我爱我家：本地CEO与管理者短视行为（TAR2020）
题目：East, West, Home’s Best: Do Local CEOs Behave Less Myopically？
摘要：We test whether CEOs working near their childhood homes are less likely than nonlocal CEOs to make myopic decisions. Place attachment theories suggest that people develop mutual caretaking relationships with their birthplaces. Also, executive labor markets face less information asymmetry about local CEOs, resulting in lower pressure on local CEOs for quick profits. Consistent with the prediction, we find that local CEOs are less likely to cut R&D expenditures for beating analyst forecasts or avoiding earnings decreases. In their last year of office, local CEOs are significantly less likely to cut R&D than nonlocal CEOs. The CEO locality effect is stronger when more local business interests are embedded in the firm and when the residents of the CEO’s birth state have stronger local social bonds. Local CEOs’ longer horizons are consistently manifested in their other decisions, such as paying more state tax and being more socially responsible in business operation.
研究问题：本地CEO是否更少短视（We test whether CEOs working near their childhood homes are less likely than nonlocal CEOs to make myopic decisions.）
研究动机：已有研究聚焦于合约式解决方案（正式制度），本研究探究非合约式因素（社会文化类）对管理者短视行为的影响。（Prior research focuses on examining contractual solutions to containing managerial myopia. In this study, we examine whether a noncontractual factor, i.e., CEO locality, reduces CEOs’ myopia tendencies.）
研究发现：本地CEO更不可能削减研发投入以实现业绩达标；本地CEO对于短视治理效应在本地居民具有更强的本地投资偏好以及公司本地业务更为集中时较为凸显；也在本地居民流动性较小和社会资本相对更高的地区中更加显著；最后还发现拥有本地CEO的企业具有更好的财务绩效和更高的公司价值。（We find that firms with local CEOs are significantly less likely to cut R&D for beating performance benchmarks. We perform two lines of cross-sectional tests to corroborate our main results. First,we find that the CEO locality effect on myopia is greater when the state’s residents have a stronger preference for investing in local stocks and when the firm’s business is more concentrated within the state.Second,our tests show that the CEO locality effect on myopia is greater when the state has relatively lower population mobility and when it boasts relatively more social capital. Finally, we find that local CEOs’ firms have better financial performance and higher valuation than those with nonlocal CEOs.）
研究贡献：本文从非合约视角拓展了管理者短视行为的研究，也丰富了管理层风格与企业经营管理的相关文献（Our paper contributes to the lite****** by identifying a noncontractual factor—CEOs’ locality—that affects managerial myopia.Our paper adds to the burgeoning lite****** on whether managers imprint their idiosyncratic styles on their firms’ operation）
