乔治·凯南的“长电报” 全文与中英对照

背景人物：大使级代办乔治·凯南和秘书多萝西·海斯曼

主题：向国务卿提交的《对苏联的指控》（乔治凯南

级别：秘密

地点：莫斯科，

时间：1946 年 2 月 22 日-晚上 9 点[2月22日--3日下午52点收到]

861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram

The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 p.m. [Received February 22--3: 52 p.m.]

国务院2月3日第284号电令要求回答的问题，既复杂又非常敏感，既与我们常规思考极为不同，又对分析我们所处的国际环境十分重要，我实在无法将我的回复压缩在一份简单的电文中，又避免造成我认为是非常危险的过分简单化。据此，我希望国务院能够容忍我将我的回复用五个部分提出。这五部分的小标题分别是：

1、苏联战后（战略）思维的基本特征；

2、这一思维的背景；

3、这一思维在政府政策层面的反映；

4、这一思维在非政府层面的反映；

5、从美国政策角度的可行性推断。

请允许我先就对电报通讯所造成的负担表示歉意。然而，所涉及的问题，特别是考虑到目前发生的事件，是那么的急迫、那么的重要，我认为对这些问题的解释——如果这些问题确实需要我们予以重视的话——（采用如此长电的形式）是值得的。

下面是我的解释。

511. Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 [13] involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows:

(1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook.

(2) Background of this outlook

(3) Its projection in practical policy on official level.

(4) Its projection on unofficial level.

(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.

I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel; but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once. There follows

第一部分 苏联政府宣传机器所宣扬的战后（战略）思维的基本特征如下：

一、苏联仍处于敌对的“资本主义（世界）的包围”之中，长期看来，取得并保持永久的和平共处是不可能的。正如斯大林1927年对一个美国工人代表团所表述的：“在国际革命继续发展的过程中，将会出现两个世界规模的中心：一个是社会主义中心，吸引着所有倾向于发展社会主义的国际；一个是资本主义中心，集结着那些希望走资本主义道路的国际。这两个中心之间为了争夺世界经济主导权的斗争将会决定世界范围内资本主义和共产主义的命运。”

二、资本主义世界正在受到它本身固有的多种矛盾的困扰。这些冲突无法通过和平的妥协得以解决，其中最大的是美国与英国之间的冲突。

三、资本主义内部的冲突不可避免地要导致战争。由此产生的战争可能会有两种形式：一种是资本主义内部两个资本主义国家之间的战争，一种是对社会主义世界的侵略战争。聪明的资本家们，为了规避资本主义内部的冲突，尽管是徒劳的，但会倾向于发动第二种战争。

四、对苏联的侵略，尽管对侵略者来说最终将是灾难性的，但也会减缓苏联社会主义建设的步伐，因此，必须不惜一切地予以制止。

五、资本主义国家之间的冲突，尽管对苏联意味着危险，但对社会主义事业的发展却提供了巨大的可能性，特别是只要苏联保持军事上的强大、意识形态的一致和对目前杰出领导人的忠诚。

六、必须牢记的是，（苏联）并非认为资本主义世界都是敌人。除了那些不可救药的反动分子和资产阶级，它还包含了：（一）一些可以由共产党组织团结起来的开明的积极分子；（二）其他一些力量，其态度、追求和行为恰巧在“客观上”对苏联的利益有益（目前出于策略上的考虑，这些力量被称为进步和民主分子）。为了苏联的目的，必须对这些力量加以鼓励和利用。

在资本主义社会中的那些反动力量中，最具危险性的是那些被列宁称之为人民的假朋友，也就是所谓温和社会主义者或社会民主领导人（换言之，即非共产主义左翼分子）。这些人比那些彻头彻尾的反动派更为危险，这是因为后者至少是以真实的面目出现，而前者是在打着社会主义的旗号迷惑人们，为反动资本者服务。

关于前提就是这些了。那么，依据这些前提到底能对苏联的政策做出怎样的推断？大致如下：

一、所有（的政策）都必须为了发展苏联相对的力量，令其成为国际社会的一个要素。相反，所有能够削弱资本主义国际的力量和影响的机会，都必须紧紧抓住，无论是以集体的，还是以单个的形式。

二、苏联以及其在世界范围内的朋友的所作所为，都必须是致力于利用和加深资本主义国家之间的分歧和冲突。假若这些分歧和冲突不断深化，最终引发一场“帝国主义”的战争，那么，这场战争必须演变成在不同的资本主义国家内部发生的革命起义。

三、对世界上的“民主进步”力量，必须最大限度地予以利用，以期按照苏联的利益对资本主义国家的政府造成压力。

四、必须与世界上的（温和）社会主义和社会民主主义的领导人作不懈、无情的斗争。

Part 1: Basic Features of Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine

Are as Follows:

(a) USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers:

"In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world."

(b) Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.

(c) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states, and wars of intervention against socialist world. Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline toward latter.

(d) Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.

(e) Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership.

(f) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes (1) certain wholly enlightened and positive elements united in acceptable communistic parties and (2) certain other elements (now described for tactical reasons as progressive or democratic) whose reactions, aspirations and activities happen to be "objectively" favorable to interests of USSR These last must be encouraged and utilized for Soviet purposes.

(g) Among negative elements of bourgeois-capitalist society, most dangerous of all are those whom Lenin called false friends of the people, namely moderate-socialist or social-democratic leaders (in other words, non-Communist left-wing). These are more dangerous than out-and-out reactionaries, for latter at least march under their true colors, whereas moderate left-wing leaders confuse people by employing devices of socialism to seine interests of reactionary capital.

So much for premises. To what deductions do they lead from standpoint of Soviet policy? To following:

(a) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity most be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.

(b) Soviet efforts, and those of Russia's friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an "imperialist" war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.

(c) "Democratic-progressive" elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.

(d) Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and social-democratic leaders abroad.

第二部分 （战后苏联战略）思维的背景。

在分析这样的（苏联）政党思维的实践层面上的细节之前，对这个思维的某些方面，我希望提请注意。

首先，这个思维并不代表俄国人民的自然思维。总的来讲，俄国人民大致上对外部世界是友善的，乐意了解外部世界，渴望以他们认为所具备的优势去衡量外部世界；最重要的是，他们也期盼着和平生活，希望能享受劳动的果实。政党路线只是体现了那些由政府宣传机器向大众不遗余力、坚持不懈灌输所展现的信条，而大众“在心底深处”常常对那些信条存在着惊人的抗拒情绪。但是，这样的政党路线对那些权利机器的主宰者们——包括政党、秘密警察和政府——的思维和行为，却具有约束力，而我们所不得不要应付的也就是这样一部分人。

其次，必须提请注意的是，上述政党路线所依据的前提条件，大多并非真实。过去的经验表明，资本主义和社会主义国家之间的和平共处和互惠互利是完全可能的。发达国家内部的冲突，已不再源于资本者对生产资料的占取，而只是反映了发达的都市化和工业化之间的矛盾；俄国迄今仍未经历工业化和都市化发展所产生的矛盾，原因并不在于其所实行的社会主义制度，而仅仅是出于它的落后。资本主义国家的内部冲突并非一定导致战争；起码并非所有的战争是由于这个原因而爆发的。在今天谈侵略苏联的可能性，特别是在消灭了德国（法西斯）和日本（军国主义）以及近期的（美苏合作）示范之后，真是无稽之谈。如果不受到坚持敌对和颠覆势力的挑衅，今天的“资本主义”世界完全能够保持自身的和平，也能够与苏联和平相处。最后，任何一个精神正常者都没有理由怀疑西方国家的温和社会主义者的诚意。例如，在斯堪的纳维亚国家，只要有机会，他们总是致力于改善劳工大众的生活条件，否认他们在这方面所取得的成功，是不公正的。

这些前提之所以是错误的，是由于每一个都基于（二）战前的经验，而且每一个前提的谬误之处都被那场战争所充分证明。事实上，英美间的分歧并非西方世界的主要分歧。除了那些轴心国，资本主义国家并没有为了解决自身的分歧而加入反对苏联的十字军远征。苏联不仅没有将一场帝国主义的战争演变成内战和革命，却为了共同的目的和承诺，不得不与资本主义国家同仇敌忾，并肩战斗。

尽管如此，所有这些毫无根据并被证明是错误的判断，在今天，仍然被大胆地提出。这意味着什么？这意味着苏联党的路线并非基于对俄罗斯外部局势的客观分析；这意味着苏联党的路线的制定与俄罗斯以外的条件无任何关联；这还意味着苏联党的路线的产生只是出于在俄罗斯战前就存在的、今天仍然存在的内部的本质上的需要。

克里姆林宫对世界事务神经质的认知的最深处是俄罗斯传统的、本能的不安全感。起初，这种不安全感，产生于一个和平地生活在广袤而无法设防的平原上的农作居民与一群凶暴的游牧民为邻的结果。最近的这场战争，由于俄罗斯人打交道的是经济发达的西方人，使得（俄罗斯人）对地区内出现较之以前更强大、更发达、组织更严密的社会产生新的恐惧。但是，这种新的不安全感与其说是在折磨着一般俄罗斯民众，毋宁说是在折磨着俄国的统治者。这是因为，俄罗斯统治者无疑感觉到，他们的统治是一个形式上相对无序的统治，其心理基础脆弱而且虚假，无法与西方国家的政治制度相提并论。因此，他们一向惧怕来自外部的渗透，惧怕与西方世界直接接触，对一旦俄罗斯人民了解了外部世界的真相或是外国人民了解了俄罗斯内部的真相所可能带来的后果担忧不已。结果，为了求得安全，他们学会的只是如何彻底地置对手于死地的方法，从没考虑与对手建立契约和妥协。

马克思主义在西欧传播了半个世纪毫无建树，但在俄罗斯却能星火燎原、一举成功，这绝非偶然。只有在这样一个从未拥有过和睦的邻邦，甚或在其内部和外部也从未产生过得以容忍的力量均衡的国土上，一个崇尚社会间的经济冲突是无法通过和平手段解决的学说的民族中，马克思主义才能得以发扬。自建立了布尔什维克政权之后，由于列宁的诠释，马克斯的教义变得更加凶狠好斗，更具排他性，成为激发不安全感的无与伦比的动力，正因为此，那些布尔什维克统治者们对不安全的感受，要比俄罗斯历史上的任何统治者都要强烈得多。也正是在这种教义所寓含的利他主义的内涵中，他们找到了本能地惧怕外部世界的正当理由，找到了除了独裁而不知如何统治的根据，找到了没有他们不敢实践的残暴的因由，也找到了他们要求别人作出牺牲的根据。正是以马克思主义的名义，他们的所作所为荡涤了哪怕只是一个细微的伦理价值。今天，他们已经离不开这样一个教义了，因为这个教义已经成为他们在道德与思辨上让别人不得不倾倒的遮羞布。没有了它，他们在历史面前，与俄罗斯一长串的为了内部的脆弱寻求外部安全，以至不断提升军事力量的凶残而骄奢的统治者们相比，充其量只能排在这些统治者的尾末。这就是为什么苏联的目标总是需要用马克思主义的衣钵严格包装的原因，也是为什么任何人不得轻视苏联（对外）事务中教义重要性的原因。这样，苏联领导人迫于历史和现状的实际需要，就提出一种教条，把外部世界描绘成为一个罪恶的、敌视的、威胁着苏联的世界，并认为这个世界内部滋生着蔓延疾病的细菌，注定要被越来越多的内部骚动所破坏，最后难逃蒸蒸日上的社会主义理论的致命一击，从而让位给一个新的、更美好的世界。这种论点为苏联扩充国家警察与军事力量提供了依据，为将俄罗斯人民与外部世界隔离提供了理由，为完全体现俄罗斯统治者本能和特性的不断扩大警察权限的压力提供了正当性。从本质上看，这只是躁动不安的俄罗斯民族主义运动的稳步前进，而在这个流延了数个世纪的运动中，进攻与防御的理念一直是不可救药地混为一谈的。但是在国际马克思主义的伪装下，对绝望的、饱受战争创伤的世界人民做出涂上蜜甜的承诺，这个运动因此比历史上任何时候都要更加危险，更加险恶。

苏维埃政党的教义喧嚷，就大多数提出的人而言，并不能认作一定是虚狂的，或是伪诈的。这些人大多对外部世界不甚了解，思想上过于依赖，以至不会对自我催眠术质疑，也不会对他们乐于而且容易相信的东西轻易提出疑问。最后，我们仍然面对一个尚未解开的谜：在这个国家到底有谁——如果确有此人的话——能够获得对外部世界准确而不偏见的信息。由于这个政府在充满了东方式的秘密和阴谋氛围中运作，歪曲和毒化信息来源和内容的可能无时不在。俄罗斯人对客观事实的不信任——实际上他们根本不承认客观事实的存在——使得他们坚信所有表述的事实都不过是为了某种险恶目的所服务的工具。人们由足够理由怀疑，现今的政府本身就是一个大阴谋中的一部分。作为众多人中的一员，我就怀疑斯大林本人能否得到客观地反映外部世界的信息。这里可以充分衡量俄罗斯人如何实施微妙的诡计，在这点上，俄国人过去擅长的尔虞我诈、勾心斗角的伎俩，大有施展的余地。外国政府无法将他们对俄关系的立场和理由在俄国决策者面前清晰地表述——实际上往往只是受到那些看上去彬彬有礼但身份模糊、鲜为人知的所谓顾问们的接待，对这些人，既不能轻易约见，也无法产生影响。在我看来，和是最令人焦虑的莫斯科外交特征。西方政治家要想有所建树，就必须了解这里所面对困难的实质之所在。

Part 2: Background of Outlook

Before examining ramifications of this party line in practice there are certain aspects of it to which I wish to draw attention.

First, it does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. Latter are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor. Party line only represents thesis which official propaganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power--party, secret police and Government--and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.

Second, please note that premises on which this party line is based are for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness. Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion "capitalist" world of today is quite capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity of moderate socialist leaders in Western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success of their efforts to improve conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they have been given chance to show what they could do.

Falseness of those premises, every one of which predates recent war, was amply demonstrated by that conflict itself Anglo-American differences did not turn out to be major differences of Western World. Capitalist countries, other than those of Axis, showed no disposition to solve their differences by joining in crusade against USSR. Instead of imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found itself obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an avowed community of aim.

Nevertheless, all these theses, however baseless and disproven, are being boldly put forward again today. What does this indicate? It indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of situation beyond Russia's borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist today.

At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes most always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven [by?] necessities of their own past and present position to put forward which [apparent omission] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final Coup de grace by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.

It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of all those who put it forward. Many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question [apparent omission] self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this Government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth--indeed, their disbelief in its existence--leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world. Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely before Russian policy makers--extent to which they are delivered up in their relations with Russia to good graces of obscure and unknown advisors whom they never see and cannot influence--this to my mind is most disquieting feature of diplomacy in Moscow, and one which Western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here.

第三部分 苏联（战后战略）思维在政府政策层面的反映。

至此，我们已经了解了苏联计划的内涵与来龙去脉。那么，在政策的实施层面，我们又会面对什么？

正如国务院询问电报所隐含的，苏联的（对外）政策是在两个平台上操作的：一、政府平台，体现了那些以苏联政府名义采取的动作；二、隐秘平台，表现为那些由某些机构采取的但苏联政府偶然是由其指示的行动。

这两个平台所展现的政策，均旨在服务于（本文）第一部分所表述的“一”和“四”基本政策目标。通过其他平台所采取的行动会有很大差异，但在目的、时机和效果方面是相互呼应的。

至于政府平台的政策，我们应该注意以下几方面：

一、所有旨在增强和提升苏联政权权威和信誉的国内政策，包括：强化军事工业化进程；最大限度地发展武装力量；为了向外国人宣传所做出的大规模展示；那些为了掩盖弱点、迷惑对手的对内长期秘密行动。

二、在时机成熟和成功有望的时候，所有为了扩展苏联力量的试图。目前，这样的试图主要集中于被认为具有现时战略需要的几个相邻地区，如伊朗北部、土耳其，也有可能包括波恩赫尔姆。然而，一旦隐秘的苏联政治影响在新的地区取得成功，其他地区也会被受到考虑。以此类推，一个“友善的”波斯政府会被要求为苏联在波斯湾开放一个港口。假若西班牙共产党取得政权，苏联有可能立即启动对在直布罗陀海峡建立基地的诉求。当然，诸如此类的动作，只有在非政府的（平台）准备完成后才会以政府的名义来推行。

三、只要看到有扩张苏联实力或限制和减弱其他国家实力的机会，俄罗斯人是会以政府的名义参与国际组织。对于联合国，莫斯科从不认为该组织是为了建立一个基于相互利益和共同目标的永久稳定的国际社会的机制，而只是看作是一个为了私利能够利用的场合。只要这个判断和诉求不变，苏联将留在联合国内。但是，一旦认为该组织只是令他们难堪、限制了其势力扩张，一旦发现通过其他途径能够实现自己的扩张目标时，苏联会毫不犹豫地抛弃联合国。此举的隐含意义是：他们坚信自己已经强大到这样的程度，以至不惜通过撤出联合国而与其他国家决裂，将对其目标和安全有威胁的联合国变成一个无效机构，并用一个符合他们利益的国际武器取代之。因此，苏联对联合国的态度在很大程度上取决于这样几个因素：其他国家对该组织的忠诚度，以及这些国家为了通过联合国推动和平和实现代表我们思考方式的具有希望的国际生活观所做出的努力，所表现的决心和所展示的团结。请允许我重申：莫斯科对联合国的理想并无任何抽象意义的首肯，它对该组织的态度主要源于实际的和策略上的考虑。

四、对殖民地和落后的、依赖他人的地区和人民，苏联的政策，即便是通过政府平台实施的，都将是为了削弱西方发达国家（在这些地区）的实力、影响甚至与这些地区的接触的实现，因为，从理论上看，一旦这样的政策实施成功，那么这些地区将会出现权力真空，有利于苏联支持的共产主义势力的渗透。在我看来，苏联施压要求参与（联合国）托管的安排，表现的是企望在这些地区处于能够弱化西方影响的地位的要求，并非为了构建一个能够发挥苏联影响力的渠道。尽管也期望建立这样的渠道，但苏联倾向于依赖其他的渠道，而不是通过政府的托管安排。据此，我们可以预见，苏联将会要求参与所有涉及托管和类似的机制，并通过所获取的地位削弱西方对这些地区和人民的影响力。

五、俄罗斯人将会竭尽全力地与所有可能倾向于反对西方权力大国的国家发展正式关系，加强苏联的影响。这种政策倾向将会广泛涉及诸如德国、阿根廷、中东和其他国家。

六、在国际经济领域，苏联的政策将集中于对苏联和苏联控制的相邻国家作为一个整体的绝对主宰地位的诉求。但是，这将是个潜在的政策，就其公开表述的路线来看，具体的政策尚不明晰。自战争结束后，苏联政府对涉及对外贸易的议题表现出奇怪的缄默。假若有可能争取到大批量的长期的信用贷款，我相信苏联政府会如30年代那样对建立一个国际经济交流的必要性表示口头上的赞同。否则，我认为，苏联的对外贸易有可能仅限于苏联自己的安全区内，包括在德国的占领区，官方对国家间发展经济合作的基本原则会采取漠视的态度。

七、关于文化交流，苏联对加深国际民族间文化了解的必要性也一样会表示口头上的赞同，即便是这样的表态，一旦在实践中被认为有损苏联民族的安全，便会被取消。苏联涉及这方面的政策表现仍将限于那些毫无生气的交流方式，包括牢牢控制下的官方访问和活动，铺天盖地的伏特加酒，以及冗长而缺乏人任何长久意义的讲话。

八、在此之外，苏联与各个外国政府的官方关系将按所谓“正确”路线的实行之，即：将无例外地强调苏联的威望和代表性，同时也强调利益——而非良好的风度——的任何一个细微之处。

Part 3: Projection of Soviet Outlook in Practical Policy on Official Level

We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation?

Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query under reference, is conducted on two planes: (1) official plane represented by actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (2) subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit responsibility.

Policy promulgated on both planes will be calculated to serve basic policies (a) to (d) outlined in part 1. Actions taken on different planes will differ considerably, but will dovetail into each other in purpose, timing and effect.

On official plane we must look for following:

(a) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark.

(b) Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a "friendly Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under Communist control, question of Soviet base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial preparation is complete.

(c) Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve this purpose, Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to conclusion that it is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for power expansion and if they see better prospects for pursuit of these aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon UNO. This would imply, however, that they felt themselves strong enough to split unity of other nations by their withdrawal to render UNO ineffective as a threat to their aims or security, replace it with an international weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude toward UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on degree of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which those nations defend in UNO the peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that organization represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.

(d) Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations, on theory that in so far as this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will favor Communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure for participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my opinion, a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of Western influence at such points rather than to provide major channel for exerting of Soviet power. Latter motive is not lacking, but for this Soviets prefer to rely on other channels than official trusteeship arrangements. Thus we may expect to find Soviets asking for admission everywhere to trusteeship or similar arrangements and using levers thus acquired to weaken Western influence among such peoples.

(e) Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense Strong possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power. This applies to such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries, etc.

(f) In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large scale long term credits should be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip service, as it did in 1930's to desirability of building up international economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviet's own security sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations.

(g) With respect to cultural collaboration, lip service will likewise be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contacts between peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could weaken security position of Soviet peoples. Actual manifestations of Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid channels of closely shepherded official visits and functions, with superabundance of vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.

(h) Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take what might be called "correct" course with individual foreign governments, with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol as distinct from good manners.

第四部分 以下部分可以被认为是我们对苏联为了其基本政策目标在非官方或是隐秘的（如那些苏联政府否认参与）的平台上将会实行的方式和方法的预测。

在这个平台上实施（苏联）政策推介的机构如下：

一、其他国家共产党内部最为核心的部分。尽管此类人具有与他们的真实身份无关联的公共面貌，但他们实际上联系紧密，形成了一个世界共产主义的地下活动中心，恰如一个隐秘的“共产国际”，受到莫斯科的严密控制和指导。这个内部核心的成员，尽管他们所隶属的是个合法的政党，但他们的活动是通过地下管道进行的，记住此点，十分重要。

二、共产党的一般成员。请注意此类人与上述人员是有区别的，而这个区别近来越来越大了。过去，外国共产党的活动多为公开和秘密、合法和阴谋的混合，这个现象是十分令人费解的——或者对莫斯科而言起码是不方便的，现在，几乎所有的秘密活动均仅限于党内的核心部分，并有效地转入地下，今天的一般党员已经不被信任，甚至对运动的真实情况都不甚了解，只是作为各自国家内部政治运动的真诚参与者而被推出，对该党与外国政府的隐秘的关系一无所知。只有在那些共产党仍具有人数上优势的国家，这些党员分子才会经常参加活动，并以集体的形式出现。作为一条规则，他们只是被用来对那些不太会被怀疑是苏联政府的工具的组织，根据具体需要和可能，进行渗透发挥影响，甚至予以控制，以便达到通过某些组织的活动——而非以一个独立的政治实体采取直接行动——的目的。

三、各国都有大量属于国家级协会和团体的此类组织，完全可能通过上述渗透的方式受到影响和控制。这些组织一般包括：工团，青年联合会，妇女协会，民族团体，宗教组织，社会机构，文化社团，自由主义的刊物，出版社，等等。

四、国际组织同样存在着（共产党）通过对不同的国家社会部分施加影响而遭受渗透的可能。最有可能发挥这种影响的有工会、青年联合会和妇女联合会。对此特别需要提出的，而且几乎具有致命的重要性的，是国际工人运动。对这个运动，莫斯科看到了能够让媳妇政府在国际事务中无法集中注意力的可能，也看到了建立国际性的“压力”组织以逼迫某些国家的政府采取有利于苏联的行动或停止不利于苏联的政策的可能。

五、俄罗斯东正教教会和它遍布海外的分会，以及通过这些教堂与一般的东正教教堂的联系。

六、泛斯拉夫运动以及其他源于苏联境内少数民族——如阿塞拜疆、亚美尼亚、土库曼人等——的运动。

七、那些愿意或多或少为苏联的政策目的效劳的外国政府于执政集团，诸如目前的保加利亚、南斯拉夫政府、北波斯政权、中国共产党集团等。这些政府和势力，不仅其宣传机器被苏联所利用，而且在具体政策上页会相当大程度地服务于苏联。

可以预料的是，由这些势力组成的这样一个广泛、庞大的机器将会受到（莫斯科的）利用，尽管利用的程度会因人而异、因势而异，但在方式上会出现如下几种：

一、打击主要西方国家的政治与战略潜力。在这些国家内，将会出现旨在打击人民自信心、破坏国防建设、激化社会与工业动乱以及挑起任何形式的分裂的活动。所有心怀不满和受到不公正待遇者，无论是经济的还是民族的，都将被挑唆通过以消灭社会中敌对势力为目的的暴力方式去寻求正义和解决问题，而非通过调解和妥协的方式。于是，穷人将会与富人形成对立，黑种人将会与白种人形成对立，年轻人将会与年长者形成对立，新来者将会与久居者形成对立，不一而足。

二、特别地通过非政府平台挑起暴力，以削弱西方大国在殖民地、落后地区或依赖他人的民族地区的实力和影响。为此，西方殖民统治的所有错误和不当将会受到毫无保留地揭露和利用。西方大国内部的自由主义势力将会动员起来反对殖民主义政策。附庸国人民对宗主国的不满也将会受到挑唆。尽管这些著名的和附庸国家的人民会被鼓励争取实现脱离西方大国统治的独立，实际上，由苏联控制的傀儡政治势力会在积极准备，一旦独立实现，他们即会上台控制政权。

三、任何一个有可能阻碍苏联的政策目的推行的外国政府将会受到下台和解散的压力。这种压力可能在三种情况下出现：政府公开直接反对苏联的对外政策目标（如土耳其、伊朗）；政府关闭国境线以阻止共产党的渗透（如瑞士、葡萄牙）；政府在那些对共产党控制十分重要的人群中争取到的认同的力度很大，如英国的工党政府。（有时，上述两种情况在同一国家出现。一旦如此，共产党的反击将会尤其激烈和残酷。）

四、作为一条法则，共产党分子在国外的活动，是为了消灭个人任何形式的独立，无论是经济上的，政治上的，还是道德方面的。他们的制度只能对付那些已经被迫完全依附于更高的权威的人。据此，所有经济上独立者——诸如企业经营者、不动产拥有者、成功的农民和艺术家，以及所有在当地社区具有信誉和起领袖作用的人，例如受人爱戴的牧师或地方政治人物，都是需要被诅咒、被打击的人。即便是在苏联内部，地方官员也会不间断地异地任职，以防他们在一地扎根太深。苏联这样的做法实在不只是一个巧合。

五、（莫斯科）将会竭尽其能，使得西方主要大国出现相互敌对。在美国人民中，将会造出反英的舆论，在英国人中，将会煽动反美的情绪。包括德国等欧洲大陆国家，将会出现反对盎格鲁-撒克逊权利的言论。所有存在这些情绪的国家，将会受到进一步煽动，那些不存在这些情绪的国家，将会受到挑唆。所有能够诋毁和破坏任何形式的、将俄罗斯排斥在外的团结和一致的可能都会受到利用。因此，任何形式的国际组织，只要有碍共产主义分子的渗透和控制，武力是天主教会，国际经济合作组织，或是贵族和皇室的国际同盟，必将处于来自它们的议论炮火攻击之中。

六、总而言之，苏联通过非官方平台的所作所为，从性质上看，是消极的，具有破坏性的，是为了摧毁苏联控制以外的所有力量的根源而设计的。这与苏联与对手不能妥协、建设只有在共产主义势力取得控制后才能开始的本能认知是完全相符合的。然而在此背后，所实施的是对外国政府不懈的、坚韧不拔的渗透压力，直至取得对政府内主要机构——特别是警察系统——的控制。苏联的政权是一个无与伦比的警察政权，由于沙皇时代的半明半暗的专制阴谋传统，他们已经习惯了将使用警察力量放在首要考虑的位置。任何人在探测苏联人动机时都不得忽视这一点。

Part 4: Following May Be Said as to What We May Expect by Way of Implementation of Basic Soviet Policies on Unofficial, or Subterranean Plane, i.e. on Plane for Which Soviet Government Accepts no Responsibility

Agencies utilized for promulgation of policies on this plane are following:

1. Inner central core of Communist Parties in other countries. While many of persons who compose this category may also appear and act in unrelated public capacities, they are in reality working closely together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a concealed Comintern tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow. It is important to remember that this inner core is actually working on underground lines, despite legality of parties with which it is associated.

2. Rank and file of Communist Parties. Note distinction is drawn between those and persons defined in paragraph 1. This distinction has become much sharper in recent years. Whereas formerly foreign Communist Parties represented a curious (and from Moscow's standpoint often inconvenient) mixture of conspiracy and legitimate activity, now the conspiratorial element has been neatly concentrated in inner circle and ordered underground, while rank and file--no longer even taken into confidence about realities of movement--are thrust forward as bona fide internal partisans of certain political tendencies within their respective countries, genuinely innocent of conspiratorial connection with foreign states. Only in certain countries where communists are numerically strong do they now regularly appear and act as a body. As a rule they are used to penetrate, and to influence or dominate, as case may be, other organizations less likely to be suspected of being tools of Soviet Government, with a view to accomplishing their purposes through [apparent omission] organizations, rather than by direct action as a separate political party.

3. A wide variety of national associations or bodies which can be dominated or influenced by such penetration. These include: labor unions, youth leagues, women's organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses, etc.

4. International organizations which can be similarly penetrated through influence over various national components. Labor, youth and women's organizations are prominent among them. Particular, almost vital importance is attached in this connection to international labor movement. In this, Moscow sees possibility of sidetracking western governments in world affairs and building up international lobby capable of compelling governments to take actions favorable to Soviet interests in various countries and of paralyzing actions disagreeable to USSR

5. Russian Orthodox Church, with its foreign branches, and through it the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.

6. Pan-Slav movement and other movements (Azerbaijan, Armenian, Turcoman, etc.) based on racial groups within Soviet Union.

7. Governments or governing groups willing to lend themselves to Soviet purposes in one degree or another, such as present Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments, North Persian regime, Chinese Communists, etc. Not only propaganda machines but actual policies of these regimes can be placed extensively at disposal of USSR

It may be expected that component parts of this far-flung apparatus will be utilized in accordance with their individual suitability, as follows:

(a) To undermine general political and strategic potential of major western powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to spelt redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc.

(b) On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken power and influence of Western Powers of [on] colonial backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred. Mistakes and weaknesses of western colonial administration will be mercilessly exposed and exploited. Liberal opinion in Western countries will be mobilized to weaken colonial policies. Resentment among dependent peoples will be stimulated. And while latter are being encouraged to seek independence of Western Powers, Soviet dominated puppet political machines will be undergoing preparation to take over domestic power in respective colonial areas when independence is achieved.

(c) Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran), where they seal their territories off against Communist penetration (Switzerland, Portugal), or where they compete too strongly, like Labor Government in England, for moral domination among elements which it is important for Communists to dominate. (Sometimes, two of these elements are present in a single case. Then Communist opposition becomes particularly shrill and savage. [)]

(d) In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic, political or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been brought into complete dependence on higher power. Thus, persons who are financially independent--such as individual businessmen, estate owners, successful farmers, artisans and all those who exercise local leadership or have local prestige, such as popular local clergymen or political figures, are anathema. It is not by chance that even in USSR local officials are kept constantly on move from one job to another, to prevent their taking root.

(e) Everything possible will be done to set major Western Powers against each other. Anti-British talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk among British. Continentals, including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to discredit and combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort of unity or cohesion among other [apparent omission] from which Russia might be excluded. Thus, all forms of international organization not amenable to Communist penetration and control, whether it be the Catholic [apparent omission] international economic concerns, or the international fraternity of royalty and aristocracy, must expect to find themselves under fire from many, and often [apparent omission].

(f) In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is doming But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure for penetration and command of key positions in administration and especially in police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime is a police regime par excellence, reared in the dim half world of Tsarist police intrigue, accustomed to think primarily in terms of police power. This should never be lost sight of in ganging Soviet motives.

第五部分 从美国政策角度的可行性推断。

概括起来，我们所面对的是这样一个政治力量，它坚信与美国的妥协根本不可能，坚信为了苏联权利的安全必须破坏我们的社会的内部和谐，必须消灭我们赖以生存的传统生活方式，必须摧毁我们国家在国际上的权威。这个政治力量孕育并成长于极其深厚、极其强烈的俄罗斯民族主义的思潮之中，完全控制了世界上最伟大之一的民族和人民的能量和世界上资源最为富饶的国土。此外，这个政治对手还拥有一架能够在其他国家发挥影响力的经过精心制作的庞大的组织机器，这部机器具有惊人的灵活性和持久性，操纵这部机器的人，他们采用地下方式的技巧和经验是史无前例的。最后，从其基本反应上看，这个政治对手对现实似乎视而不见，充耳不闻。对其而言，人类社会浩瀚的客观事实，不是作为不断衡量和改进思维的参照系，而是作为一个用来人为地、随意地选个别现象去支撑其早已形成的思维的百宝囊。这种对待客观事实的态度与我们恰恰相反。显然，这里所描绘的并非一幅让人赏心悦目的前景。然而，如何面对这样一个对手和力量，无疑已成为我们外交上从未经历的最大挑战，恐怕也将是我们未来所面临的最大挑战。如何应对这样的挑战，应该是我们目前的政治和政策设计者制定（对外政策）的出发点。对于这样的挑战，必须以战争期间解决重大战略问题时的全面、慎重和小心对待它，而且如果必要，还要在计划方面做出同样大的努力，来处理这个问题。至于答案是什么，在这里我是无法提出的。但是，我希望能借此明确地表述我的观点：我们完全具有解决这个难题的力量，而且完全可以避免采用一场大的战争的形式。为了支持我的这一观点，请允许我提出如下一些令人振奋的观察：

一、苏联的实力，与希特勒的德国不一样，既不是基于长期阴谋策划，也不具备冒险性。它如何按计划行事是不会得逞的，它也冒不必要的风险。因为它对理性分析无动于衷，对逻辑的力量又是高度敏感。基于这个理由，当任何时候出现抵抗时，它是可能——常常也这样——退却的。所以，假若它的对手拥有足够的力量并明确地展示使用这个力量的决心，那么，（它的对手）实际上使用这个力量的可能几乎不存在。（我们）只要将类似的局势妥善地处理好，那么，出现拿声望做赌注而介入军事冲突的必要性也是很小的。

二、面对作为一个整体的西方世界，苏联人仍然是处于弱势的一方。因此，苏联人能否扭转劣势，取决于西方世界所展示的团结、坚定和魄力的程度。而我们具备影响这个因素的实力。

三、作为一种内部政权的形式，苏维埃政权的优越之处迄今尚未得到证明。它仍然不得不证明，这个政权是能够经受得住权利从一个人或一个团体向另一个人或团体交接这样一个根本的考验。列宁的逝世，是这个权利的首次交接，它所产生的影响让苏联国家15年间不得安生。斯大林的去世或退休，就是这个权力交接的第二次考验，而即便这次也不会是最后一次这样的考验。由于它近期的领土扩张，苏联统治制度将会碰到一连串更多的麻烦，而这些麻烦曾令过去的沙皇们头痛不已。在这里的我们完全有利于相信，自从内战结束之后，俄罗斯广大民众对共产主义教条的心理反感，从未像今天这样强烈。在俄罗斯，政党已经从未一个庞大而有效——起码在目前——的独裁统治机器，但是，这个政党已经不再是鼓舞人们情感的源泉。据此，（苏维埃）运动的内部健康和长久并不可以看作是一个确定的事实。

四、所有苏联安全区域以外的苏维埃式的宣传，本质上是消极而具有破坏性的。因此，通过充满智慧和具有建设性意义的宣传将其打败，相对是容易的。

基于上述理由，我认为，我们应该冷静、理智地处理俄罗斯问题。至于具体如何实施，我谨希望以本文的结束语的方式提出以下建议：

一、我们的第一步必须是对我们所面对的（共产主义）运动的实质予以了解，并认识其客观存在。我们必须像医生诊断一个难以控制的不可理喻的病人那样，用同样的勇气，同样客观态度，同样的中立立场和同样的决心去研究这个问题，避免受其感情上困惑或干扰。

二、我们必须教育我们的公众，了解俄罗斯问题的真相。对这一点的重要性，我无论如何强调都是不过分的。为此，单靠新闻界已无法做到，政府必须担负起主要责任，因为政府对所面对的实际问题的认识更为清晰，处理问题的经验更为充分。我们没有必要在问题的黑暗面前怯而止步。我坚信，一旦我们的民众了解到这个情势的真相，那种歇斯底里地反苏情绪会得到大大缓解，因为没有什么再比不知情要更为危险，更为可怕。当然，认为更多地暴露我们针对苏联的困难以至不利于美苏关系的观点也成立。我认为，假如真的存在着危机，那么，我们就必须有勇气去面对它，而且越早越有利。但是，我实在看不出我们会触发怎样的危机。即使我们追求的是与俄罗斯人民的伟大友谊，我们在国内的（政治）赌注也是很小的。实际上（在俄罗斯），我们没有什么投资需要保护，不会失去任何具有实质意义的贸易，不需要保护多少本国公民，也没有太多的文化交流需要保留。我们唯一的赌注，是我们希望得到的，而非我们实际上已经拥有的。我坚信，只要我们的公众受到教育，只要我们与苏联的交往完全置于现实的客观的基础之上，我们实现期望的可能性将会大得多。

三、（我们应对苏联问题的挑战）相当程度上必须依赖于我们社会的健康和活力。世界共产主义就像是一种恶性的寄生虫，只会发生在生了病的肌肤组织上生存。在这一点上，国内和对外政策便交织在一起。每一个能够解决我们自身社会问题（的政策），每一个可以提升我们自己人民的自信心、纪律性、士气和集体精神的勇敢而坚定的举动，都是针对苏联的一个外交胜利，这要比集体精神的勇敢而坚定的举动，都是针对苏联的一个外交胜利，这要比数千个（与莫斯科之间产生的）外交文件和共同声明要更有价值得多。假若我们无法消除宿命论的影响，无法改变我们的社会面对（外部）挑战的漠然，莫斯科将得分，因为莫斯科无法不利用（我们的）这些（弱点）在外交政策上获利。

四、我们必须对其他国家展现和描绘出一个我们所希望看到的，但要比以前更加积极、更加富有建设性的世界的前景。只是希望别人按我们的政治模式发展是远远不够的。不少的国家与人民，起码在欧洲，由于过去的经历已经疲惫不堪，而且（对历史的重演）惧怕万分，因此，他们对自身的安全的兴趣远比对抽象的自由要大得多。他们需要的是领导，并非只是责任。我们必须比苏联提供更多他们所需求的领导。如果我们不这样去做的话，俄罗斯人是一定会责无旁贷的。

五、最后，我们必须对坚守我们的人类社会的信念和方式充满自信和勇气。毕竟，在应对苏联共产主义挑战中最大的危险，是我们让自己变成了我们所需要应对者那样。

Part 5: [Practical Deductions From Standpoint of US Policy]

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict.. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:

(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventunstic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.

(2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.

(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for the moment--highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.

(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.

For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:

(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.

(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.

(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit--Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.

(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.

(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.

乔治凯南

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KENNAN

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