经济学权威期刊The Journal of Industrial Economics 2022年第12期

The Journal of Industrial Economics 2022年第12期

Volume70, Issue4

December 2022

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1.Input Price Discrimination, Demand Forms, And Welfare

投入价格歧视、需求形式与福利

Germain Gaudin, Romain Lestage

We analyse the effects of input price discrimination in the canonical model where an upstream monopolist sells to downstream firms with various degrees of efficiency. We first recast a series of existing results within our setting, extending previous findings related to discrimination in final-goods markets to the case of discrimination in input markets. Then, we examine the impact of input price discrimination on welfare. A key determinant of the effects of input price discrimination corresponds to the sum of demand curvature and pass-through elasticity. We provide examples relying on derived demands with constant curvature, including demands with constant pass-through rates.

在上游垄断者以不同程度的效率向下游企业销售产品的典型模型中，我们分析了投入价格歧视的影响。我们首先在我们的背景下改写了一系列现有的结果，将先前有关最终产品市场歧视的发现扩展到投入市场歧视的情况。然后，我们考察了投入价格歧视对福利的影响。投入价格歧视效应的一个关键决定因素是需求曲率和传递弹性之和。我们提供的例子依赖于具有恒定曲率的导出需求，包括具有恒定通过率的需求。

2.Fostering the Diffusion of General Purpose Technologies: Evidence from the Licensing of the Transistor Patents

促进通用技术的扩散:来自晶体管专利许可的证据

Markus Nagler, Monika Schnitzer, Martin Watzinger

How do licensing and technology transfer influence the spread of General Purpose Technologies? To answer this question, we analyze the diffusion of the transistor, one of the most important technologies of our time. We show that the transistor diffusion and cross-technology spillovers increased dramatically after AT&T began licensing its transistor patents along with symposia to educate follow-on inventors in 1952. Both these symposia and the licensing of the patents itself played important roles in the diffusion. A subsequent reduction in royalties did not lead to further increases, suggesting that licensing and technology transfer were more important than specific royalty rates.

许可和技术转让如何影响通用技术的推广?为了回答这个问题，我们分析了晶体管的扩散，这是我们这个时代最重要的技术之一。我们发现，在AT&T于1952年开始授权其晶体管专利并举办研讨会以教育后续发明家之后，晶体管扩散和跨技术溢出显著增加。这些研讨会和专利许可本身都在传播中发挥了重要作用。后来特许权使用费的减少并没有导致进一步的增加，这表明许可和技术转让比具体的特许权使用费更重要。

3.Bundling with Resale

捆绑转售

Drew Vollmer

How does resale affect multiproduct bundling? I investigate using a model of monopoly bundling with costly resale. Consumers purchase in the primary market while anticipating resale, then participate in a resale market with market-clearing prices. Resale forces the monopolist to balance the additional profit from a discounted bundle against the opportunity for consumer arbitrage. In equilibrium, the monopolist may still offer a discounted bundle, but resale reduces the returns to bundling and has an ambiguous effect on consumer and total welfare. When consumers have heterogeneous costs of resale, it is possible for consumers to resell in equilibrium.

转售如何影响多产品捆绑?我使用垄断捆绑与昂贵的转售模型进行研究。消费者在一级市场购买，同时期待转售，然后以市场出清价格参与转售市场。转售迫使垄断者在折扣套餐带来的额外利润与消费者套利机会之间做出平衡。在均衡状态下，垄断者仍可能提供打折的捆绑销售，但转售降低了捆绑销售的回报，并对消费者和总福利产生模糊的影响。当消费者有异质转售成本时，消费者有可能进行均衡转售。

4.Incentivized Mergers and Cost Efficiency: Evidence from the Electricity Distribution Industry

激励性并购与成本效率:来自配电行业的证据

Robert Clark, Mario Samano

We propose an endogenous merger algorithm to evaluate the impact of government-provided incentives on consolidation patterns for services such as electricity distributors, school boards, hospitals and municipalities. The algorithm replicates the observed industry reconfiguration, with calibrated parameters used to simulate consolidation patterns that would have resulted from policy incentives. We apply the method to the case of Ontario, where transfer tax reductions have been proposed to incentivize consolidation of electricity distributors. We find that the proposed incentive would have no impact on efficiency and consolidation, and even subsidies would still leave many more electricity distributors than desired by policy makers.

我们提出了一种内生合并算法，以评估政府提供的激励措施对电力分销商、学校董事会、医院和市政当局等服务的合并模式的影响。该算法复制了观察到的行业重新配置，并使用经过校准的参数来模拟政策激励可能导致的整合模式。我们将该方法应用于安大略的案例，在安大略，已提出减少转让税以激励电力分销商的整合。我们发现，拟议中的激励措施对效率和整合没有任何影响，即使是补贴也会留下比决策者期望的更多的电力分销商。

5.Learning by Selling, Knowledge Spillovers, and Patents

通过销售学习，知识溢出和专利

Yves Guéron, Jihong Le

We examine the incentives for experimentation in the context of innovation and market competition. A monopolist chooses whether to sell early-stage product or perform costly scale-up R&D. Early market participation facilitates learning about demand but invites knowledge spillovers and competitors, while R&D acts as a barrier to entry. The firm's optimal policy can exhibit both under- and over-experimentation vis-à-vis the socially optimal policy. Patents can control the pace of innovation and restore efficient experimentation. When the surplus from R&D is large, rewarding early-stage innovation encourages market experimentation and limits wasteful R&D investment. We offer a theory of two-tier patent policy involving ‘petty’ patents.

我们在创新和市场竞争的背景下研究实验的动机。垄断者可以选择是销售处于早期阶段的产品，还是进行成本高昂的大规模研发。早期的市场参与有助于了解需求，但会带来知识溢出和竞争对手，而研发则是进入市场的障碍。相对于社会最优政策，企业的最优政策可以表现出不足和过度实验。专利可以控制创新的步伐，并恢复有效的实验。当来自研发的盈余很大时，奖励处于早期阶段的创新可以鼓励市场试验，并限制浪费的研发投资。我们提出了涉及“小”专利的双层专利政策理论。