politics and vested interests against which it was originally directed.
首先，权贵领袖和他们的士兵之间的忠诚和赞助的个性化关系的更明显的演变，尤其是那些来自前者拥有土地的省份的士兵。第二，在国家控制或权力方面的中央集权，以及为捍卫中央权力利益而建立的单位数量的大量增加。第三，国家对不属于省级或军区赞助关系的雇佣军士兵的招募增加，因此忠于他们的支付者。在这方面，巴西尔二世对瓦良吉人的招募在性质上是一个非常不同的顺序，并且对一个完全不同的情况和背景做出反应，从大八世纪开始（直到约翰·齐米克斯统治）早期皇帝的招募他们自己的单位，无论是土著还是外国。 11世纪中后期诺曼和佩切涅格军队的使用，同样反映了传统军区部队的退化，同时也反映了省级精英部分要素的弱化，必须在这种背景下看到，即可以说，统治中心的权力精英派系与各省的权力精英派系之间的利益冲突和对立政治。事实上，必须强调的是，尽管军区民兵越来越无关紧要，军队的“标签化”程度有所提高，但省级招募的塔马塔人倾向于保留或复制与众所周知的当地特征和团结相似的地方特征和团结已经存在于较旧的 theata 之内和之间。在这些单位中，当地的赞助网络继续运作，当地的忠诚度得以延续。国家的政策最终证明，它只是暂时缓解了它最初针对的地方政治和既得利益。
To summarize, from the "professional" type armies of the later Roman Empire in the sixth century, which played only a very limited role in state politics, we can observe two stages of a progressive politicization of armies and soldiers: during the seventh and eighth centuries, as soldiers recruited locally identified with, and acted on behalf of, local loyalties, local ideological perspectives, and political or economic concerns; and during the later eighth and ninth centuries onward, as the opposition between the central tagmatic forces and the provincial thematic forces evolves. At the same time, the latter stage is accompanied by the efforts of the central establishment to prevent the process of alienation of provincial military resources, concurrent with the demands of the offensive warfare of the tenth century and the rise of a provincial elite. An increased dependency on both indigenous and foreign, professional or full-time, forces was a logical concomitant, a dependency which had the effect of centralizing military power and reinforcing, for a while, the authority and policies of the rulers.
总而言之，从六世纪后期罗马帝国的“职业”型军队，在国家政治中只发挥非常有限的作用，我们可以观察到军队和士兵逐渐政治化的两个阶段：第七和第八几个世纪以来，当地招募的士兵认同当地忠诚度、当地意识形态观点以及政治或经济问题并代表他们行事；而在八、九世纪后期，随着中央标签力量与地方军区力量之间的对立演变。同时，后期伴随着中央建制努力阻止省级军事资源异化进程，同时伴随着10世纪进攻性战争的需求和省级精英的兴起。对本土和外国、专业或全职力量的日益依赖是一个合乎逻辑的伴随，这种依赖具有集中军事权力并在一段时间内加强统治者的权威和政策的效果。
The result was, in its turn, a two-fold polarization within the military establishment of the empire, which accurately reflected the internal tensions and dynamic of Byzantine state and society over the period in question: on the one hand, between the traditional provincial or thematic armies under their local officers and leaders, the latter drawn from different and often competing families of the magnate class, and the tagmatic or centrally controlled forces, some under provincial magnate authority, others still based at the capital, all again under officers drawn from this internally differentiated social and political elite. On the other hand there was a contradiction between the interest of the dominant elite as a social group, whatever its internal divisions may have been, and the interests of the "state," which is to say the faction dominating the center and imperial politics at any given moment. Over the period from the tenth century up to the seizure of power by Alexios I in 1081, different families and factions of the magnate elite, whether dependent upon indigenous, provincial tagmata or upon imperial positions, generally competed between themselves and with the center for dominance, with now one, now another family or group of families coming to the fore. But a direct result of the Seljuk victory in 1071, which affected the older military elite of the regions in question most immediately, altered this balance in favor of those elements with access to state power and control over mercenary forces (as well as their own power bases). The victory of Alexius I and the political order he evolved is directly connected with these military and administrative considerations. In this respect, the army, both as an important and central institution of state and within society, represents an extremely valuable focus for research into the pattern and form of Byzantine social and political history.
结果反过来又导致帝国军事机构内部的两极分化，这准确地反映了该时期拜占庭国家和社会的内部紧张局势和动态：一方面，传统的省级或由地方官员和领导人领导的主题军队，后者来自不同的、经常相互竞争的权贵阶级家族，以及由地方权贵领导的地方或中央控制的部队，一些在省级权贵之下，另一些仍然驻扎在首都，所有的军官又都来自于这种内部分化的社会和政治精英。另一方面，统治精英作为一个社会群体的利益（无论其内部分歧如何）与“国家”的利益（即统治中心的派系和帝国政治）之间存在矛盾。任何给定的时刻。从 10 世纪到 1081 年阿莱克修斯一世夺取权力的这段时间里，权贵精英的不同家族和派系，无论是依赖土著、省级塔格马塔还是帝国职位，通常都在他们自己之间以及与统治中心的竞争，现在一个，现在另一个家庭或一群家庭脱颖而出。但 1071 年塞尔柱胜利的直接结果，最直接地影响了相关地区的老军事精英，改变了这种平衡，有利于那些有权获得国家权力和控制雇佣军（以及他们自己的权力）的元素基）。阿莱克修斯一世的胜利和他所形成的政治秩序与这些军事和行政考虑直接相关。在这方面，军队作为国家和社会中重要的中央机构，是研究拜占庭社会和政治史的模式和形式的极有价值的焦点。
预告：
VIII. SOLDIERS AND STATUS
八、士兵和地位
