Leviathan - 06
===CHAPTER XIX :OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF COMMONWEALTH BY
INSTITUTION, AND OF SUCCESSION继承 TO THE SOVEREIGN POWER
In monarchy there is this inconvenience麻烦/不便; that any
subject被统治者, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a
favourite or flatterer谄媚者, may be deprived of all he possesseth; which
I confess is a great and inevitable inconvenience.
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But the same may as well happen, where the sovereign power is in
an assembly:for their power is the same; and they are as subject
to evil counsel, and to be seduced引诱 by orators演说家, as a monarch
by flatterers; and becoming one another's flatterers, serve
one another's covetousness贪婪 and ambition by turns轮流地.
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And whereas the favourites of monarchs, are few, and they have
none else to advance提拔 but their own kindred亲族; the favourites of an
assembly, are many;and the kindred much more numerous, than of any monarch.
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Besides, there is no favourite of a monarch, which cannot as well
succour救助 his friends, as hurt his enemies: but orators演说家,
that is to say, favourites of sovereign assemblies, though they have
great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires
less eloquence口才 (such is man's nature) than to excuse; and
condemnation谴责, than absolution more resembles像/类似于 justice.
There is no perfect form of government, where the disposing安排
of the succession is not in the present sovereign.
In a democracy, the whole assembly cannot fail, unless the multitude
that are to be governed fail. And therefore questions of the right
of succession继承, have in that form of government no place at all.
The greatest difficulty about the right of succession, is in
monarchy君主制: and the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first
sight, it is not manifest who is to appoint the successor继任者;
nor many times, who it is whom he hath appointed.
Without any representative in whom
they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all:
and therefore they are incapable of election of any new monarch;
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every man having equal right to submit himself to such as he
thinks best able to protect him; or if he can, protect himself by
his own sword;
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which is a return to confusion, and to the condition
of a war of every man against every man, contrary to the end
for which monarchy had its first institution.
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Therefore it is manifest, that by the institution of monarchy,
the disposing安排 of the successor, is always left to the judgment
and will of the present possessor.